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R v Dupas (No 2)

R v Dupas (No 2)

Case [2005] VSCA 212 26 August 2005

Admissibility of Evidence

Causation

Criminal Liability

Criminal Law

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No. 209 of 2004

THE QUEEN
	v.
PETER NORRIS DUPAS (No. 2)

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JUDGES:	WARREN, C.J., NETTLE, J.A. and HARPER, A.J.A.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	25 July 2005
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	26 August 2005
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2005] VSCA 212	1^stRevision – 14 September 2005

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CRIMINAL LAW – Evidence – Similar fact evidence – Admissibility – Accused charged with murder of woman – Body of deceased left mutilated – Circumstantial evidence – Murder and mutilation of another woman 18 months after offence alleged – Whether evidence of later murder and mutilation is admissible – Whether just to admit – Probative value – Prejudicial effect – Balancing exercise – Applicability of “Christie” discretion – Whether evidence revealed “striking similarity” with offence charged – Causation – Whether directions as to causation adequate – Crimes Act 1958, s.398A.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr C.G. Hillman, S.C.	Mr S. Carisbrooke, Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Applicant	Mr C.B. Boyce Mr L.C. Carter	Andrew George Solicitors

WARREN, C.J.:

This application for leave to appeal by Peter Norris Dupas is principally directed against the admission by the trial judge of similar fact evidence during his trial on a charge for the murder of Margaret Josephine Maher for which he was convicted. It concerns s.398A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.) and whether the evidence should have been excluded because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. The applicant also applied for leave to appeal on the basis that the trial judge’s directions to the jury relating to the similar fact evidence were flawed. Those two grounds flowed into a more general ground that the admission of the evidence and the handling of it by the trial judge resulted in a miscarriage of justice and that the verdict should therefore be set aside. The applicant further contended that the trial miscarried because the trial judge did not direct the jury adequately with respect to causation.

The salient facts were as follows. At trial, the Crown case against the applicant at trial was essentially circumstantial. There were no eyewitnesses to the death of Margaret Maher and the last time she was seen alive, she appeared to be walking in the direction of Pascoe Vale Road following her departure from Safeway supermarket at Broadmeadows Town Shopping Centre at 12.20am on 4 October 1997. A witness at trial gave evidence that as she was driving westward along Somerton Road between 1.00am and 2.30am that day, she saw a woman not wearing any trousers or skirt emerge from the bushes on her right hand side. The witness could not, however, definitively identify the woman as Margaret Maher. The deceased’s body was found later that same day, at about 1.45pm, by the side of Cliffords Road at Somerton. She was lying on her side, her lower garments having been pulled down and her upper garments pulled up. Post-mortem examination revealed that Ms Maher had suffered…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Dupas (No 2)

Details

AGLC: R v Dupas (No 2) [2005] VSCA 212
Case: [2005] VSCA 212
Decision Date: 26 August 2005

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Dupas (No 2), the accused, Dupas, faced charges of murder and mutilation of a woman, the victim of the current proceedings. The body of the deceased was found mutilated, and Dupas was subsequently charged. The dispute in this case centred on the admissibility of evidence relating to a similar offence committed by Dupas 18 months after the offence in question. The Victorian Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether this evidence was admissible and if its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. The court was also required to consider whether the evidence demonstrated a "striking similarity" to the offence charged and whether the directions given to the jury regarding causation were adequate.

The primary legal issues before the court involved the admissibility of similar fact evidence under section 398A of the Crimes Act 1958, and the application of the "Christie" discretion in balancing the probative value against the prejudicial effect. The court needed to assess whether the evidence of the later murder and mutilation revealed a "striking similarity" that would make it unfair to exclude it, and whether the jury had been adequately directed on the issue of causation. The court also had to determine if the prejudicial effect of the evidence would substantially outweigh its probative value.

The court concluded that the evidence of the later murder and mutilation was admissible. It found that the later offence demonstrated a striking similarity to the offence charged, which made it unfair to exclude. The court determined that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and thus, it was appropriate to admit it. The court further held that the directions given to the jury regarding causation were adequate, ensuring that the jury could properly consider the evidence in relation to the current charges. The court upheld the conviction, finding that the evidence was properly admitted and considered within the parameters of the law.

No additional orders were made beyond the affirmation of the conviction and the reasoning provided by the court. The court's decision provided clarity on the admissibility of similar fact evidence in cases involving striking similarities and the appropriate application of the "Christie" discretion.

Orders