Scholz v Ace Finance Australia Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Scholz & Anor v Ace Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 27

PARTIES:

JOHN MICHAEL SCHOLZ

(first plaintiff/first respondent)
JANICE MERLE SCHOLZ
(second plaintiff/first respondent)
v
ACE FINANCE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 101 588 747

(defendant/first applicant)

FILE NO:

No 9662 of 2016

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

DELIVERED ON:

26 February 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

17 November 2017

JUDGE:

Davis J

ORDER:

1.    The order of the Court is as set out in the Schedule attached to these reasons.

CATCHWORDS:

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS – IMPLIED TERMS – where the defendant has applied to have a question as to the existence of an implied term determined prior to trial – where there are multiple agreements – where there may be an implied term appropriately read into a different agreement than the one specified in the application and pleadings – whether the question is appropriate to answer

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SEPARATE DECISION OR DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OF PROCEEDINGS – SEPARATE DECISION OR DETERMINATION – where the defendant has applied to have the question of a default under a relevant contract determined prior to trial – where the plaintiffs argue there was no default – whether it is appropriate to answer the question

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SEPARATE DECISION OR DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OF PROCEEDINGS – SEPARATE DECISION OR DETERMINATION – where the defendant has applied to have the plaintiffs’ allegation of an implied term determined prior to trial – where there are multiple agreements – where there may be an implied term appropriately read into a different agreement than the one specified in the application and pleadings – whether the question is appropriate to answer

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 483, r 658

Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, cited
Finchbourne Ltd v Rodrigues [1976] 3 All ER 581, distinguished
Lambourn v McLellan [1903] 2 Ch 268, cited
Mount Bruce Mining Pty Limited v Wright Prospecting Pty Limited (2015) 256 CLR 104, applied
Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1999) 240 FCR 276, followed
Re Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd [1999] 1 Qd R 287, distinguished
Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329, cited
Tamplin (FA) Steamship Co Ltd v Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co Ltd [1916] 2 AC 397, cited

Victorian Producers Co-operative Co Ltd v Edwards (1993) 62 SASR 415, distinguished

COUNSEL:

G Handran for the applicant/defendant

W Wild for the respondent/plaintiff

SOLICITORS:

Hickey Lawyers for the applicant/defendant

TDK Lawyers for the respondent/plaintiff

  1. The defendant (the applicant in this application) seeks to have issues in the case summarily determined, or, if the issues cannot be determined summarily, seeks orders that the issues be determined prior to trial. It does this by seeking relief primarily under r 483 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999…

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Details
Case
[2018] QSC 27
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Scholz v Ace Finance Australia Pty Ltd involved the defendant, a money lending company, entering into a loan agreement with Fraser Development Group Pty Ltd (Fraser) on 8 May 2012. The plaintiffs were the sellers of property at 43 Lamberth Road, Regents Park, which was owned by them. The dispute arose from a complex series of agreements involving multiple parties, including the Anderson Family Trust No 3, the Anderson Family Trust No 4, Odna Pty Ltd, and the individual guarantors Stephen, John, and Sonja Anderson. The defendant had advanced funds to Fraser and Odna, secured by mortgages over respective properties. The plaintiffs sold Lamberth Road to Odna, with payment to be made in instalments, and also provided services for which payment was to be made in 2013 and 2014. Odna intended to subdivide Lamberth Road into residential lots.

The legal issues before the court included whether there was a default under the Lamberth Road Loan Facility and whether an implied term existed in the Priority Deed limiting the interest, fees, costs, and expenses the defendant could claim, in priority to the plaintiffs' debt, to “reasonable” interest, charges, etc., which were “reasonably incurred”. The defendant applied for a determination of these issues before trial. The court considered the principles governing the separate determination of issues and concluded that the issue of default might be irrelevant depending on the proper construction of clause 14 of the Lamberth Road Loan Facility. Additionally, there was a factual dispute between the parties regarding the receipt and effect of the so-called letters of demand. The court also noted that full argument had not been heard on the construction of the guarantee, and the determination of the issue would not conclude the proceedings, as there were other issues to be tried. Therefore, the court refused to determine the issue of default summarily and decided that the issue should be dealt with at a full trial of the action.

The court also considered the question of whether a term was implied in the Priority Deed limiting the interest, fees, costs, and expenses the defendant could claim, in priority to the plaintiffs' debt. The defendant argued that provided the interest, fees, costs, etc., were owing under the terms of the Lamberth Road Loan Facility, they took priority regardless of their “reasonableness”. The court did not find it appropriate to answer this question at this stage and refused to determine the issue summarily. The matter was to be tried at a full trial of the action. The court's reasoning was based on the need for a comprehensive trial to resolve the complex factual and legal disputes between the parties. The orders of the court reflected its decision not to determine the issues of default and implied terms in the Priority Deed prior to trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The order of the Court is as set out in the Schedule attached to these reasons.

Background

Background to the litigation

In order to understand the application it is necessary to understand some background facts and the pleadings.Background facts The defendant is in the business of money lending. On 8 May 2012, the defendant entered into a loan agreement with a company, Fraser Development Group Pty Ltd (Fraser). Fraser entered into the loan agreement (the Fraser Loan Agreement) in its capacity as trustee for the Anderson Family Trust No 3. By the Fraser Loan Agreement, the defendant advanced the sum of $704,617.12 to Fraser, on security of a mortgage over real property at Benowa on the Gold Coast. Guarantees were given by Fraser in its own right (not as trustee), Odna Pty Ltd (Odna), Odna as trustee of the Anderson Family Trust No 4, and each of Stephen, John and Sonja Anderson.[4][4] Affidavit of John Robert Facer, filed 17 November 2017, Ex JRF-1 at 1, 9. By the terms of the Fraser Loan Agreement, the principal advanced was to be repaid six months from the date of advance of the funds.[5] That was calculated to be 10 November 2012.[5] Affidavit of John Robert Facer, filed 17 November 2017 at [5], Ex JRF-1 at 2. Property at 43 Lamberth Road, Regents Park (Lamberth Road) was owned by the plaintiffs. By a contract dated 16 July 2012, the plaintiffs agreed to sell Lamberth Road to Odna as trustee for the Anderson Family Trust No 4 for the sum of $3,799,999.[6] The purchase price was payable by instalments. By the time of the conveyance of the title in Lamberth Road to Odna, the plaintiffs had been paid the sum of $1,700,000. The plaintiffs allege they also provided services to Odna at a consideration of $200,000, payment for which was to be made by Odna on dates in 2013 and 2014.[7][6] Affidavit of Hendrik de Korte, filed 17 November 2017, Ex HDK-1 at 8; Statement of claim, filed 20 September 2016, CFI 1 at [2]. [7] Affidavit of Hendrik de Korte, filed 17 November 2017, Ex HDK-1 at 8; Statement of claim, filed 20 September 2016, CFI 1 at [3], [5]. Lamberth Road had development potential and Odna intended to subdivide the land into residential lots.[8][8] Affidavit of John Robert Facer, filed 17 November 2017, Ex JRF-5 at 32; Defence, filed 19 October 2016, CFI 2 at [4(b)]. By a document styled “Finance and Development Agreement” dated 17 July 2012 (the Lamberth Road Loan Facility), the defendant agreed to lend to Odna as trustee for the Anderson Family Trust No 4 the sum of $3,500,000. The advance was to be secured by a first mortgage over Lamberth Road in favour of the defendant, together with guarantees by Odna in its own right (not as trustee) and Sonja and John Anderson.[9][9] Lamberth Road Loan Facility: Affidavit of John Robert Facer, filed 17 November 2017, Ex JRF-5 at 25, 54, 58. By the terms of the Lamberth Road Loan Facility:(i) The sum advanced was for the purposes of the acquisition and development of Lamberth Road;[10][10] Lamberth Road Loan Facility, recital B, cls 1.1(c), 2, 6.1. (ii) The advance was to be made in instalments, the first of which financed the acquisition of Lamberth Road.[11] Subsequent instalments were intended to finance the land’s development;[12][11] Clause 2.[12] Clause 2.(iii) Interest was payable at a rate of 36 per cent per annum unless the borrower (Odna) was not in default of its obligations under the Lamberth Road Loan Facility and in those circumstances the interest rate would fall to 18 per cent;[13][13] Clause 13.1, set out in full later; sch 1 item 6.(iv) Odna and the defendant were to share in any profits generated by the development of Lamberth Road. After repayment of the debt to the defendant and all development expenses, the defendant would receive the first $1,152,000 profit.[14] There were provisions dealing with the division of further profits, but they are not relevant to the present application.(v) Odna was liable to pay various fees including:(a) an establishment fee of $96,250;[15](b) an ongoing administration fee of 0.25 per cent of the debt;[16](c)a “Finance Control Fee” of not less than $375,000, with an additional $125,00 per annum in certain circumstances;[17] and(d) a “Risk Management Fee” of $627,000.[18](vi) The defendant had the right to recover various costs and expenses, including costs incurred in enforcing its rights under the securities.[19](vii) “Default” under the Lamberth Road Loan Facility was defined as default “in the performance of any term agreement or condition contained in or implied by this Agreement, a Transaction Document or any other agreement between the Lender [the defendant] and … The Borrower [Odna as trustee for the Anderson Family Trust No 4]”.[20] The term “Transaction Document” was defined as I later explain. [14] Clause 17.2.[15] Schedule 2.[16] Schedule 2.[17] Schedule 2.[18] Schedule 2.[19] Clause 19.[20] Clause 14.1, set out in full later.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rules 483 and 658 of the UCPR provide as follows:“483 Order for decision and statement of case for opinion(1)The court may make an order for the decision by the court of a question separately from another question, whether before, at, or after the trial or continuation of the trial of the proceeding.(2)The Supreme Court, other than the Court of Appeal, may also state a case for the opinion of the Court of Appeal.658General(1)The court may, at any stage of a proceeding, on the application of a party, make any order, including a judgment, that the nature of the case requires.(2)The court may make the order even if there is no claim for relief extending to the order in the originating process, statement of claim, counterclaim or similar document.” Many cases have considered the exercise of discretion to determine issues before trial. Branson J in Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society[62] analysed the principles relevant to the separate determination of issues. I adopt her Honour’s analysis. While in Re Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd[63] the Court of Appeal urged the summary determination of separate questions, when possible and convenient,[64] it will often not be appropriate to do.[65][62] (1999) 240 FCR 276, applied consistently, see Oceltip Pty Ltd v Noble Resources Pte Ltd [2016] QSC 246; Prescott Securities Limited v Gobbett (No 2) [2017] FCA 81.[63] [1999] 1 Qd R 287.[64] At 288.[65] Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited v Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Limited [2009] FCAFC 161. In exercise of discretion, I do not intend to make orders in terms of either paragraph 1(a) or 2(a) of the application, for reasons which follow. Firstly, the issue as to whether Odna was in default of its guarantee may be irrelevant depending upon the proper construction of clause 14 of the Lamberth Road Loan Facility. Secondly, there is clearly a factual dispute between the parties as to the receipt and effect of the so-called letters of demand. Thirdly, there are questions arising as to the construction of the guarantee and full argument was not heard on that issue. Fourthly, the determination of the question will not determine the proceedings. There will still need to be a trial on the other issues between the parties. It seems to me appropriate that the issue be dealt with at a full trial of the action. I therefore refuse to determine the issue raised by paragraphs 1(a) and 2(a) summarily and I refuse to order that issue to be tried before trial of the claim. The question raised by paragraphs 1(b) and 2(b) of the application is whether a term is implied in the Priority Deed limiting the interest, fees, costs and expenses the defendant can claim, in priority to the plaintiffs debt, to “reasonable” interest, charges, etcetera, which are “reasonably incurred”.[66] The defendant’s position is that provided the interest, fees, costs, etcetera, are owing under the terms of the Lamberth Road Loan Facility, they take priority regardless of their “reasonableness”.[66] Application filed 30 October 2017, CFI 5; Amended reply of the plaintiffs, filed 4 July 2017, CFI 4 at [7A].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.