Ryan v RSPCA SA Inspectorate Inc - [2018] SASC 53

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)
RYAN v RSPCA SA INSPECTORATE INC
[2018] SASC 53
Judgment of The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis
26 April 2018
ANIMALS - VARIOUS STATUTORY PROVISIONS - PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS - OFFENCES - CAUSING UNNECESSARY PAIN AND CRUELLY ILLTREATING
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS
Appeal against a decision of a Magistrate of the Port Pirie Magistrates Court dismissing an interlocutory application brought by the appellant seeking summary relief against the respondent in a form of an order that it return to her 23 Pomeranian dogs it had seized.
Held (dismissing the appeal):
1.     The Magistrate did not err in his discretion in dismissing the interlocutory application (at [8]).
2.     The controversy between the RSPCA and Ms Ryan involves complex questions of law and fact, which are not capable of resolution in chambers and can only be determined after an evaluation of the competing evidence at trial (at [8]-[50]).
Held (dismissing the interlocutory application brought in this Court):
1.     Questions of apprehended harm are factual questions which can only be determined at trial (at [53]).
Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) ss 3, 28, 31A, 31B, 34B; Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA) rule 8, referred to.
Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; Fancourt and Anor v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87; Ceneavenue Pty Ltd & Ors v Martin & Ors (2008) 106 SASR 1, applied.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED
"Unnecessary harm", "may if urgent action is not taken"

RYAN v RSPCA SA INSPECTORATE INC
[2018] SASC 53
Magistrates Appeal: Civil

KOURAKIS CJ: This is an appeal against a decision of a Magistrate made in the Port Pirie Magistrates Court on 5 January 2018, dismissing an interlocutory application brought by the appellant seeking summary relief against the respondent in the form of an order that it return to her 23 Pomeranian dogs it had seized.
Ms Cheryl Doudle is an employee of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and an inspector appointed pursuant to s 28 and for the purposes of the Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) (the Animal Welfare Act). On 3 May 2017 she attended Ms Ryan’s rural property at Baroota (the Baroota property), located in the mid-north of the State where, exercising her powers under the Animal Welfare Act, she seized 23 chickens, 23 Pomeranian dogs and four German Shepherd dogs, all the property of Ms Ryan. One of the German Shepherds was euthanized on site,[1] and the other three were euthanized at a later date, to end the suffering caused by age-related arthritis. Two of the chickens have since died of causes unrelated to the way in which they were kept and arrangements have recently been made to return the remaining chickens to Ms Ryan. Many other dogs and other…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ryan v RSPCA SA Inspectorate Inc and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2018] SASC 53
Decision Date: 26 April 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ryan v RSPCA SA Inspectorate Inc involved a dispute between Ms Ryan and the RSPCA SA Inspectorate Inc regarding the treatment of animals under various statutory provisions. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia, with the court reviewing an interlocutory appeal brought by Ms Ryan against a decision made by the Magistrate. Ms Ryan sought summary judgment, arguing that there was no reasonable basis for the RSPCA's defence.

The court had to determine whether Ms Ryan's application for summary judgment was appropriate and if the RSPCA's defence had a reasonable basis. The court considered whether the RSPCA's defence was arguable, which would prevent the granting of summary judgment. The court also evaluated whether the questions of fact and law involved in the case were too complex to be resolved in chambers and required a full trial.

In dismissing the appeal, the court held that the dispute involved intricate questions of law and fact that could only be resolved after a thorough examination of the evidence presented at trial. The court found that the Magistrate was correct in dismissing Ms Ryan’s interlocutory application for summary judgment. The court concluded that the RSPCA's defence had a reasonable basis, and therefore, it was not appropriate to grant summary judgment at that stage. The case was to proceed to a full trial to determine the merits of the claims and defences presented by both parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I would dismiss the appeal. The controversy between the RSPCA and Ms Ryan involves complex questions of law and fact, which are not capable of resolution in chambers and can only be determined after an evaluation of the competing evidence at trial.[3] For the reasons which follow, the Magistrate was right to dismiss Ms Ryan’s interlocutory application. [3] Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118.Summary Judgment in Principles Rule 8 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Rules) 2013 (SA) (MCR) provides:8.(1) Where a party wishes to obtain – (a)summary judgment in, or the disposal of the whole or part of, an action; or(b)immediate relief,he or she may do so on interlocutory application accompanied by an affidavit specifying –(c)that there is no reasonable basis for the action or defence. (2) The Court may –(a)enter judgment accordingly;(b)grant the whole or part of the relief sought, and order that the action continue in relation to the part not disposed of;(c)make an order for an early trial; or(d)make any other order. (3) The Court may enter a summary judgment based on an Enforceable Payment Agreement verified by an affidavit. In Ceneavenue Pty Ltd and Others v Martin and Others,[4] with respect to r 232(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) which provides that summary judgment may be given for a plaintiff if there is no reasonable basis for defending the applicant’s claim, Debelle J said:[5][92]For these reasons, r 232(2)(a) does not represent a significant departure from the previous practice in relation to an application for summary judgment by a plaintiff on the ground that the defendant has no arguable defence. On an application for summary judgment by a plaintiff, the court will examine whether the asserted defence is real or fanciful. It will consider whether the defence is bona fide. It will assess whether the defendant has a real as opposed to a fanciful case. It will have regard to the injunction in Fancourt which is in similar terms to that in Agar v Hyde. The applicant for summary judgment must show that it is clear that the other party has no arguable case. The test does not require the court to determine whether the defendant will succeed. Instead, the court must consider only whether the ground or grounds relied on by the defendant are reasonably arguable. The test in r 232(2)(a) is not, I think, materially different from the test whether there is a real question to be tried.[4] (2008) 106 SASR 1.[5] Ceneavenue Pty Ltd and Others v Martin and Others (2008) 106 SASR 1 at [92]. A summary judgment is final and the power to give it should be exercised with great care. It should not be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried.[6] An order should not be made if the application requires consideration of apparently complex questions of fact.[7] On the other hand, a defence may have no reasonable prospect of success even if it cannot be said that it is hopeless or bound to fail.[6] Fancourt and Another v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 at 99.[7] Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 at [26].The Animal Welfare Act

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.