F, B v Commissioner of Police

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Criminal)

F, B v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

[2024] SASCA 25

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice David and the Honourable Justice Kimber)

21 March 2024

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - SEXUAL OFFENCES - RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE - APPEAL DISMISSED

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT - PROOF AND EVIDENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE - PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES NOT AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE - IMPROPER ADMISSION OR REJECTION OF EVIDENCE

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - ERROR OF LAW - PARTICULAR CASES INVOLVING ERROR OF LAW - FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS FOR DECISION - ADEQUACY OF REASONS

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE - PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE - MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION

Following a trial before a Magistrate of the Youth Court, the appellant was found guilty of one count of aggravated rape, contrary to s 48(1)(a) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’). The circumstances of aggravation were that at the time of the alleged offence, the appellant committed the offence knowing that he was in a relationship with the complainant, JF, who is his half-brother, and, knowing that JF was under the age of 12.

The prosecution alleged that between 1 January 2014 and 1 December 2015, the appellant committed a single act of penile anal rape against JF. It was also alleged that the appellant committed several uncharged acts of rape and unlawful threats upon JF in the 12 months following the charged offence.  The appellant was alleged to have raped JF in a portable sleepout at the family home which he used as a bedroom.

The appellant was found guilty. The trial Magistrate discharged the appellant without conviction and without penalty being imposed. He was ordered to enter a bond to be of good behaviour for 12 months.

The appellant now seeks permission to appeal against his conviction on the following, summarised, grounds:

1.The verdict of guilty was contrary to the evidence.

2.The trial Magistrate erred by reversing the onus of proof with respect to an element of the offence, namely the identity of the offender.

3.The trial Magistrate erred in admitting the evidence of uncharged acts. 

4.The trial Magistrate erred in law in failing to direct herself in accordance with s 13(7) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ('the Evidence Act'). 

5.The trial Magistrate erred in finding that the sleepout was installed on, and not before, 27 November 2023, and the rebuttable presumption of doli incapax did not arise.

6.The trial Magistrate erred by providing inadequate reasons for her apparent rejection of the appellant’s denial of…

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Details
Case
[2024] SASCA 25
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by the appellant, F, B, against a conviction for sexual offences, specifically rape and sexual assault, brought by the Commissioner of Police. The complainant, JF, who was the appellant's half-brother, gave evidence of multiple instances of non-consensual penile anal sexual intercourse occurring in a sleepout. JF testified that the appellant would play pornography, remove their clothing, force him onto a bed, and engage in sexual intercourse, followed by threats of harm if the incidents were disclosed. The appeal was heard by Livesey P, David and Kimber JJ.

The legal issues before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia included whether the verdict reached at trial was unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence presented. The Court was also required to consider whether there had been a miscarriage of justice, potentially arising from the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or from a misdirection or non-direction by the trial judge. Furthermore, the adequacy of the reasons provided by the trial judge for their decision was a point of consideration.

The Court granted permission to appeal on all grounds but ultimately dismissed the appeal. While the specific reasoning for dismissing each ground is not detailed in the provided text, the outcome indicates that the Court found no reversible error in the trial proceedings or the verdict. The Court's decision to dismiss the appeal suggests that it was satisfied that the verdict was supported by the evidence and that no miscarriage of justice had occurred.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the following reasons, we grant permission to appeal on all grounds but dismiss the appeal. Evidence at trial The prosecution called four witnesses at trial: the complainant, JF, the complainant’s foster mother, Ms D; the Business Information Officer for Housing SA, Ms Hackel; and Detective Brevet Sergeant Muske (‘DBS Muske’), the investigating officer. JF was born on 23 September 2003 and was 18 years old at the time of trial. JF and the appellant are half-brothers, having the same mother but different fathers. JF has another older half-brother, HH, who did not live with them at the time of the alleged offence, and whom JF rarely saw. JF gave evidence about the alleged incident of rape. This was the first occasion there was any sexual activity between the appellant and JF. He said that the appellant invited him into the sleepout to play Xbox. They spent a brief period ‘just chilling’ before the appellant began playing pornography on his laptop. After a few minutes, the appellant pulled down his own pants and then pulled down JF’s pants before pushing JF onto the bed, causing him to land on his stomach. JF said the appellant then inserted his penis into JF’s anus. JF said that apart from slight movements to alleviate pain, he remained motionless because he was scared and confused. This continued for a few minutes before the appellant withdrew his penis. JF said nothing. After the appellant stood up and pulled his own pants back up, he warned JF not to disclose the events, threatening to hurt him if he did. JF said he acknowledged the threat by nodding his head in response. The appellant then instructed JF to leave the sleepout, which he promptly did. Upon returning to the main house, JF went straight to his bedroom without disclosing the incident to anyone. JF gave evidence that there were other occasions when the appellant had penile anal sexual intercourse with him in a similar manner. The next incident occurred a couple of weeks after the charged offence, and then once or twice every week or two after that. According to JF, this persisted until the appellant moved out of home. JF was not sure when the appellant stopped living at the home but thought the sexual activity continued for about eight to 12 months following the charged offence. It was JF’s evidence that the only place sexual activity occurred was in the sleepout. He said the appellant would close the door and curtains, play pornography on his laptop, remove his and JF’s pants, push JF onto the bed and then put his penis in JF’s anus for several minutes. He said that after each sexual incident, the appellant would threaten to harm him if he disclosed the incident. In response, JF would nod in acknowledgement. JF said that he did not disclose the sexual activity to anyone when it was occurring. When questioned why he continued to go to the sleepout at the appellant’s request, he explained it was due to his fear of the appellant, and feeling uncertain about what to do because the appellant was his half-brother.

Decision

Reasons for decision

We grant permission to appeal but dismiss this ground of appeal. Conclusion1. We grant permission to appeal on all grounds but dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established