Nokia Corporation v Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nokia Corporation v Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 726

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment – trade mark infringement – no real or arguable defence

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), s 120
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 78, s 79
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth), Item 44 of Pt 2 of Sch 1

Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), O 9 r 1(3), O 11 r 13, O 20 r 1

Nokia Corporation v Truong [2005] FCA 1141 followed
Nokia Corporation v Mai (2003) 59 IPR 413 followed
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 cited
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 cited
Geoffrey Inc v Luik (1997) 38 IPR 555 cited
Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 cited
Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 cited
Rourke v Victorian Finance Guarantee and Share Co Ltd (1894) 20 VLR 8 cited
Evans Deakin & Co Pty Ltd v Kaiser Engineers and Constructors Inc [1968] Qd R 379 cited
Wallingford v The Mutual Society (1880) 5 AC 685 cited
Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407 referred to
Termi-Mesh Australia Pty Ltd v Josu Manufacturing Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1241 referred to
Clout (Trustee) v Anscor Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 604 referred to
Melaleuca of Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Duck [2005] FCA 1481 referred to

NOKIA CORPORATION v CELLULAR LINE AUSTRALIA (ACN 093 296 694), ABBAS ZEITOUN, TUNCAY AKYILDIZ, ERIC SOO WOONG KIM

VID 1484 OF 2005
KENNY J

14 JUNE 2006
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1484 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

NOKIA CORPORATION
APPLICANT

AND:

CELLULAR LINE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 093 296 694)
FIRST RESPONDENT

ABBAS ZEITOUN
SECOND RESPONDENT

TUNCAY AKYILDIZ
THIRD RESPONDENT

ERIC SOO WOONG KIM
FOURTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 JUNE 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

UPON THE THIRD RESPONDENT UNDERTAKING that he will not, whether by himself, his employees or agents or otherwise howsoever infringe the Nokia Trade Marks (as defined hereafter) or any of them and, in particular, will refrain from using any of the Nokia Trade Marks or any name, word, mark, sign or device which is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to any one or more of the Nokia Trade Marks in the course of trade on or in relation to:

(i)any of the Nokia Registered Goods (as defined hereafter);

(ii)goods of the same description as any of the Nokia Registered Goods; or

(iii)services that are closely related to any of the Nokia Registered Goods,

not manufactured or provided by or under the authority of the applicant.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.There be summary judgment pursuant to Order 20, Rule 1 of the Federal Court Rules for the applicant and against the respondents in terms of the declarations and orders hereinafter set out.

THE…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 726
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nokia Corporation, the registered proprietor of various Australian trade marks, filed an application for summary judgment against Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd and three other respondents, alleging that the respondents had infringed these trade marks by importing and selling goods bearing the Nokia Trade Marks. The dispute was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The court had to decide whether the respondents had an arguable defence to the claims of trade mark infringement made by Nokia. The court had to consider whether Nokia had established that the respondents had no defence to the claims and whether the respondents' defence, if any, disclosed no answer to Nokia's claims.

The court considered the relevant authorities and the evidence presented by Nokia. It held that the standard for granting summary judgment required the court to be satisfied that there was no real question to be tried. The court noted that Nokia had filed affidavits establishing the necessary facts for its cause of action and that the respondents had not provided specific evidence that dealt with Nokia's claims or clearly stated their defence. The court concluded that the respondents had not shown an arguable defence to the claims of trade mark infringement made by Nokia. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favour of Nokia.

The court ordered that the respondents and each of them be restrained from infringing the Nokia Trade Marks, delivering up goods and materials bearing the Nokia Trade Marks for destruction, making discovery of relevant documents, and paying damages or accounting for profits to Nokia. The court also set a deadline for the parties to file and serve written submissions regarding costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. There be summary judgment pursuant to Order 20, Rule 1 of the Federal Court Rules for the applicant and against the respondents in terms of the declarations and orders hereinafter set out.

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

2. The use by the respondents and each of them whether by themselves, its officers (in the case of the first respondent), their employees or agents or otherwise howsoever of any of the following Australian registered trade marks:

(a) Australian Registered Trade Mark No 458364 for NOKIA in class 9;

(b) Australian Registered Trade Mark No 490781 for NOKIA AND DEVICE in class 9;

(c) Australian Registered Trade Mark No 808735 for NOKIA in class 16;

(d) Australian Registered Trade Mark No 867057 for NOKIA in classes 9, 18, 25, 38, 41 and 42;

(together referred to as the “Nokia Trade Marks”) or any name, word, mark, sign or device which is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to any one or more of the Nokia Trade Marks in the course of trade on or in relation to:

(e) any of the goods in respect of which the Nokia Trade Marks are registered (the “Nokia Registered Goods”);

(f) goods of the same description as any of the Nokia Registered Goods; or

(g) services that are closely related to any of the Nokia Registered Goods,

not manufactured or provided by or under the authority of the applicant or by any other means whatsoever constitutes an infringement of the Nokia Trade Marks.

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:

3. The first, second and fourth respondents and each of them be restrained, whether by themselves, its officers (in the case of the first respondent), their employees or agents or otherwise howsoever from infringing the Nokia Trade Marks or any of them and in particular from using any of the Nokia Trade Marks or any name, word, mark, sign or device which is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to any one or more of the Nokia Trade Marks in the course of trade on or in relation to:

(a) any of the Nokia Registered Goods;

(b) goods of the same description as any of the Nokia Registered Goods; or

(c) services that are closely related to any of the Nokia Registered Goods,

not manufactured or provided by or under the authority of the applicant.

4. The second respondent be restrained whether by himself, his employees or agents or otherwise howsoever from aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or directly or indirectly knowingly being involved or concerned in, or a party to, infringement by the first respondent of the Nokia Trade Marks.

5. Within seven (7) days of the date of these Orders, the respondents and each of them deliver up on oath to the applicant or its duly authorised agent for destruction under supervision all goods in the possession, power, custody or control of the respondents or any of them, its officers (in the case of the first respondent), their employees or agents or otherwise howsoever to which any of the Nokia Trade Marks or any name, word, mark, sign or device which is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to any one or more of the Nokia Trade Marks has been applied without the licence or authority of the applicant.

6. Within seven (7) days of the date of these orders, the respondents and each of them deliver up on oath to the applicant or its duly authorised agent for destruction under supervision all catalogues, price lists, brochures and other documents and materials, including materials which are or which are capable of being stored, generated or transmitted via any electronic media in the possession, power, custody or control of the respondents or any of them, its officers (in the case of the first respondent), their employees or agents or otherwise howsoever bearing any of the Nokia Trade Marks or any name, word, mark, sign or device which is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to any one or more of the Nokia Trade Marks without the licence or authority of the applicant.

7. The respondents and each of them make discovery verified by affidavit to the applicant within twenty-eight (28) days of the making of these orders in respect of all purchases and sales by each of them or on their behalf of all items bearing the Nokia Trade Marks and any of them or any name, word, sign, mark or device which is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to any one or more of the Nokia Trade Marks.

8. The respondents and each of them pay the applicant damages for infringement of the Nokia Trade Marks, to be assessed together with interest thereon, or, at the option of the applicant, the respondents and each of them account for the profits made by each of them by the said infringements and pay the applicant the amount found to be due on the taking of such account, together with interest thereon.

9. The parties file and serve any written submissions as to costs on or before 4:30 pm on 23 June 2006.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

According to Nokia’s statement of claim, the first respondent is a company incorporated under the laws of New South Wales. Nokia alleges that the second respondent is a director and guiding mind of the first respondent. The third respondent resides in Melbourne and allegedly has retail premises at the Pipeworks Fun Market. The fourth respondent resides in Sydney and operates a stall at Flemington Markets.EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION AND IN OPPOSITION Nokia relied on affidavits sworn by its solicitor Luke Andrew Merrick on 24 February 2006, 27 February 2006, 16 March 2006, 20 March 2006, 9 May 2006, as well as two affidavits sworn by him on 8 May 2006. Nokia also relied on an affidavit sworn on 13 December 2005 by Omer Khan, an affidavit sworn by Alex Diaz on 5 May 2006, affidavits sworn on 21 February 2006 and 9 May 2006 by Sam Dakanalis, an affidavit sworn on 6 March 2006 by Huong Nguyen, and an affidavit sworn on 14 March 2006 by John Clifton Ramsden. As well, Nokia relied on affidavits sworn on 8 December 2005, 22 February 2006, 16 March 2006 and 28 April 2006 by Kenneth James Taylor. Nokia’s affidavits establish that the material on which it relied had been served on the respondents, although there was an issue at the hearing concerning the service of two exhibits. It is unnecessary to resolve that issue. The first and second respondents have filed affidavits sworn by the second respondent, Abbas Zeitoun, on 6 February 2006 and 20 April 2006, and an affidavit sworn by Sam Assi on 20 April 2006. Pursuant to my order of 28 February 2006, Abbas Zeitoun’s affidavit of 6 February 2006 stands as the defence of the first and second respondents. The third respondent has filed an appearance but no other documents in this proceeding. On 24 February 2006, the fourth respondent filed a document titled “Defence for Eric Kim” which, although it was not in the proper form for a defence, stands as the fourth respondent’s defence pursuant to my order of 28 February 2006. As O 20 r 1 of the Rules requires, Mr Merrick has deposed that he did not believe that the respondents had a defence to the allegations of trade mark infringement made by Nokia in the proceeding. The evidence on which Nokia relies establishes that it is incorporated under the laws of Finland and is the registered proprietor of the Nokia Trade Marks. Searches undertaken by Mr Merrick also show that, as at 21 February 2006, the first respondent was registered as a company in New South Wales. According to Mr Merrick, he sent a letter to the first respondent on 30 May 2005 alleging that it was importing and offering for sale goods infringing the Nokia Trade Marks. He also said that, on 24 June 2003, his firm received a Deed of Undertaking signed by the second respondent on behalf of the first respondent by which the first respondent undertook not to use the Nokia Trade Marks in any manner. Mr Merrick deposed to searches of the Victorian Business Names Register, which disclosed that the name “Tunjay Electronics” was registered as a business name on 16 September 2003 and that the proprietor of that name was the third respondent.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the hearing, counsel for Nokia also submitted that, if the matter went to trial, then it would submit that, whether or not the second respondent was a director of the first respondent, he was its proper officer. Counsel pointed out that the second respondent had signed undertakings purportedly on behalf of the first respondent. CONSIDERATION Order 20 rule 1 of the Rules provides as follows:“(1)Where, in relation to the whole or any part of the applicant’s claim for relief, there is evidence of the facts on which the claim or part is based, and– (a)there is evidence given by the applicant or by some responsible person that, in the belief of the person giving the evidence, the respondent has no defence to the claim or part; or(b)the respondent’s defence discloses no answer to the applicant’s claim or part;the Court may pronounce judgment for the applicant on that claim or part and make such orders as the nature of the case requires.(2)Where the Court pronounces judgment against a party under this rule, and that party claims relief against the party obtaining the judgment, the Court may stay execution on, or other enforcement of, the judgment until determination of the claim by the party against whom the judgment is directed to be entered.(3)The Court in any application under this rule may give such directions, whether for amendment of the pleadings or otherwise, as may be thought fit.” Prior to the enactment of s 31A of the Federal Court Act, the standard to be satisfied before summary judgment would be granted was settled law. The authorities made it clear that the jurisdiction to give summary judgment should be exercised with great care and only where the Court was satisfied that the respondent had no arguable defence to the claim made by the applicant: see, e.g., Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129-130; Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 (“Fancourt”) at 99; and Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 (“Webster”). As the applicant conceded, s 31A of the Federal Court Act does not apply to this proceeding. Accordingly, the Court should apply the authorities cited above. Whether or not the Court is satisfied that that there is no real question to be tried (see Fancourt at 99) will depend entirely on the circumstances of the case. By its affidavits, Nokia is required to make out such facts as are necessary for its cause of action: see Rourke v Victorian Finance Guarantee and Share Co Ltd (1894) 20 VLR 8 at 11 and Evans Deakin & Co Pty Ltd v Kaiser Engineers and Constructors Inc [1968] Qd R 379 at 382. Once Nokia has filed the requisite affidavits, the respondents must place evidence before the Court that deals specifically with the Nokia’s claim, and state clearly what their defence is and what facts are relied on to support that defence. A mere general denial is usually not sufficient to avoid summary judgment: see Wallingford v The Mutual Society (1880) 5 AC 685 at 704; also O 11 r 13 of the Rules. Where the outcome of a case depends on the resolution of disputed facts, the Court should be especially cautious to order summary judgment: see Webster at 603 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ. The Court should approach an application for summary judgment on the basis that the respondent’s evidence, if not inherently credible, will be accepted at trial, and on the basis that the Court should consider the material to determine whether it discloses either an arguable defence or material that might give rise to an arguable defence: see Webster at 603 and Geoffrey Inc v Luik (1997) 38 IPR 555 at 557 per RD Nicholson J. The Court retains discretion to refuse summary judgment, although that discretion must be exercised judicially.