FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 9) [2020] FCA 846
File number(s): NSD 850 of 2014 Judge(s): RARES J Date of judgment: 22 May 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application under r 30.11 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – where parties engaged in a farrago of litigation, including two sets of proceedings currently before another judge of the Federal Court of Australia – where respondents sought orders that proceeding be transferred to that judge’s docket or stayed until other proceedings decided – where respondents in this proceeding had no defence to applicants’ claims – where both other proceedings commenced later in time, concerned mostly unrelated issues and other parties – where respondents commenced one of other proceedings without informing their solicitor of this proceeding – whether there would be a risk of inconsistent findings or judgments if all proceedings were managed separately or current proceeding were not stayed – whether transfer or stay would further overarching purpose of s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act (1976) – application dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – r 16.07 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – where defence of first respondent had been struck out – whether r 16.07(2) deemed first respondent to admit allegations in absence of defence – r 16.07 applies
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2, s 18
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), Pt VB, s 37P, s 37M
Federal Court Rules 1979, O. 11 r 13
Federal Court Rules 2011, r 16.07, r 16.32, r 16.33, r 30.11
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244
Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 579
Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) (2017) 256 FCR 90
Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2018] FCA 593
Michell, in the matter of Aizome1 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Millar [2019] FCA 2169
MY Distributors Pty Ltd v Omaq Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 578
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589
Re Wakim; ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511
Sampson v Taboada [2016] FCA 926
Sony Corporation v Costaneo [2012] FCA 153
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 3) [2017] FCA 1170
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 5) [2017] FCA 1572
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 8) [2018] FCA 1995
Date of hearing: 22 May 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 42 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 846
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the situation was entirely of the Kazal parties' own making. They had not informed their solicitor about the existence of other related proceedings when instructing him to commence the KTC proceeding. The court concluded that staying or transferring the Thunder proceeding to be dealt with together with the other two proceedings would not achieve the overarching purpose of Part VB of the Federal Court Act. The interlocutory application was dismissed with costs, which should be payable forthwith due to the apparent impecuniosity of the Kazal parties.
The court found that the Kazal parties had not provided a satisfactory explanation for their conduct, which weighed heavily against them. The court found no substantive risk of conflicting judgments in the proceedings, as the findings sought in the Thunder proceeding related to the existence of defamatory meanings or representations conveyed by the publications complained of and awards of damages as relief for those claims. The potential for conflicting judgments was not a significant factor in the court's decision.
The final orders were that the respondents' interlocutory application filed on 24 April 2020 be dismissed, and the respondents pay the applicants' costs of the interlocutory application, which should be payable forthwith. Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondents’ interlocutory application filed on 24 April 2020 be dismissed.
2. The respondents pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application and those costs be payable forthwith.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I attempted to explore with senior counsel for the Kazal parties how that could be if the Court’s decision to stay or transfer the Thunder proceeding was made on the basis of their submissions. It is difficult to conceive of a reasoning process as to how Mr David’s damages from the publication of a defamatory matter could be affected by the conduct of the Kazal parties in obtaining the order for stay or transfer that they seek, on the basis that their application could be said to be improper, unjustifiable or lacking in bona fides so as to entitle him to an award of aggravated damages: see Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497 at 514 per Dixon, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ. Senior counsel for the Kazal parties did not enlighten me further.Consideration In Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589, Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ discussed consequences that could arise from the potential inconsistency of judgments in different actions, giving rise to what is now known as the principle of an Anshun estoppel. They said (147 CLR at 602–604):we would prefer to say that there will be no estoppel unless it appears that the matter relied upon as a defence in the second action was so relevant to the subject matter of the first action that it would have been unreasonable not to rely on it. Generally speaking, it would be unreasonable not to plead a defence if, having regard to the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and its subject matter it would be expected that the defendant would raise the defence and thereby enable the relevant issues to be determined in the one proceeding. In this respect, we need to recall that there are a variety of circumstances, some referred to in the earlier cases, why a party may justifiably refrain from litigating an issue in one proceeding yet wish to litigate the issue in other proceedings e.g. expense, importance of the particular issue, motives extraneous to the actual litigation, to mention but a few. See the illustrations given in Cromwell v. County of Sac [(1876) 94 US [24 Law. Ed at 199]It has generally been accepted that a party will be estopped from bringing an action which, if it succeeds, will result in a judgment which conflicts with an earlier judgment….The likelihood that the omission to plead a defence will contribute to the existence of conflicting judgments is obviously an important factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the omission to plead can found an estoppel against the assertion of the same matter as a foundation for a cause of action in a second proceeding. By "conflicting" judgments we include judgments which are contradictory, though they may not be pronounced on the same cause of action. It is enough that they appear to declare rights which are inconsistent in respect of the same transaction.(emphasis added) The potential for there to be conflicting judgments is, as their Honours said, an important factor. However, in my opinion, in the present proceedings, there is no substantive risk of there being conflicting judgments. The findings that Thunder and Mr David seek to obtain in the Thunder proceeding relate to the existence of the pleaded defamatory meanings or representations conveyed by the publications complained of that are said to be false, and awards of damages as the relief for those claims.