PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

P.T. GARUDA INDONESIA LTD   APPELLANT

AND

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER
COMMISSION  RESPONDENT

P.T. Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission

[2012] HCA 33

7 September 2012

S343/2011

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

J T Gleeson SC with C H Withers for the appellant (instructed by Norton White)

S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with T M Howe QC and D J Roche for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ. The appellant ("Garuda") argued this appeal on the uncontested footing that it is a "foreign corporation" within the meaning of s 51(xx) of the Constitution. The controversy turns on its character as an emanation of the Republic of Indonesia.

  2. Ninety five point five per cent of the issued shares in Garuda are owned directly by the Republic of Indonesia, the minority shareholding is held by government controlled corporations associated with Indonesian airports, and at the relevant times four of the five members of its Board of Commissioners were senior officials of the Indonesian government.  That state of affairs is said to attract Pt II of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) ("the Act") and thereby to render Garuda "immune" from the exercise of jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia in a proceeding for contravention of Pt IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the TPA")[1] instituted against it in 2009 by the respondent ("the ACCC").

    [1]Part IV of the TPA is now embedded in Pt IV, Div 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) but the TPA continues to apply to unconcluded proceedings: Item 7 of Sched 7 to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth).

  3. A judge of the Federal Court (Jacobson J) dismissed a motion by Garuda that the proceeding be stayed or dismissed[2].  The Full Court (Lander, Greenwood and Rares JJ) granted Garuda leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal[3].

  4. For the reasons which follow the appeal by Garuda to this Court should be dismissed.

    The common law

  5. In the Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, adopted in 1986[4], it is said with reference to the rule of absolute immunity and the development of a more restrictive view of immunity:

    "Until the twentieth century, sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts seemed to have no exceptions.  However, as governments increasingly engaged in state‑trading and various commercial activities, it was urged that the immunity of states engaged in such activities was not required by international…

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Details
Case
[2012] HCA 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the application of the *Foreign States Immunities Act 1985* (Cth) to proceedings brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) against PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd. The ACCC alleged that PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd had contravened provisions of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth). It was common ground that PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd was a "separate entity" of a foreign state and that the proceeding was not a prosecution.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the proceeding brought by the ACCC concerned a "commercial transaction" within the meaning of section 11(1) of the *Foreign States Immunities Act 1985* (Cth), thereby excluding PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd from immunity from jurisdiction. The definition of "commercial transaction" in section 11(3) included "a commercial, trading, business, professional or industrial or like transaction into which the foreign State has entered or a like activity in which the State has engaged," and expressly stated that this was "without limiting the generality of the foregoing."

The High Court reasoned that the phrase "without limiting the generality of the foregoing" in section 11(3) prevented the application of the *ejusdem generis* principle to restrict the broad meaning of "commercial transaction." The Court found that the ACCC's allegations, which concerned arrangements or understandings that led to PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd entering into contracts for air freight services, constituted a "commercial transaction" even if the arrangements themselves were not pleaded as contracts. This was because the definition extended beyond purely contractual arrangements to encompass commercial, trading, or like activities.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This appeal concerns the construction of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) ("the Act"). Background The issue turns on the meaning of s 11 of the Act. That issue is to be determined in the context of an application for relief arising from alleged contraventions of s 45 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the TP Act"). That application has been brought in the Federal Court of Australia. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia found that the appellant was a "separate entity", as that phrase is defined in s 3(1) of the Act. It was thus an agent or instrumentality of Indonesia, but not an organ of Indonesia itself. The respondent does not challenge that finding. Nor, for its part, does the appellant contend that the proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia is a prosecution. Thus it is common ground that the application in the Federal Court of Australia brought by the respondent against the appellant is a "proceeding", as that word is defined in s 3(1) of the Act. Section 9 confers a general immunity from jurisdiction on foreign States. Section 22 extends that immunity to separate entities of those States. It follows that by reason of ss 9 and 22 of the Act, the appellant is immune from the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia in the proceeding, unless the proceeding "concerns a commercial transaction" within the meaning of s 11(1), as defined in s 11(3)[42].[42]See above at [11] and [37]. The Statement of Claim filed by the respondent in the proceeding alleges that the appellant has made numerous arrangements or arrived at numerous understandings containing particular provisions. It does not allege that these arrangements or understandings are contracts. Hence the alleged arrangements or understandings do not of themselves answer the description given in s 11(3)(a) – "a contract for the supply of goods or services". And the proceeding does not concern the commercial transactions described in s 11(3)(b) (agreements to do with the provision of finance) or s 11(3)(c) (guarantees or indemnities in respect of certain financial obligations). The respondent's case is divisible into two limbs. The first limb is that the alleged arrangements or understandings called for the appellant to enter contracts with its customers to provide air freight services on particular terms, which terms are reflected in the contracts the appellant actually entered. The second is that the examples given in pars (a)-(c) of s 11(3) do not limit the generality of the words which precede them. Among those words are "a commercial, trading … or like transaction". Those words indicate that "commercial transactions" extend beyond contractual transactions. The alleged arrangements or understandings are therefore "commercial transactions" even though they are not pleaded as contracts. Each of these two limbs support the submission that the proceeding concerns a "commercial transaction". That submission is correct. It is convenient to take the two limbs in turn. The first limb: commercial transactions as described in s 11(3)(a)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ HEYDON J
In Spectrum Stores Inc v Citgo Petroleum Corp[34], the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in affirming the decision of the District Court, held that it was "the political question" and "act of state" doctrines which denied the justiciability of a claim by gasoline retailers of price fixing, in contravention of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, by United States firms working in concert with OPEC member nations[35]. On a motion for summary dismissal, the District Court had declined to consider the application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA")[36]. The Court of Appeals observed[37]:"We note that a 'commercial activity' exception to this sovereign activity may obtain with respect to application of the FSIA when, for example, a foreign sovereign enters into 'a joint venture contract with oil companies for the exploration, production, and sale on the world market of oil and gas,' thus acting 'not as a regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it.'[38] However, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that, under current precedents, '[t]he act of state doctrine is not diluted by the commercial activity exception which limits the doctrine of sovereign immunity.'[39] Neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit have adopted a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine, and we decline to do so today."[34]632 F 3d 938 at 951 (2011).[35]See also Areeda and Hovenkamp, Anti‑Trust Law, 3rd ed (2006), vol 1B, ¶274; Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Anti‑Trust Laws, 5th ed (1996), vol 1, §2.26.[36]In re Refined Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation 649 F Supp 2d 572 at 598 (2009).[37]632 F 3d 938 at 955, fn 16 (2011).[38]Connecticut Bank of Commerce v Republic of Congo 309 F 3d 240 at 264 (5th Cir 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).[39]Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v OPEC 649 F 2d 1354 at 1360 (9th Cir 1981) (noting that the two doctrines "address different concerns and apply in different circumstances").Conclusions The term "commercial transaction" as it appears in s 11(1) is defined in s 11(3) as meaning:"a commercial, trading, business, professional or industrial or like transaction into which the foreign State has entered or a like activity in which the State has engaged and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes:(a)a contract for the supply of goods or services;(b)an agreement for a loan or some other transaction for or in respect of the provision of finance; and(c)a guarantee or indemnity in respect of a financial obligation; but does not include a contract of employment or a bill of exchange." The express statement in s 11(3) "without limiting the generality of the foregoing" precludes resort to the ejusdem generis principle to limit the generality of the preceding words in the definition of "commercial transaction". In Leon Fink Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Film Commission[40], Mason J said of the statute under consideration there:"In this case the words 'without limiting the generality of the foregoing' evince an intention that the general power should be given a construction that accords with the width of the language in which it is expressed and that this construction is not to be restricted by reference to the more specific character of that which follows. The clause therefore operates to negative the restrictive implication which might otherwise have been derived from the presence of the specific power to lend contained in par (a)."[40](1979) 141 CLR 672 at 679; [1979] HCA 26.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ, HEYDON J