FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (ACN 064 829 616)
(No 2) [2008] FCA 691PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – motion to dismiss under s 31A Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and O 11 r 16 Federal Court Rules – leave to file further amended application and statement of claim
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEE – superannuation – alleged entitlement to total and permanent disablement pension – principles of judicial review of trustee’s discretion – significance of failure to give reasons for decision
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules O 11 r 16
Misrepresentation Act 1972 (SA)
Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 370 cited
Minehan v AGL Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd (1998) 134 ACTR 1 cited
Neil v Nott (1994) 121 ALR 148 cited
Jeffrey Guy Baker v Local Government Superannuation Scheme Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1173 cited
Hay v Total Risk Management Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 94 cited
Sayseng v Kellogg Superannuation Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 945 cited
Flegeltaub v Telstra Super Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 107 cited
Vidovic v Email Superannuation Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Bryson J, 3 March 1995) cited
Maciejewski v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 601 cited
Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Thompson (2002) 116 FCR 139 cited
Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161 citedFord and Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts
Butler LM, “Reviewing Trustees’ Decisions: The Right to Reasons” (1999) 7 Aust Property LJ 251KAZIMIR KOWALSKI v MMAL STAFF SUPERANNUATION FUND PTY LTD (ACN 064 829 616) AND AMP SUPERANNUATION LIMITED (ACN 008 414 104)
SAD 11 OF 2007
FINN J
20 MAY 2008
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD 11 OF 2007
BETWEEN:
KAZIMIR KOWALSKI
Applicant
AND:
MMAL STAFF SUPERANNUATION FUND PTY LTD
(ACN 064 829 616)
First RespondentAMP SUPERANNUATION LIMITED
(ACN 008 414 104)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FINN J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 MAY 2008
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The amended statement of claim be struck out.
2.Leave be granted to the applicant to file and serve a further amended application and further amended statement of claim.
3.The costs of this motion be the respondents’ costs in the cause.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD 11 OF 2007
BETWEEN:
KAZIMIR KOWALSKI
Applicant
AND:
MMAL STAFF SUPERANNUATION FUND PTY LTD
(ACN 064 829 616)
First RespondentAMP SUPERANNUATION LIMITED
(ACN 008 414 104)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FINN J
DATE:
20 MAY 2008
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The motion before me is a predictable sequel to the circumscribed leave I gave Mr Kowalski in Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 370 to file and serve an…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 691
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the pleading sufficiently demonstrated a cause of action against the respondents, given the terms of the Trust Deed and the definition of "Total and Permanent Disablement" within it. The Trust Deed required the trustee to form an opinion on Mr Kowalski's incapacity based on medical evidence, a determination that was within the trustee's discretion and not the court's. The court found that Mr Kowalski's claim for a TPD Benefit was contingent on a favourable determination by the trustee, and without such a determination, he did not have an absolute entitlement to the benefit. Furthermore, the court noted that even if there was a duty for the trustee to consider medical evidence, the most Mr Kowalski could seek was a direction for the trustee to reconsider the matter, which he did not pursue in this proceeding.
In conclusion, the court decided that the amended statement of claim did not sufficiently disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action. Consequently, the court struck out the amended statement of claim and granted Mr Kowalski leave to file and serve a further amended application and statement of claim. The costs of the motion were awarded to the respondents.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The amended statement of claim be struck out.
2. Leave be granted to the applicant to file and serve a further amended application and further amended statement of claim.
3. The costs of this motion be the respondents’ costs in the cause.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FINN J
The response made to the above letter was by letter dated 24 February 2006 and came from MMA Super’s solicitors. It said:We refer to recent letters to the Trustee in respect to your “formal” application for a TPD benefit from the Fund dated 3 November 2005.We are instructed that the Trustee has previously considered and declined your claim for a TPD benefit from the Fund arising from your employment to 16 March 1994 and including its cessation on that date. The trustee is of the opinion that your letter of 3 November 2005 and its annexures raise no new issues.We have again been instructed by the Trustee that we will not be responding to any matters that you have previously raised and which have been dealt with. The Trustee has made its position clear in respect to your entitlement to a TPD benefit from the Fund in previous correspondence and this position remains unchanged.CONSIDERATION Disregarding the wholly inappropriate claims made under the Misrepresentation Act, the Fair Trading Act and the Corporations Act, the deficiencies of the amended statement of claim are obvious enough. The single question raised by the pleading is whether, having regard to the circumstances of Mr Kowalski’s cessation of employment by MMAL on 16 March 1994 and the terms of the Trust Deed and its Schedule C, the pleading sufficiently discloses a reasonably arguable cause of action against MMA Super – hence AMP Super – in respect of its administration of the fund vis-à-vis Mr Kowalski. The technical answer to that question must be no. While the structure of the Trust Deed and Schedule C is such that, in the circumstances, Mr Kowalski had some entitlement to be paid a sum out of the fund, the deed did not give him any absolute entitlement to be paid a TPD Benefit as such. For such a benefit to be payable the trustee had to determine whether Mr Kowalski fell within the definition of “Total and Permanent Disablement” in cl 1(6) of the Trust Deed. Part (b) of that definition required the trustee to form an opinion as to whether Mr Kowalski was incapacitated to such an extent as to render him unlikely ever to engage or work for reward in any occupation for which he is reasonably suited by education, training or experience. The cl 1(6) determination and the opinion embedded in it were ones for the trustee not the court: see Ford and Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts, [5185] and the cases cited therein. Accordingly, absent a favourable determination by the trustee, it cannot be said, as Mr Kowalski claims in his pleading, that he has an entitlement to a TPD Benefit: but cf Minehan v AGL Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd (1998) 134 ACTR 1 at [68] where the court itself executed the trust – a rare event. Again the pleading alleges repeated failures by the trustee to consider any of the medical evidence that was available to it and hence whether he was entitled to a TPD Benefit. Assuming that there were times at which a duty to consider so arose, the most that Mr Kowalski could expect from a court by way of relief – if any – would be a direction to the trustee to consider whether, in the circumstances, a cl 1(6) determination should be made and this on the basis of an unreasonable and culpable failure to consider the matter. Mr Kowalski does not seek such relief in this proceeding.