ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Criminal Law-Statement made in presence of prisoner-Denial by Prisoner-
Admissibility-Misdirection SYDNEY,
A prisoner was convicted of an unnatural offence upon a boy. Evidence Nov. 17, 30.
was given on behalf of the Crown by the arresting constable of a conver- sation between the constable, the boy, and the prisoner, before his arrest, in which the boy, in answer to questions put to him, charged the prisoner with the commission of the offence, and the prisoner asserted his innocence. This evidence was not objected to. The boy subsequently gave independent evidence of the commission of the offence by the prisoner, and there was inde- pendent evidence that an assault of the kind alleged had been committed upon the boy. In his summing-up the Judge directed the jury that the evidence of the boy if true proved that an assault had been committed upon him by the prisoner; that the prisoner in his statement to the jury, and also in his statement to the constable denied the charge; and that unless they were satisfied of the truth of the boy's evidence they should acquit. No exception was taken to this direction when it was given, but after verdict the objection was taken that the jury should have been directed that state- ments made in the prisoner's presence and denied by him were not evidence of his guilt.
Held, that evidence of the statements made in the prisoner's presence was properly admitted.
Held, also, by Griffith C.J., Barton J., and O'Connor J. (Isaacs J. dissent. ing), that under the circumstances of the case the direction given to the jury was sufficient, and that the conviction should be sustained.
Per Griffith C.J.-When evidence has been given of an unsworn statement made in the presence of the accused, whether in the course of conversation or not, if the circumstances of the case suggest a danger that the jury may regard the statement as independent evidence of the facts alleged in it, the jury should be cautioned against giving it any such effect. Otherwise such a caution is unnecessary, and need not be given.
Per O'Connor J.-In criminal cases objection may be taken by the prisoner at any time before sentence to a misdirection or non-direction of the Judge at the trial, although no exception was taken to the direction during the course of the trial.
R. v. Gibson, 18 Q.B.D., 537, and R. v. Norton, (1910) 2 K.B., 496, con- Decision of the Supreme Court: R. v. Grills, 10 S.R. (N.S.W.), 309 27 W.N. (N.S.W.), 95, reversed.
APPEAL, by special leave, from the decision of the Full Court quashing a conviction upon a special case stated by Judge Docker, Chairman of Quarter Sessions at Kempsey.
The case stated was as follows:-
This prisoner was tried before me at the Kempsey Quarter Session, 5th April 1910, on a charge of having committed an unnatural offence upon a boy. He was convicted…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
R v Grills [1910] HCA 68
Case
[1910] HCA 68
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of R v Grills involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal concerned the conviction of a prisoner for an unnatural offence upon a boy. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility and proper direction to the jury regarding evidence of a conversation that occurred between the arresting constable, the boy, and the prisoner before the prisoner's arrest. In this conversation, the boy accused the prisoner of the offence, and the prisoner asserted his innocence.
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the evidence of the statements made in the prisoner's presence, and subsequently denied by him, was properly admitted, and whether the trial judge's summing-up to the jury constituted a sufficient direction regarding this evidence. Specifically, the question arose whether the jury should have been explicitly directed that statements made in the prisoner's presence, which he denied, were not evidence of his guilt.
A majority of the High Court, comprising Griffith C.J., Barton J., and O'Connor J., held that the evidence of the statements made in the prisoner's presence was properly admitted. They reasoned that while such statements are not independent evidence of guilt if denied, they can be relevant to the accused's conduct. The majority concluded that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the trial judge's direction to the jury, which focused on the conflict between the boy's sworn evidence and the prisoner's denial and left the ultimate belief to the jury, was sufficient. Griffith C.J. articulated a principle that a caution to the jury is only necessary if the circumstances suggest a danger that the jury might treat the statement as independent evidence of the facts alleged; otherwise, such a caution is unnecessary. Isaacs J. dissented.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and restoring the prisoner's conviction. The Supreme Court had previously quashed the conviction on the ground that the jury should have been more explicitly directed regarding the statements made in the prisoner's presence and denied by him.