Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 2)

[2017] FCA 202

File number: NSD 850 of 2014
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 27 February 2017
Catchwords: CONTEMPT OF COURT – sentencing – where respondent found guilty of four charges of breaching mandatory orders and two charges of bringing improper pressure on a party and party’s lawyer – whether necessary to include in charge allegation of contumacious and wilful disobedience of court order – findings of acts of public defiance of a court order – where contemnor undischarged bankrupt and had provided no information about financial position or resources to trustee in bankruptcy or for sentencing hearing – whether fine, suspended sentence of imprisonment or imprisonment appropriate – where contemnor expressed no remorse or acknowledgment of responsibility 
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 54

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A

Cases cited:

Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 279

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375

Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238

Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610

R v Kilic (2016) 339 ALR 229

Rv Smith (1987) 44 SASR 587

Sage v ZZ (No 2) 234 FCR 251

The Queen v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal [2016] FCA 1598

Vaysman v Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc (2011) 276 ALR 596

Vaysman v Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc (2014) 222 FCR 387

Date of hearing: 27 February 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 54
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr PW Gray SC with Mr M Polden
Solicitor for the Applicants: Aitken Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr DEJ Ryan SC with Mr P Bolster
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 850 of 2014
BETWEEN:

THUNDER STUDIOS INC (CALIFORNIA)

First Applicant

RODRIC MARC DAVID

Second Applicant

AND:

CHARIF KAZAL

First Respondent

ADAM KAZAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.On the charges of contempt in the amended statement of charge dated 20 December 2016:

(a)there be a verdict that the second respondent is not guilty on each of charges 1, 2 and 4, and in respect of charge 7, of particulars (i) and (iii);

(b)there be a verdict on charge 3 that the second respondent is guilty of breaching orders 1 and 3 of the orders made on 11 November 2016 (the 11 November orders) by republishing, after 11 November 2016, each of the 22 posts in exhibit WM2 that first appeared at or about the date and time that each post respectively records as that of its posting, between 11 and 21 November 2016 on the website at in that the second respondent caused to be displayed on one or…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 202
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 2), the dispute involved the respondent, Kazal, found guilty of breaching mandatory orders and bringing improper pressure on a party and their lawyer. The Federal Court was tasked with determining the appropriate sentence for Kazal’s contempt of court. The court had to consider various factors, including the seriousness of the contempt, the contemnor's intent, the importance of conveying the seriousness of the contempt, any apology or explanation offered, the degree of recognition of the offending conduct, and any attempts to comply with the order. Given that Kazal was an undischarged bankrupt and provided no financial information, the court also had to assess the appropriate penalty considering these circumstances.

The court’s reasoning highlighted the fundamental importance of upholding the rule of law and the administration of justice. It stressed that disobedience of court orders could seriously undermine the justice system. The court referenced previous cases, including Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd and Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources, to underscore the necessity of enforcing court orders. The court also noted the absence of remorse and acknowledgment of responsibility by Kazal, which influenced the sentencing decision.

The court concluded that Kazal was guilty of multiple charges of contempt and imposed a series of concurrent prison sentences for each charge, summing to 15 months for charge 3, 9 months for charge 5, 2 months for charge 6, 2 months for charge 7, 12 months for charge 8, and 18 months for charge 9. Additionally, Kazal was ordered to pay the applicants' costs of the interlocutory application on an indemnity basis. The court's decision aimed to uphold the authority of the court and deter future acts of contempt.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. On the charges of contempt in the amended statement of charge dated 20 December 2016:

(a) there be a verdict that the second respondent is not guilty on each of charges 1, 2 and 4, and in respect of charge 7, of particulars (i) and (iii);

(b) there be a verdict on charge 3 that the second respondent is guilty of breaching orders 1 and 3 of the orders made on 11 November 2016 (the 11 November orders) by republishing, after 11 November 2016, each of the 22 posts in exhibit WM2 that first appeared at or about the date and time that each post respectively records as that of its posting, between 11 and 21 November 2016 on the website at www.kazalfamilystory.com in that the second respondent caused to be displayed on one or more vans in O’Connell Street, Sydney on 18 and 22 November 2016 words and images that directed readers thereof to the website on which so many of the 22 posts appeared as had been posted at the respective time of republication;

(c) there be a verdict on charge 5 that the second respondent is guilty of breaching orders 1 and 3 of the 11 November orders by republishing, after 11 November 2016, each of the 22 posts by including in the seven tweets that he published and displayed on 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 November 2016 on his Twitter account containing copies of emails that he had addressed to Kate McClymont, words and images that directed readers of the seven tweets to the website on which so many of the 22 posts appeared as had been posted at the respective time of republication;

(d) there be a verdict on charge 6 that the second respondent is guilty of breaching order 3(d) of the 11 November 2016 orders in that he continued to publish on the internet on and after 11 November 2016 the video entitled “Street protest and vans exposing corporate thieves Rodric David and David Singh” in that it continued to be accessible on the website up to and at 8 December 2016;

(e) there be a verdict on charge 7 that the second respondent is guilty of breaching order 4 of the 11 November 2016 orders in that he failed to remove the video from the website;

(f) there be a verdict on charge 8 that the second respondent is guilty of making public statements between 28 October 2016 and 11 November 2016 in that he published on his Twitter account:

(i) on 28 October 2016 a tweet that reproduced his email a copy of which was annexed and marked “D” to the 11 November 2016 orders (the 28 October publication);

(ii) on 31 October 2016 a tweet that reproduced his email a copy of which was annexed and marked “B” to the 11 November 2016 orders (the 31 October publication);

each being a statement that was intended and calculated to influence a party, being the second applicant, and to expose him to the risk of public prejudgment of the issues or merits of these proceedings.

(g) there be a verdict on charge 9 that the second respondent is guilty of making public statements after 11 November 2016 being:

(i) each of the 28 October and 31 October publications;

(ii) the 22 posts;

(iii) the seven tweets;

(iv) the republication of one or more of the 22 posts by display and publication of the words and images that he caused to be made on one or more vans in O’Connell Street, Sydney on 18 and 22 November 2016 that directed readers thereof to the website on which so many of the 22 posts appeared as had been posted at the respective time of republication;

each being a statement that was intended and calculated to influence a party, being the second applicant, and to expose him to the risk of public prejudgment of the issues or merits of these proceedings.

2. The following sentences be imposed on the second respondent:

(a) on charge 3, 15 months imprisonment;

(b) on charge 5, 9 months imprisonment;

(c) on charge 6, 2 months imprisonment;

(d) on charge 7, 2 months imprisonment;

(e) on charge 8, 12 months imprisonment;

(f) on charge 9, 18 months imprisonment.

3. All sentences be served concurrently.

4. The second respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application filed on 25 November 2016 on an indemnity basis.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is a very serious matter where a person disobeys a Court order knowing the Court has made it. If that conduct went unpunished by the Courts, a fundamental aspect of our society would suffer. Other people would come to think that they also could disobey or flout orders that a Court had made. The rule of law would be seriously undermined were such a situation left unpunished. Justice could not be done satisfactorily if the ordinary respect that members of our society have for the authority of the Courts to resolve disputes, as a part of our system of government, came to be undermined by persons openly disobeying Court orders or bringing public pressure on a litigant in proceedings that sought to influence the litigant or condemn him, her or it in the public eye for pursuing or defending the litigation. Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ said in Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 107 that:… the underlying rationale of every exercise of the contempt power … [is] that it is necessary to uphold and protect the effective administration of justice. Although the primary purpose in committing a defendant who disobeys an injunction is to enforce the injunction for the benefit of the plaintiff, another purpose is to protect the effective administration of justice by demonstrating that the court’s orders will be enforced. As the authors of Borrie and Lowe’s Law of Contempt, 2nd ed (1983) say, at p. 3:If a court lacked the means to enforce its orders, if its orders could be disobeyed with impunity, not only would individual litigants suffer, the whole administration of justice would be brought into disrepute. (emphasis added) These considerations underpin the inherent or implied power of every court, superior or inferior, to protect the due administration of justice in proceedings before it: cf Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375 at 388 [41] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ; see too Kazal [2016] FCA 1598 at [105]. There is no maximum penalty for contempt of a superior court of record. That is because the Court must be able to determine and fashion a penalty that operates to impose an appropriate punishment on the contemnor, to make its denunciation of the contempt, as well as to deter others from committing similar or other contempts. As Besanko J, with whom Siopis J agreed, said in Vaysman v Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc (2014) 222 FCR 387 at 426 [137], it is difficult to identify a range of appropriate sentences for contempt or a standard or prevailing sentence for a serious contempt. That is due to the many and varied circumstances that can give rise to the particular contempt and the factors to which the Court can have regard in assessing what sentence is appropriate in the factual scenario at the time of sentencing. In cases of a contemnor’s breach of an order it is appropriate to consider factors including those that Spender J identified in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 279 at 283 [16]-[17], which Besanko J cited with approval in Vaysman 222 FCR at 426 [139], namely:·the relative seriousness of the contempt, which is, or may be, determined by the extent to which the contemnor appreciated that a contempt was being committed (cf: the position in a contempt by publication that may have been very serious, yet the contemnor may have been ignorant of the existence of the proceedings);·whether the contemnor subjectively intended to disobey the order;·the importance of bringing home to the contemnor the seriousness of the contempt;·whether the contemnor has offered any apology or explanation for his or her conduct;·the extent and degree to which the contemnor has recognised the nature of his or her offending conduct;·any attempt by the contemnor to comply with the order in question and, where relevant, the degree to which he, she or it did comply with the order;·the practical consequence of a contemnor’s failure to comply with an order and the effect of that non-compliance upon the effective administration of justice.