HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON, McHUGH AND GUMMOW JJ
Matter No S62 of 1995
3 April 1996
Harris v Commercial Minerals Limited and Ors Harris v Auqal Pty Limited and Ors Limitation of actions—Personal injury—Extension of limitation period—Latent injury—Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 60G, 60I. Limitation of actions—Personal injury—Extension of limitation period—"unaware of nature or extent of personal injury"—Subjective awareness—Reasonable foreseeability irrelevant—Time at which awareness determined—Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 60I(1). Damages—Personal injury—Deduction of future statutory benefits—Financial source—Nature of benefit—Workers' Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 1942 (NSW) ss 6, 8. Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 60G(2), 60I(1). Workers' Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 1942 (NSW) ss 6, 8.
Headnote
Hearing
CANBERRA, 17 August 1995
#DATE 3:4:1996, SYDNEY
Matter No S62 of 1995
Counsel for the Appellant D F Jackson QC with
A J Katzmann
Solicitors for the Appellant Turner Freeman
Counsel for the First Respondent B M Toomey QC with
D R Russell
Solicitors for the First Respondent A O Ellison and Co
Counsel for the Third Respondent J D Hislop QC with
G J Parker
Solicitors for the Third Respondent P V McCulloch and Buggy
Matter No S63 of 1995
Counsel for the Appellant D F Jackson QC with
A J Katzmann
Solicitors for the Appellant Turner Freeman
Counsel for the First Respondent J D Hislop QC with
G J Parker
Solicitors for the First Respondent P V McCulloch and Buggy
Counsel for the Second Respondent B M Toomey QC with
D R Russell
Solicitors for the Second Respondent A O Ellison and Co
Orders
1. Appeals allowed.
2. Set aside the orders of the New South Wales Court of Appeal.
3. In lieu of the said orders of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, order that:
(a) the appeals to that Court against the assessment of damages by the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales be allowed;
(b) otherwise, the appeals to that Court by the respondents be dismissed;
(c) the matter be remitted to the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales to assess the damages to be awarded against the second and third defendants before that Tribunal on the basis of the findings of and the evidence before Johns CCJ.
4. The respondents pay the costs of the appellant in the New South Wales Court of Appeal and in this Court.
Decision
DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON, McHUGH AND GUMMOW JJ. Pursuant to the grant of special leave, Donna Therese Harris, as administratrix ad litem ("the administratrix"), appeals against an order of the New South Wales Court of Appeal setting aside a judgment for damages and an order extending the time for commencing the action for damages. The judgment and the order extending time were made by the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales in favour of Denis Paul Hollins ("the worker") who died before the hearing of this appeal.
2. The questions in the appeal are:
(1) whether the worker was entitled under subdiv 3 of Div 3
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- Case
- [1996] HCA 49
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by the operation of s 139 of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987* (NSW) (the Act). Section 139 of the Act provides that a worker who has received or is entitled to receive weekly payments under the Act is not entitled to bring proceedings for damages against their employer for an injury sustained in the course of employment. The court was required to determine the scope and effect of this statutory bar, particularly in circumstances where the worker had not yet commenced receiving weekly payments but was entitled to do so.
The High Court held that the plain wording of s 139(1) of the Act indicated that the entitlement to receive weekly payments, rather than the actual receipt of such payments, was the trigger for the statutory bar. The majority reasoned that the purpose of the provision was to provide a statutory scheme of compensation and to prevent double recovery. Therefore, the plaintiff's entitlement to weekly payments under the Act meant that he was precluded from pursuing a common law claim for damages against his employer. The court affirmed the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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