FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2011] FCAFC 52
Citation: PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2011] FCAFC 52 Appeal from: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd [2010] FCA 551
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Malaysian Airline System Berhad [2010] FCA 757Parties: PT GARUDA INDONESIA LTD (ARBN 000 861 165) v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM BERHAD (ARBN 000 996 903), MALAYSIA AIRLINES CARGO SDN BHD v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
File numbers: NSD 667 of 2010, NSD 943 of 2010 Judges: LANDER, GREENWOOD AND RARES JJ Date of judgment: 19 April 2011 Catchwords: PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW – Jurisdiction – Foreign State Immunity – whether corporation, wholly or partly owned by foreign state, is immune from the jurisdiction of Australian courts – whether Australian Government regulator can seek pecuniary penalties against foreign State or separate entity of foreign State in respect of alleged contraventions of anti-competitive prohibitions in Pt IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – alleged price fixing cartel for international air freight – airlines claiming to be separate entities of foreign States – no claim made by foreign State that airline is separate entity –whether alleged conduct capable of amounting to commercial transaction or like activity falling within exclusion from immunity for activities concerning “commercial transactions” as defined in s 11(3) of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth)
Held: alleged price fixing activities of airlines operated by separate entity of foreign State capable of amounting to commercial transactions or like activities – airlines acted as private players in the market and alleged activities concerned commercial transactions within the meaning of s 11(3) of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) – airlines not immune from the jurisdiction of Australian courts
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – definition of ‘separate entity’ in relation to a foreign State in s 3(1) of Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) – whether corporation conducting international airline is a 'separate entity' being an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of foreign State – whether the foreign State must wholly own corporation or exert day-to-day management control
Held: a person is a ‘separate entity’ if, on the whole of the evidence, the person is acting for, or being used by, the foreign State as its means to achieve some purpose or end of that State in the relevant circumstances – day-to-day control of a corporation by foreign State not determinative
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA, 15AB(1)
Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) ss 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 40, 41
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) ss 3, 14
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 45, 52, 76, 80Cases cited:
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- Case
- [2011] FCAFC 52
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the alleged price-fixing activities of the airlines were capable of amounting to commercial transactions or like activities, thereby falling within the exclusion from immunity provided by s 11(3) of the Foreign States Immunities Act. The court reasoned that the airlines acted as private players in the market and engaged in commercial transactions within the meaning of the statute. This interpretation was based on the natural and ordinary meaning of "commercial transaction" and the understanding that such activities are ordinary features of daily life in commercial markets. The court also held that a corporation conducting international airline operations could be considered a 'separate entity' if it was acting for, or being used by, the foreign State as its means to achieve some purpose or end of that State, without necessarily requiring day-to-day management control by the state.
The court dismissed the appeal brought by PT Garuda Indonesia and ordered that leave to appeal be granted, the appeal be dismissed, and the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal. This decision underscores the importance of interpreting statutory provisions in their natural and ordinary context while also considering the broader legislative intent and policy behind such statutes.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal is granted to the applicant and the appeal be treated as having been instituted in accordance with the draft notice of appeal.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Note:
1. Leave to appeal is granted to the applicant and the appeal be treated as having been instituted in accordance with the draft notice of appeal.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Next, the Commission argued that ALRC 24 at [72] had stated that:“… it is expected that a court would consider whether the entity is exercising governmental functions on behalf of the foreign State.”It contended that although the ALRC had acknowledged the difficulties inherent in the application of a government functions test (in ALRC 24 at [71]), it considered that such a test was preferable to an alternative approach.CONSIDERATION The task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text of the provision or provisions being construed: Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46-47 [47] per Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ. Their Honours observed that if the meaning of the text was clear, considerations of history and extrinsic materials could not displace that meaning. This was because the intention of the legislature was most surely to be found in the words it chose to use. However, as they noted, the meanings of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision and, in particular, any mischief that it seeks to remedy: Alcan 289 CLR at 47 [47]; see too Tran v Commonwealth (2010) 187 FCR 54 at 71-72 [66]-[69] per Rares J. First, the definition of “separate entity” in s 3(1) is notable because it applies expressly to a natural person as well as a corporation: cp Grunfeld v United States of America [1968] 3 NSWR 36 where Street J held that at common law an army major could contract for a foreign State. No Australian law permits a natural person to be owned. Thus, ownership cannot be a determinative criterion of whether a person (being an individual or corporation) is a separate entity. However, that does not exclude consideration of ownership as relevant to the characterisation of a corporation as a separate entity. Secondly, the definition distinguishes the role of a separate entity, as an agency or instrumentality of the foreign State, from its being a department or organ of the State’s executive government. This suggests that the Parliament was conscious that the executive government’s control of a separate entity would not be as immediate or direct as would be the case with a department or organ of State. Thirdly, different foreign States will have differing internal structures and employ differing means to create the relationship between each State and a person that is contemplated by the expression “an agency or instrumentality of the foreign State”. “Agency” and “instrumentality” are ordinary English words. The section has employed those words, as alternatives, to express a connection to the foreign State denoted by the possessive pronoun “of”. The words “agency” and “instrumentality” are largely synonymous. The Macquarie Dictionary defines “agency” as including:“3. … the office of agent; the business of an agent entrusted with the concerns of another … 5. a mode of exerting power; a means of producing effects; instrumentality”It defines “instrumentality” to include the meanings:“… 2 the fact or function of serving some purpose. 3. a means or agency.”The Oxford English Dictionary defines “agency” as including:“… 2. working as a means to an end; instrumentality, intermediation; 3. action of instrumentality embodied or personified as concrete existence; 4. Comm [in commercial usage] the office or function of an agent or factor. 5. An establishment for the purpose of doing business for another, usually at a distance.”It defines “instrumentality” as:“1. the quality or condition of being instrumental; the fact or function of serving or being used for the accomplishment of some purpose or end; agency. 2. with pl[ural]. That which serves or is employed for some purpose or end; a means, an agency.”