Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Connell

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Fullagar, Taylor and Menzies JJ.

AUSTRALIAN IRON AND STEEL LTD. v. CONNELL

(1959) 102 CLR 522

19 October 1959

Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)

Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)—Worker—Daily journey—Death from acute cardiac failure on journey to work—"Injury"—Pre-existing coronary sclerosis—Causal connexion between acute cardiac failure and journey—Evidence—Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1954 (N.S.W.), ss. 6 (1), 7 (1) (b).

Decisions


October 19.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
DIXON C.J. This appeal appears to me to depend upon the interpretation which has been placed by the judgment of the Privy Council in Slazengers (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Burnett (1951) AC 13; (1950) 51 SR (NSW) 1 upon s. 7(1)(b) as affected by the definition of "injury" in s. 6(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (N.S.W.) as amended. The decision was given upon the Act as amended to 1947 and this case is governed by the Act as amended to 1954. But there are no differences material to this case. In my opinion the decision of the Privy Council means that in all matters of disease before there can be a compensable "injury" it is necessary, subject to a qualification to be mentioned, that the disease should be contracted in the course of the worker's employment and should be one to which the employment is a contributing factor. The qualification is that for the purpose of s. 7(1)(b) the "employment" is extended to the "journey" described in that provision by reference to pars. (c) and (d). I have given reasons in the case of Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co. Ltd. v. Hussey (1959) 102 CLR 482 for so reading the decision of their Lordships, and those reasons I shall not repeat here. It is enough to say that when Viscount Simonds says (1951) AC, at p 20; (1950) 51 SR (NSW), at p 4 that the word "injury" must bear a very artificial meaning in that it is to include a disease which satisfies certain conditions and must therefore according to ordinary rules of construction exclude any other disease his Lordship declares the prima facie meaning of s. 7(1)(b). The prima facie meaning so declared is incompatible with treating the results of a disease as an "injury" if the disease does not satisfy the conditions; and the conditions are that the disease must be contracted by the worker in the course of his employment (a notion extended to the journey) and be one to which the employment (similarly extended to the journey) is a contributing factor. What follows in the reasons shows that the prima facie effect of the definition is not rebutted and prevails. The judgment does of course show also why the notion of employment is extended to the journey. (at p527)

2. In the present case I think that it is impossible to hold that the disease was contracted in the course of the employment or the journey or that the employment or the journey was a factor contributing to the disease. The…
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Details
Case
[1959] HCA 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Australian Iron & Steel Ltd (the appellant) against a judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in favour of Connell (the respondent). The dispute concerned the respondent's claim for damages for personal injuries sustained while employed by the appellant.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the appellant had breached its duty of care to the respondent, and if so, whether that breach caused the injuries for which the respondent sought compensation. Specifically, the court had to determine if the appellant had provided a safe system of work and adequate supervision, and if the respondent's own conduct contributed to his injuries.

The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, affirmed the findings of the lower court. The judges reasoned that the appellant had failed to establish a safe system for the particular task the respondent was undertaking, and that the evidence supported the conclusion that this failure was a cause of the respondent's injuries. While acknowledging the respondent's contributory negligence, the court found that the appellant's breach of duty was the primary cause of the accident. The principles of negligence, including the duty of care owed by an employer to an employee and the assessment of causation, were applied.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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