Attorney-General for the State of South Australia v Henriette Piepkorn
[2005] SASC 425
•11 November 2005
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v HENRIETTE PIEPKORN
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Layton
11 November 2005
EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - INJUNCTIONS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSES - TO RESTRAIN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Application for a declaration and orders pursuant to s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act seeking the defendant be declared a vexatious litigant and be prohibited from instituting further proceedings in any Court of South Australia without leave of the Supreme Court - Order sought a stay of proceedings currently in District Court - Whether defendant persistently instituted proceedings without reasonable ground - Relevant principles - Consideration of proceedings instituted in other jurisdictions as background - Meaning of 'proceedings' under s 39 - Whether vexatious proceedings instituted "persistently" - Declaration made and orders granted.
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 39; Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth); Workplace Relations Act 1966 (Cth) s 298K; Workers Rehabilitation Act 1996 (Cth) s 170EA; Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 s 105; s 14; Industrial Relations Act 1984 s 15(1)(e); District Court Rules (SA) r 46; r 67, referred to.
Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481; Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314; Kay v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (2000) 2 VR 436; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154; Valassis v South Sydney City Council (1996) 92 LGERA 275, applied.
Attorney-General (NSW) v Solomon (1987) 8 NSWLR 667; Attorney-General v Collier [2001] NZAR 137; Brogden v Attorney-General [2001] NZAR 208, considered.
WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED
""vexatious"
"reasonable grounds"
"proceedings"
"persistently""
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v HENRIETTE PIEPKORN
[2005] SASC 425
LAYTON J: This is an application by the Crown Solicitor on behalf of the plaintiff, the Attorney General for the State of South Australia seeking orders against the defendant, Henriette Piepkorn, by way of inter partes summons and statement of claim filed on 28 April 2005, namely;
1.A declaration that the defendant has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings as defined by section 39(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 in that she has persistently instituted proceedings without reasonable ground.
2. An order pursuant to section 39(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 that the defendant be prohibited from instituting further proceedings in any Court of the State of South Australia without leave of this Court.
3. An order pursuant to section 39(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 staying the proceedings in District Court of South Australia Action No DCCIV 44 of 2005.
4. Such further or other order as this Honourable Court deems fit.
The application was supported by two affidavits of David Ray Ades. The first sworn 28 April 2005 which annexes three exhibits being volumes of documents obtained from files and records of both State and Federal courts relating to the defendant’s litigation from 1982 to 2003. The volumes are contained in Copy Documents for trial Judge volumes 2, 3 and 4. The second affidavit of Mr Ades is sworn on 3 August 2005.
The defendant filed an affidavit in opposition to the application sworn herein 10 June 2005 with annexed Exhibits 1 - 4.
All of the affidavits and annexures comprised the evidence before me.
The application by the plaintiff is made under s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), (“the Act”) which provides;
39—Vexatious proceedings
(1) If, on the application of the Attorney-General or any other interested person, the court is satisfied that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings, the court may make either or both of the following orders:
(a) an order prohibiting the person by whom the vexatious proceedings were instituted from instituting further proceedings, or further proceedings of a particular class, without leave of the court;
(b) an order staying proceedings already instituted by that person.
(2) Where it appears to a prescribed court that there are proper grounds for an application under this section, it may refer the matter to the Attorney-General for consideration.
(3) An order under this section remains in force (subject to variation by the court)—
(a) if a period for the operation of the order is fixed—until the expiration of that period or the revocation of the order (whichever first occurs);
(b) if no such period is fixed—until revocation of the order.
(4) Where an order is made under this section, a copy of the order must be published in the Gazette.
(5) For the purposes of this section, proceedings are vexatious—
(a) if instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay, or for any other ulterior purpose; or
(b) if instituted without reasonable ground.
(6) In this section—
prescribed court means—
(a) the Supreme Court; or
(b) any other court of the State; or
(c) the Workers Compensation Tribunal; or
(d) any other tribunal of the State prescribed by the regulations;
proceedings means civil or criminal proceedings instituted in a prescribed court.
This section of the Act, is similar in terms to other Supreme Court Acts in other jurisdictions in Australia which empower the Supreme Court in each jurisdiction to deal with vexatious litigants. Only Western Australia and Queensland have legislation which specifically addresses vexatious litigants.
The plaintiff relies solely on s 39(5) (b) in support of the application and submits that the defendant has persistently instituted proceedings without reasonable grounds.
Legal Principles
In determining whether the defendant has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings as contended by counsel for the plaintiff, I have had regard to the following legal principles:
·s 39(5) of the Act provides an exhaustive definition of what constitutes vexatious proceedings and it is unhelpful to embark upon and rely on an analysis of what other courts have interpreted as amounting to vexatious proceedings.[1]
·It is an objective question to be determined by examining the number and nature of proceedings which have been instituted by the defendant.[2]
·The Court is not concerned with the manner in which a defendant conducts himself or herself in a proceeding, although this may be a helpful indicator of whether proceedings were instituted for a purpose described in para (a) of subs (5), in order to ascertain whether there was any reasonable ground for instituting the proceedings.[3]
·The proper approach is for the Court to assess whether the proceeding instituted was utterly hopeless or had no prospect of success.[4]
·In assessing whether the proceedings fulfilled that characterisation, the Court is to have regard to the reasons given; the orders made; other observations made by the court in those proceedings; and whether there has been a successful strike out of the proceeding as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.[5]
·The word “persistently” suggests determination, and continuing in the face of difficulty or opposition, with a degree of stubbornness.[6]
·Mere frequency of proceedings is insufficient. It must be shown that the person acted persistently or “as a matter of course”, in pursuing proceedings.[7]
·A person may be regarded as having persistently engaged in vexatious litigation even though particular proceedings may have had reasonable grounds.[8]
·The term “proceedings” is defined under s 39 as either civil or criminal proceedings but there is no further amplification in the Act. A person institutes a proceeding for the purposes of the Act when he or she files an originating process, or makes a counterclaim in a proceeding, or appeals from a final determination in a proceeding, or seeks to set aside a determination in a manner, which is in substance, an attempt to appeal or re-litigate a matter otherwise finally determined.[9] Interlocutory applications and appeals do not, in the ordinary case, constitute the institution of a proceeding except if they are in substance an attempt to appeal or re-litigate a matter otherwise finally determined.[10]
[1] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154 [58].
[2] Kay v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (2000) 2 VR 436 at 437; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154 [17].
[3] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154 [58].
[4] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154 [58].
[5] Kay v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria [2000] 2 VR 436 at 437; Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314 [18]; Attorney-General v Collier [2001] NZAR 137 [40]; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154 [18, 19, 58].
[6] Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988)14 NSWLR 481, 492.
[7] Valassis v South Sydney City Council (1996) 92 LGERA 275.
[8] Attorney-General (NSW) v Solomon (1987) 8 NSWLR 667 at 673; C. Thompson, ‘Vexatious Litigants-Old Phenomenon, modern methodology: A consideration of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA)’ (2004) 14 Journal of Judicial Administration 64, 73.
[9] Attorney General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314, [13] per Whelan J.
[10] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154 [147].
General overview of proceedings
Before turning to the specific proceedings I will describe briefly the history and general nature of the litigation conducted by the defendant.
The defendant has a lengthy history of instituting court proceedings in a number of jurisdictions with the first action commencing in South Australia in the Industrial Court in 1982. Since that time there have been proceedings in the Magistrates Court, District Court, Full Court of the Supreme Court, Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Federal Court, Federal Magistrates Court and the High Court. The latter four jurisdictions are not directly relevant to this application as this Court does not have jurisdiction to make orders in relation to proceedings in those jurisdictions. However, the actions in those courts are part of the overall context and background in which the proceedings in the South Australian courts can be viewed and there are overlapping topics of litigation in both State and Federal jurisdictions.
The litigation saga commenced when the defendant was injured at work whilst employed at Caroma Industries Limited (“Caroma”) in 1982 (“the work injury”). The defendant instituted proceedings against Caroma seeking compensation in the Industrial Court for the work injury. In the first two actions, the defendant was represented and was successful in settling her worker’s compensation claim for $22,236.54 and later after a trial in the Supreme Court, obtained an order that she be paid an additional sum of $116,686.86 by way of damages for her work injury.
From 1987 onwards, the defendant has been unrepresented. The defendant has instituted litigation against the following persons or bodies:
·Caroma Industries Ltd – the defendant’s former employer at the time of the work injury;
·Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd - the defendant’s solicitors which acted for her in relation to her work injury;
·Phillip Arthur Templeton - the defendant’s former solicitor in the firm of Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd who acted for her in relation to her work injury;
·Wallmans Lawyers – the firm of solicitors which acted for Caroma in relation to the work injury;
·Margaret L Byrnes – a solicitor from the firm of Wallmans Lawyers who acted for Caroma in relation to the work injury;
·Perrett, Harrison and Partners – a firm of radiologists which provided a radiology report in relation to the work injury;
·Bronte J Hockley – a radiologist at Perrett, Harrison and Partners who provided a radiology report in relation to the work injury;
·Pannell Kerr and Forster – the firm of the Trustee in Bankruptcy in relation to the defendant’s estate following her being declared bankrupt on 22 February 1993 for failure to pay the costs payable to Bronte J Hockley, pursuant to a judgment and allocatur for costs;
·Alan Geoffrey Scott – the Trustee in Bankruptcy appointed in relation to a second sequestration order made against the defendant’s estate on 13 March 2000 after the expiration and failure to pay a judgment sum obtained against her by Caroma for unpaid costs;
·Sims Partners – the firm in which the Trustee in Bankruptcy, Alan Geoffrey Scott was employed;
·Federal Court of Australia South Australian Registry – in relation to matters concerning the work injury and her application to dismiss the sequestration order made against her estate;
·Minister of Employment and Training - in relation to issues related to Caroma;
·The State of South Australia – various claims.
Each of the above persons or bodies were in some way associated with the work injury of the defendant, albeit in some instances remotely.
In addition to the proceedings against these persons or bodies in respect of the work injury, the defendant has also been involved in proceedings in relation to a road traffic infringement for failure to give way to oncoming traffic on 1 September 2003 to which she pleaded guilty. The defendant later appealed against the conviction and issued proceedings against two police officers J Illingworth and K Bowden as well as the driver of the other vehicle involved in the incident, Vonnie Van Develen.
The Proceedings
I will now discuss each of the proceedings and indicate whether individually the proceedings were instituted without reasonable grounds in accordance with the legal principles described earlier, before then considering whether there was persistent institution of vexatious proceedings as required under s 39(1) of the Act. I will consider each of the proceedings individually and my findings on each must then be considered in the light of the defendant’s defence to the application being made against her, which is an umbrella defence alleging invalidity of all the decisions.
I indicate that I will refer to the initiating procedure in an action by a number only, for example Decision No 1. A reference to a decision by both a number and an additional letter such as Decision No 1a, refers to a subsequent proceeding instituted within that action such as an interlocutory application or appeal in Decision No 1. In organising the proceedings in this way, I recognise that where interlocutory applications are in substance an attempt to appeal or re-litigate a matter otherwise finally determined, they fall into the category of the institution of proceedings.[11] I have also had regard to the fact that the instituting of an appeal amounts to the institution of proceedings. [12]
[11] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154 [47].
[12] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154 [47].
Annexure A to this judgment sets out all decisions in which the defendant has instituted proceedings or has been involved in and is a helpful guide to the analysis.
The documentation in evidence before me was not always complete and on many occasions I did not have the benefit of any transcript or any reasons which appear to have been misplaced. I have therefore had on some occasions, to rely on the pleadings filed by the defendant in combination with the record of the decision. I also note that r 67 of the District Court Rules 1992 appears to have often been used to strike out or dismiss proceedings which disclosed no cause of action or failed to properly plead any cause of action.
Decision No 1
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Industrial Court Action No 2537/82
On 22 July 1982, the defendant sought workers’ compensation in the Industrial Court Workers Compensation jurisdiction for having suffered a strain of her right wrist and for her incapacity for work whilst employed as a press operator at Caroma Industries Limited (“Caroma”) on 9 February 1982. This is the work injury previously referred to. The matter was resolved by a final settlement on or about 18 January 1984 and the defendant was paid $22,236.54.
The defendant was successful and the plaintiff does not claim that this proceeding was instituted vexatiously.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 2
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Supreme Court Action No 991/84
On 12 April 1984 the defendant made a claim for damages in the Supreme Court for her work injury. The case proceeded to trial and Bollen J on 23 April 1986 awarded damages of $138,923.40 which resulted in an additional payment to the defendant of $116,686.86, after deducting the workers’ compensation already received.
The defendant was successful and the plaintiff does not submit that this proceeding was instituted vexatiously.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 2a
Application to reinstate the action
On 17 December 1993 the defendant brought an application seven years after the action in Decision No 2, to reinstate the common law damages claim, which had already been finalised by Bollen J. There is ambiguity on the record as to whether it was one or more applications but I will treat the matter as one application.
On 12 January 1994, Judge Anderson dismissed the application(s) and indicated that “each of these applications is entirely misconceived and they must be dismissed”.
In my opinion this demonstrates that there was no substance to the application, it was clearly an attempt to re-litigate issues already determined and was instituted without reasonable ground.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 3
Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd v Henriette Piepkorn
Local Court of Para Districts/Local Court of Onkaparinga Action No 5150/87
On 3 September 1987 Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd instituted an action against the defendant to recover outstanding fees for professional services for work undertaken by them as solicitors for the defendant in relation to a possible action against Dr Hockley.
Judgment was obtained against the defendant on 6 October 1987.
It is not claimed that this matter was vexatious as it was a proceeding instituted against the defendant and not by the defendant. It does however, set the background for later proceedings instituted by the defendant.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 4
Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd v Henriette Piepkorn
Local Court of Para Districts/Local Court of Onkaparinga Action No RTJ 376/87
In relation to Decision No 4 an Unsatisfied Judgment Summons was issued on 23 December 1987 by Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd against the defendant.
Correctly this action is not claimed by the plaintiff as being a vexatious claim for the same reason as Decision No 3.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 4a
Leave to Appeal
On 14 January 1988 the defendant issued a Notice of Intention to seek Leave to Appeal and also took out an Interlocutory Summons seeking to suspend the execution of judgment referred to in Decision Nos 3 and 4 pending the outcome of the defendant’s application for Leave to Appeal. The Court made the orders and also ordered that she pay the costs. On 20 January 1988, the Local Court stayed execution of the judgment pending appeal. On 8 March 1988, the defendant’s application for leave to appeal against the judgment of 6 October 1987 was refused in the District Court.
Correctly, this is not claimed by the plaintiff as being a vexatious claim as it was responsive to action taken against her but it was part of the background against which subsequent litigation was instituted by the defendant.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 4b
Application to set aside warrant
On 8 March 1988, his Honour Judge Rogerson in the District Court refused the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. On 25 July 1988, a Warrant of Commitment was issued by Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd. On 13 September 1988 a further Interlocutory Summons was taken out by the defendant applying to set aside the Warrant of Commitment and applying for leave to suspend the execution of the judgment debt against her after the defendant’s application for Leave to Appeal was refused by his Honour Judge Rogerson on 8 March 1988. This application was granted and the Unsatisfied Judgment Summons was re-listed. There was no order as to costs.
Correctly, these proceedings are not claimed by the plaintiff as being vexatious for the same reasons referred to in Decision No 4a.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 4c
Application to suspend execution of judgment and warrant
On 4 December 1989 a further interlocutory summons was taken out by the defendant seeking to suspend the execution of the judgment debt on which a Warrant of Execution had been issued in respect of the re-listed Unsatisfied Judgment Summons referred to in Decision No 4b. On 11 April 1990 the defendant’s application to suspend the execution of judgment was refused and a costs order was made against her.
Correctly, this proceeding was not claimed by the plaintiff as being a vexatious claim, however the plaintiff indicated that this was the commencement of a “vexatious chain”, as the defendant later appealed from this decision to the Supreme Court in a subsequent action.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 5
Henriette Piepkorn v Bronte J Hockley
Supreme Court Action No 2504/87
On 22 October 1987, the defendant commenced an action in the Supreme Court seeking damages against Dr Hockley for medical negligence. After a number of interlocutory applications, an Amended Statement of Claim was filed and the matter went to trial.
The claim against Dr Hockley, who was a radiologist, concerned a typographical error in a report which he had provided with regard to her work injury. The report stated
There was no evidence of extravasation of contrast medium into the distal radio – ulnar joint even after excising the wrist. There is damage to the scapho-lunate interosseous ligament. [Emphasis added].
Conclusion normal arthrogram.
The typographical error of Dr Hockley was that he had omitted the word “no” before the word “damage”. So that instead of saying that there was “no damage to the scapho-lunate interosseous ligament” there was instead an indication of damage. However this was in the context of the conclusion on the next line which was that there was a “normal arthrogram”.
The defendant endeavoured to argue that as a consequence of this error she underwent two unwarranted operations and therefore had suffered grievous bodily harm for which she was entitled to damages.
On 17 March 1989, Matheson J provided detailed reasons and dismissed the action stating,
I am not satisfied that the error resulted in the plaintiff suffering grievous bodily harm … the plaintiff has no valid claim against the defendant, either as pleaded or at all.
Although the defendant was not successful in the action I am not prepared to conclude that the institution of this action against Dr Hockley could be said by itself to be instituted without reasonable cause. Whilst it was an action which was highly unlikely to succeed, especially because the basis for the claim, namely the omission, was overtly discernible in the context of the report, and particularly when the surgeon Mr Hayes, whom the defendant called, deduced that the word ‘no’ had been omitted, I give the benefit of the doubt to the defendant.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 5a
Appeal to the Full Court
On 28 March 1989, the defendant appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court against the judgment of Matheson J. The Notice of Appeal contained a number of grounds and also added that there was “perjury committed by the defendant and the misleading information delivered and substantiated by the defendant’s solicitors”. Not surprisingly the appeal against the judgment of Matheson J was dismissed on 7 August 1989.
In my view the grounds indicated in the Notice of Appeal, in conjunction with the detailed reasons for decision provided by Matheson J, indicate that the appeal was doomed to fail. In my opinion this was chronologically the first of the actions which can be described as being instituted without reasonable grounds.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 5b
Notice of Dispute as to Costs
On 16 July 1991, the defendant issued a Notice of Dispute in relation to her liability to pay Dr Hockley’s costs as ordered by Matheson J and as upheld on appeal by the Full Court. On 1 November 1991, Master Kelly refused the application on the grounds that the defendant “wants to … attack the basis of the costs order and … does not appear to raise any questions as to any item of either Bill.”
This is an action by way of an interlocutory summons. Although it was doomed to fail particularly as it was an attempt to wrongly challenge the basis of a costs order, I give the benefit to the defendant and do not consider it fits within the descriptor of being a proceeding in its own right which was instituted by the defendant without reasonable ground.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 5c
Application in defiance to dismiss notice
On 28 February 1992, the defendant made an application “in defiance to the notice of Wallmans” to dismiss a notice served on the defendant by Wallmans Lawyers. The notice issued by Wallmans advised the defendant of Dr Hockley’s intention to issue a warrant of sale against the defendant as a result of her failure to pay Dr Hockley’s costs as ordered.
On 17 March 1992, Master Burley dismissed the defendant’s application. In his ex tempore reasons the Master noted that,
the submissions put to me by Ms Piepkorn this morning, to the extent that I can understand them, seem to be directed at reinstating the action in these proceedings. It ignores the fact that there has been a decision of a single Judge (affirmed by the Full Court) dismissing that action.
In my view this application sought in effect to re-litigate that which had already been decided not only by Matheson J but also by the Full Court of the Supreme Court. This application was instituted without reasonable ground and in my view amounts to a vexatious proceeding.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 5d
Application to reinstate claim
On 22 December 1993, the defendant made an application in the Supreme Court to have the action in Decision No 5 against Dr Hockley, reinstated.
This application came on before his Honour Judge Anderson in the District Court who dismissed the application on 12 January 1994 on the grounds that it was “entirely misconceived” and had “no prospect of succeeding at all”. The defendant was ordered to pay costs.
In my view this application was instituted for the express purpose of re-litigating that which had been decided by Matheson J and by the Full Court of the Supreme Court and it was instituted without reasonable grounds and was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 6
Henriette Piepkorn v Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd
Supreme Court Action No 734/88
On 30 March 1988, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal in the Supreme Court against the judgment delivered in the District Court on 8 March 1988 dismissing the defendant’s application for leave to appeal from the judgment entered against her on 6 October 1987 in the Local Court of Para Districts, Onkaparinga, Action No 5150/87 (Decision Nos 3 and 4b). The Notice of Appeal complained that his Honour Judge Rogerson had given “no definite judgment”. The grounds of appeal make little sense and the endorsement by the Supreme Court Appeals Clerk was that there was “no right of appeal against decision of the District Court”.
In my view, the content of the Notice of Appeal indicates that there was no reasonably arguable ground of appeal against the decision of Judge Rogerson.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 7
Henriette Piepkorn v Philip Arthur Templeton
Local Court Action No 26964/88
On 17 November 1988, the defendant instituted proceedings in the Local Court seeking damages against Mr Templeton her former solicitor in the firm of Frederick Templeton and Evans Pty Ltd. The Statement of Claim alleged that the defendant had instructed Mr Templeton to write to Dr Hockley to enquire about the typographical error in the x-ray report dated 29 October 1982 and that she had suffered loss and damage from Mr Templeton’s failure to carry out the instructions of the defendant. The loss and damage claimed included work carried out by Mr Templeton which the defendant alleged had not been requested by her as well as her costs in attending Mr Templeton’s office and costs of various calls.
This proceeding was an attempt to re-litigate in another forum the issue with regard to the typographical omission of Dr Hockley which already had been rejected by Matheson J in Decision No 5 and upheld by the Full Court in Decision No 5a. Appropriately the learned Magistrate Boxall SM on 17 March 1989 struck out the matter as “an abuse of process”.
I regard this as a matter commenced without reasonable ground and is another attempt to re-litigate a previously decided issue and was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 7a
Application for leave to appeal
On 30 March 1989, the defendant applied for leave to appeal in the District Court against the judgment of Boxall SM. The grounds of appeal included that the Court had disregarded her evidence and that “through the ethics of the Court [Mr Templeton] is using the backing and ethics of the Court to have [Ms Piepkorn] forced into imprisonment, falsely and discriminately”.
On 16 May 1989 Judge Stevens refused leave to appeal.
In my view the application for leave to appeal was also an attempt to re-litigate. As the bizarre content of the application for leave to appeal demonstrates, the application was instituted without reasonable ground.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 8
Henriette Piepkorn v Philip Arthur Templeton
District Court Action No 2056/89
On 2 June 1989, the defendant made an application in the District Court seeking damages for defamation and libel against her former solicitor Mr Templeton. This was the second action instituted by the defendant against him. The document supporting the summons indicated that she claimed “defamation and discredit” and alleged that Mr Templeton had failed to follow instructions given to him by the defendant. This appeared to relate to a hearing in the Local Court on 6 October 1987 when judgment was entered against her (Decision No 3). The defendant alleged that Mr Templeton had referred to facts in open court which were degrading to her and was done disregarding instructions she had given. A similar allegation related to an appearance by Mr Templeton before another magistrate and also with regard to the hearing before Judge Rogerson (Decision No 4b).
In relation to this application, interlocutory costs orders were made against the defendant on two occasions when adjournments were granted to enable the defendant to file a clear and precise Statement of Claim.
On 17 October 1989, Judge Burnett in the District Court dismissed the action, however no reasons are available.
It is clear from the pleadings which were lodged by the defendant, that they were very confused and did not demonstrate any clear or reasonable cause of action. I consider that this action was commenced by the defendant in an endeavour to continue raising groundless allegations against her former solicitor. I regard the proceeding as vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 9
Henriette Piepkorn v Philip Arthur Templeton
District Court Action No 4169/89
On 27 October 1989, the defendant made an application in the District Court seeking damages against her former solicitor Mr Templeton. This was the third action which had been commenced against him. The Statement of Claim which accompanied the ordinary summons alleged that Mr Templeton had by-passed instructions given to him and also that he had taken actions on his own initiative and contrary to instructions. The claim for damages sought was not exceeding $100,000.00 Insofar as a cause of action could be ascertained, it was an allegation of negligence against Mr Templeton. Interlocutory cost orders were also made in this action against the defendant when on two occasions adjournments were obtained to enable the defendant to file further and better particulars of claim.
On 19 June 1990 the defendant’s amended particulars of claim and further amended particulars of claim were struck out by Master Berry for non-compliance with r 67 of the Local Court Rules and the defendant was ordered to pay costs. The strike out was clearly on the basis that there was no reasonable cause of action indicated in the pleadings.
In my view this claim was attempting to re-litigate matters which had already been raised in proceedings in Decision Nos 4, 5, 7 and 8. There were no reasonable grounds to the claim and I consider that the institution of the proceedings was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 9a
Notice of dispute
This document purported to challenge an order made by Judge Burnett in Decision No 8 on 17 October 1989. This action was effectively an attempt by the defendant to appeal against that order. The defendant alleged that the Court had failed to accept that Mr Templeton had followed the instructions allegedly given to him by the defendant. On the documentation before me the status of this document is confusing and because of this I do not consider that it alone was an “initiating proceeding” in the action between the defendant and Mr Templeton within the definition of “instituting vexatious proceedings.”
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 9b
Appeal to District Court Judge
On 20 June 1990, the defendant appealed the decision of Master Berry (Decision No 9) to strike out the pleadings for non-compliance with r 67. The grounds of appeal include that the Master erred in his judgment by delivering “a tort judgment” against the defendant, and further that the Master “failed to enforce [Mr Templeton] to deliver goods to substantiate that [Mr Templeton] carried out the instructions of the contract” and “the Master’s ignorance to accept the charge [Mr Templeton’s] failure to follow instructions”. As later revealed the defendant’s reference to a failure to “deliver goods” refers to an alleged failure by Mr Templeton to discover documents to substantiate whether or not Mr Templeton had followed instructions.
The notice of intention to appeal was supported by an affidavit of the defendant which requested that “the Court enforce [Mr Templeton] to present the correspondence, between [Ms Piepkorn] and himself.”
On 17 August 1990, the appeal by Ms Piepkorn was dismissed. I do not have the advantage of any reasons but it is clear from the documentation in relation to the grounds for appeal and the accompanying affidavit that there was no discernable cause of action and no merit whatsoever in the appeal. There were no reasonable grounds for instituting the appeal and I consider the proceeding was a vexatious proceeding.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 9c
Statement of Claim - Attempting to reinstate the Statement of Claim
On 24 August 1990, documents were filed in the District Court. The first was addressed to Judge Kitchen and purported to enclose documents related to the defendant’s intention with regard to this Local Court action. Enclosed with that document was another purporting to be “a Statement of Claim” as well as a document headed “affidavit to support interlocutory summons dated 20 August 1990”. The overall documentation is confusing but the Statement of Claim purports to claim compensation against Mr Templeton for failure to follow instructions. It also refers to the action in relation to Dr Hockley and records the previous actions in which he had been unsuccessful. The Statement of Claim continues, that the defendant
seeks compensation for the stress, suffering by having to learn medical a[sic] legal fields. By having to bring her own Supreme Court action for [Mr Templeton’s] failure to obey instructions.
There is also a reference to an allegation that Mr Templeton had carried out work which the defendant categorises as “unordered goods” and further asserted that because the courts ordered her to pay for the “unordered goods” that this implicated her as “an accessory to the defamation claims” in Supreme Court Action No 919/90 commenced by the defendant. This action is referred to hereafter under Decision No 11.
The “unordered goods” referred to is made more apparent later and refers to a letter from Frederick Templeton and Evans Pty Ltd dated 7 May 1987 which the defendant alleged she had not authorised and which was referred to in a Bill of Costs.
On 2 October 1990, “no order” was made by the Master on the application save that Mr Templeton have his costs of that attendance.
It is clear from the purported pleadings in the matter that they were incomprehensible and did not disclose any reasonably arguable cause of action. They also sought to re-activate issues previously litigated. In my view the proceeding was also instituted without reasonable ground and was vexatious. In particular it was an attempt to reinstate a Statement of Claim which had previously been struck out by Master Berry on 19 June 1990 in Decision No 9.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 9d
Notice of Dispute
On 29 August 1990, the defendant filed a Notice of Dispute alleging that the orders made by two Masters and also Judge Kitchen were “tort judgments” and further that the orders “failed to follow Rule 67, by encouraging [Mr Templeton] and his solicitors to continue to harass [the defendant]”. Again there was a reference to the defendant not being liable for “unordered goods dated 7 May 1987” being a letter referred to in the Bill of Costs filed by Mr Templeton.
Again the status of this document is uncertain. However as incomprehensible, as it is, I do not consider that this amounted to the “institution of a proceeding” within the meaning of s 39(1).
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 10
Henriette Piepkorn v Phillip Arthur Templeton
District Court Action No 3352/90
On 9 October 1990, the defendant made an application in the District Court for damages for abuse of process. The statement of particulars again adverted to the “unordered goods” being the letter from Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd dated 7 May 1987. Again in the fourth action instituted by the defendant against Mr Templeton, the defendant alleged a failure to follow instructions and also sought production of evidence to support the claims made in the “unordered letter” of 7 May 1987. The contents of the statement of particulars is incomprehensible. This was clearly another attempt to re-litigate previous matters with regard to Mr Templeton (Decision Nos 7, 8 and 9). The allegations were unsubstantiated and unfounded.
On 4 December 1990, his Honour Judge Lee struck out the proceedings for abuse of process indicating that they were the same in substance as the matters of complaint in the various statement of claims filed in Action No 4169/89 (Decision No 9). The defendant was also ordered to pay the costs of proceedings to be taxed.
In my view this was a proceeding instituted without reasonable ground, and was an attempt to re-litigate previous matters and was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 11
Henriette Piepkorn v Phillip Arthur Templeton
Supreme Court Action No 919/90
On 20 April 1990, the defendant filed a Notice of Intention to appeal against the decision of the Local Court of Para Districts and Onkaparinga (Decision No 4) in which the Court ordered that she pay costs in relation to Decision No 3. Again the Notice of Intention to Appeal referred back to the failure of Mr Templeton to follow instructions and the failure of judicial officers to accept her submissions.
On 11 July 1990, his Honour Justice Duggan who after hearing submissions from Ms Piepkorn dismissed the appeal indicating,
However, having looked at the material closely and considered carefully the arguments which she has advanced, it is my view that there is nothing in the material before me or the arguments which justify the grant of leave to appeal, and the application is dismissed.
The clear indication given by his Honour was that there was no reasonable ground. I consider that again this was an attempt to re-litigate without reasonable grounds and was a vexatious proceeding.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 12
Henriette Piepkorn v Frederick Templeton & Evans
Supreme Court Action No 2877/90
On 6 December 1990, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Full Supreme Court from the decision of his Honour Judge Lee of 4 December 1990 in District Court Action No 3352/90 (Decision No 10). The Notice of Appeal complained that the Judge had failed to comprehend the implied threats that Mr Templeton had allegedly made against her; that his Honour “failed to follow the Crown law in the case”; and further claimed that the Judge had failed to acknowledge the defendant’s rights of claiming “no liability as to costs for the unordered goods and services”. The grounds of appeal also alleged that Mr Templeton wished to “have [the defendant] imprisoned for recovery for the unordered goods thereby causing physical assault upon the body of [the defendant] and for failure to follow instructions”. Other similarly incomprehensible matters were set out in the Notice of Appeal.
On 4 April 1991, the Full Court of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the defendant pay the costs of the appeal to be taxed. I do not have the benefit of grounds but it is clear from the pleadings themselves that the grounds had no merit and that there was no likelihood of success and it was yet another attempt to re-litigate the same issues.
I therefore regard this as a proceeding instituted by the defendant which was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 13
Henriette Piepkorn v Margaret L Byrnes
District Court Action No 2928/91
On 10 September 1991, the defendant made an application in the District Court seeking damages for false pretences, forgery, defamation and other unspecified actions against Ms Byrnes a solicitor at Wallmans Lawyers. Ms Byrnes was the particular solicitor from Wallmans Lawyers who had represented Dr Hockley in Supreme Court Action No 2504/87 (Decision No 5).
The particulars of claim asserted that there had been false pretences by Ms Byrnes in claiming that the defendant had given authorisation to Ms Byrnes to act on “Ms Piepkorn’s legal behalf”. This accusation relates to a typographical error on the backsheet of an appearance filed by Wallmans Lawyers on behalf of its client Dr Hockley which wrongly indicated that Wallmans Lawyers were acting as solicitors for the “plaintiff” (being Ms Piepkorn) instead of acting as they were for the defendant being Dr Hockley.
An interlocutory cost order was made against the defendant when the matter was adjourned by Master Berry on 24 October 1991 by Master Berry, who enabled the defendant to file and serve an amended particulars of claim. In due course the amended claim was filed and alleged damages to the “plaintiff’s mental characteristics” by defamation caused to her by the delivery of “a pleading using [the defendant’s] name and action”.
Needless to say this action was struck out on 5 December 1991 by Master Berry for non-compliance with r 67, and an order for costs against the defendant, was made.
This was clearly a proceeding initiated without any reasonable ground and was vexatious within the meaning of the Act.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 14
Henriette Piepkorn v Wallmans
Supreme Court Action No 1613/92
On 15 July 1992, the defendant made an application in the Supreme Court which in substance made the same complaint against Wallmans Lawyers as in Decision No 13. It involved the assertion of the “incorrect endorsement” on the Appearance but in addition embellished it with allegations of false pretences, forgery and other matters. On 23 September 1992, Judge Kelly dismissed the application. His Honour described it as a “rehash” of the previous District Court action against Ms Byrnes (Decision No 13) and concluded,
…try as I might I cannot imagine there being any cause of action against Wallmans arising out of the history as is apparent to me. The statement of claim is quite unintelligible and in my opinion no amendment can possibly cure that position.
The defendant was ordered to pay the costs of the action.
In my opinion this matter was initiated by the defendant without reasonable grounds, it was attempting to re-litigate and I consider that it was a vexatious proceeding.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 14a
Appeal to the Full Court against judgment of Judge Kelly
On 7 October 1992, the defendant appealed against the order of Judge Kelly, further alleging bias and prejudice against his Honour.
The matter came on before Mohr J who struck out the Notice of Appeal and agreed with Judge Kelly that the Statement of Claim was “unintelligible and did not disclose a cause of action”. His Honour further indicated that the Notice of Appeal was also “unintelligible and is nonsense”. In striking it out his Honour gave the defendant liberty to file a fresh Notice of Appeal within 14 days and the defendant was ordered to pay the costs of the hearing.
On 9 November 1992, the defendant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. This matter came on for hearing before the Full Supreme Court and on 30 November 1992 the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the judgment given by Judge Kelly on 23 September 1992 be affirmed with a costs order against the defendant.
I consider this appeal to have been a proceeding instituted by the defendant without reasonable grounds and an attempt to re-litigate the same unmeritorious issues. I consider that this was a vexatious proceeding.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 15
Henriette Piepkorn v Perrett, Harrison & Partners
District Court Action No 923/93
Perrett, Harrison & Partners were the firm of radiologists in which Dr Hockley was a partner. On 3 May 1993 the defendant commenced an action claiming criminal compensation and alleging that she was defrauded in the Common Law case of Action No 991/94 (Decision No 5) in which Bollen J had previously given a decision.
On 3 June 1993, Master Berry ordered that the defendant serve and file an Amended Statement of Claim within 14 days. After this was received on 1 July 1993, Master Berry struck out the Amended Statement of Claim for non-compliance with the provisions of r 46 of the District Court Rules 1992 and the defendant was ordered to pay the costs.
On 1 September 1993, Judge Taylor dismissed the action on the ground that there was “no statement of claim on file” and made no order as to costs.
In relation to the action commenced against Perrett, Harrison & Partners, this was clearly an attempt to re-litigate the matters raised in Decision No 5 and I consider that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable grounds and were vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 15a
Interlocutory Application to reinstate action
On 9 December 1993, the defendant took out an interlocutory application in the District Court to reinstate the action. On 2 February 1994, Acting Judge Thompson characterised it as being an Appeal from the decision of Judge Taylor of 1 September 1993. The application was struck out as “incompetent” and the defendant was ordered to pay costs.
In my view this application to reinstate was an attempt to re-litigate this matter without reasonable grounds and is vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 15b
Interlocutory Application to reinstate action
On 2 February 1994, the defendant issued yet another interlocutory application to have the action reinstated. On 18 February 1994, Master Kelly dismissed the application and ordered that the defendant pay costs of the application to be taxed if not agreed. The Reasons for Decision were not available but it is quite clear from the nature of the proceedings instituted, that this was a claim which could not be maintained. It was an application to reinstate an action and an attempt to re-litigate without reasonable grounds and I consider it was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 16
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd; Bronte J Hockley and Pannell, Kerr and Forster
Supreme Court Action No 55/94
On 14 January 1994, the defendant made an application against three defendants, two of whom had already been the subject of litigation as described above. The Statement of Claim alleged assault and criminal compensation against Caroma. In relation to Dr Hockley, the defendant claimed that the bankruptcy instituted against the defendant, prevented “prosecution against the fraud and assault”. The Statement of Claim also alleged conspiracy between Caroma Industries and Dr Hockley and sought criminal compensation for fraud.
On 11 May 1994, Judge Kelly struck out the action on the basis that no reasonable cause of action existed against any of the defendants. In respect of the claim made by the defendant against Dr Hockley, the Judge found that the defendant had “well and truly exhausted her complaint about him” and also indicated in his reasons that the various actions raised “essentially the same subject matter” as previous actions. The defendant was ordered to pay the costs of the action to be taxed or agreed.
In relation to this proceeding I consider there was lack of reasonable grounds and it was an attempt to re-litigate issues already decided. I consider that the proceeding was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 16a
Appeal to the Full Court
On 18 May 1994, the defendant appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court against the findings of Judge Kelly, alleging that his Honour had “perverted the course of justice” through alleged “personal pecuniary interests”. On 5 July 1994, the Full Court of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the defendant pay costs of the appeal to be taxed or agreed.
In my view the Notice of Appeal is also an institution of a proceeding without reasonable grounds for the purpose of re-litigating a matter that has previously been decided and is therefore vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 17
Piepkorn v Perrett, Harrison & Partners
Supreme Court Action No 259/94
On 23 February 1994, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal in the Supreme Court seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal against the decision and order of Judge Taylor delivered on 1 September 1993 (Decision No 15). The Notice of Appeal alleged that the trial Judge,
…prevented prosecution of the criminal act of [Perrett, Harrison & Partners]. In his breach of contract by the suppression of a 9 month old fractured hand.
The defendant alleged that the order was given by the Judge as a result of his Honour being “fraudulently misdirected” by Perrett, Harrison & Partners in that action. The defendant also claimed that fresh evidence had been discovered relevant to her claim and she sought to elicit it.
On 11 March 1994, Justice Duggan dismissed the appeal and indicated that it was “inconceivable that the material identified by the applicant could be led as fresh evidence” and also refused to extend the time to appeal as a result of which the appeal was dismissed.
This is an application commenced by the defendant to further re-litigate what had previously been decided without reasonable ground and in my view is vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 18
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Industrial Relations Commission Action No 1035/94
On 30 September 1994, the defendant instituted proceedings seeking a remedy for alleged unfair dismissal against Caroma pursuant to s 105 of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994. In instituting the proceedings the defendant sought an extension of time, in excess of ten years, in order to proceed with the action. On 12 December 1994, Commissioner McCutcheon found that the Commission had no jurisdiction or power to deal with the matter which was dismissed.
It is questionable as to whether the Industrial Relations Commission is a Court for the purposes of s 39 of the Act.It is not necessary for me to have to decide this and there are many other actions which are still relevant to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to s 39 of the Act. I will therefore give the benefit of any doubt as to whether this was instituted as a vexatious proceeding pursuant to s 39 of the Act, to the defendant although it was clearly a vexatious proceeding instituted in the Industrial relations Commission. The proceeding is another indication of the extent to which the defendant is endeavouring to continue to re-litigate her grievance with Caroma in another jurisdiction so many years after the event.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 19
Piepkorn v Pannell, Kerr & Forster
Supreme Court Action No 1681/94
On 13 October 1994, the defendant issued a summons and Statement of Claim in the Supreme Court. The defendant alleged that Pannell, Kerr & Forster had declared her bankrupt under false pretences and made false accusations against her. She described this action as being an “extortion action” and referred to the failure of Wallmans to “produce goods by the means of documents”, referred again to her complaints about Dr Hockley, Margaret Byrnes, Frederick Templeton and Evans Pty Ltd and indicated that this was “a question of law of plaintiff and bankruptcy”.
On 6 December 1994, Judge Kelly dismissed the summons stating that,
..this is yet another “re-hash” in a slightly different form of all her previous failed actions wherein she raised complaints, among others, about a doctor mis-reading some x-rays of her hand, which she allegedly injured at her work with Caroma Industries, and the defendant’s solicitors falsely pretending they were acting for her.
As I have said, I can glean very little from her summons and very little from her submissions in support, so much so that even an arguable case for relief is not established.
The learned Judge found no cause of action and indicated that pre-action discovery was inappropriate. The defendant was ordered to pay costs.
In my view this was a proceeding instituted by the defendant without reasonable cause of action and was vexatious with the defendant again attempting to re-litigate previously dismissed actions.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 20
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Industrial Relations Court (SA) Action No 698/94
On 19 December 1994, the defendant made an application in the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia pursuant to s 15(1)(e) of the Industrial Relations Act 1984 against Caroma. The particulars of the claim complained that Caroma retrenched her in 1984 whilst she was still on a sickness certificate and she sought to claim for wages since 9 February 1982 to the date of the claim being some 12 years.
On 21 March 1995, Industrial Magistrate Cunningham dismissed the application because the defendant failed to satisfy him that,
…there is any enduring relationship that has entitled her to payment from the respondent within the last 6 years.
This related to the fact that the Court had jurisdiction only to deal with claims for payment in the nature of a debt which arose in the last six years with no power to extend the time limit. The Magistrate further found that the applicant had failed to satisfy him that she had any claim which came within the jurisdiction of the Court under the law which the Court was obliged to apply and he dismissed the application. At the same time the Magistrate urged the defendant to,
seek and obtain proper advice before committing yourself to, particularly, such extremely expensive proceedings where costs can be ordered against you as those you contemplate in the High Court.
This proceeding was therefore doomed to failure, and is again an attempt by the defendant to litigate matters with regard to her former employer at Caroma. Unlike Decision No 18 instituted in the Industrial Relations Commission, in my view this proceeding was instituted in a “court” within the meaning of s 39 namely the Industrial Relations Court, and was instituted vexatiously.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 21
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Industrial Relations Court (SA) Action No 582/95
On 28 August 1995, the defendant made a further application to the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia against Caroma pursuant to s 14 of the Industrial Relations Act 1994 (SA). The particulars of claim indicated that the applicant claimed the sum of $1,127,802 as payment pursuant to an employment contract with Caroma until the age of 65 years. The grounds of the claim alleged that Caroma had taken away her right to work “through [a] failure of contractual duties by [Caroma]”.
On 16 October 1995, Industrial Magistrate Cunningham struck out the application on the basis that,
…the applicant has indeed once again failed to bring any material before the court upon which the court could be satisfied that there remains a continuing relationship of employment between her and the respondent that has subsisted in an uninterrupted form since February of 1984. The indications, I might add, are all [to] the contrary.
In my view this was a proceeding instituted by the defendant without reasonable grounds and raised the same issues that had previously been raised in Decision No 20. This was therefore an attempt in another form to re-litigate a matter which had already been dismissed.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 21a
Notice of Appeal from decision of Magistrate Cunnigham
On 23 October 1995, the defendant appealed against the decision of Industrial Magistrate Cunningham. The grounds included that the Magistrate had questioned a High Court hearing which the defendant had had on 23 August 1995 in which she stated that the Court had indicated that her contract with Caroma had been confirmed and that she was still employed. A further document called a “Notice of Reference to be Brought Forward” was filed. This document alleged that the learned Magistrate’s ruling was given “through third parties mis-representation by opposing [Ms Piepkorn’s] legal right to the contract of employment”.
On 20 December 1995 after hearing full submissions, Senior Judge Jennings dismissed the appeal after giving many opportunities to the defendant to clarify her argument and submissions.
Judge Jennings stated,
However, after taking into account all that she put to me, both in the documents and orally, I cannot find any valid ground of appeal that can be supported in any way.
This proceeding was instituted by the defendant without reasonable ground and again re-litigating on previous matters related to her dismissed actions for relief from her former employer. In my view this proceeding was vexatious and was instituted within a “court” pursuant to s 39 of the Act.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 22
Henriette Piepkorn v Wallmans
District Court Action No 1062/95
On 1 September 1995, the defendant instituted an action in the District Court against Wallmans Lawyers. This application relates back to the same subject matter as Decision Nos 5c, 13 and 14. The Summons and Statement of Claim seek damages for Supreme Court Action No 2504/87 being the action against Dr Hockley in Decision No 5c. It also sought damages for defamation of character and credibility of the plaintiff and alleges “contractual fraud” of Wallmans and $300,000 in damages was sought.
On 30 October 1995, Master Berry struck out the defendant’s Statement of Claim for non-compliance with r 46 of the District Court Rules and made an order for costs against her. On that same day Master Berry ordered that the defendant if so advised was at liberty to file and serve an amended Statement of Claim within 14 days. An amended Statement of Claim was subsequently filed on 3 November 1995 and on 4 December 1995, Master Berry again struck out the Amended Statement of Claim indicating that there was a “failure to disclose a cause of action and for non-compliance with Rule 46”. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiffs costs of attendance and costs of action and it is also to be noted that the Master indicated that the proceedings would be referred to the Attorney-General pursuant to s 39 of the Act.
This process of further pursuing through an amended Statement of Claim the same issues the subject of Decision Nos 5c, 13 and 14 which had previously been decided is an attempt to re-litigate a cause of action which had no reasonable ground. It was a vexatious proceeding.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 23
Piepkorn v Perrett, Harrison & Partners
Supreme Court Action No 195/96
On 23 January 1996, the defendant commenced another action against Perrett, Harrison & Partners in which she alleged that it had given “a written admission to breach of private contract, [t]hat error in x-ray did occur” and further that Dr Hockley being a partner in Perrett, Harrison & Partners “swore to x-ray error and to signature”. Conspiracy was alleged and damages were sought.
On 7 May 1996, Master Burley ordered that the defendant’s Statement of Claim be struck out on the basis that he could not “see that the statement of claim discloses an arguable cause of action” and further that the allegation was not supported by any material allegations of fact. The Master also referred to the previous judgment of Matheson J in Decision No 5 to indicate that,
leave should not be granted because the finding of Matheson J in the earlier judgment that the original version of Dr Hockley’s report contained an error, cannot now be re-litigated in these proceedings…she is estopped from raising it again.
This action was instituted by the defendant without reasonable ground. It was an attempt to re-litigate and was a vexatious proceeding.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 23a
Notice of Appeal
On 15 July 1996, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal appealing against the order of Master Burley striking out her Statement of Claim (Decision No 3). The Notice of Appeal is an extraordinary document which refers to labour law, State taxation, State courts, fraud of the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES), a number of judges, a political protection for medical perjury and assault, the State’s Attorney-General’s Office and more, in support of her application to appeal to the Full Court.
Justice Cox gave the lead reasons for decision of the Full Court and after adverting to the above irrelevant material concluded;
I can see no legitimate grounds of appeal in the appellant’s notice and there is nothing in her oral argument this afternoon which could support, in my opinion, the setting aside of the master’s order, or indeed leading me to have the slightest misgivings about the correctness of that order.
The remainder of the Full Court Coram agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. The defendant was ordered to pay costs.
This appeal was a proceeding instituted by the defendant without reasonable grounds and was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 24
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Industrial Relations Court (SA) Action No 664/97
On 21 October 1997, the defendant made an application pursuant s 14 of the Industrial Relations Act 1994 (SA) against Caroma. This was the third action commenced by the defendant against Caroma in the Industrial Relations Court in an endeavour to claim payment of wages. The particulars of claim alleged that the defendant was entitled to a payment of award wages for 38 years. It was effectively a restatement of the previous claims in Decision Nos 20 and 21.
On 16 January 1998, Industrial Magistrate Gun dismissed the application because the application was out of time and further that under s 167(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1994 (SA), the Court was prohibited from granting an extension of time. The Industrial Magistrate also remarked,
you are now claiming the same thing again, and you have already lost twice. How many times do you think you are entitled to have a go?
and then concluded
now all I am saying to you is that you have made the same claim, dressed slightly differently, on two prior occasions and you have lost …
In my view this was a proceeding instituted without reasonable ground which was seeking to litigate previously dismissed actions and was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 25
Henriette Piepkorn v Federal Court of Australia, South Australian District Court Registry
District Court Action No 1571/97
On 9 December 1997, the defendant made an application in the District Court seeking damages against the Federal Court of Australia, South Australia District Registry. The Statement of Claim referred to the defendant’s assertion of having a “legal right of employment contract of Comparable Verdicts” and then referred to the decision of Bollen J (Decision No 2) and referred to the Constitution and Powers of Parliament. The Statement of Claim asserted that the Federal Court of Australia had entered “a criminal charge on [Ms Piepkorn’s] credit line; without proof of debt” and the sum of $80,000 and costs were sought.
In relation to this application made by the defendant, an application was made on behalf of the Federal Court of Australia by the Australian Government Solicitor seeking that the summons and Statement of Claim be struck out as not raising a cause of action known to law and was issued against a body which is not a legal entity capable of being sued.
On 22 January 1998 the Court dismissed the summons and Statement of Claim as sought.
This was a proceeding instituted by the defendant without reasonable cause, it was doomed to fail and was an attempt to re-litigate matters already decided in the Federal Court and was a vexatious proceeding.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 26
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
District Court Action No 469/98
On 6 April 1998, the defendant issued a summons against Caroma seeking “Common Law Damages of breach of contract; - employment contract; a Business Transaction”. This was filed in conjunction with a Statement of Claim in which the defendant traversed the written contract, the work injury, alleged an “assault by breach of occupational health, safety and welfare” and stated that retrenchment was “illegal” pursuant to the “Arbitration Act”. The defendant claimed damages for breach of contract and loss of ability to work for the period 1982 – 2020.
This was yet another attempt to sue Caroma for the non-payment of wages for 30 years. It was an action attempting to re-litigate those matters which had been decided in Decision Nos 20, 21 and 24.
On 15 June 1998, Master Berry struck out the Statement of Claim filed by the defendant on the basis that it disclosed no cause of action and had not been pleaded in compliance with r 46. In addition the Master gave leave to the defendant to file and serve a fresh Statement of Claim within 14 days and the matter was adjourned.
On 19 June 1998, the defendant filed a further Amended Statement of Claim. The Master heard extensive argument and gave detailed reasons for decision on 25 August 1998. Master Berry concluded that the defendant was attempting to re-litigate matters which had already been the subject of previous judicial decisions; that the defendant’s claim was misconceived; that no reasonable cause of action had been disclosed; and that the Statement of Claim be struck out as not disclosing a cause of action and for non-compliance with r 46. The defendant was ordered to pay costs.
The institution of this action was another attempt to re-litigate matters already decided, had no reasonable grounds and was a vexatious proceeding.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 27
Police v Henriette Piepkorn
Mount Barker Magistrates Court Action No 1802/03
On 22 January 2004, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of failing to give way to an oncoming vehicle when turning right. The defendant was convicted with a fine of $45, court fees $104, Victims of Crime Levy $35, Prosecution Costs $16, totalling $200 with 28 days to pay being due on 19 February 2004.
This proceeding in the Court which then gave rise to subsequent proceedings was not instituted by the defendant and could not therefore constitute a vexatious proceeding. It did however set the scene for subsequent proceedings initiated by the defendant.
Conclusion: Not vexatious.
Decision No 28
Piepkorn v Police
On 12 February 2004, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court against the conviction and sentence recorded against her following her plea of guilty in the Mount Barker Magistrates Court on 22 January 2004 (Decision No 27). The defendant on the Notice of Appeal stated that “the plea was coerced by intimidation by the Prosecution” and alleged that the plea was given as a result of “character discrimination by the police” who “perverted the course of justice” and obtained the plea through “criminal intimidation”. This matter came on before Anderson J who on 27 May 2004 rejected the defendant’s arguments stating;
In my view, there is no possibility that a miscarriage of justice occurred in this instance.
I likewise reject the appeal in relation to the sentence being manifestly excessive. The sentence of a $45 fine in my view is particularly lenient. Both appeals therefore are dismissed.[13]
[13] [2004] SASC 137, [22] – [23].
The allegations made by the defendant were extraordinary and not surprisingly the Judge found that the defendant’s attempt to change her plea was an afterthought on her part.
In my view the appeal instituted by the defendant in relation to her previously recorded plea was instituted without a reasonable ground and was vexatious as demonstrated by the findings by Anderson J. Even though this proceeding was on a topic unrelated to her previous work injury and other related litigation, it appears to demonstrate the defendant’s continual abuse of court procedures instituting groundless proceedings.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 28a
Notice for Specific Directions
Supreme Court Action No 242/04
On 27 September 2004, the defendant lodged a Notice for Specific Directions for Leave to Seek “reassessment of Judge Anderson as well as a waiver of fees and an extension of time”.
I note at this point, that following the decision of Anderson J rejecting her appeal on 27 May 2004, and the defendant lodging the Notice for Specific Directions on 27 September 2004, the defendant instituted a claim on 17 June 2004 for damages against the two police officers. The claim against the police officers is Decision No 29 referred to hereafter.
Returning to the Notice for Specific Directions filed on 27 September 2004, no documentation was filed by the defendant to support an application for extension of time. On 22 November 2004, Judge Bowen Pain rejected the application by the defendant for a waiver of fees.
I do not consider this decision as related to a waiver of fees alone should be considered as the institution of proceedings by the defendant.
Conclusion: Not vexatious
Decision No 28b
Application for Leave to Appeal
On 1 February 2005, the defendant sought leave to appeal against the decision of Anderson J and filed a draft Notice of Appeal. The defendant sought,
to have the judgment re-assessed on the grounds of the human legal right to challenge, the freedom to plead without persecution of a pre-trail (sic) conference. By threat of who will be believed by the bench – this question the plaintiff would like answered.
The defendant also referred to the right to a re-assessment pursuant to the Constitution s 51 (XXIV) and referred to “perverting the course of justice”.
On 21 March 2005, Anderson J refused the defendant’s application for an extension of time and refused her leave to appeal. In his reasons, his Honour noted that there was no valid reason provided for an application for extension of time and in any event he would not have given leave even if the application had been made within time. This decision was appropriate bearing in mind the “incomprehensible grounds” upon which the appeal against Anderson J was sought.
The application for leave to appeal was in my view a vexatious proceeding instituted without reasonable ground and was doomed to failure. It was attempting to re-litigate an already hopeless appeal (Decision No 28).
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 28c Leave to Appeal to the Full Court
On 3 May 2005, the defendant filed a Notice for Specific Directions seeking an extension of time within which to appeal to the Full Court against the decision of Anderson J.
On 31 May 2005 the Full Court of the Supreme Court refused the extension of time to appeal against the decision of Anderson J and stated as follows:
Her summary of argument provides no basis for the Court to grant leave to appeal. She identifies no issue of principle that arises, and no issue of general importance. Nor has she identified reasonably arguable grounds upon which the decision dismissing her appeal could be attacked. The Judge’s reasons for dismissing the appeal are comprehensive and persuasive.[14]
[14] [2005] SASC 193 [10]
In my view the proceeding instituted for leave to appeal was without a reasonable ground, was seeking to re-litigate a hopeless appeal (Decision No 28) and was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 29
Henriette Piepkorn v J Illingworth and K Bowden
Mount Barker Magistrates Court Action No 737/04
On 17 June 2004, the defendant issued a complaint and summons against police officers Illingworth and Bowden being the two police officers alleged to have intimidated and verbally assaulted the defendant and allegedly influenced her in pleading guilty to the traffic offence referred to in Decision No 27. The complaint alleged that the police officers had “breached the Human Right of Legal Justice” alleged. Section 264 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act was also referred to. On 4 August 2004 the complaint against both of the police officers was dismissed on the basis that there was “no valid process” and the defendant was ordered to pay costs in the amount of $600 payable to the Crown Solicitor’s Office.
The complaint and summons was not only overtly untenable as disclosing an arguable cause of action but also it had previously been the subject of the appeal before Anderson J and had also previously been dismissed on 27 May 2004.
In my opinion the complaint and summons instituted by the defendant was an attempt to re-litigate the content of a matter already decided against her. It was vexatious.
Conclusion: Proceedings instituted vexatiously.
Decision No 30
Henriette Piepkorn v Vonnie Van Develen
Mount Barker Magistrates Court Action No 714/04
On 22 November 2004, the defendant applied for and obtained a remission of court fees for the purpose of instituting a civil claim for motor vehicle property damage of $882. The claim related to the motor vehicle accident that had occurred on 1 September 2003 and had given rise to the defendant having pleaded guilty to the offence of failing to give way. As at the point when this matter came on for hearing before me it was still a matter listed for trial.
I am unable to assess whether or not this is or is not a vexatious proceeding on the basis of no reasonable grounds. A finding of guilt of the offence of failing to give way does not necessarily mean that it would exclude a claim by the defendant for property damage.
No conclusion.
Decision No 31
Henriette Piepkorn v Simms & Partners
District Court Action No 44/05
On 17 January 2005, the defendant filed a summons against Sims & Partners, the firm of accountants in which the present trustee in bankruptcy, Alan Geoffrey Scott, is employed. The summons seeks various remedies including “damages for the removal of the Human Legal Right of Power of Attorney of Contract Credit Rights and the human legal right of statute to prosecute; removed by bankruptcy.” The relief sought was removal of the sequestration orders against the defendant and to have “full human legal rights (sic)” and also restitution for criminal assault.
I consider this proceeding to have been instituted vexatiously.
This summons on the face of it discloses no discernible or reasonable cause of action.
Conclusion: Proceeding instituted vexatiously.
Proceedings in Non-State Courts and Tribunals
The proceedings instituted by the defendant in the South Australian courts as set out above have also been interspersed with numerous actions instituted in other jurisdictions, namely the Federal Court, the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Federal Magistrates Court and the High Court. Since 1993, the defendant has instituted or been involved in actions in jurisdictions with many topics and issues of litigation mirroring those of the actions in South Australia. The actions commenced or involving the defendant in these jurisdictions, whilst outside the jurisdiction for declarations of vexatious proceedings under s 39(1), indicate the lengths the defendant will go to continue to litigate matters which have already been heard and determined or dismissed in the South Australian courts. It is demonstrative of the persistency and stubbornness with which she has instituted proceedings in all jurisdictions.
Federal Court and Federal Magistrates Court Proceedings
Decision Nos 32 to 46
The various actions and applications in the Federal jurisdiction relate essentially to the bankruptcy and sequestration orders taken out against the defendant. As well as shedding light on the background to the current proceedings in the District Court, the applications in the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court often emulate substantive issues in earlier claims in the State courts. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the matters in the Federal jurisdiction reflect a general understanding of the idiosyncrasies of the defendant’s litigation, namely that the applications attempt to re-litigate the same issues against the same parties, are groundless, unlikely to succeed, and nonsensical.
Apart from Decision No 34 which was an application made by the defendant against Gerard Industries seeking reasons for the refusal of employment.[15] Decision Nos 32 - 46 relate to applications and appeals against sequestration orders imposed on the defendant.
[15] Workplace Relations Act 1966 (Cth) s 298K(d) and (e).
In Decision No 34, the defendant stated as a ground for her claim, that Gerard Industries by not employing her and giving reasons for this refusal, had restricted her right to employment. On 27 January 2000, Justice Mansfield dismissed the application for written reasons for refusal of employment as a matter of law and for lack of any evidence. While the issues in this decision do not overlap directly with any issues in the South Australian matters the defendant’s claims as to the restrictions of employment are similar to claims made against Caroma and the State Government in the State jurisdictions to which s 39 applies.
Applications and Appeals to dismiss sequestration orders in the Federal Court
Decision Nos 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 45 and 46
The submissions by the defendant of a breach of contractual duty and breach of care against the State of South Australia are no basis for a defence by the defendant to the application to have her declared a vexatious litigant. First, they are nonsensical and contain no arguable defence. Second, in a convoluted way they are based on the failed litigation in relation to Caroma. Third, it is absurd to suggest that the State has a duty to ensure that the defendant always wins in her claims before State courts. These arguments are complete nonsense dressed up in legal sounding language.
I therefore reject the defendant’s submissions as lacking cogency or a legal basis as a defence to this application.
Constitutional Arguments
In the affidavit in reply to this action, the defendant argues that her right to prosecute for the termination of her employment contract for her sprained wrist was a breach by the State of South Australia of the “Labourer’s Law of s 5d1 (xxxv); Conciliation and Arbitration Act s14A(5)”. I assume that the defendant’s reference to “Labourer’s Law of s5d1 (xxxv)” refers to s 51 (35) of the Constitution, that section provides that the Parliament has power to make laws with respect to “conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State.”
When making her oral submissions the defendant argued that the State of South Australia which she referred to as being a “third-party”, had further,
liability under constitution 75 which goes under the constitution 51(39) matters incidental to [the] execution of power vested by the Constitution in Parliament, that the situation as previous court cases are all invalid on grounds that they handled a federal jurisdictional matter which was not their jurisdictional boundaries to be handled.
In endeavouring to make sense of the defendant’s submission, I understood her to assert that it was the Commonwealth alone which had power to make laws related to industrial matters being those which she submitted governed her employment, work injury and termination of employment with Caroma. Her argument continued, that to the extent that the State courts had dealt with her complaints and dismissed them, they were invalid decisions as this should have been dealt with by the Federal jurisdiction. It was, she continued, the State of South Australia which was responsible for this situation, resulting in invalid decisions.
I reject the defendant’s submissions as being nonsensical and without legal foundation. They also ignore the constitutional power of the State courts on the subject matter of her employment which governed her various proceedings in the State courts. This is yet another way of re-litigating those matters which have already been decided against her. This argument could not be a defence to the s 39(1) application being made by the plaintiff.
The defendant in her oral submissions referred to another constitutional aspect which she intertwined with the previous constitutional point. The defendant appeared to argue that the State of South Australia was “in charge of” the terms and conditions of a contract of employment and included the legislation on occupational health, safety and welfare. However at the same time the defendant asserted that the “welfare situation” namely social security fell under para 75 of the Constitution and was a Commonwealth matter. This resulted in the defendant asserting that she was being told alternatively by each State and Federal jurisdiction that her employment complaint was not within the respective jurisdictions.
The defendant then appeared to argue that “under human rights law” she had to,
go through every jurisdictional court situation which as is done in South Australia. Now I have to go back to the High Court matter, human rights matter, because the human rights only takes on when you’ve fought every legal action that’s possible in the country, and I get refused my human right of what I’m applying for.
I have assumed this to be a reference to potential applications to the UN Human Rights Commission under the Covenant.
None of these constitutional arguments make any legal sense and they are certainly not a defence to the application before me. In addition, while making those submissions the defendant repeated submissions and arguments made by her in her other actions in which the courts held that the defendant’s claims had no cause of action, were without foundation or were an attempt to re-litigate already determined issues.
Persistent institution of vexatious proceedings
I am satisfied that my findings as to the number of vexatious proceedings demonstrates that the defendant was acting vexatiously in instituting proceedings within the meaning of s 39(1). However the number of proceedings alone is not an indicator of “persistently” instituting vexatious proceedings.
Although the defendant was successful in her initial claim for compensation in Decision Nos 1 and 2, and in some interlocutory applications such as a stay of execution of judgment, to set aside a Warrant of Commitment and a grant leave to appeal, the defendant has been unsuccessful in all other actions. Despite these failures and the numerous cost orders made against her, with which she has repeatedly failed to comply resulting in two sequestration orders and her bankruptcy, the defendant continues to institute groundless proceedings.
The defendant’s attempt to re-litigate issues already determined against the same or related parties, the lack of any reasonable grounds or discernable cause of action in many of her claims, her inability to accept the cost orders and judgments made against her, as well as the number of vexatious claims, leads me to the conclusion that the vexatious proceedings were “persistently” instituted. This conclusion is based on the observations made as to the expression “persistently” in the cases of Wentworth, Valassis and the New Zealand case of Brogden v Attorney-General,[19] where the Court of Criminal Appeal said;
What constitutes institution of such proceedings ‘persistently’ will not depend merely on the number of them but, just as importantly, on their character, their lack of any reasonable ground and the way in which they have been conducted. A litigant may be said to be persisting in litigating though the number of separate proceedings he or she brings is quite small if those proceedings clearly represent an attempt to re-litigate an issue already conclusively determined against that person, particularly if this is accompanied by extravagant or scandalous allegations which the litigant has no prospect of substantiating or justifying.[20]
[19] [2001] NZCA 208.
[20] [2001] NZCA 208; [2001] NZAR 809 at [21].
I am satisfied on the analysis of the proceedings in the State jurisdiction to declare that the majority of proceedings have been persistently instituted by the defendant vexatiously without reasonable ground within the meaning of s 39(1)(b) and her stubborn refusal to accept ‘no’ as an answer, indicates the unlikelihood that she will cease unless a declaration and orders are made.
This conclusion is reinforced by the other actions which she has taken in other jurisdictions. On the plaintiff’s submissions, the defendant has instituted or attempted to institute one or more actions a year with a total of over 50 known separate actions in various jurisdictions.
Conclusion
While access to the law and its processes is fundamental and while I recognise the fine line which is drawn between access to justice and preventing such access when proceedings become vexatious, there is no legal basis for the defendant’s arguments in her defence to this application. In her submissions she did not challenge any particular proceeding as not being vexatious but instead challenged all decisions as invalid. This is no defence.
I therefore grant the declaration.
In addition, in relation to Decision No 31, I consider it appropriate to order a stay of those proceedings pursuant to s 39(1)(b) of the Act, by reason of its vexatious nature.
Orders
I therefore grant the following orders sought by the plaintiff in the Statement of Claim of 28 April 2005.
1.I declare that the defendant, Henriette Piepkorn has instituted vexatious proceedings as defined in s 39(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1935, by persistently instituting proceedings without reasonable ground.
2. I order that the defendant be prohibited from instituting further proceedings in any Court of the State of South Australia without leave of this Court pursuant to s 39(1)(a) of the Act.
3. I order that the proceedings in Henriette Piepkorn v Sims Partners in District Court of South Australia Action No DCCIV 44-05 being Decision No 31 be stayed pursuant to s 39(1)(b) of the Act.
4. I order that the defendant pay the costs of this application to be agreed or taxed.
5.I give liberty to apply in relation to any further precise terms which may be required in relation to these orders.
ANNEXURE ‘A’
Table of proceedings
No
Citation
Decision
Date
Appeal Ref./ Volume/
Page No.1
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Industrial Court Action No 2537/82
Worker’s Compensation Claim
22 July 1982
2/1
2
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Supreme Court Action No. 991/84
Common Law Claim for Compensation
12 April 1984
2/25
2a
Application to reinstate the action
17 December 1993
3/236
3
Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd v Henriette Piepkorn
Local Court of Para Districts/Local Court of Onkaparinga Action No. 5150/87
Debt recovery claim for professional services
3 September 1987
2/49
4 Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd v Henriette Piepkorn
Local Court of Para Districts/Local Court of Onkaparinga Action No. RTJ 376/87
Summons on an unsatisfied judgment
23 December 1987 2/59 4a
Interlocutory Summons seeking to suspend the execution of judgment
14 January 1988
2/61
4b
Interlocutory Summons seeking to suspend the execution of judgment
13 September 1988
2/68
4c
Interlocutory Summons seeking to suspend the execution of judgment
4 December 1989
2/75
5
Henriette Piepkorn v Bronte J Hockley
Supreme Court Action No 2504/87
Claim for damages for grievous bodily harm resulting from two unwarranted operations
22 October 1987
3/239
5a
Full Court Appeal
28 March 1989
3/259
5b
Notice of dispute re order for costs
16 July 1991
3/261
5c
Application ‘in defiance to the notice of Wallmans’
28 February 1992
3/266
5d
Application to reinstate claim
22 December 1993
3/276
6
Henriette Piepkorn v Frederick Templeton & Evans Pty Ltd
Supreme Court Action No 734/88
Notice of Appeal re Local Court of Para Districts No. 5150/87
30 March 1988
3/281
7
Henriette Piepkorn v Philip Arthur Templeton
Local Court Action No. 26964/88
Claim for damages against the defendant’s former solicitor.
17 November 1988
2/80
7a
Application for leave to appeal
30 March 1989
2/83
8
Henriette Piepkorn v Philip Arthur Templeton
District Court Action No. 2056/89
Claim for damages for defamation and discredit
2 June 1989
2/98
9
Henriette Piepkorn v Philip Arthur Templeton
District Court Action No. 4169/89
Application for damages
27 October 1989
2/114
9a
Notice of Dispute
27 November 1989
2/123
9b
Appeal to District Court Judge
20 June 1990
2/143
9c
Affidavit attempting to reinstate the statement of claim
21 August 1990
2/152
9d
Notice of Dispute
29 August 1990
2/153
10
Henriette Piepkorn v Phillip Arthur Templeton
District Court Action No. 3352/90
Claim for damages for abuse of process
9 October 1990
2/154
11
Henriette Piepkorn v Phillip Arthur Templeton
Supreme Court Action No. 919/90
Notice of Intention to Appeal against the decision of the Local Court of Onkaparinga Action No. RTJ 376/87
20 April 1990
3/284
12
Henriette Piepkorn v Frederick Templeton & Evans
Supreme Court Action No. 2877/90
Notice of Appeal to the Full Supreme Court from the decision in District Court Action No. 3352/90
6 December 1990
3/298
13
Henriette Piepkorn v Margaret L Byrnes
District Court Action No. 2928/91Application for damages
10 September 1991
2/165
14
Henriette Piepkorn v Wallmans
Supreme Court Action No. 1613/92
Inter Partes Summons for damages for false pretences, forgery, defamation and other unspecified actions
15 July 1992
3/305
15 Henriette Piepkorn v Perrett, Harrison and Partners
District Court Action No. 923/93
Claim for medical negligence
3 May 1993 2/180 15a
Interlocutory application to reinstate the action
9 December 1993
2/179
15b
Interlocutory application to reinstate the action
2 February 1994
2/279
16
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd; Bronte J Hockley and Pannell, Kerr and Forster
Supreme Court Action No. 55/94
Claim for conspiracy, criminal compensation, assault, and extortion, and other claims of a general nature
14 January 1994
3/332
16a
Appeal to the Full Court
18 May 1994
3/339
17
Piepkorn v Perrett, Harrison and Partners
Supreme Court Action No. 259/94Appeal to Supreme Court from the decision in District Court Action No. 923/93
23 February 1994
3/342
18
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Industrial Relations Commission Action No. 1035/94
Claim for unfair dismissal
30 September 1994
3/411
19
Piepkorn v Pannell, Kerr and Forster
Supreme Court Action No. 1681/94
Claim for damages arising from false accusations, false pretences and extortion
13 October 1994
3/347
20
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Industrial Relations Court (SA) Action No. 698/94
Application pursuant to section 15 (1) (e) of the Industrial Relations Act
19 December 1994
3/428
21
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Industrial Relations Court (SA) Action No. 582/95
Application pursuant to section 14 Industrial Relations Act 1994
28 August 1995
3/445
21a
Appeal from the decision of the Industrial Magistrate
23 October 1995
3/461, 3/470, 3/491
22
Henrietta Piepkorn v Wallmans
District Court Action No. 1062/95
Application for damages for false pretences, forgery, defamation and other unspecified actions
1 September 1995
2/186
23
Piepkorn v Perrett, Harrison and Partners
Supreme Court Action No. 195/96
Claim for damages for conspiracy Reasons of Judge Burley
23 January 1996
3/353
23a
Notice of Appeal
15 July 1996
3/372
24
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Industrial Relations Court (SA) Action No. 664/97
Application pursuant to section 14 Industrial Relations Act 1994
21 October 1997
3/493
25
Henriette Piepkorn v Federal Court of Australia South Australia District Registry
District Court Action No. 1571/97
Claim for damages
9 December 1997
2/198
26
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
District Court Action No. 469/98
Claim for damages for breach of contract, assault and non-compliance with Occupational Health Safety and Welfare regulations
6 April 1998
2/206
27
Police v Henriette Piepkorn Mount Barker Magistrates Court Action No. 1802/03
Plead of guilty to a charge of failing to give way
22 January 2004
2/84
28
Piepkorn v Police
Supreme Court Action No. 242/04
Appeal against the conviction
4 March 2004
3/382
28a
Notice for specific directions for leave to seek ‘a re-assessment’ of the decision in Supreme Court Action No. 242/04
27 September 2004
3/399
28b
Application for leave to appeal to the Full Court
3/404, 3/406
28c
Judgement on notice for specific directions seeking an extension of time within which to appeal to the Full Court
3 May 2005
1/71
29
Henriette Piepkorn v J Illingworth and K Bowden
Mount Barker Magistrates Court Action No. 737/04
Claim for damages for intimidation and verbal assault re the plea of guilty in Mount Barker Magistrates Court Action No. 1802/03
17 June 2004
2/86
30
Henriette Piepkorn v Vonnie Van Develen
Mount Barker Magistrates Court Action No. 714/04
Minor civil claim for motor vehicle property damage
22 November 2004
1/61
31
Henriette Piepkorn v Sims Partners
District Court Action No. 44/05
Claim seeking various remedies including the removal of a sequestration order
17 January 2005
2/220
Federal Court of Australia
32
Re Henriette Piepkorn (Debtor)
Federal Court Action No. SP 502/92
Petition for a sequestration order
17 December 1992
4/591
32a
Notice of intention of debtor to appear
2 February 1992
4/596
33
Henriette Piepkorn v Bronte J Hockley
Federal Court Action No. SB251/93Notice of Motion seeking leave to appeal against a sequestration order
10 May 1993
4/599
33a
Application for the sequestration order made to be annulled
1 December 1993
4/600
34
Henriette Piepkorn v Gerard Industries Pty Ltd
Federal Court Action No. S 97/99Application under the Workplace Relations Act 1966 seeking orders against Gerard Industries for refusing her employment
3 December 1999
4/608
35
Caroma Industries v Henriette Piepkorn
Federal Court Action No. S 7219/99
Application for a sequestration order against the estate of the defendant
16 December 1999
4/620
35a
Notice of opposition
10 January 2000
4/621
36
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries
Federal Court Action No. S 23/00Appeal against the decision in Federal Court Action No. S 7219/99
24 March 2000
4/629
37
Henriette Piepkorn
Federal CourtApplication to dismiss the sequestration order made in Action No. S 7219/99 (uninsured)
19 June 2001
4/637
38
Henriette Piepkorn v Federal Court of Australia District Registry
Federal Court Action No. S 145/01
Notice of appeal, and an application for leave to appeal from the decision to refuse to receive the application
9 August 2001
4/637
39
Henriette Piepkorn v Alan Geoffrey Scott (Trustee)
Federal Magistrates Court Unissued applicationApplication for the annulment of a sequestration order and the removal of a prevention of prosecution
21 August 2002
4/571
40
Henriette Piepkorn v State Government of South Australia
Federal Magistrates Court Unissued application
Application for common law damage
12 November 2002
4/574
41
Henriette Piepkorn v State of South Australia
Federal Magistrates Court Action No. AZ 314/02
Application for review of the decision of the South Australian Registrar of the Federal Magistrates’ Court
3 December 2002
4/579
42
Henriette Piepkorn v State of South Australia
Federal Court Action No. S 296/02
Notice of Appeal against the decision of Federal Magistrates’ Court in Action No. AZ 314/02
24 December 2002
4/651
43
Henriette Piepkorn v State of South Australia
Federal Court Unissued application
Application for judicial correction to the removal of the defendant’s power of contractual rights
4 April 2003
4/666
44
Henriette Piepkorn v Minister of Employment and Training and Caroma Industries Ltd
Federal Court Action No. S 138/04
Application seeking to remedy perceived wrongs arising out of her former employment
21 June 2004
4/671
45
Henriette Piepkorn v Sims Partners; Alan Scott
Federal Court Action No. S 209/04
Application to have the sequestration order made against her annulled
20 September 2004
4/686
46
Henriette Piepkorn v Alan Scott
Federal Court Action No. SAD 1/05
Notice of Appeal
4 January 2005
4/695
High Court of Australia
47
Henriette Piepkorn v Bronte J Hockley
High Court Action No. A37/1989
Application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Supreme Court of South Australia in Supreme Court Action No. 2504/87
8 September 1989
4/696
48
Henriette Piepkorn v Wallmans
High Court Action No. A28/1992Application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Supreme Court of South Australia in Supreme Court Action No.1613/92
16 December 1992
4/728
49
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd & Ors
High Court Action No. A28/1994
Application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Supreme Court of South Australia in Supreme Court Action No.55/94
18 July 1994
4/741
50
Henriette Piepkorn v State of South Australia
High Court Action No. A9/1995
Application to issue proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia
21 March 1995
4/772
51
Henriette Piepkorn v Perrett, Harrison and Partners
High Court Action No. A55/1996
Application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Supreme Court of South Australia in Supreme Court Action No. 195/96
6 December 1996
4/773
52
An ex parte application by Henriette Piepkorn
High Court Action No. A1/1999
A summons in the High Court which named the State of South Australia as a defendant
14 December 1998
4/789
53
An ex parte application by Henriette Piepkorn
High Court Action No. L00/1999
Application to issue proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia
12 May 1999
4/802
54
An application by Henriette Piepkorn for leave to issue a proceeding
High Court Action No. A33/1999
A summons and statement of claim in the High Court which named the State of South Australia as a defendant
September 1999
4/803
55
An application for leave to appeal by Henriette Piepkorn against the refusal of leave to issue a proceeding
High Court Action No. A38/1999
Application for leave to appeal against the decision of Justice Gaudron in High Court Action No. A33/1999
17 November 1999
4/809
56
An application by Henriette Piepkorn for leave to issue a proceeding
High Court Action No. A6/2001
A summons and statement of claim in the High Court which named the ‘Attorney-General Department - [S.A. Government]’ as a defendant
December 2000
4/824
57
An application by Henriette Piepkorn for leave to issue a proceeding
High Court Action No. A19/2001
An application for leave to issue proceeding
1 May 2001
4/831
58
An application by Henriette Piepkorn for leave to issue a proceeding
High Court Action No. C14/2001
An application for leave to issue proceeding
12 December 2001
4/835
59
An application by Henriette Piepkorn for leave to issue a proceeding
High Court Action No. C7/2002
A summons and statement of claim in the High Court which named the ‘State Government’ as a defendant
14 March 2002
4/840
60
Piepkorn v State Government of South Australia
High Court Action No. A201/2003
Application for special leave to appeal against the decision delivered by Justice von Doussa in Federal Court of Australia Action No. S 296/02
1 May 2003
4/852
Australian Industrial Relations Commission
61
Henriette Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd
Australian Industrial Relations Commission Action No. U 50527/96
Application for an extension of time for the lodgement of an application for relief in respect to an alleged unlawful termination of the defendant’s employment
8 October 1996
4/564
7
9
1