FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 8) [2018] FCA 1995
ORDERS
NSD 850 of 2014 BETWEEN: THUNDER STUDIOS INC (CALIFORNIA)
First Applicant / Second Cross-Respondent
RODRIC MARC DAVID
Second Applicant / First Cross-Respondent
AND: CHARIF KAZAL
First Respondent / Cross-Claimant
ADAM KAZAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 AUGUST 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicants’ interlocutory application for a separate trial be dismissed.
2.The parties bring in short minutes as to the amount of security for costs that the first respondent / cross-claimant should provide and how and when that should occur.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RARES J:
This is yet another interlocutory application in this closely fought defamation proceeding. Earlier today, by consent, I ordered that the first respondent, Charif Kazal, have leave to further amend his cross-claim by joining the first applicant, Thunder Studios Inc (California), as the second cross-respondent, thus bringing both applicants, namely, Thunder Studios and Rodric David, onto the record as cross-respondents to Charif’s cross-claim.
The applicants seek today two separate orders: first, the issue of whether one or both applicants was a publisher of the matters complained of in the cross-claim be heard separately and before all other issues in the cross-claim under r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1995
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court rejected Thunder Studios' application for a separate trial on the question of publication, finding that it was not in the interests of justice to separate this issue from the broader proceeding. The court reasoned that the inter-relationship between the publication of the defamatory matter and the overall context of the dispute, including the history of relations between the parties, necessitated a unified approach to the litigation. Additionally, the court noted the well-documented risks associated with separate trials, which further supported its decision.
Regarding the security for costs, the court found that Charif should provide security, as it would not substantially prejudice him and would overlap with the security Thunder Studios was entitled to. The court considered that Charif had the means to secure the necessary funds and that the security would cover prospective costs only, with little progress made in the cross-claim at that point. The court concluded that it was appropriate to grant the application for security to ensure the smooth progression of the proceedings.
The court's final orders were that Thunder Studios' application for a separate trial was dismissed and that the parties were to prepare short minutes outlining the amount of security for costs Charif should provide, along with the details of how and when this should occur. These orders reflect the court's determination to manage the litigation efficiently while ensuring a fair and comprehensive resolution of the dispute.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicants’ interlocutory application for a separate trial be dismissed.
2. The parties bring in short minutes as to the amount of security for costs that the first respondent / cross-claimant should provide and how and when that should occur.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Significantly, the applicants did not undertake that, in those circumstances, Mr David would be called as a witness on the separate publication trial, were one to be ordered. Rather, they said that they intended to call Mr Price as the person who would claim to be the person solely responsible for the publication, and the person whom, after the failed California proceeding, Charif and his other brothers have sued in the Florida proceeding. They argued that a variety of factors supported the hearing of the separate issue, including the utility, economy and fairness to the parties of having a decision on a contained, discrete issue that was capable of resolving the whole case. They contended that there was a clear distinction between the issues that would arise in a hearing limited to the question of publication and the balance of the proceeding, and that the question of publication would be able to be determined discretely and in a straightforward way.Consideration – separate trial I reject the applicants’ application for a separate trial. In my opinion, the question of publication of the matter complained of in the cross-claim is not one that is convenient or right to separate from the balance of the issues between the parties. While Mr Price has said that he was responsible for the publication of the matter complained of in the cross-claim, the circumstance that he was an employee of Thunder Studios and gave his address as publisher as his employer’s address, suggests that there will be an issue as to whether either directly or circumstantially it may be inferred that he did so as a person who was a publisher with Mr David and or their employer, Thunder Studios. In Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 356 ALR 178 at 188 [39], Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ said that the law as to publication was tolerably clear, citing among others Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331 at 363-364, per Isaacs J. They added:It is the application of it to the particular facts of the case which tends to be difficult, especially in the relatively novel context of internet search engine results. Their Honours made that comment in the course of giving reasons for overturning a decision in which the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria had ordered summary dismissal of a proceeding against Google prior to discovery and the filing of defences. Moreover, in my opinion, the inter-relationship between publication of the matter complained of in the cross-claim and all of the circumstances, having regard to the history of relations between the parties, suggests that it would not be in the interests of justice to separate the question of its publication from all other parts of the proceeding. Indeed, the dangers of separate trials are well-known and ought be avoided. In AWB Ltd v Cole (No. 2) (2006) 253 FCR 288, Young J discussed many of those dangers. I followed his decision in City of Swan v Lehman Bros Australia Ltd (subject to a deed of company arrangement) (2009) 73 ACSR 86, although in that case, I determined that there was a discrete issue that could be separated.