FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DHI22 v Qatar Airways Q.C.S.C (No 3) [2024] FCA 351
File number(s): NSD 837 of 2022 Judgment of: HALLEY J Date of judgment: 10 April 2024 Catchwords: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – where second respondent asserts immunity under s 9 of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) (FSI Act) – whether second respondent is a separate entity within the meaning of s 3(1) of the FSI Act – whether second respondent is an agency or instrumentality of the State of Qatar – whether second respondent is not a separate entity entitled to immunity because it was not exercising inherently governmental or sovereign functions – second respondent is a separate entity entitled to immunity under the FSI Act
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – whether the commercial transactions exception to foreign State immunity in s 11 of the FSI Act is made out – whether proceeding “concerns” a commercial transaction – where necessary to consider substance of case pleaded and conduct giving rise to claims – whether conduct can be properly characterised as a commercial, trading, business, professional or industrial or like transaction – exception to foreign State immunity not made out.
TORTS – originating application advancing claims in negligence, assault, battery and false imprisonment – interlocutory application by second respondent to set aside service and the originating application and the further amended statement of claim in so far as they advance claims against second respondent on the basis of foreign State immunity – service and originating documents set aside
Legislation: Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) s 3, Pt II, ss 9, 11, 13, 22, Pt IV, ss 32, 38
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222, art 6
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, done at Montreal on 28 May 1999, 2242 UNTS 309
Cases cited: Alcom Ltd v Republic of Colombia [1984] AC 580
Benkharbouche v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan [2019] AC 777
CCDM Holdings, LLC v Republic of India (No 3) [2023] FCA 1266
DHI22 v Qatar Airways Q.C.S.C (No 2) [2024] FCA 348
DSG Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Helenic Pty Ltd (2014) 86 NSWLR 293; [2014] NSWCA 96
Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (2015) 258 CLR 31; [2015] HCA 43
Greylag Goose Leasing 1410 Designated Activity Company v PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd (2023) 111 NSWLR 550; [2023] NSWCA 134
I Congreso del Partido [1978] QB 500
Playa Larga v I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 AC 244
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012) 247 CLR 240; [2012] HCA 33
PT Garuda International Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2011) 192 FCR 393; [2011] FCAFC 52
Wells Fargo Bank Northwest National Association v Victoria Aircraft Leasing Ltd
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 351
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of the QCAA as a public entity of Qatar, established to regulate civil aviation and perform inherently governmental functions. It considered the statutory provisions and legal principles regarding foreign State immunity, including the customary international law principle that immunity is granted for inherently governmental or sovereign acts. The court found that the QCAA was exercising governmental functions during the incident, thus qualifying as a separate entity under the Act. Furthermore, the court held that the commercial transactions exception did not apply as the proceeding did not concern a commercial transaction but rather involved inherently governmental acts.
Consequently, the court set aside the service of the originating application and amended statements of claim against the QCAA. It ordered the applicants to pay the QCAA's costs. The decision underscores the importance of distinguishing between inherently governmental and commercial activities when determining foreign State immunity under the Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The order made on 6 October 2022 granting leave to the applicants to serve the originating application and the statement of claim on the second respondent be set aside pursuant to s 38 of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth).
2. The further amended originating application filed on 23 May 2023 and the further amended statement of claim filed on 23 May 2023, in so far as they make claims against the second respondent, be set aside pursuant to s 38 of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth).
3. The applicants are to pay the costs of the second respondent, as taxed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the second respondent (QCAA) is a separate entity within the meaning of s 3(1) of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) and entitled to immunity.
2. Whether the second respondent is an agency or instrumentality of the State of Qatar.
3. Whether the second respondent was not exercising inherently governmental or sovereign functions and therefore not a separate entity entitled to immunity.
4. Whether the commercial transactions exception to foreign State immunity in s 11 of the FSI Act is made out.
Held
1. The court held that the second respondent (QCAA) is a separate entity within the meaning of s 3(1) of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) and is entitled to immunity.
2. The court held that the second respondent is an agency or instrumentality of the State of Qatar.
3. The court held that the second respondent was exercising inherently governmental or sovereign functions and is therefore a separate entity entitled to immunity.
4. The court held that the commercial transactions exception to foreign State immunity in s 11 of the FSI Act is not made out.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, and in any event, the principle proffered by the applicants is not an accepted part of customary international law. E.3. ConsiderationE.3.1. The applicants’ exercise of governmental function requirement As a general proposition, it is entirely unexceptional that a Court would consider whether an entity was exercising governmental functions on behalf of a foreign State, for the purpose of determining whether that entity was an agency or instrumentality within the meaning of “separate entity” for the purposes of the FSI Act. So much is clear from the ALRC Report and the rule of customary international law, that a foreign State is entitled to immunity only in respect of its inherently governmental or sovereign acts: Benkharbouche at [37] and [52]-[53] (Lord Sumption giving the judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court). Further, it is well settled that the FSI Act ought, so far as its language permits, to be construed in conformity with this rule of customary international law, particularly where the FSI Act implements or codifies Australia’s obligations under international law: Firebird at [44] (French CJ and Kiefel J) and [134] (Gageler J). The applicants’ contention, however, that the QCAA was not a separate entity for the purposes of s 9 and s 22 of the FSI Act because it was not relevantly “exercising inherently governmental or sovereign functions” in relation to the Incident, is untenable for the following reasons. First, the conduct of which the applicants complain occurred in the course of a police operation conducted by the MOI. That was on any view conduct that had the character of an “inherently governmental or sovereign act”. A police operation seeking to locate a person who had committed an apparent crime under Qatari law of abandoning a newborn baby in a toilet cubicle necessarily involved a range of different activities, including interviewing potential witnesses and suspects. Those interviews could be pursued in a variety of ways, some relatively unobstructive and others more so. It is also readily apparent that the manner in which interviews of potential witnesses and suspects are conducted may involve breaches of relevant regulations or laws and give rise to criminal offences or breach fundamental human rights. Second, and in any event, any contention that an entity cannot be a separate entity of a foreign State to the extent that it engages in conduct that is unlawful or in breach of human rights is contrary to the statutory text and intrinsic materials. The ALRC Report recommended at [65], in the context of the underlying principles of foreign state immunity identified in Chapter 3 of the report:Accordingly the proposed Australian legislation should provide that a foreign state is immune except as provided in the legislation. The exceptions should be designed so as to reflect not a single governmental/commercial dichotomy but rather the full range of considerations outlined in Chapter 3. The form of “restrictive immunity” recommended in the ALRC Report, and adopted by the Parliament, was one pursuant to which s 9 of the FSI Act granted an absolute immunity “[e]xcept as provided by or under this Act”. Specific exceptions to the absolute immunity from jurisdiction are then set forth in s 10 to s 20 of the FSI Act. None of these exceptions stipulates that an entity cannot be a “separate entity” for the purposes of the immunity in s 9, read together with s 22 of the FSI Act, if it engages in unlawful conduct or the conduct is in breach of human rights.