FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 5)
[2017] FCA 1572
File number: NSD 850 of 2014 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 8 December 2017 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – r 1.39 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – application by first respondent for extension of time to comply with self-executing order after the date for compliance had passed – where first respondent ordered to file and serve verified answers to interrogatories within certain time in default of which defence would be struck out – where non-compliance – whether exercise of Court’s discretion under r 1.39 to extend the time would relieve against injustice – whether first respondent gave adequate explanation as to why order was not complied with – where first respondent made no sufficient arrangements to comply with order in time and gave no explanation for failure – where first respondent had defaulted on two earlier occasions in complying with orders to file and serve verified answers – whether first respondent fulfilled obligations under ss 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB, ss 37M, 37N, 45
Federal Court Rules 2011 r 1.39
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
FAI General Insurance Company Limited v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268
Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361
Lodestar Anstalt v Campari Australia LLC (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 118
Palmer v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 727
Sandbach v Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 526
STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 528
Sydney Equine Coaches Pty Ltd v Gorst [2017] FCAFC 34
Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (a firm) (2016) 332 ALR 199
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 3) [2017] FCA 1170
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 4) [2017] FCA 1571
Date of hearing: 4 and 8 December 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 63 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr PW Gray SC with Mr M Polden Solicitor for the Applicants: Aitken Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C Dibb with Mr S Richardson Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mitry Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 850 of 2014 BETWEEN: THUNDER STUDIOS INC (CALIFORNIA)
First Applicant
RODRIC MARC DAVID
Second Applicant
AND: CHARIF KAZAL
First Respondent
ADAM KAZAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 DECEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The first respondent’s interlocutory application filed in Court on 4 December 2017 be dismissed.
2.The first respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application and to the extent appropriate in accordance with the undertaking given by the first respondent, by his…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1572
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the Court had to determine included whether Charif had demonstrated sufficient grounds to warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretion under rule 1.39, and whether he had met his obligations under sections 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The Court assessed whether Charif had made adequate arrangements to comply with the order and whether he had provided a sufficient explanation for his non-compliance. Charif had previously defaulted on two occasions in complying with similar orders, which further complicated his case. The Court also considered the impact of Charif's failure to comply on the administration of justice and the potential for additional procedural burdens on all parties involved.
The Court found that Charif had not discharged the onus of demonstrating why the discretion in rule 1.39 should be exercised to prevent an injustice. Charif's explanation for his non-compliance was deemed insufficient, as he had not made any arrangements to comply with the order despite being aware of the need to do so. Additionally, Charif had not provided any explanation for his failure to comply, and his previous defaults on similar orders further undermined his case. The Court concluded that Charif had not fulfilled his obligations under the relevant sections of the Federal Court of Australia Act and that there was no sufficient basis to extend the time for compliance. Consequently, the interlocutory application was dismissed with costs awarded to the applicants.
The Court's final orders included dismissing the first respondent's interlocutory application and directing him to pay the applicants' costs of the application. The costs were to be taxed forthwith, in accordance with the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The first respondent’s interlocutory application filed in Court on 4 December 2017 be dismissed.
2. The first respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application and to the extent appropriate in accordance with the undertaking given by the first respondent, by his counsel, on 4 December 2017 and those costs may be taxed forthwith.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Charif contended that, in order to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice, it was necessary that there be a hearing on the merits of his defence to the claims made by Thunder Studios and Mr David. He argued that he had given a sufficient explanation for his default. He submitted that it was almost certain that there would be a further procedural burden for all parties and the Court, because Charif would have to seek leave to file and serve an amended defence, and, therefore, there would be another interlocutory application. Charif argued that there had been no appreciable prejudice occasioned to the applicants by his most recent default, since the draft answers served, albeit an hour after the time specified in order 4, on 15 September 2017, were in identical terms to the verified answers that were served later. He argued that his communications with his solicitors indicated he was conscious of the need to comply with the order to file and serve his verified answers by 15 September 2017, that he had wanted his solicitors to do so and that, when he had left Australia earlier in September 2017, he expected to have been in a position where he would have been able to comply with the Court’s order.Consideration A crucial question underpinning Charif’s application for an extension of time to 22 September 2017 in which to file his verified answers to the five interrogatories that had to be filed by 15 September 2017, is whether he has established that the Court should act to relieve him against injustice. In FAI General Insurance Company Limited v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268 at 283, Wilson J, with whom Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ agreed, said of the power to extend time to comply with a self-executing order after the date for compliance had passed: It is a remedial provision which confers on a court a broad power to relieve against injustice. The discretion so conferred is not readily to be limited by judicial fiat. The fact that it manifestly is a power to be exercised with caution and, in the case of conditional orders, with due regard to the public policy centred in the finality of litigation does not warrant an arbitrary limitation of the power itself, not expressed in the words of the rule, so as to deny its capacity to apply to circumstances such as those which are to be found in the present case. It would be wrong to so read the rule as to deny to a court power to prevent injustice in circumstances where the party subject to a conditional order ought to be excused from non-compliance. (emphasis added) In that case, the party in default had failed to provide security for costs within the time ordered but it provided that security late. Here, the injustice of which Charif complains is that by force of orders 4 and 5 made on 7 September 2017, reflecting the rulings I had made on 18 August 2017, his defence has been struck out. Those orders, as made on 7 September 2017, reflected what I required the parties to prepare as orders to give effect to my intention as expressed in the hearing on 18 August 2017 and of which Charif was aware from that date because Mr Mitry had emailed him to that effect. Thus, from 18 August 2017 Charif personally was aware that, if he failed to file and serve verified answers to the five interrogatories by 15 September 2017, his defence would be struck out.