Sweeney v Credit Union Australia Limited (ACN 087 650 959) (t/as Great Southern Bank)

Case [2025] QDC 19


DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Sweeney v Credit Union Australia Limited (ACN 087 650 959) (t/as Great Southern Bank) [2025] QDC 19

PARTIES:

BRANDON NICHOLAS SWEENEY

(appellant)

v

CREDIT UNION AUSTRALIA LIMITED
(ACN 087 650 959)

(TRADING AS GREAT SOUTHERN BANK)

(respondent)

FILE NO:

2267/24

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

4 March 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

28 February 2025

JUDGE:

Farr SC, DCJ

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to this appeal on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – CIVIL APPEAL – NATURE OF APPEAL – APPEAL AGAINST SUMMARY JUDGMENT – where the respondent brought a claim against the appellant to recover monies owing under a loan agreement – where the respondent applied for and obtained summary judgment in the Magistrates court  - where the appellant contends no loan contract was signed – where the appellant contends the learned Magistrate did not provide adequate reasons for decision – whether the learned Magistrate erred in granting summary judgment to the respondent

LEGISLATION:

Magistrates Court Act 1921 (Qld) 

Uniform Civil Procedures Rules 1999 (Qld)

CASES:

Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172

Builders Licencing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd & Anor (1976) 135 CLR 616

Cypressvale Pty Ltd v Retail Shop Leases Tribunal [1996] 2 Qd R 462

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232

Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Jorgensen v Body Corporate for Cairns Central Plaza Apartments [2020] QDC 300

Kowalski v MMALStaff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 404; [2009] FCFCA 117

Lunapas Pty Ltd v Murphy [2019] QDC 111

Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353

Queensland Pork Pty Ltd v Lott [2003] QCA 271

Queensland University of Technology v Project Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2003] 1 Qd R 259

Re: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte v Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407

Shaw v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2016] QCA 275

Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VR

Suncorp Insurance and Finance v Hill [1998] QCA 112

Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91

Walsh v Toyota Finance Australia Ltd (No 3) [2016] QDC 336

Willmot v McLeay [2013] QCA 84

COUNSEL:
SOLICITORS:

The appellant is self-represented.

HWL Ebsworth, lawyers for the respondent

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal against an order made in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 26 July 2024 granting summary judgment for the plaintiff (the respondent in this appeal) for the recovery of $39,967.10 as a debt owed under a loan agreement plus costs.

  2. The appellant’s grounds of appeal are:

    1.the learned Magistrate gave inadequate reasons;

    2.the learned Magistrate erred in granting summary judgment, because the Loan Contract…

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Details
AGLC
Sweeney v Credit Union Australia Limited (ACN 087 650 959) (t/as Great Southern Bank) [2025] QDC 19
Case
[2025] QDC 19
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sweeney v Credit Union Australia Limited (ACN 087 650 959) (t/as Great Southern Bank) is an appeal against summary judgment obtained by the respondent, Credit Union Australia Limited, in the Magistrates Court. The appellant, Sweeney, contends that no loan contract was signed and that the Magistrate did not provide adequate reasons for granting summary judgment. The central issue before the court was whether the Magistrate erred in granting summary judgment to the respondent.

The court addressed the nature of the appeal and the criteria for granting summary judgment. The court noted that the applicant must prove the claim and persuade the court that there is no real prospect of the appellant succeeding. If the applicant demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the respondent. If there is no real prospect, the applicant is ordinarily entitled to judgment. The court found that the appellant's submissions were without merit, as the evidence included a Personal Loan Acceptance Form bearing the appellant's digital signature. This form comprehensively identified the Loan Contract and was considered as binding as a signature on the contract itself. The court also noted that an agreement can be binding through conduct, and the evidence presented by the respondent included the Loan Contract, credit of the loan amount to the appellant's account, and the appellant drawing down on the loan.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal on the standard basis. The decision underscores the importance of proving a claim and the criteria for granting summary judgment. The court found that the respondent had sufficiently demonstrated a prima facie case, and the appellant had no real prospect of success. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to this appeal on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The words “no real prospect” speak for themselves; they are directed to “realistic” as opposed to “fanciful” prospects of success.[25] The applicant bears the onus of proving the claim and persuading the Court that there is no real prospect of the appellant succeeding, though once a prima facia case has been made out, the evidentiary onus shifts to the respondent.[26] If there is no real prospect, then “ordinarily” the applicant is entitled to judgment.[27][25]Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91 at 92, approved in Salcedo at 242 [47].[26]Queensland Pork Pty Ltd v Lott [2003] QCA 271 at [41].[27]Salcedo at 234 [11] and 242 [47].Consideration and determination of the appellant’s submissions The appellant’s admission that the learned Magistrate erred by ordering summary judgment because the appellant had not signed the Loan Contract is without merit. The evidence before the Court included a Personal Loan Acceptance Form bearing the appellant’s digital signature. That acceptance form comprehensively and accurately identified and referred to the Loan Contract in question. The appellant’s digital signature on the acceptance form was to the same effect as a signature on the contract itself, and resulted in it being a binding contract. Regardless of that fact however, it is well established that an agreement need not be signed to be binding. An agreement can also be made and accepted by conduct.[28][28]Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353. The appellant has also submitted that as the Statement of Claim only referred to ‘two documents that comprise the Loan Contract’, they being(a)the Offer and Loan Contract (Loan Schedule) dated 24 March 2021; and(b)the Terms of Personal Loan Contract (Terms and Conditions);then, the ‘Personal Loan Acceptance Form’ is an irrelevant document to the issue at hand. He also submits that, the respondent is not permitted to rely upon conduct as evidence of acceptance of conduct, as it was not specifically pleaded. Such submissions are demonstrably without merit. The Statement of Claim correctly identifies the contract documents, as it must, and asserts that such contract was accepted by the appellant. How it was accepted by the appellant, however, is a matter for evidence, and need not be specifically pleaded. In this matter, the respondent adduced evidence of:(a)the Loan Contract;(b)the credit of the loan amount to the appellant’s account;[29] and(c)the fact that the appellant drew down on the loan (a fact admitted by the appellant).[29]The appellant argued at first instance that the credit of an account did not evidence an advance. This is contrary to the decision of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471 at [45]-[47], where their Honours held that the crediting of a bank account is a legally effective transaction capable of assigning value, and that a loan does not require “real” money to be lent. So in this matter, evidence of a binding contract, based both on written form and on conduct, was before the Court.