Freeman v National Australia Bank Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Freeman v National Australia Bank Limited [2012] FCA 866

Citation: Freeman v National Australia Bank Limited [2012] FCA 866
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659
Application for leave to appeal: Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659
Parties: LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937) and MATTHEW LESLIE JOINER AND PHILIP GREGORY JEFFERSON, TRUSTEES IN THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE PROPERTY OF LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN
File number: QUD 215 of 2012
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 16 August 2012
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – vexatious litigant – application for extension of time for leave to appeal – application for leave to appeal against decision dismissing application to rescind vexatious litigant orders – order declaring vexatious litigant interlocutory not final – relevant principles in considering application for extension of time and for leave to appeal – reopening previous decision because of alleged fresh evidence – merits of case – whether primary judge had proper regard to issues raised by applicant – indemnity costs
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) Pt 6 Div 6.1, rr 35.13, 35.14, 36.05
Cases cited: Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 cited
Croker v Minister for the Department of Finance and Deregulation [2011] FCA 1418 cited
Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659 related
Freeman v National Australia Bank Ltd [2006] QCA 329 cited
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 cited
Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153 cited
Monroe Schneider Associates (Inc) v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 37 FCR 234 cited
National Australia Bank Limited v Freeman (a Bankrupt) [2005] FCA 1895 cited
Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443 cited
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 286 ALR 257 cited
Date of hearing: 14 August 2012
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Muir
Solicitor for the First Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr DH Locke
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Robinson Locke Litigation Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 215 of 2012

BETWEEN:

LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN
Applicant

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)
First Respondent

MATTHEW LESLIE JOINER AND PHILIP GREGORY JEFFERSON, TRUSTEES IN THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE PROPERTY OF LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 AUGUST 2012

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal against the decision in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659 and the application for leave to appeal against the decision in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 866
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Freeman v National Australia Bank, the Federal Court was called upon to determine two interlocutory applications brought by the applicant, Mr Freeman, against the National Australia Bank Limited and the Trustees in Bankruptcy. The primary issue before the court was whether Mr Freeman should be granted leave to appeal against the decision dismissing his application to rescind vexatious litigant orders, as well as an extension of time to file such an appeal. The court also had to consider whether the primary judge had properly regarded the issues raised by Mr Freeman.

Mr Freeman had a history of litigating against the Bank and had been declared a vexatious litigant. The court noted that Mr Freeman's application was an attempt to relitigate past decisions that had been determined against him. The primary judge had endeavoured to ensure that Mr Freeman focused on new evidence that could justify the grant of leave. However, the court found that there was no new evidence presented that would warrant reconsideration of the previous judgment or suggest that any prior judgment was obtained by fraud.

The court applied the relevant principles in considering the application for extension of time and for leave to appeal. It was established that the test for whether leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment would be granted comprised two parts: whether the decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court found that Mr Freeman's application did not meet either criterion.

The orders of the court were that the application for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal, as well as the application for leave to appeal against the decision in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659, were dismissed. Mr Freeman was also ordered to pay the costs of the respondents on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal against the decision in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659 and the application for leave to appeal against the decision in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659 are dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondents on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I note that before Logan J, and in respect of the two interlocutory applications before me, Mr Freeman was self-represented, whereas the respondents had legal representation.Background The history of litigation between the parties, until the end of 2005, was summarised by Spender J in National Australia Bank Limited v Freeman (a Bankrupt). Pertinently, his Honour explained as follows:[3] This application is part of extensive saga of litigation between the Bank, Mr Freeman and the Trustees. The saga has its origins in a mediation between the Bank and Mr Freeman conducted before the late Mr R R Douglas QC (as he then was) in December 1997, at which Mr Freeman was represented by counsel and solicitors.[4] As a result of the mediation, the Bank and Mr Freeman executed an agreement on 4 December 1997 (“the mediation agreement”). The mediation agreement led to the establishment by the Bank of a bill facility of $1,020,000 in favour of Mr Freeman which was due for repayment on 6 April 1998. By the mediation agreement, Mr Freeman agreed to use his best endeavours to refinance the Bank’s debt or to sell the property ‘Glassford Vale’ by 4 March 1998. Settlement of any sale or refinancing was to be effected by 6 April 1998. The mediation agreement contained a provision (Cl 9.1) under which Mr Freeman released the Bank from claims which he had or might have had against the Bank in respect of a wide range of matters.[5] Mr Freeman was unable to refinance the Bank’s debt, or sell ‘Glassford Vale’. On 14 May 1998 the Bank commenced proceedings (No 4013 of 1998) in the Queensland Supreme Court for possession of ‘Glassford Vale’ (which had been mortgaged to the Bank), and for moneys owing under the expired bill facility.[6] The proceedings were heard before Ambrose J over a period of four days in September 2000, when Mr Freeman was represented by counsel. On 11 October 2000 Ambrose J gave judgment for the Bank for possession of ‘Glassford Vale’, and for the sum of $1,427,890.08 and indemnity costs. His Honour:• rejected Mr Freeman’s case that he was mentally incompetent when the mediation agreement was concluded;• found that the release was effective to release the Bank from all of the claims made by Mr Freeman in his counter claim; and• held that in any event Mr Freeman had no real prospect of success in establishing those claims.[7] On 2 November 2001 Mr Freeman unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal from the decision of Ambrose J (No 9718 of 2000). In the reasons for judgment of White J, [2001] QCA 473 her Honour concluded:‘There is no substance in any of the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant in the extensive written submissions or in his oral submissions.’[8] On 14 March 2003 the High Court refused special leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal. One of the matters relied upon in argument by counsel for Mr Freeman at the special leave application was an alleged failure on the part of the Bank to give proper discovery, a matter which had not been raised in the Court of Appeal. Special leave to appeal was refused by the High Court because no arguable error had been demonstrated in the courts below.[9] On 11 March 2002 Mr Freeman commenced proceedings against the Bank in the Supreme Court of Queensland (No 2339 of 2002) seeking damages for the sale of his property ‘Glassford Vale’ at an alleged undervalue. The property had been sold by Receivers appointed by the Bank in July 2001, hence one of the issues in the proceedings was whether the Bank was responsible for any default on the part of the Receivers who were deemed by the mortgage documents to be the agents of the Bank.[10] The first proceedings in the Federal Court began on 18 January 2001 when the Bank issued a Creditor’s Petition against Mr Freeman based upon the failure of Mr Freeman to comply with a warrant of execution issued by the Supreme Court on 31 October 2000. In dismissing a notice of motion filed by Mr Freeman seeking further discovery from the Bank, I noted:‘In this case, Mr Freeman is seeking to re-litigate the question of whether he owes a debt to the National Australia Bank.’[11] On 12 March 2002 I made a sequestration order in relation to Mr Freeman’s estate on the application of the Bank. I held that a prima facie case of fraud, or collusion, or miscarriage of justice had not been made out, so as to impeach the judgment of Ambrose J. I also found that any claim by Mr Freeman asserting a sale of the mortgaged property at an undervalue was a claim against the Receivers, and not against the Bank. On 9 April 2002 I stayed the sequestration order pending an appeal to the Full Court.[12] On 7 May 2002 Muir J dismissed an application by the Bank for summary dismissal of proceedings No 2339 of 2002, upon the basis that there was a triable issue as to whether the Bank had intermeddled in the Receivers’ sale so as to render it liable for any default on the part of the Receivers.[13] On 26 August 2003 the Full Court of the Federal Court (French, Cooper, R D Nicholson JJ) dismissed Mr Freeman’s appeal from the making of the sequestration order. Mr Freeman unsuccessfully sought to adduce further evidence before the Full Court, which the Court declined to receive because it could have been placed before the Court when the sequestration order was made.[14] On 27 August 2003 Mr Freeman commenced further proceedings in the Queensland Supreme Court under Rule 668 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) seeking orders setting aside the judgment in action SC4013 of 1998 on the basis of fresh evidence. The application was heard and dismissed by de Jersey CJ on 15 October 2003 on the ground that Mr Freeman did not have standing to pursue the application in view of his bankruptcy.[15] On 14 October 2003, the Trustees elected not to adopt Mr Freeman’s proceedings against the Bank. On 31 October 2003, Mr Freeman filed a motion seeking to compel the Trustees to commence actions against the Bank. I declined to make any orders on the motion. I then noted:‘While this court has, on the present motions, been subjected to a considerable volume of material, most of it is directed at issues which are not central to the applications which Mr Freeman wishes the court to consider today or the orders he wishes the court to make. Much of the material seeks to re-canvass the question of whether the judgment of Ambrose J was correct, and whether the consequential proceedings in the Court of Appeal, in the High Court, the making of a sequestration order, and the unsuccessful appeal from the making of that order are consequently tainted.’[16] Mr Freeman appealed to the Full Federal Court, who dismissed his appeal on 1 December 2004. Their Honours (Lee, Merkel and Hely JJ) noted:‘The appellant [Mr Freeman] placed a large volume of material before us which was primarily directed towards establishing that the decision of Ambrose J was wrong, ... there was little focus on the issues...’[17] On 6 February 2004 Dowsett J rejected an application made by Mr Freeman under s 153B of the Act to annul the sequestration order of 12 March 2002. An appeal to the Full Federal Court was stayed on 7 May 2004, pending the payment by Mr Freeman of $5000 as security for the Bank’s costs. In my reasons in staying the appeal pending the provision of security, I said:‘In my judgment there is no question of legal principle involved in the appeal from the judgment of Dowsett J....As the submissions by Mr Freeman on his own behalf ... confirm, what he is seeking to do is to demonstrate what he has been unsuccessful in demonstrating thus far in many proceedings, namely that decisions in favour of the National Australia Bank from the time of the first trial before Ambrose J and in successive proceedings, have been erroneously determined in favour of the bank and adversely to Mr Freeman.’[18] An application for leave to appeal the security for costs order was dismissed by Tamberlin J on 7 July 2005.[19] On 11 March 2005, Mr Freeman filed an application seeking an order that the Trustees assign to him two actions commenced by him in the Supreme Court prior to his bankruptcy. The application was dismissed by Tamberlin J on 6 May 2005. A subsequent appeal to the Full Federal Court (Spender, Kiefel, Dowsett JJ) was dismissed on 8 August 2005.[20] As noted above, this application seeking orders pursuant to O 21 r 2 that Mr Freeman be declared vexatious and be required to obtain the Court’s leave before commencing any further proceedings was filed on 3 June 2005, after the dismissal of Mr Freeman’s application by Tamberlin J on 6 May 2005, and before the dismissal of Mr Freeman’s appeal by the Full Court on 8 August 2005.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In considering both interlocutory applications together, it is useful to commence by:·having regard to the decision of his Honour; and·having regard to the grounds of appeal proposed by Mr Freeman.Decision of his Honour A copy of the transcript of the proceedings before his Honour in QUD 106/2012 on 23 March 2012 was annexed to the affidavit of Mr Philip Pan sworn 4 July 2012. From perusal of this transcript, in my view the following is clear:·His Honour endeavoured to facilitate the filing of material by Mr Freeman, including the amended outline prepared by Mr Freeman (TS p 5 ll 40-44).·His Honour explained to Mr Freeman that Mr Freeman needed to persuade the Court that his application was not an attempt to relitigate matters which had been determined against Mr Freeman in the past (TS p 7 ll 7-8).·His Honour allowed Mr Freeman the opportunity to voice his concerns in relation to:othe alleged corporate culture of NAB and issues relating to his account with NAB (TS p 6 ll 12-45);oalleged falsification of interest in customers’ accounts by NAB (TS p 7 ll 40-42);oevents from 25 August 2005 involving alleged refunds made by NAB to customers (TS p 8 ll 12-16, 35-45);othe judgment of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2006] QCA 329 (TS p 8 l 20);othe amount of money Mr Freeman claimed was refundable by NAB to him (TS p 9 ll 8-12);othe quantum of debt which Mr Freeman claimed ought to have been owing by him to NAB (TS p 9 ll 16-28); andothe inappropriate charging of interest by NAB (TS p 9 ll 25-26).·His Honour sought to make Mr Freeman focus on a key document containing a “magic bullet” which would justify his Honour in granting leave (TS p 7 ll 26-28). His Honour’s decision is relatively brief, concluding in orders dismissing Mr Freeman’s application and ordering that he pay the costs of each respondent on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not agreed. After introductory comments and reciting the orders of Spender J in respect of the parties in 2005, his Honour said:[6] Both the bank and the trustees in bankruptcy oppose that application for leave. They seek, pursuant to r 5.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), that the application be heard and determined at the directions hearing. It is convenient to do that. The bank’s submission, which is adopted by the bankruptcy trustees, is that an analysis of the material upon which Mr Freeman relies, in other words, his affidavit filed on 17 February 2012, discloses the following issues as the basis upon which he maintains that the orders for a grant of leave should be granted:(a) there is fresh evidence;(b) there was no debt at the time of bankruptcy;(c) all judgments are based on incorrect evidence;(d) the bank has admitted a corporate culture of maximising profits and not providing and controlling information to other parties;(e) the bank did not discover documents;(f) the bank discovered documents advantageous to the bank but disadvantaged the others;(g) the bank issued incorrect documents, including bank statements; and(h) the bank’s representatives gave incorrect information that all judgments in the federal jurisdiction are unjust on the grounds of discovered new evidence, material nondisclosure of new evidence, and are fraudulent.[7] Regard to the statement of claim, as well as Mr Freeman’s affidavit, discloses that there is substance in each of the bases apprehended by the bank upon which Mr Freeman seeks a grant of leave. Each of those is a feature of the affidavit, as is underscored as well by the way in which that material is developed in the outline Mr Freeman has lodged.[8] It is not my purpose today to recite again the history of disputation as between the bank and Mr Freeman. That has been amply done by Spender J in his reasons for judgment. Further, today is not a hearing of whether or not, in relation to the bank and the bankruptcy trustees, Mr Freeman is to be regarded as vexatious, having regard to the principles set out in cases such as Ramsey v Skyring [1999] FCA 907; (1999) 164 ALR 378 and Kowlaski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153. He already has that status in relation to those parties. Rather, the question for today is whether, notwithstanding his possession of that status, there is anything warranting a grant of leave.In the course of his oral submissions supplementing the written submissions, Mr Freeman was asked by me to identify with precision a particular feature of his affidavit which was new. He drew my attention, by way of response, to an announcement made by the National Australia Bank in July 2005 in respect of a refunding of what the bank acknowledged to be incorrectly debited bank accounts debit tax to particular accounts.[9] That particular body of evidence seems to have been the subject of agitation at the time when Spender J made his determination. I can see nothing in the evidence today which would warrant a grant of leave more particularly, nothing which would support even an arguable case that any prior judgment was obtained by fraud. The application is dismissed.Grounds of appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Further, in relation to applications for leave to appeal the Full Court recently observed in Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 286 ALR 257 at [26]:In this court, it is well established that the relevant test (or “litmus test”) for whether leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment will be granted, comprises the following two integers:(1) whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court; and(2) whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong.Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398–400; 104 ALR 621 at 622–4; 23 IPR 1 at 3–5 (Décor).Consideration In considering both interlocutory applications together, it is useful to commence by:·having regard to the decision of his Honour; and·having regard to the grounds of appeal proposed by Mr Freeman.Decision of his Honour A copy of the transcript of the proceedings before his Honour in QUD 106/2012 on 23 March 2012 was annexed to the affidavit of Mr Philip Pan sworn 4 July 2012. From perusal of this transcript, in my view the following is clear:·His Honour endeavoured to facilitate the filing of material by Mr Freeman, including the amended outline prepared by Mr Freeman (TS p 5 ll 40-44).·His Honour explained to Mr Freeman that Mr Freeman needed to persuade the Court that his application was not an attempt to relitigate matters which had been determined against Mr Freeman in the past (TS p 7 ll 7-8).·His Honour allowed Mr Freeman the opportunity to voice his concerns in relation to:othe alleged corporate culture of NAB and issues relating to his account with NAB (TS p 6 ll 12-45);oalleged falsification of interest in customers’ accounts by NAB (TS p 7 ll 40-42);oevents from 25 August 2005 involving alleged refunds made by NAB to customers (TS p 8 ll 12-16, 35-45);othe judgment of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2006] QCA 329 (TS p 8 l 20);othe amount of money Mr Freeman claimed was refundable by NAB to him (TS p 9 ll 8-12);othe quantum of debt which Mr Freeman claimed ought to have been owing by him to NAB (TS p 9 ll 16-28); andothe inappropriate charging of interest by NAB (TS p 9 ll 25-26).·His Honour sought to make Mr Freeman focus on a key document containing a “magic bullet” which would justify his Honour in granting leave (TS p 7 ll 26-28). His Honour’s decision is relatively brief, concluding in orders dismissing Mr Freeman’s application and ordering that he pay the costs of each respondent on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not agreed. After introductory comments and reciting the orders of Spender J in respect of the parties in 2005, his Honour said:[6] Both the bank and the trustees in bankruptcy oppose that application for leave. They seek, pursuant to r 5.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), that the application be heard and determined at the directions hearing. It is convenient to do that. The bank’s submission, which is adopted by the bankruptcy trustees, is that an analysis of the material upon which Mr Freeman relies, in other words, his affidavit filed on 17 February 2012, discloses the following issues as the basis upon which he maintains that the orders for a grant of leave should be granted:(a) there is fresh evidence;(b) there was no debt at the time of bankruptcy;(c) all judgments are based on incorrect evidence;(d) the bank has admitted a corporate culture of maximising profits and not providing and controlling information to other parties;(e) the bank did not discover documents;(f) the bank discovered documents advantageous to the bank but disadvantaged the others;(g) the bank issued incorrect documents, including bank statements; and(h) the bank’s representatives gave incorrect information that all judgments in the federal jurisdiction are unjust on the grounds of discovered new evidence, material nondisclosure of new evidence, and are fraudulent.[7] Regard to the statement of claim, as well as Mr Freeman’s affidavit, discloses that there is substance in each of the bases apprehended by the bank upon which Mr Freeman seeks a grant of leave. Each of those is a feature of the affidavit, as is underscored as well by the way in which that material is developed in the outline Mr Freeman has lodged.[8] It is not my purpose today to recite again the history of disputation as between the bank and Mr Freeman. That has been amply done by Spender J in his reasons for judgment. Further, today is not a hearing of whether or not, in relation to the bank and the bankruptcy trustees, Mr Freeman is to be regarded as vexatious, having regard to the principles set out in cases such as Ramsey v Skyring [1999] FCA 907; (1999) 164 ALR 378 and Kowlaski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153. He already has that status in relation to those parties. Rather, the question for today is whether, notwithstanding his possession of that status, there is anything warranting a grant of leave.In the course of his oral submissions supplementing the written submissions, Mr Freeman was asked by me to identify with precision a particular feature of his affidavit which was new. He drew my attention, by way of response, to an announcement made by the National Australia Bank in July 2005 in respect of a refunding of what the bank acknowledged to be incorrectly debited bank accounts debit tax to particular accounts.[9] That particular body of evidence seems to have been the subject of agitation at the time when Spender J made his determination. I can see nothing in the evidence today which would warrant a grant of leave more particularly, nothing which would support even an arguable case that any prior judgment was obtained by fraud. The application is dismissed.Grounds of appeal