Rapuano (t/as RAPS Electrical) v Karydis-Frisan

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Civil)

RAPUANO (TRADING AS RAPS ELECTRICAL) v KARYDIS FRISAN & ANOR

[2013] SASCFC 93

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Vanstone, The Honourable Justice David and The Honourable Justice Peek)

17 September 2013

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW - PARTICULAR CASES - OTHER MATTERS - COSTS

PROCEDURE - COSTS - APPEALS AS TO COSTS - MISTAKE OF LAW OR FACT

PROCEDURE - COSTS - GENERAL RULE - COSTS FOLLOW THE EVENT

PROCEDURE - INFERIOR COURTS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - DISTRICT COURT

PROCEDURE - COSTS - DEPARTING FROM THE GENERAL RULE - CONDUCT OF PARTIES - DEMAND, OFFER AND CONSENT

EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY AND RELEVANCY

PROCEDURE - COSTS - DEPARTING FROM THE GENERAL RULE - CONDUCT OF PARTIES - MISCONDUCT, ETC - IN PROCEEDINGS

PROCEDURE - COSTS - DEPARTING FROM THE GENERAL RULE - ORDER FOR COSTS ON INDEMNITY BASIS

The plaintiff (the appellant) was successful in his quantum meruit claim in the District Court, and sought an order for costs.  The defendants (the respondents) resisted that application on the basis that the plaintiff had not bettered a number of offers of settlement, both formal and informal, made prior to, and during the course of, the action.  The Judge found that an offer dated 2 December 2009 fell within r 187, District Court Civil Rules 2006 and that the plaintiff had not bettered that offer.  His Honour had made adverse findings at trial that the plaintiff had materially exaggerated aspects of his claim and the defendants had also engaged in misconduct in the course of the trial.  The Judge ordered that the defendants pay 70 per cent of the plaintiff's costs up to and including 16 December 2009 and that the plaintiff pay 85 per cent of the defendants' costs subsequent to 16 December 2009.  The plaintiff appealed and the defendants cross-appealed.

Held (Peek J; Vanstone J and David J agreeing, allowing the appeal and cross-appeal in part):

(1) The defendants' offer of 2 December 2009 was not a valid r 187 offer.

(i) Rule 187 specifically envisages the entry of a judgment by consent upon the acceptance of a complying offer.  Inconsistently with this, the offer required the plaintiff to file a Notice of Discontinuance upon acceptance.  This was not a mere procedural irregularity and it deprived the offer of any status under r 187.

(ii) A complying r 187 offer cannot purport to resolve claims not raised in the subject proceedings.  Paragraph 4 of the offer required the parties upon acceptance to enter into "a Deed of Release and Discharge releasing each other from any further claims in respect of works carried out by the Plaintiff at 28 Mellor Avenue Lockleys, South Australia".  The offer required resolution of claims or possible claims separate to the extant proceedings as a condition of acceptance and did not comply with r 187.

(iii) Paragraph 4 was uncertain as to the terms and…

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Details
Case
[2013] SASCFC 93
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal from the District Court of South Australia regarding an award of costs. The dispute arose from an electrical services contract where the plaintiff, Rapuano (t/as RAPS Electrical), sought to recover outstanding invoices and material costs. The defendants, Karydis-Frisan, admitted the plaintiff was entitled to payment on a quantum meruit basis but disputed the amounts claimed, alleging overstated hours, inflated material costs, and poor workmanship. The trial judge found the plaintiff to be an unreliable witness, making adverse findings regarding his timesheets and material cost claims, but also found the defendants' evidence to be lacking in credibility. Ultimately, the judge awarded the plaintiff $34,996 plus interest, a total of $38,496.

The central legal issues before the appellate court revolved around the trial judge's decision on costs. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the trial judge erred in his assessment of the admissibility of settlement offers and whether his departure from the general rule that costs follow the event was justified. The defendants argued that they should have been awarded costs because the plaintiff failed to better a number of settlement offers made prior to and during the litigation. They also contended that the plaintiff's lack of credibility and conduct warranted an indemnity costs order. The admissibility of these offers was contested, with arguments concerning compliance with relevant court rules and the application of section 67C of the Evidence Act 1929, which governs the admissibility of communications made in connection with settlement negotiations.

The appellate court considered the trial judge's reasoning regarding the admissibility of settlement offers. The judge had rejected the defendants' submissions that certain pre-action offers were admissible under Rule 33 of the District Court Civil Rules 2006, finding they did not meet the criteria for a valid offer under that rule. Furthermore, the judge found that informal offers were not admissible under section 67C(2) of the Evidence Act 1929. However, the judge did find that one offer, dated 2 December 2009, complied with Rule 187 of the District Court Civil Rules 2006. Despite this, the judge ultimately determined that none of the offers made by the defendants were sufficient to warrant a departure from the general rule that costs follow the event, and therefore ordered that the plaintiff should recover his costs.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's decision on costs. It found no error in the judge's assessment of the admissibility of the settlement offers, nor in his conclusion that the conduct of the parties and the offers made did not justify a departure from the general rule. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the plaintiff was awarded his costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

However, there followed a protracted argument as to the awarding of costs, particularly having regard to the fact that prior to, and over the course of, the action a number of documents relating to possible settlement had passed between the parties. Background facts It is necessary to refer briefly to some of the matters discussed in the Judge’s principal reasons in order to understand the factual background to the costs arguments. It is important to note that there was never an express contract between the plaintiff and the defendants. The scope of the work to be performed was ascertained from piecemeal instructions from the defendants on various occasions, which included several “walk arounds” at the site during which the first defendant identified to the plaintiff the various items of electrical work to be done. Over the course of the working relationship until 7 November 2008 (when the Judge found that the plaintiff’s access to the site was terminated by the first defendant), the plaintiff rendered three invoices. The defendants paid the whole of the first in the amount of $6,845; $5,000 of the second in the amount of $54,065; and none of the third in the amount of $15,235. At trial, the plaintiff sought to recover an amount of $83,473 (or alternatively an invoiced amount of $64,300) for those outstanding invoices and the cost of materials provided. The defendants, while agreeing that the plaintiff was entitled to claim the value of his work on a quantum meruit basis, resisted his claim on the grounds that the plaintiff had overstated his hours, the hours of his offsider (Mr Curry), and the cost of the materials the plaintiff had provided. They further alleged that the plaintiff’s work was overall of a poor standard. The Judge gave judgment for the plaintiff but found that he was not a credible or reliable witness and made adverse findings, including that he had: ·overstated the hours worked in the timesheets of both himself and Mr Curry;·overstated the cost of the materials provided;·falsified at least the first 12 dated timesheets (which appeared on printed forms containing an ABN number which only came into existence after the date of the last of those 12 timesheets); and·given vague and uncertain evidence in relation to his personal liability for GST. These matters are referred to in detail below in the context of the defendants’ cross-appeal. However, it is to be noted that the Judge was also “very unimpressed” with the evidence given by each of the defendants, both of whom he found to lack credibility and reliability; again, these matters are considered in detail below. Ultimately, the trial Judge relied on the evidence of Mr Curry,[2] Mr Lister (the standards officer from the Office of the Technical Regulator),[3] and that of the various expert witnesses proffered by each side;[4] his Honour found each of these witnesses to be credible and reliable.[5] On the basis of this evidence, his Honour awarded the plaintiff $34,996 plus $3,500 interest (a total of $38,496).[2] Rapuano (Trading as Raps Electrical) v Karydis-Frisan [2011] SADC 122 [318]-[321].[3] Rapuano (Trading as Raps Electrical) v Karydis-Frisan [2011] SADC 122 [329].[4] Rapuano (Trading as Raps Electrical) v Karydis-Frisan [2011] SADC 122 [147].[5] Rapuano (Trading as Raps Electrical) v Karydis-Frisan [2011] SADC 122 [386], [398].The Judge’s decision as to costs

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 67C(1), Evidence Act 1929 creates a general rule that informal communications directed at settling an action are inadmissible, with s 67C(2) then creating a number of limited exceptions to that rule:67C—Exclusion of evidence of settlement negotiations(1) Subject to this section, evidence of a communication made in connection with an attempt to negotiate the settlement of a civil dispute, or of a document prepared in connection with such an attempt, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceedings.(2) Such evidence is, however, admissible if—(a) the parties to the dispute consent; or(b)the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the parties to the dispute; or(c)the substance of the evidence has been partly disclosed with the express or implied consent of the parties to the dispute, and full disclosure of the evidence is reasonably necessary to—(i)enable a proper understanding of the other evidence that has already been adduced; or(ii) avoid unfairness to any of the parties to the dispute; or(d)the communication or document included a statement to the effect that it was not to be treated as confidential; or(e)the proceeding in which the evidence is to be adduced is a proceeding to enforce an agreement for the settlement of the dispute or a proceeding in which the making of such an agreement is in issue; or(f)the evidence tends to contradict or to qualify evidence that has already been admitted about the course of an attempt to settle the dispute; or(g)the making of the communication, or the preparation of the document, affects the rights of a party to the dispute; or(h)the communication was made, or the document was prepared, in furtherance of—(i) the commission of a fraud or an offence; or(ii)the doing of an act that renders a person liable to a civil penalty; or(iii) the abuse of a statutory power.(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to parts of a document that do not concern attempts to negotiate a settlement of a dispute, if it would not be misleading to adduce evidence of only those parts of the document.Section 67C(2)(c): Partial disclosure The defendants submit that each of the pre-action offers could be admitted under s 67C(2)(c) as their substance was partly disclosed with the express or implied consent of the parties to the dispute by the reference to endeavours to settle in the plaintiff’s endorsement on the summons pursuant to r 38, District Court Civil Rules 2006. The defendants submit that full disclosure of the evidence is reasonably necessary to avoid unfairness to them.[66][66] Evidence Act 1929 s 67C(2)(c)(ii). Section 67C(2)(c) was considered by Judge Lunn in Mair v Mazzitti (No 1).[67]His Honour made the following observations:[68][11]… When referring to “the substance of the evidence” and “full disclosure of the evidence” subs (2)(c) is referring to “evidence of a communication made in connection with an attempt to negotiate the settlement of a civil dispute” as referred to in subs (1). It is not referring to the evidence of the circumstances of the dispute but evidence of the communication. A similar interpretation also applies in respect of subs (2)(b) and other subparagraphs of subsection (2). If subs (2)(c) meant that once some evidence of the matters in dispute had been given by consent then everything said about the matters in dispute in negotiations would become admissible provided either subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection (2)(c) were satisfied, it would mean that parties to settlement negotiations would need to be very careful and circumspect about what was said and disclosed in negotiations and this would be likely to inhibit settlements. That is not the intention of s 67C. Rather, in the light of the purpose of s 67C, and in its context, subs (2)(c) means only that if part of the communication is put into evidence by consent then neither party can prevent the balance of the communication being put into evidence if subparagraphs (i) or (ii) are satisfied. (Subs (2)(c) was considered by the Full Court in Chapman v Allan (1999) 74 SASR 274, but the issue raised in this matter was not addressed there.)[67] (2003) 231 LSJS 186.[68] Mair v Mazzitti (No 1) (2003) 231 LSJS 186, 190.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ultimately, the trial Judge relied on the evidence of Mr Curry,[2] Mr Lister (the standards officer from the Office of the Technical Regulator),[3] and that of the various expert witnesses proffered by each side;[4] his Honour found each of these witnesses to be credible and reliable.[5] On the basis of this evidence, his Honour awarded the plaintiff $34,996 plus $3,500 interest (a total of $38,496).[2] Rapuano (Trading as Raps Electrical) v Karydis-Frisan [2011] SADC 122 [318]-[321].[3] Rapuano (Trading as Raps Electrical) v Karydis-Frisan [2011] SADC 122 [329].[4] Rapuano (Trading as Raps Electrical) v Karydis-Frisan [2011] SADC 122 [147].[5] Rapuano (Trading as Raps Electrical) v Karydis-Frisan [2011] SADC 122 [386], [398].The Judge’s decision as to costs The plaintiff applied for costs and submitted that, in accordance with the general prima facie rule, an order for costs should follow the event of judgment being entered in his favour. The defendants resisted the plaintiff’s application and submitted that they were entitled to an award of costs on the basis that the plaintiff had not bettered a number of offers of settlement (both formal and informal) made prior to, and during the course of, the action. The costs argument largely turned on the precise nature of documents sent by the defendants to the plaintiff, including as to whether they complied with r 187, District Court Civil Rules 2006 (the Rules) or, if not, whether they could nevertheless be taken into account on the question of costs on some other basis. The defendants also submitted that the Judge’s findings as to the lack of reliability and credibility of the plaintiff and his conduct of the litigation should lead to an award on an indemnity basis. The Judge delivered separate reasons on the issue of costs.[6] [6] See Rapuano T/A Raps Electrical v Karydis-Frisan (No 2) [2012] SADC 177. The Judge rejected the defendants’ submission that a pre-action offer made by the plaintiff dated 18 February 2009 was to be properly characterised as an offer within the terms of r 33 and hence that the defendants’ counter-offer to that offer, dated 23 February 2009, itself fell within r 33(7). His Honour found that the plaintiff’s offer was not one within r 33[7] and accordingly that the counter-offer could not be considered under r 33(7) and was therefore inadmissible.[7] Rapuano T/A Raps Electrical v Karydis-Frisan (No 2) [2012] SADC 177 [41]-[49]. The Judge also rejected the defendants’ submission that the various informal offers were admissible pursuant to s 67C(2), Evidence Act 1929. His Honour found that they were not so admissible. However, the Judge found that the defendants had made one relevant offer (“the 2 December 2009 offer”) that did comply with r 187. The primary submission of the defendants was that three offers had been validly filed in accordance with r 187. They were summarised by his Honour thus:[8][51] The defendants filed three Rule 187 offers.1. On 23 March 2009 the defendants offered $25,000 to settle the principal claim and $1000 in respect of costs. The offer noted that the plaintiff could accept the offer to settle the principal relief without accepting the offer for costs. (“the first offer”)2. On 2 December 2009 the defendants offered $45,000 to settle the claim and $5000 in respect of costs, but that the plaintiff could not accept the offer to settle the principal relief without accepting the offer for costs. (“the second offer”)3. On 7 July 2010 the defendants offered $30,000 to settle the claim and $10,000 in respect of costs but that the plaintiff could not accept the offer to settle the principal relief without accepting the offer for costs. (“the third offer”)[8] Rapuano T/A Raps Electrical v Karydis-Frisan (No 2) [2012] SADC 177.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established