Ingall v Australian Postal Corporation (t/as Australia Post)
[2025] QCATA 85
•25 September 2025
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION
Ingall v Australian Postal Corporation (t/as Australia Post) [2025] QCATA 85
PARTIES:
CHRIS INGALL
(APPLICANT)
V
AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION (T/AS AUSTRALIA POST) (respondent)
APPLICATION NO:
ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO:
APL245-24
MCDO34 of 2023
MATTER TYPE:
Other minor civil dispute matters
DELIVERED ON:
25 September 2025
HEARING DATE:
25 June 2025
HEARD AT:
Brisbane
DECISION OF:
Dr J R Forbes
ORDERS:
1. The order made herein on 17 July 2024 is set aside.
2. In lieu thereof it is ordered that the respondent pay the applicant Ingall the sum of $7.91 within 14 days.
3. No order as to costs.
CATCHWORDS CONSUMER DISPUTE – application for leave to appeal – contract for service – where postage via Australia Post – where item posted not delivered – where it is admitted by latter that letter lost in post – where consumer seeks compensation – whether post office negligent or in breach of contract – whether claims for compensation should be upheld – whether alleged losses foreseeable – where claims dismissed by primary tribunal – where application for leave to appeal – whether reasonably appellable error shown – where application for leave dismissed – where findings of tribunal turn on findings of fact – where limitations of applications for leave considered – whether failure of consideration appropriate form of action – whether primary order for dismissal should be varied
Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 (Cth), s 32
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 53, s 122, s 142(3), s 162(b), s 164, s 237(1)
Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167
Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139
Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky (2001) 122 A Crim R 568
CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172
Davis v Perry O'Brien Engineering Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 18
Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472
Drew v Bundaberg Regional Council [2011] QCA 359
Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 219
Felton & Anor v Raine and Horne Real Estate [2011] QCATA 330
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
JM v QFG and GK [1998] QCA 228
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259O’Hara v Kmart Tyre & Auto Service [2019] QCAT 152
Owen v Menzies [2013] 2 Qd R 327
QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41
Re Palmdale Insurance Ltd [1982] VR 921APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION
Applicant:
In person
Respondent:
Mr M Maynard of counsel instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
On 1 May 2023 the applicant Chris Ingall (‘Ingall’), then resident at Elanora on the Gold Coast, had a document to deliver to the police prosecutions office (‘the office’) in Brisbane. The deadline for its delivery was variously identified as ‘one or two weeks’[1] or ‘ten days or two weeks’[2] or simply 2 weeks[3] ahead.
[1] Transcript of hearing 17 July 2024 (‘T’) page 20 line 9 (Ingall).
[2] T page 20 lines 30–33.
[3] T page 26 line 26.
On May 1 Ingall engaged the respondent, Australia Post (‘the Post’), to deliver a letter containing the said document to the office. He sent it by Express Post.[4]
[4] T page 6 line 29, page 11 line 29.
It is common ground that the letter in question was never duly delivered,[5] but was evidently lost in the postal process.
[5] T page 31 line 11 (Maynard).
Apparently the subject document was readily replaceable. Ingall replaced it, albeit less quickly than he might have done. However, after protracted inquiries about the letter’s whereabouts, on the eve of the deadline, Ingall drove to Brisbane to deliver the replacement in person. He disdained further resort to the Post,[6] or to other couriers, or to electronic means of communication. Thus adverse action by the police was averted. The primary tribunal found that this was not a reasonable or compensable expenditure of time and money in the circumstances.[7]
[6] T page 26 line 45.
[7] T page 26 line 25, page 27 line 30, page 28 line 36, page 46 line 32.
On 25 October 2023 Ingall began these proceedings, alleging negligence and breach of contract, and claiming compensation in the amount of $6,835.53 including costs.
Subsequently the amount claimed was amended and reduced to $1,696.[8]
[8] T page 43 line 19.
The respondent Post denied liability but made a without prejudice[9] offer of $100 with a refund of postage paid,[10] in accordance with its terms of service.[11]
[9] See term and condition 66.2.
[10] Response filed 5 February 2024.
[11] Terms made in accordance with the Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 (Cth) s 32.
The defence, as first pleaded, relied upon the proposition that QCAT, not being a ‘court’, had no jurisdiction to hear and determine this case against a federal instrumentality. The logic supporting this argument need not be pursued here, in view of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Owen v Menzies,[12] which is of course binding upon this tribunal. The principal ratio in Owen is that QCAT ranks as a court of the State by virtue of section 164 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘the Act’). It may be added that QCAT may take over certain matters from a court,[13] must give written reasons on request,[14] is not subject to direction or control by any entity[15] and its adjudicating members enjoy the same protection and immunity as a Supreme Court judge performing judicial functions.[16] As a former Chief Justice of the High Court has observed, the concept of a ‘court’ is not set in stone, but is evolving.[17] Appropriately, counsel for the respondent abandoned the jurisdictional challenge.
[12] [2013] 2 Qd R 327.
[13] The Act s 53.
[14] Ibid s 122.
[15] Ibid 162(b).
[16] Ibid s 237(1).
[17] Chief Justice Robert French AC, ‘Essential and Defining Characteristics of Courts in an Age of
Institutional Change’ (Conference Paper, Supreme and Federal Court Judges Conference, 21 January 2013).
In various parts of the said terms and conditions it is specifically provided that they are not intended to override the Australian Consumer Law.[18] However, no issue arises on this point.
[18] See for example term and condition 64.1.2 re failure to deliver an article.
The primary hearing took place on 17 July 2024. Confronted by the applicant’s claims the adjudicator exclaimed, ‘It’s a ridiculous claim … it’s so inflated it’s not even funny’.[19] However, these candid comments did not inspire the popular plea of apparent bias.
[19] T page 26 lines 1–7.
The reasons for the primary judgment may be summarised as follows: (a) no breach of contract or negligence has been established; (b) if such default were established, almost no compensable loss has been proved.
On the first point the adjudicator explained:
[Y]ou cannot infer negligence just because something [adverse] has happened which … may or may not have been negligent, but … the simple fact that it happened does not prove that there is negligence.[20]
The applicant has the onus of showing negligence or absence of care. [I accept that] in the context of millions of letters a year, going through airports, going through trucks, going through – all over the country, there is a prospect – it is the nature of postal services that some of them will be lost.[21] … The mere fact that they have lost the letter does not satisfy me that there has been negligence.[22]
[20] T page 53 lines 7–9.
[21] T page 51 lines 37–40.
[22] T page 54 lines 30–32.
No adverse inference based on res ipsa loquitur was drawn from the admitted fact of loss, although the facts in this case seem less complex than those in the unsuccessful appeal to res ipsa in O’Hara v Kmart Tyre & Auto Service.[23]
[23] [2019] QCAT 152, [47].
Understandably the applicant tends to see his complaint microcosmically, but the tribunal accepted the respondent’s submission the loss of one item among millions of others in the postal system did not amount to sufficient evidence to discharge the applicant’s onus of proof. The legal concept of negligence displays a remarkable capacity for ‘mission creep’, but it has not yet reached the stage where every person’s misfortune ensures a judgment against any targeted third party with apparent capacity to pay.
The Post did not guarantee delivery. Clause 61B.1 of its statutory terms and conditions, incorporated in the particular contract, reads:
As set out in clause 7B Australia Post will exercise due care and skill in supplying its services. However, the nature of postal services is such that circumstances may impact on the successful delivery of articles.
On the quantum of compensation the tribunal was succinct:
I am not giving you any compensation for the fact that the document was lost by Australia Post because it – the document had no inherent value. It was easily replaced, as you replaced it. The consequences of it not getting to its destination in the ordinary course of the post that you engaged – there was no consequence except that you had to find a replacement for it.[24]
In my view, [regarding] the losses that you associate with your loss of work … you have provided no evidence other than your statement that you lost work. … You have not given me any details of what you lost. [Besides] … in my view, those losses are not reasonably foreseeable. … You chose to take the document – a replacement document … to the police personally. That is a decision that you made. That is not necessarily something that you should be compensated for because you took the decision. … There were alternatives. You did not pursue those alternatives. You should not therefore then be entitled to be compensated for your loss of time in taking the document … to Brisbane.[25]
[24] T page 47 lines 10–15.
[25] T page 47 lines 33–45.
Absence of foreseeability of claimed losses was noted several times in the course of evidence.[26] At page 19 a highly questionable claim for $1,568 ‘basically’ for phone calls was discounted.[27]
[26] T page 14 line 1, page 16 lines 6 and 41, page 17 line 4, page 18 lines 27-28, page 19 line 14 et
passim.
[27] T page 44 lines 16–18.
The reasons for decision are somewhat disjointed, partly because the applicant interrupted and sought to argue with the adjudicator while the reasons were being given.[28] Some of the dicta on matters of detail are somewhat difficult to reconcile. At one point the adjudicator is reluctant to dismiss the application altogether: ‘I do not feel right about just simply dismissing this.’[29] Then: ‘The correct answer to this, the jurisdictional question aside, is that Mr Ingalls is entitled to compensation for the cost of the service that was not provided.’[30] However, the courts stress that judgments of busy and often overloaded tribunals are not to be subjected to scrutiny appropriate to Supreme Court decisions.[31]
[28] See T pages 51–55.
[29] T page 14 lines 18–19.
[30] T page 49 line 32.
[31] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 291-292 (Kirby J); Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 219, [60]; Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky (2001) 122 A Crim R 568, 578 (Spigelman CJ).
In my respectful opinion, given the tribunal’s decisive dismissal of negligent breach of contract and monetary heads of claim, its reference to ‘compensation for the cost of the service’ points the way to a non-fault solution to this dispute. However, unfortunately for the applicant, it leads to a purely nominal award in his favour. Hence, perhaps, the adjudicator’s regret at ‘just simply dismissing this’ and the respondent’s ex gratia offer of $100. At law, as I see it, the applicant’s only remaining course is to rely upon a form of action implicit in several of his complaints – namely an action for total failure of consideration.[32] This action sometimes supports large awards, but in the circumstances of this case, alas, it promises very slim pickings indeed. The Post has taken his money and given him nothing for it. Therefore the Post must refund the cost of a service charged for but not supplied, viz $7.91. To that limited extent the order for dismissal of this application must be amended, and there will be an order accordingly.
[32] Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32; followed in Re Palmdale Insurance Ltd [1982] VR 921, 931. See also Davis v Perry O'Brien Engineering Pty Ltd[2025] QCA 18.
An application for leave to appeal is not an opportunity to conduct a retrial. It is an inquiry to see whether any reasonably arguable error of law or ‘glaringly improbable’[33] error of fact, has resulted in serious injustice.[34] This matter turns upon the primary tribunal’s findings of fact; fact-finding is its prerogative,[35] and findings of fact by a trial court are seldom disturbed on appeal. If there is evidence, or if there are available inferences which compete for the judge’s acceptance, no error of law occurs simply because the judge prefers one version of evidence to another or one set of inferences to another.[36] Reasonable minds may differ, but that is not a proper ground of appeal. It is not the function of a tribunal of appeal to substitute its own view for reasonable findings of a primary judge, even if disposed to do so.
[33] Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472, 479; Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167, 178–179.
[34] QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41, [6]; Drew v Bundaberg Regional Council
[2011] QCA 359, [18]; Felton & Anor v Raine and Horne Real Estate [2011] QCATA 330, [19].
[35] Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139, 151; JM v QFG and GK [1998]
QCA 228.
[36] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118.
Finality is an important legal object,[37] particularly in lower courts where an interminable dispute can too easily result in costs and inconvenience out of all proportion to the interests involved.
[37] CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172, 203. Hence the requirement for leave: s 142(3) of the Act.
I discern no reasonably appellable error in the decision under appeal. The application is dismissed, subject to the foreshadowed minor change in the order of 17 July 2024.
I note that the respondent has offered, without prejudice, to make an ex gratia payment of $100 to the applicant. Counsel informs me that that offer remains open. Its rejection or acceptance is entirely a matter for Mr Ingall.
Orders
The order made herein on 17 July 2024 is set aside.
In lieu thereof it is ordered that the respondent pay the applicant Ingall the sum of $7.91 within 14 days.
No order as to costs.
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