FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Freeman v National Australia Bank Limited [2012] FCA 866
Citation: Freeman v National Australia Bank Limited [2012] FCA 866 Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659
Application for leave to appeal: Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659Parties: LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937) and MATTHEW LESLIE JOINER AND PHILIP GREGORY JEFFERSON, TRUSTEES IN THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE PROPERTY OF LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN File number: QUD 215 of 2012 Judge: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 16 August 2012 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – vexatious litigant – application for extension of time for leave to appeal – application for leave to appeal against decision dismissing application to rescind vexatious litigant orders – order declaring vexatious litigant interlocutory not final – relevant principles in considering application for extension of time and for leave to appeal – reopening previous decision because of alleged fresh evidence – merits of case – whether primary judge had proper regard to issues raised by applicant – indemnity costs Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) Pt 6 Div 6.1, rr 35.13, 35.14, 36.05Cases cited: Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 cited
Croker v Minister for the Department of Finance and Deregulation [2011] FCA 1418 cited
Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659 related
Freeman v National Australia Bank Ltd [2006] QCA 329 cited
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 cited
Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153 cited
Monroe Schneider Associates (Inc) v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 37 FCR 234 cited
National Australia Bank Limited v Freeman (a Bankrupt) [2005] FCA 1895 cited
Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443 cited
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 286 ALR 257 citedDate of hearing: 14 August 2012 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Muir Solicitor for the First Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr DH Locke Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Robinson Locke Litigation Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 215 of 2012
BETWEEN: LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN
ApplicantAND: NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)
First RespondentMATTHEW LESLIE JOINER AND PHILIP GREGORY JEFFERSON, TRUSTEES IN THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE PROPERTY OF LYNTON NOEL CHARLES FREEMAN
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 AUGUST 2012
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal against the decision in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659 and the application for leave to appeal against the decision in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 866
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Mr Freeman had a history of litigating against the Bank and had been declared a vexatious litigant. The court noted that Mr Freeman's application was an attempt to relitigate past decisions that had been determined against him. The primary judge had endeavoured to ensure that Mr Freeman focused on new evidence that could justify the grant of leave. However, the court found that there was no new evidence presented that would warrant reconsideration of the previous judgment or suggest that any prior judgment was obtained by fraud.
The court applied the relevant principles in considering the application for extension of time and for leave to appeal. It was established that the test for whether leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment would be granted comprised two parts: whether the decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court found that Mr Freeman's application did not meet either criterion.
The orders of the court were that the application for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal, as well as the application for leave to appeal against the decision in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659, were dismissed. Mr Freeman was also ordered to pay the costs of the respondents on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time in which to file an application for leave to appeal against the decision in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659 and the application for leave to appeal against the decision in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2012] FCA 659 are dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondents on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Further, in relation to applications for leave to appeal the Full Court recently observed in Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 286 ALR 257 at [26]:In this court, it is well established that the relevant test (or “litmus test”) for whether leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment will be granted, comprises the following two integers:(1) whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court; and(2) whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong.Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398–400; 104 ALR 621 at 622–4; 23 IPR 1 at 3–5 (Décor).Consideration In considering both interlocutory applications together, it is useful to commence by:·having regard to the decision of his Honour; and·having regard to the grounds of appeal proposed by Mr Freeman.Decision of his Honour A copy of the transcript of the proceedings before his Honour in QUD 106/2012 on 23 March 2012 was annexed to the affidavit of Mr Philip Pan sworn 4 July 2012. From perusal of this transcript, in my view the following is clear:·His Honour endeavoured to facilitate the filing of material by Mr Freeman, including the amended outline prepared by Mr Freeman (TS p 5 ll 40-44).·His Honour explained to Mr Freeman that Mr Freeman needed to persuade the Court that his application was not an attempt to relitigate matters which had been determined against Mr Freeman in the past (TS p 7 ll 7-8).·His Honour allowed Mr Freeman the opportunity to voice his concerns in relation to:othe alleged corporate culture of NAB and issues relating to his account with NAB (TS p 6 ll 12-45);oalleged falsification of interest in customers’ accounts by NAB (TS p 7 ll 40-42);oevents from 25 August 2005 involving alleged refunds made by NAB to customers (TS p 8 ll 12-16, 35-45);othe judgment of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Freeman v National Australia Bank [2006] QCA 329 (TS p 8 l 20);othe amount of money Mr Freeman claimed was refundable by NAB to him (TS p 9 ll 8-12);othe quantum of debt which Mr Freeman claimed ought to have been owing by him to NAB (TS p 9 ll 16-28); andothe inappropriate charging of interest by NAB (TS p 9 ll 25-26).·His Honour sought to make Mr Freeman focus on a key document containing a “magic bullet” which would justify his Honour in granting leave (TS p 7 ll 26-28). His Honour’s decision is relatively brief, concluding in orders dismissing Mr Freeman’s application and ordering that he pay the costs of each respondent on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not agreed. After introductory comments and reciting the orders of Spender J in respect of the parties in 2005, his Honour said:[6] Both the bank and the trustees in bankruptcy oppose that application for leave. They seek, pursuant to r 5.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), that the application be heard and determined at the directions hearing. It is convenient to do that. The bank’s submission, which is adopted by the bankruptcy trustees, is that an analysis of the material upon which Mr Freeman relies, in other words, his affidavit filed on 17 February 2012, discloses the following issues as the basis upon which he maintains that the orders for a grant of leave should be granted:(a) there is fresh evidence;(b) there was no debt at the time of bankruptcy;(c) all judgments are based on incorrect evidence;(d) the bank has admitted a corporate culture of maximising profits and not providing and controlling information to other parties;(e) the bank did not discover documents;(f) the bank discovered documents advantageous to the bank but disadvantaged the others;(g) the bank issued incorrect documents, including bank statements; and(h) the bank’s representatives gave incorrect information that all judgments in the federal jurisdiction are unjust on the grounds of discovered new evidence, material nondisclosure of new evidence, and are fraudulent.[7] Regard to the statement of claim, as well as Mr Freeman’s affidavit, discloses that there is substance in each of the bases apprehended by the bank upon which Mr Freeman seeks a grant of leave. Each of those is a feature of the affidavit, as is underscored as well by the way in which that material is developed in the outline Mr Freeman has lodged.[8] It is not my purpose today to recite again the history of disputation as between the bank and Mr Freeman. That has been amply done by Spender J in his reasons for judgment. Further, today is not a hearing of whether or not, in relation to the bank and the bankruptcy trustees, Mr Freeman is to be regarded as vexatious, having regard to the principles set out in cases such as Ramsey v Skyring [1999] FCA 907; (1999) 164 ALR 378 and Kowlaski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153. He already has that status in relation to those parties. Rather, the question for today is whether, notwithstanding his possession of that status, there is anything warranting a grant of leave.In the course of his oral submissions supplementing the written submissions, Mr Freeman was asked by me to identify with precision a particular feature of his affidavit which was new. He drew my attention, by way of response, to an announcement made by the National Australia Bank in July 2005 in respect of a refunding of what the bank acknowledged to be incorrectly debited bank accounts debit tax to particular accounts.[9] That particular body of evidence seems to have been the subject of agitation at the time when Spender J made his determination. I can see nothing in the evidence today which would warrant a grant of leave more particularly, nothing which would support even an arguable case that any prior judgment was obtained by fraud. The application is dismissed.Grounds of appeal