Woods v T&F.S. Woods Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Woods v T&F.S. Woods Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 1108  

Appeal from: Application for Leave to Appeal: Woods v T & F.S. Woods Pty Ltd [2021] FedCFamC2G 369
File number: QUD 14 of 2022
Judgment of: THOMAS J
Date of judgment: 18 September 2023
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from decision to summarily dismiss proceeding –where the parties have previously entered into a Deed of Settlement and Release (the Deed) – proper construction of the Deed – whether current proceedings are barred by the Deed – meaning of “arising from” – whether the current proceedings are ones arising from the previous proceedings – arguable case that the Deed did not bar the proceedings – leave be granted and the appeal allowed
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)

Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW)

Cases cited:

Butler v St John of God Health Care Inc [2008] WASCA 174

CMW22 v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2023] FCA 262

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; [2014] HCA 7

Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160

Grant v John Grant & Sons Proprietary Limited (1954) 91 CLR 112

Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Rinehart (2017) 257 FCR 442; [2017] FCAFC 170

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564; [2000] FCA 1572

Khoury v Coffey Projects (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 371

Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401; [2009] FCAFC 117

Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451; [2004] HCA 35

Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808

Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1; [2003] HCA 70

Schiffer v Pattison (2005) 143 FCR 328; [2005] FCA 494

Shepherds Producers Co-operative Ltd v John Scott Lamont & Ors [2009] NSWSC 294

Shockthorap v Electricity Network Corporation [2019] FCA 619

Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28

ThoughtWare Australia Pty Limited v IonMy Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 906

Toll (FCGT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited (2004) 219 CLR 165; [2004] HCA 52

Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited (2015) 256 CLR 507; [2015] HCA 28

Walker v University of Sydney [2013] NSWSC 104

Waters v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Taxation Office) [2017] FCA 1199

White Industries Aust Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298; [2007] FCA 511

Woods v T & F.S. Woods Pty Ltd [2021] FedCFamC2G 369

Macquarie Dictionary (8th ed, Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2020) Vol…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1108
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Woods v T&F.S. Woods Pty Ltd concerns an application for leave to appeal from a decision to summarily dismiss proceedings brought by DW against TFS. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia had dismissed DW's claims on the basis that they were barred by a prior Deed of Settlement and Release between the parties. DW sought to appeal this decision, arguing that the current proceedings were not barred by the Deed.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Deed of Settlement and Release, which settled disputes arising from a previous proceeding, barred DW from bringing the current proceedings. The primary judge had held that the current proceedings were indeed barred by the Deed, as they arose from the previous proceeding. DW contended that the primary judge erred in this determination, arguing that the current claims were not matters that "arose from" the previous proceeding as required by the Deed.

The court found that the primary judge had erred in concluding that the current proceedings were barred by the Deed. The court held that there was an arguable case that the current claims did not "arise from" the previous proceeding within the meaning of the Deed. The court reasoned that the current claims related to specific statutory entitlements and property, which were distinct from the broader disputes settled by the Deed. As such, the court found that DW had made out a sufficient arguable case to warrant the grant of leave to appeal and the allowance of the appeal.

The court set aside the primary judge's order for summary dismissal and dismissed TFS' application for summary judgment. The court granted DW leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, holding that the primary judge had erred in concluding that the current proceedings were barred by the prior Deed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant be granted leave to appeal.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The order made by the primary judge on 20 December 2021 be set aside and the application for summary judgment filed on 20 September 2021 be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, I have concluded that the primary judge erred in granting summary judgment. DW should be granted leave to appeal, and the appeal should be allowed.BACKGROUNDThe proceeding below The proceeding below, to which this appeal relates, was commenced by DW against TFS on 2 December 2020 by way of originating application in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it then was before it merged with the Family Court of Australia to form the FCFCOA) (the FCC proceeding). By the FCC proceeding, DW sought:(a)declarations of various contraventions by TFS of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA) for its failure to pay him annual leave, minimum wages and allowances, overtime and superannuation;(b)an order for compensation for loss suffered because of those contraventions under s 545 of the FWA;(c)an order that TFS pay DW’s outstanding long service leave under the Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW);(d)a declaration that DW is entitled to possession of certain property and an order for delivery up of such property, or alternatively, damages for conversion; and(e)the payment of damages for breach of a deed of settlement entered into between DW and TFS. On 20 September 2021, TFS filed an interlocutory application seeking summary dismissal of the FCC proceeding. It advanced that application, relevantly, on the basis that DW was barred from commencing proceedings “for matters arising out of the operation of the business of [TFS]” by a Deed of Settlement and Release entered into by TFS and DW on 27 November 2019 (the Deed). The Deed was entered into by TFS and DW to compromise certain disputes between them arising from a proceeding which had been commenced by DW in the Federal Court of Australia (the FCA proceeding). On 20 December 2021, the primary judge granted TFS’ application for summary dismissal, holding that the Deed barred DW from commencing the FCC proceeding. DW now seeks to appeal (and leave to appeal) from that decision. Before considering whether leave to appeal should be granted, it is useful to set out the relevant details surrounding the FCA proceeding.The FCA proceeding As the primary judge summarised, TFS was founded by DW’s father, Mr Terence Woods (TW). When TW died in 2017, he left his shares to DW and his brother, Mr Allan Woods (AW). A dispute subsequently arose between DW and AW as to the class of shares that was left to them under the will. This dispute was the subject of proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. At that time, DW and AW were both directors and shareholders of TFS. The brothers carried on running the company, with AW responsible for the management, control and financial administration of TFS and DW responsible for running the workshop, the service and maintenance of vehicles and equipment, and some long-distance driving. DW eventually developed suspicions that AW and his wife, Mrs Julieanne Woods (JW) (an employee and former director of TFS), were misappropriating funds from TFS. On 24 July 2019, DW commenced the FCA proceeding, in his capacity as director and shareholder of TFS, against AW and JW. TFS was the second named plaintiff in the proceeding.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is not the role of the Court on appeal to make findings regarding the matters raised by the parties. The central question in this appeal is whether the primary judge erred by granting summary judgment and determining, in effect, that DW had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding: Schiffer v Pattison (2005) 143 FCR 328; [2005] FCA 494 at [83] (per Weinberg J).The primary judgment The primary judge identified that the “real question” to be determined on the application for summary dismissal was (Woods at [22]):… whether the present proceeding is a matter that fits the definition of “Claim” in the Deed. If it fits that definition, then there is a bar to [DW] proceeding with the present application. If it does not fit that definition, then the matter should continue according to law. The primary judge approached the construction of the Deed by, first, examining the issues in the FCA proceeding and, secondly, considering whether the issues in the FCC proceeding were ones “arising from” the FCA proceeding. The primary judge observed that the “genesis” of the FCA proceeding was a claim by DW that AW had misappropriated money from TFS. The primary judge found that, arising from that central claim, was a “request by [DW] for liquidators to assume control of all operations of [TFS] and to carry on [TFS’] business”: Woods at [23]. The primary judge concluded that the “correct and proper payment to be made to any employee of [TFS] was a part of the day-to-day running of the business” and that any employee claims or rights against TFS were “certainly part of carrying on the business” of TFS. Accordingly, the primary judge considered it necessary to decide whether those claims or rights were matters that “arose from the proceedings”: Woods at [24]. The primary judge held that the issues in the FCC proceeding “arose from” the FCA proceeding such that the FCC proceeding was barred by the Deed. The primary judge reached that conclusion as a result of the following reasoning:(a)“The Deed goes much farther than the allegation of misappropriation. All of the disputes between [DW] and [AW] (including their dispute over their late father’s will) arose out of the proceedings”: Woods at [30]-[31].(b)It could be inferred that Woods Transport Pty Ltd became part of the Deed so that AW and DW “could sever their relationship and that they (and their corporate identities) would never need to darken each other’s doorstep again”: Woods at [32].(c)This meant that “the whole issue of how the corporate entities, owned and directed by [AW] and [DW], were being operated on a day-to-day basis was an issue that ‘arose from the proceedings’ and therefore became the subject of the Deed”: Woods at [33].(d)Given “the way that the Deed has been executed”, it would be an “absurdity” if any litigation that AW may wish to instigate against Woods Transport Pty Ltd would not be barred by the Deed because it would not arise from an allegation of misappropriation by AW of money owned by TFS: Woods at [34].(e)In the FCA proceeding, DW requested TFS’ wage records and ledger accounts showing all payments made to directors, having regard to wages, dividends and payment of personal expenses. DW also wanted the scope of audit to include “all payments made by [TFS]…to any person with the surname Woods (including but not limited to wage records, entitlements and superannuation)” (italics omitted): Woods at [35].(f)This led “inexorably to the conclusion that the [FCA proceeding] involved the payment of wages, entitlements and superannuation to [DW] and the records thereof”: Woods at [36].(g)The property claimed in the FCC proceeding was “part and parcel” of the transfer of property and assets between [DW], [AW] and their respective corporate entities under the Deed. The claim to property made in the FCC proceeding was therefore clearly a matter that arose from the FCA proceeding: Woods at [37]-[38].The proposed grounds of appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In considering whether the primary judge erred in granting summary judgment and determining that DW had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding, the court examined the proper construction of the Deed of Settlement and Release and whether the current FCC proceeding was barred by the Deed. The court found that the primary judge's interpretation of the Deed was flawed as it did not properly consider the scope of the issues in the FCC proceeding. The court held that the primary judge had incorrectly concluded that the FCC proceeding was barred by the Deed because it arose from the FCA proceeding. The court further determined that the FCC proceeding was not barred by the Deed because it was not one "arising from" the previous FCA proceeding. The court noted that the Deed did not include any provisions that would bar DW from bringing a proceeding seeking compensation for loss suffered because of contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and other claims, as alleged by DW in the FCC proceeding. The court held that the primary judge erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing DW's proceeding. As a result, the appeal was allowed and the order made by the primary judge on 20 December 2021 was set aside.
The court's ratio decidendi is that a Deed of Settlement and Release should be properly construed to determine whether a subsequent proceeding is barred by the Deed. The court also held that a proceeding is not barred by a Deed if it is not one "arising from" a previous proceeding, even if the issues in the subsequent proceeding are related to the issues in the previous proceeding. The court departed from the primary judge's decision as it did not properly construe the Deed and incorrectly concluded that the FCC proceeding was barred by the Deed.