Nokia Corporation v Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nokia Corporation v Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 980

Costs– whether costs should follow the event – apportionment of costs among respondents

Nokia Corporation v Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 726 referred to
Gladstone Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Ross Wills (1984) 6 FCR 496 referred to
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 referred to
Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333 referred to

NOKIA CORPORATION v CELLULAR LINE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 093 296 694), ABBAS ZEITOUN, TUNCAY AKYILDIZ AND ERIC SOO WOONG KIM
VID 1484 OF 2005

KENNY J
11 AUGUST 2006
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1484 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

NOKIA CORPORATION
Applicant

AND:

CELLULAR LINE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 093 296 694)
First Respondent

ABBAS ZEITOUN
Second Respondent

TUNCAY AKYILDIZ
Third Respondent

ERIC SOO WOONG KIM
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 AUGUST 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Subject to 2 below, the respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the motion, notice of which was filed on 24 February 2006.

2.The costs of the applicant be apportioned between the respondents as follows:

(a)       60 per cent be paid by the first and second respondents;

(b)       20 per cent be paid by the third respondent; and

(c)20 per cent be paid by the fourth respondent (less 20 per cent of costs referable to the applicant’s costs of preparing evidence of sales of counterfeit products after 24 February 2006).

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1484 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

NOKIA CORPORATION
Applicant

AND:

CELLULAR LINE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 093 296 694)
First Respondent

ABBAS ZEITOUN
Second Respondent

TUNCAY AKYILDIZ
Third Respondent

ERIC SOO WOONG KIM
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE:

11 AUGUST 2006

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 14 June 2006, I delivered reasons for judgment and ordered that there be summary judgment for the applicant against the respondents: Nokia Corporation v Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 726 (“Nokia”).  I assume familiarity with those reasons.  At [61] I noted that:

    “At the hearing, I suggested to the parties that they might turn their minds to whether or not costs should be equally proportioned between the respondents.  It seemed to me that the third and fourth respondents had not seriously contested the summary judgment motion; and that this should be reflected in any costs order.  I also noted, and counsel for Nokia agreed, that the third and fourth respondents were alleged to have engaged in a lower volume of infringing conduct than the first and second respondents.  I proposed to hear the parties on the matter of costs after delivering these reasons.”

    I ordered that the parties file written submissions on costs.  The disposition of costs now falls for determination.

    SUBMISSIONS

  2. The…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 980
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Nokia Corporation v Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) dealt with a dispute concerning intellectual property infringement, specifically the unauthorised sale of counterfeit products bearing Nokia's trademarks. The matter was before the court to decide the allocation of costs following a successful summary judgment against the respondents. The applicant, Nokia Corporation, sought an award of costs against the four respondents, who were involved in the sale of counterfeit products.

The primary legal issue was the apportionment of costs among the respondents, given that the first and second respondents were found to be closely linked in their business operations, while the third and fourth respondents operated independently. The court considered whether the general rule of costs following in favour of the successful party applied and whether any special circumstances existed that would warrant a deviation from this rule. The fourth respondent argued against costs being awarded based on admissions made after proceedings had commenced, but this did not satisfy the court as sufficient grounds for not awarding costs.

The court found that there were no special circumstances to justify departing from the general rule that a successful litigant is entitled to costs. The first and second respondents did not provide any justification for avoiding their liability for costs, and the court rejected the fourth respondent's argument based on admissions made post-commencement of proceedings and the possibility of a settlement. The court noted that the principles of Calderbank v Calderbank did not apply since no offer of compromise had been rejected. The court concluded that the first and second respondents, being jointly and severally liable, should bear the majority of the costs, while the third and fourth respondents should bear a lesser portion based on the scale of their involvement in the infringement.

The court ordered that the respondents collectively pay the applicant's costs of the motion filed on 24 February 2006. Specifically, the first and second respondents were to bear 60% of the costs, the third respondent 20%, and the fourth respondent 20%, with a deduction for costs related to evidence of sales of counterfeit products post-24 February 2006. This apportionment was based on the evidence of Mr Merrick and the court's assessment of the case's scale against each respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Subject to 2 below, the respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the motion, notice of which was filed on 24 February 2006.

2. The costs of the applicant be apportioned between the respondents as follows:

(a) 60 per cent be paid by the first and second respondents;

(b) 20 per cent be paid by the third respondent; and

(c) 20 per cent be paid by the fourth respondent (less 20 per cent of costs referable to the applicant’s costs of preparing evidence of sales of counterfeit products after 24 February 2006).

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J (dissent)

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The first and second respondents did not file any submissions as to costs.CONSIDERATION A successful litigant is ordinarily entitled to an award of costs: see, e.g., Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 97 per McHugh J (dissenting in result) and 120-1 per Kirby J. In this case, I have ordered summary judgment against the respondents. Thus, absent special circumstances, the respondents should pay the applicant’s costs. Whilst I am aware of the third respondent’s position, he has not advanced any justification, which, as a matter of law, would permit a departure from the general rule as to costs. As noted already, the fourth respondent argued that there should be no costs ordered against him because he admitted selling counterfeit products and because the case against him could have settled. I am also not satisfied, however, that there are sufficient grounds for departing from the general rule with respect to the fourth respondent. It is clear from the evidence that the applicant sought to place the fourth respondent on notice that proceedings might be filed. It may well be that, after further negotiations, settlement could have been reached between the applicant and the fourth respondent. The fourth respondent has not, however, alleged and shown that the applicant rejected an offer of compromise. Thus, the principles of Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333 do not apply. While the fourth respondent’s admissions, which were made after the institution of the proceedings, may be relevant as to what costs should be ordered against him (see [15] below) these admissions are not sufficient to avoid a costs order altogether. The first and second respondents have not contended that costs should not be awarded against them according to the ordinary rule. I see no reason why they too should not pay costs. The remaining issue, therefore, is apportionment. The second respondent is a manager of the first respondent. In Nokia at [56], I found that no other person plays an active role in the first respondent’s business. I accept the applicant’s submission that, in these circumstances, any costs order against these respondents should bind them jointly and severally. Aside from the close link between the first and second respondents, there are no other links between the respondents. The businesses of the third and fourth respondents are totally independent. Therefore, I find that costs should be apportioned amongst the respondents upon the basis the applicant has proposed. As a starting point, I accept the evidence of Mr Merrick concerning the proportion of the costs attributable to each respondent. These figures were based on his review of the applicant’s files. Mr Merrick’s estimates are also commensurate with my sense of the scale of the case against each of the respondents. Therefore, I find it appropriate to order that the first and second respondents should bear 60% of the costs of the proceeding. Similarly, I would order that the third respondent pay 20% of the costs of the proceeding.