Criminal Law—Murder—Malice aforethought—Recklessness—Knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm will probably result from act—Likelihood of death or grievous bodily harm ensuing—Appreciation of likelihood—Wilful blindness—Direction to jury.
Decision
GIBBS C.J., WILSON, BRENNAN, DEANE and DAWSON JJ. This is an application by the Crown for special leave to appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court which, by a majority, quashed the conviction of the respondent on five counts of murder and ordered a new trial.
2. The alleged offences occurred in the early hours of the morning of 18 August 1983 in a motel near Ayers Rock. The respondent had driven a road train, consisting of a prime mover and three trailers, to Ayers Rock on 17 August. He there uncoupled one trailer and went about his work of delivering, loading and unloading. Later during the evening, after he had consumed a substantial amount of alcohol, he visited the Inland Motel and drank in a crowded bar. His behaviour in the bar caused nuisance and annoyance and he was physically ejected from the bar. In the early hours of the morning following this incident he returned to the motel at the controls of his prime mover, to which one trailer was now attached. He drove the vehicle through the wall and into the bar; as a result five persons died and many were injured. The respondent did nothing to assist the injured but left the motel. He was apprehended on the following day.
3. The respondent was tried by the learned Chief Justice of the Northern Territory and a jury. After a summing up to which no objection was or could have been taken, the jury retired but shortly afterwards was recalled by the learned Chief Justice who, at the request of the Crown Prosecutor, gave a short redirection which included the following passage:
"It is this, I said to you, you will recall, that you had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, on the question of recklessness, that he knew that there would be people in the bar.
It is also a matter of law, of which I have
been reminded, that if he thought there might have been, but chose to blind himself, chose not to avail himself of any opportunity of finding out. In other words, if he swept round the corner and his state of mind then was that there might be people in there, but he just went straight ahead blinding himself, not giving himself the opportunity of finding out if there were going to be any people in there. So that he cannot - if he deliberately stops himself being able to see whether or not there were people in there, as a deliberate choice. If he says, 'Well, I'm going to go ahead anyway. I think there might be people in there,…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v Crabbe [1985] HCA 22
Case
[1985] HCA 22
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of R v Crabbe, a case concerning the interpretation and application of the offence of "unlawfully endangering life" under section 31 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The appellant, Crabbe, had been convicted of this offence following an incident where he discharged a firearm in circumstances that endangered the lives of police officers.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the prosecution was required to prove that the accused intended to endanger life, or if it was sufficient to prove that the accused's actions were objectively likely to endanger life, regardless of his subjective intent. The Court also had to consider the proper interpretation of the phrase "unlawfully endangers life" within the context of the statutory provision.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the offence of unlawfully endangering life does not require proof of an intention to endanger life. Instead, the focus is on the objective likelihood of the conduct endangering life. The Court reasoned that the word "unlawfully" in the section refers to the absence of lawful justification or excuse for the conduct, and that the act itself, if likely to endanger life, is sufficient for the offence. The Court emphasised that the gravity of the conduct, rather than the subjective state of mind of the accused, is the key element.
The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court affirming the conviction of the appellant.