Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (ACN 064 829 616)
(No 2) [2008] FCA 691

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – motion to dismiss under s 31A Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and O 11 r 16 Federal Court Rules – leave to file further amended application and statement of claim

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEE – superannuation – alleged entitlement to total and permanent disablement pension – principles of judicial review of trustee’s discretion – significance of failure to give reasons for decision

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules O 11 r 16
Misrepresentation Act 1972 (SA)
Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 370 cited
Minehan v AGL Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd (1998) 134 ACTR 1 cited
Neil v Nott (1994) 121 ALR 148 cited
Jeffrey Guy Baker v Local Government Superannuation Scheme Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1173 cited
Hay v Total Risk Management Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 94 cited
Sayseng v Kellogg Superannuation Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 945 cited
Flegeltaub v Telstra Super Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 107 cited
Vidovic v Email Superannuation Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Bryson J, 3 March 1995) cited
Maciejewski v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 601 cited
Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Thompson (2002) 116 FCR 139 cited
Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161 cited

Ford and Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts
Butler LM, “Reviewing Trustees’ Decisions:  The Right to Reasons” (1999) 7 Aust Property LJ 251

KAZIMIR KOWALSKI v MMAL STAFF SUPERANNUATION FUND PTY LTD (ACN 064 829 616) AND AMP SUPERANNUATION LIMITED (ACN 008 414 104)

SAD 11 OF 2007

FINN J
20 MAY 2008
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 11 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

KAZIMIR KOWALSKI
Applicant

AND:

MMAL STAFF SUPERANNUATION FUND PTY LTD
(ACN 064 829 616)
First Respondent

AMP SUPERANNUATION LIMITED
(ACN 008 414 104)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 MAY 2008

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The amended statement of claim be struck out.

2.Leave be granted to the applicant to file and serve a further amended application and further amended statement of claim.

3.The costs of this motion be the respondents’ costs in the cause.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 11 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

KAZIMIR KOWALSKI
Applicant

AND:

MMAL STAFF SUPERANNUATION FUND PTY LTD
(ACN 064 829 616)
First Respondent

AMP SUPERANNUATION LIMITED
(ACN 008 414 104)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE:

20 MAY 2008

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The motion before me is a predictable sequel to the circumscribed leave I gave Mr Kowalski in Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 370 to file and serve an…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 691
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (No 2), the applicant, Mr Kowalski, sought relief from the Federal Court of Australia concerning his superannuation entitlements after the cessation of his employment with Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (MMAL). The respondent entities, MMA Super and AMP Super, sought to have the proceedings dismissed or the statement of claim struck out on the basis that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The central issue before the court was whether Mr Kowalski's amended statement of claim adequately disclosed a reasonably arguable cause of action against the respondents regarding the administration of the superannuation fund in relation to his claim for a Total and Permanent Disablement (TPD) benefit.

The court considered whether the pleading sufficiently demonstrated a cause of action against the respondents, given the terms of the Trust Deed and the definition of "Total and Permanent Disablement" within it. The Trust Deed required the trustee to form an opinion on Mr Kowalski's incapacity based on medical evidence, a determination that was within the trustee's discretion and not the court's. The court found that Mr Kowalski's claim for a TPD Benefit was contingent on a favourable determination by the trustee, and without such a determination, he did not have an absolute entitlement to the benefit. Furthermore, the court noted that even if there was a duty for the trustee to consider medical evidence, the most Mr Kowalski could seek was a direction for the trustee to reconsider the matter, which he did not pursue in this proceeding.

In conclusion, the court decided that the amended statement of claim did not sufficiently disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action. Consequently, the court struck out the amended statement of claim and granted Mr Kowalski leave to file and serve a further amended application and statement of claim. The costs of the motion were awarded to the respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended statement of claim be struck out.

2. Leave be granted to the applicant to file and serve a further amended application and further amended statement of claim.

3. The costs of this motion be the respondents’ costs in the cause.

Background

Background to the litigation

The motion before me is a predictable sequel to the circumscribed leave I gave Mr Kowalski in Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 370 to file and serve an amended application and statement of claim. That leave was exercised but the respondents (MMA Super and AMP Super) now seek orders either that the proceedings be summarily dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), or that the statement of claim be struck out under O 11 r 16 of the Federal Court Rules as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. I intend taking the latter course for the reason that, while the pleading is misguided in its thrust, it cannot be said that the underlying complaint that appears to inform it may not suggest a reasonable cause of action. In their submissions the respondents, while not admitting this to be the case, have come close to identifying that cause of action, though without conceding that it is reasonably arguable or that they do not have a good defence to it.BACKGROUND As I indicated in Kowalski (No 1), the actual dispute between Mr Kowalski and his past employer, Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (MMAL), has a long history dating to before 16 March 1994 when his employment with that company ceased. MMA Super, a subsidiary of MMAL, was the trustee of the MMA Staff Superannuation Fund and was brought into that dispute because of claims Mr Kowalski has asserted as to his superannuation entitlements consequent upon the cessation of his employment with MMAL. It is unnecessary for present purposes to outline the many proceedings he has brought against MMAL and MMA Super. Though his complaints in substance relate to defaults of MMA Super, AMP Super has been joined in this proceeding because by a deed of 15 June 2006 the trust fund was transferred to it as trustee and MMA Super was then wound up as a superannuation entity. The relief Mr Kowalski seeks includes an order for payment of a sum of money out of the fund, hence the joinder of AMP Super. The trust rules of the fund that was administered by MMA Super and on which Mr Kowalski seeks to rely as they relate to his alleged “entitlements” provide (Rule C.7) that in the event of his retirement “from the employ of [MMAL] before his Normal Retirement due to his Total and Permanent Disablement”, he is to be paid a lump sum from the Fund in accordance with the relevant rules (“a TPD Benefit”) which lump sum, it is claimed in his pleading, represented an entitlement of $181,195.00 as at 1 July 1991. Clause 1(6) of the fund’s Trust Deed defined “Total and Permanent Disablement” as follows:Total and Permanent Disablement” means in relation to a Member disablement due to illness accident or injury as a result of which –(a)he has been continuously absent from employment with the Employer for a period of at least six months (or such lesser period as the Trustee may determine in any particular case); and (b)he is, in the opinion of the Trustee after consideration of medical evidence satisfactory to them, incapacitated to such an extent as to render him unlikely ever to engage or work for reward in any occupation for which he is reasonably suited by education, training or experience.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

The response made to the above letter was by letter dated 24 February 2006 and came from MMA Super’s solicitors. It said:We refer to recent letters to the Trustee in respect to your “formal” application for a TPD benefit from the Fund dated 3 November 2005.We are instructed that the Trustee has previously considered and declined your claim for a TPD benefit from the Fund arising from your employment to 16 March 1994 and including its cessation on that date. The trustee is of the opinion that your letter of 3 November 2005 and its annexures raise no new issues.We have again been instructed by the Trustee that we will not be responding to any matters that you have previously raised and which have been dealt with. The Trustee has made its position clear in respect to your entitlement to a TPD benefit from the Fund in previous correspondence and this position remains unchanged.CONSIDERATION Disregarding the wholly inappropriate claims made under the Misrepresentation Act, the Fair Trading Act and the Corporations Act, the deficiencies of the amended statement of claim are obvious enough. The single question raised by the pleading is whether, having regard to the circumstances of Mr Kowalski’s cessation of employment by MMAL on 16 March 1994 and the terms of the Trust Deed and its Schedule C, the pleading sufficiently discloses a reasonably arguable cause of action against MMA Super – hence AMP Super – in respect of its administration of the fund vis-à-vis Mr Kowalski. The technical answer to that question must be no. While the structure of the Trust Deed and Schedule C is such that, in the circumstances, Mr Kowalski had some entitlement to be paid a sum out of the fund, the deed did not give him any absolute entitlement to be paid a TPD Benefit as such. For such a benefit to be payable the trustee had to determine whether Mr Kowalski fell within the definition of “Total and Permanent Disablement” in cl 1(6) of the Trust Deed. Part (b) of that definition required the trustee to form an opinion as to whether Mr Kowalski was incapacitated to such an extent as to render him unlikely ever to engage or work for reward in any occupation for which he is reasonably suited by education, training or experience. The cl 1(6) determination and the opinion embedded in it were ones for the trustee not the court: see Ford and Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts, [5185] and the cases cited therein. Accordingly, absent a favourable determination by the trustee, it cannot be said, as Mr Kowalski claims in his pleading, that he has an entitlement to a TPD Benefit: but cf Minehan v AGL Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd (1998) 134 ACTR 1 at [68] where the court itself executed the trust – a rare event. Again the pleading alleges repeated failures by the trustee to consider any of the medical evidence that was available to it and hence whether he was entitled to a TPD Benefit. Assuming that there were times at which a duty to consider so arose, the most that Mr Kowalski could expect from a court by way of relief – if any – would be a direction to the trustee to consider whether, in the circumstances, a cl 1(6) determination should be made and this on the basis of an unreasonable and culpable failure to consider the matter. Mr Kowalski does not seek such relief in this proceeding.