Section 113 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956 (Cth.) pro- vides - (1.) The Court" (i.e. the Commonwealth Industrial Court) " has jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence of a State court (not being a Supreme Court) or of a court of a Territory of the Commonwealth made, given or pronounced in a matter arising under-(a) this Act;
(3.) An appeal does not lie to the High Court from a judgment, decree, order or sentence from which an appeal may be brought to the Court under sub-section (1.) of this section.
Held, that sub-s. (3) of S. 113 is a valid exercise of the legislative power to prescribe exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court contained in S. 73 of the Constitution.
Accordingly, where informations charging offences under S. 138 of the Con- ciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956 were dismissed by a stipendiary magistrate and the informant appealed as of right to the High Court,
Held, that by virtue of S. 113 (3) of such Act the High Court had no jurisdic- tion to entertain the appeals.
Upon separate informations laid on 23rd November 1956, at Sydney, by John Simon Cockle, shipping association secretary, Neville Isaksen, a vigilance officer of the Sydney branch of the Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia, was, before the chief stipendiary magistrate, charged that, on 1st November 1956, he being an officer of a branch of an organisation within the meaning of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956 during the currency of an award advised members of an organisation which was bound by the award, to wit, S. Field, P. Ryan, G. Dimick and R. Law respectively, to refrain from working with Macquarie Stevedoring Co. Pty. Ltd., an employer bound by the award, contrary to the provisions of the said Act.
Upon a similar information by John Simon Cockle, one Matthew Munro, likewise a vigilance officer of the said Sydney branch, was similarly charged that on 9th November 1956, being an officer of a branch of an organisation within the meaning of the said Act during the currency of an award advised members of an organisation which was bound by the award, to wit, men of the hatches Nos. 2, 3 and 5 of the vessel River Clarence respectively to refrain from working with the said Macquarie Stevedoring Co. Pty. Ltd., an employer bound by the award, contrary to the provisions of the said Act.
The chief stipendiary magistrate found that none of the inform- ations had been proved and dismissed each of them. In his reasons for decision the chief stipendiary magistrate said the proceedings had…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Cockle v Isaksen [1957] HCA 85
Case
[1957] HCA 85
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Cockle v. Isaksen* involved appeals brought before the High Court of Australia by an informant against the dismissal of several informations by a stipendiary magistrate. The informations charged the respondents, who were officers of the Waterside Workers' Federation, with advising members to refrain from working with a particular stevedoring company, contrary to the *Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956*. The magistrate had dismissed these informations, and the informant sought to appeal to the High Court as of right.
The central legal issue before the High Court was the validity of section 113(3) of the *Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1956*. This provision stipulated that no appeal lay to the High Court from a judgment, decree, order, or sentence from which an appeal could be brought to the Commonwealth Industrial Court under section 113(1) of the same Act. The High Court was required to determine whether this statutory restriction on its appellate jurisdiction was a valid exercise of the Parliament's power under section 73 of the Constitution to prescribe exceptions to the High Court's appellate jurisdiction.
The Court reasoned that section 73 of the Constitution grants the High Court appellate jurisdiction "with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament prescribes." The majority of the Court held that section 113(3) of the *Conciliation and Arbitration Act* constituted a valid exception within the meaning of section 73. They found that the provision did not seek to destroy the general rule of appellate jurisdiction but rather to carve out a specific class of judgments from that jurisdiction, namely, those arising under the *Conciliation and Arbitration Act* from which an appeal could be brought to the Commonwealth Industrial Court. This was considered a permissible exception, as it related to the subject matter of the judgment or order, and did not unduly encroach upon the High Court's constitutional appellate powers.
Consequently, the High Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals. The Court concluded that section 113(3) was a valid legislative exercise of the power to prescribe exceptions to the High Court's appellate jurisdiction under section 73 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the appeals were struck out as incompetent.