Re An Application Under S 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act;

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION: RE AN APPLICATION UNDER S 6 OF THE VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS RESTRICTION ACT; EX PARTE BARKLA [2017] WASC 102

CORAM:   TOTTLE J

HEARD:   1 MARCH 2017

DELIVERED          :   13 APRIL 2017

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1192 of 2017

EX PARTE

GEOFF BARKLA
Plaintiff

Catchwords:

Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) - Whether leave should be granted to institute proceedings pursuant to s 6 of the Act - Where applicant wishes to appeal against an interlocutory order of a judge of the District Court - Where applicant has failed to comply with s 6(3) of the Act - Application dismissed

Legislation:

District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA)
Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA), s 6

Result:

Application dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     In person

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     In person

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Spiers Earthworks Pty Ltd v Landtec Projects Corporation Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 43

TOTTLE J: 

Introduction

  1. This is an application made under s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) for leave to institute a proceeding, namely an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order of a judge of the District Court of Western Australia.

  2. On 21 September 2016, an order was made by a judge of this court prohibiting the applicant from instituting any proceedings, as that word is defined under the Act, without first obtaining the leave of a court under s 6 of the Act.

  3. Section 79(1)(b) of the District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA) provides, in effect, that a party dissatisfied with an interlocutory order of a judge of the District Court requires leave of the Court of Appeal to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the order with which that party is dissatisfied.

  4. Making an application for leave to appeal is to 'institute proceedings' for the purpose of the Act. 

Procedural background

  1. By a notice of originating motion bearing the date 24 January 2017, filed in the Central Office of this court on 6 February 2017, the applicant sought relief expressed in the following terms:

    [A]n order that the Appellant be permitted to appear by 'Video Link' in hearings be [sic] the District Court WA and Supreme Court WA AND that the costs of and incidental to this application may be paid by the Respondent And [sic] further take notice that the grounds of this application are:

    Application for leave is sought pursuant to section 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2002 WA to apply for leave to appeal against an order McCann DCJ made on the 5th September 2016 'requiring' the Appellant to appear in person at any future Court appointments in the matter of CIV 2764 of 2016 Barkla v Allianz Australia.  The nature of this claim is for permission for a 'Video Link' in the District Court WA for 'Future Economic Loss' in which Allianz 'Accept Liability' (please see attached Insurer's Notice that liability is…

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Details
Case
[2017] WASC 102
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Re An Application Under S 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act, the applicant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order made by a District Court Judge. The applicant wished to appeal the decision that denied his request to appear by video link during proceedings. The decision of the Supreme Court was to dismiss the application for leave to appeal on the grounds that the application was vexatious.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether leave should be granted to the applicant to institute proceedings under Section 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA). The court was also required to determine whether the applicant had complied with Section 6(3) of the Act, which mandates that an application for leave to appeal must be supported by written reasons.

The court held that the principles relating to the grant of leave for interlocutory appeals required the applicant to demonstrate that the decision was arguably wrong or attended with sufficient doubt to warrant an appeal. Additionally, the applicant needed to show that substantial injustice would result from leaving the challenged interlocutory decision unreversed. The court found that the applicant had failed to comply with Section 6(3) of the Act by not providing written reasons for his application. The court further noted that the applicant's attempts to use the notice to admit procedure and interrogatories constituted an abuse of process. Based on these findings, the court dismissed the application as vexatious.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal an interlocutory order made by a District Court Judge. The court held that the application had no reasonable grounds and was vexatious, as the applicant failed to comply with the requirements of the Act and had engaged in an abuse of process.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The decision from which the applicant wishes to appeal is an interlocutory decision concerning a matter of practice or procedure. The principles relating to the grant of leave for interlocutory appeals are summarised in Spiers Earthworks Pty Ltd v Landtec Projects CorporationPty Ltd [2010] WASCA 43 (Pullen JA and Kenneth Martin J):No rigid rules govern the grant of leave for interlocutory appeals. Usually, however, an appellant needs to show that the decision appealed against is wrong, or at least is arguably attended with sufficient doubt to support a grant of leave to appeal. There is usually a further requirement to demonstrate that substantial injustice would be done in leaving the challenged interlocutory decision unreversed: see Wilson v Metaxas [1989] WAR 285; Wing Luck Foods v Lay Choo Lim [1989] WAR 358 and The State of Western Australia v Bond Corporation Holding Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 40, per Malcolm CJ at 54 - 55 … [36]. Particular caution is to be exercised in considering an application for leave to appeal from a decision dealing with matters of practice and procedure. Granting or refusing a party leave to appeal by video link is quintessentially a matter of practice and procedure. There are a variety of matters that have the capacity to bear upon whether leave to appear by video link should be granted. One that immediately comes to mind as being potentially relevant in this case is whether a party is taking steps that abuse the processes of the court. As I have already indicated, my impression from the documents that the applicant has attached to his affidavits in support of this application is that he had misconceived the nature and purpose of the notice to admit procedure and the circumstances in which interrogatories might be administered and that his attempts to employ those processes constituted an abuse of process. There is no right to appear by video link. It is a facility used by the court where appropriate and its use lies within the discretion of the relevant judicial officer. In this case, McCann DCJ may well have been of the view that he would not permit the applicant to appear by video link if he was satisfied that the applicant wished to pursue a course of conduct that constituted an abuse of process. If so, this seems to me to be a sound exercise of the court's discretion. In any event, on the basis of the materials the applicant has put before me in support of his application for leave to commence an application for leave to appeal, I consider that the proposed application for leave to appeal has no reasonable grounds and that thus it is a vexatious proceeding. For the reasons set out above I dismiss the application.