Mattner v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

MATTNER v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (CTH)

[2011] SASC 89

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Kelly

25 May 2011

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - POWERS OF COURT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION - STATE CONSTITUTIONS, POWERS AND LAWS

MAGISTRATES - JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE GENERALLY - JURISDICTION, POWERS AND DUTIES - SUBJECT MATTER - SUMMARY TRIAL OF INDICTABLE OFFENCES

JURY - ENTITLEMENT TO TRIAL BY JURY

Application for withdrawal of notice of discontinuance of appeal against conviction recorded in the Magistrates Court – applicant convicted of four counts of misuse of a carriage service contrary to s 474.17(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) – applicant filed notice of appeal and subsequent notice of discontinuance on advice from senior counsel – applicant sought extension of time within which to file further grounds of appeal – s 4J of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides for summary disposition of indictable offences with the consent of prosecution and defendant – applicant unrepresented at the trial – whether s 4J of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) inconsistent with s 80 of the Constitution – whether applicant properly consented to summary determination.

Held: Applicant to withdraw notice of discontinuance allowed – extension of time to file amended grounds of appeal permitted – appeal allowed – constitutional validity of s 4J of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) has been settled by the High Court – indictable offences charged did not proceed to trial n indictment – no evidence that applicant made an informed choice about whether to consent to summary determination – applicant effectively deprived of her right to trial by jury –no substantial delay in applying for withdrawal of notice of discontinuance.

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 474.17(1); Crimes Regulations 1990 (Cth); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 4 and r 117; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 39; Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Cth) s 80; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4J, s 12, s 12A and s 30K, referred to.
R v Brain (1999) 74 SASR 92; R v Archdall and Roskruge; Ex parte Carrigan and Brown (1928) 41 CLR 128 ; Kingswell v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 264; Cheng v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 248, discussed.
Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd; Attorney-General for the State of South Australia v Garrett [2009] SASC 19; Rule Chambers Pty Ltd v Badge Constructions (SA) Pty Ltd (2009) 261 LSJS 434; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154; Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314; R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556; Sachter v Attorney-General (Cth) (1954) 94 CLR 86; Zarb v Kennedy (1968) 121 CLR 283; Li Chia Hsing v Rankin (1978) 141 CLR 182; Brown v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 171, considered.

WORDS…

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Details
Case
[2011] SASC 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant in this matter, Michelle Mattner, appealed against her conviction in the Magistrates Court of South Australia. She was found guilty of four counts of misuse of a carriage service contrary to s 474.17(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The central issue in this case was whether the applicant had properly consented to the summary determination of the indictable offences under s 4J of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), and whether this was consistent with her constitutional right to trial by jury under s 80 of the Constitution.

The court examined whether the applicant, who was unrepresented during the trial, had made an informed choice about consenting to the summary determination. The court found that there was no evidence that the applicant had made such a choice, and therefore, she was effectively deprived of her right to a trial by jury. Furthermore, the court noted that the constitutional validity of s 4J of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) had already been settled by the High Court, and that the applicant's indictable offences did not proceed to trial by indictment.

The court allowed the applicant to withdraw the notice of discontinuance of her appeal and granted an extension of time to file further grounds of appeal. The appeal was allowed on the ground that the applicant was effectively deprived of her right to trial by jury. The court held that the applicant's constitutional rights had been infringed and that there was no substantial delay in applying for the withdrawal of the notice of discontinuance. The court's decision highlights the importance of ensuring that a defendant is fully informed of their rights and the consequences of consenting to a summary determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The history of this matter is not without its complications. Since the applicant was arrested on 2 April 2009 she has, for significant periods of time, been unrepresented. That factor has not only added to the complications but is of central significance to my conclusion in this matter which is, that the applicant should be permitted to withdraw the notice of discontinuance and that the applicant succeeds in relation to one ground of appeal. Background On 2 April 2009 the applicant was arrested and charged with four counts of using a carriage service in such a way that a reasonable person would regard that use as being menacing, harassing or offensive contrary to s 474.17(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The applicant was initially represented by Vadasz Lawyers who corresponded with the SAPOL Elizabeth Criminal Justice Section and the respondent on 9 April 2009 and 14 May 2009 respectively requesting information from the prosecution concerning the information and the allegations and requesting certain documents and video and audio material. In the first of these letters the lawyers advised that since her arrest the applicant had been suspended from her employment and it was therefore a matter of concern that the charges be prosecuted without delay. In the second communication the lawyers reiterated that although the applicant had since returned to work under supervision it was a matter of concern that the charges be prosecuted without delay. The matter first came before the Elizabeth Magistrates Court on 12 May 2009 when the matter appears to have been simply adjourned to 14 July 2009 for further hearing. Meanwhile on 19 June 2009 Rosey Batt & Associates lawyers wrote to the respondent indicating that they now had instructions to represent the applicant and requested a copy of the information and apprehension report. By correspondence dated 22 June 2009 the respondent replied by enclosing certain material that had been requested and indicated that the respondent would be laying a new information with respect to each victim before the next court date. That duly occurred and on 10 July 2009 the respondent sent the new information together with other material requested to the applicant’s then solicitors. The respondent says that attached to the three count information was a notice to the applicant in which the respondent advised that it consented to the matter being heard and determined by a court of summary jurisdiction. The terms of that notice are quite important and are set out in full below:DPPCommonwealth Director of Public ProsecutionsAdelaide OfficeNOTICE TO DEFENDANTMICHELLE MATTNERTHE PROSECUTION DOES CONSENT TO SUMMARY DETERMINATIONSection 4J of the Crimes Act (Commonwealth) provides:“Subject to subsection (2), an indictable offence (other than an offence referred to in subsection (4)) against a law of the Commonwealth, being an offence punishable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, may, unless the contrary intention appears, be heard and determined (with the consent of the prosecutor and the defendant) by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction.”The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions does consent to this matter being heard and determined by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction. [Emphasis in original]The notice was signed by Ms Propsting on behalf of the respondent.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KELLY J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KELLY J