STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd

[2010] FCA 1002

Citation: STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1002
Parties: STX PAN OCEAN CO., LTD v BOWEN BASIN COAL GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 141 187 760), DAVID JOHN THOMSON and BEACH BUILDING AND CIVIL GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 081 893 414)
File number: NSD 561 of 2010
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 3 September 2010
Catchwords:

EVIDENCE – oath or affirmation – whether affidavit attested before a notary public in accordance with South Korean law amounts to an oath or affirmation in a similar form to the Schedule to s 21(4) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – sufficient acknowledgment of the gravity and importance of the truth being told required to amount to an affirmation

Held: the attestation is in a form sufficient to comply with s 21(4) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 21
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 45
Cases cited: R v Governor of Pentonville Prison;  Ex parte Singh [1981] 3 All ER 23 followed
Reg. v Governor of Pentonville Prison;  Ex parte Passingham [1983] 2 AC 464 referred to
R v Climas (1997) 74 SASR 411 applied
Date of hearing: 3 September 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 15
Counsel for the Plaintiff: P King
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Hicksons
Counsel for the Second Defendant: A Morris QC
Solicitor for Second Defendant: Worcester & Co

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 561 of 2010

BETWEEN:

STX PAN OCEAN CO., LTD
Plaintiff

AND:

BOWEN BASIN COAL GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 141 187 760)
First Defendant

DAVID JOHN THOMSON
Second Defendant

BEACH BUILDING AND CIVIL GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 081 893 414)
Third Defendant

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 SEPTEMBER 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The affidavit made by Jung-Hyun Ahn on 19 July 2010 in South Korea may be read, subject to the taking of any proper objections, at the resumption of the trial on 13 October 2010, provided that Mr Ahn is available for cross-examination on that occasion, unless Mr Thomson notifies that he is no longer required for that purpose.

2.The costs:

(a)thrown away by the necessity to raise the objection to the said affidavit at the directions hearing on 20 August 2010 be paid by the plaintiff;

(b)of the objection to the admissibility of the same affidavit be paid by the second defendant.

(c)in orders 2(a) and (b) may be set off.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 561 of 2010

BETWEEN:

STX PAN OCEAN CO., LTD
Plaintiff

AND:
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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 1002
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd v Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Ltd, the plaintiff sought to establish the quantum of damages they were owed by the defendants due to alleged misrepresentations. The plaintiff claimed damages for being induced into charterparty agreements for two vessels by the defendants' alleged misrepresentations and for the resulting losses. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary legal issue was whether the affidavits provided by the plaintiff, which were executed in South Korea, met the requirements of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to be admissible as evidence. Specifically, the defendants argued that the affidavits were not properly verified as true under oath or affirmation, as required by the legislation. The court had to determine whether the attestation of the affidavits before a notary public in South Korea was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Evidence Act.

The court considered the provisions of the Evidence Act and the Federal Court of Australia Act, as well as relevant case law, to determine the admissibility of the affidavits. The court found that while the affidavits had been validly attested under South Korean law, this process did not necessarily amount to a verification of the affidavits for the purposes of the Australian legislation. The court referred to the judgment in R v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Singh and Ex parte Passingham, which established that an affirmation must recognise the gravity and importance of the truth being told on the particular occasion. The court concluded that the attestation before a notary public in South Korea did not sufficiently recognise the gravity and solemnity of the occasion on which the statements were made. Therefore, the affidavits were deemed inadmissible unless they could be properly verified under oath or affirmation.

The court ordered that the plaintiff have leave to file and serve an affidavit deposing to whether the manner of execution of the affidavit by Mr Ahn amounted to verification of its contents as true for the purposes of the law of the Republic of South Korea. This decision highlights the importance of ensuring that evidence is properly verified in accordance with the relevant legislation and the need for parties to raise objections to the admissibility of evidence in a timely manner. The court's ruling emphasises the requirement for an affirmation to recognise the gravity and importance of the truth being told on the particular occasion, and the need for evidence to meet the standards set by the Evidence Act and the Federal Court of Australia Act.

Background

Background to the litigation

When this matter was before me at the time of the trial in early July 2010, the plaintiff, STX Pan Ocean Co Limited, was granted leave to re-open to adduce evidence limited to the issue of the quantum of damages which it claimed against the second defendant, David Thomson. Mr Thomson was a director and shareholder of the first defendant, Bowen Basin Coal Group Pty Limited, against whom, on 1 July 2010, I had entered judgment on the writ for $US2,483,296.25. The nature of STX’s claim was for damages for being induced to enter into charterparties of two vessels by Mr Thomson’s alleged misrepresentations and for consequential losses. The damages hearing has been fixed for 13 October 2010.BACKGROUND During the course of the trial, Mr Thomson had objected to a document that he said purported to be an affidavit made by Jung-Hyun Ahn in South Korea. This affidavit, on its face, did not appear to have been sworn or affirmed by Mr Ahn at all, the jurat on the third page of the text of the affidavit being blank. A notarial certificate was attached to that affidavit. It was in a form that identified Mr Ahn as having personally appeared before the notary, admitted his subscription to the affidavit, placed his chop (i.e. a type of seal) on it, and having attested it before the notary. Initially, Mr Thomson objected to the admissibility of this affidavit because, on its face, it did not appear to have been verified on oath or by affirmation in accordance with s 21 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). This objection was taken without any prior notice during the hearing. There was no opportunity for STX to remedy it since Mr Ahn had not been required for cross-examination. I indicated that if Mr Thomson maintained the objection I would uphold it, but I also said that I would adjourn the trial and permit STX to call Mr Ahn and order costs against Mr Thomson on an indemnity basis for the failure to identify the objection in a timely way so as to avoid this necessity. At that point the objection was withdrawn and Mr Ahn’s affidavit was read without relevant objection. I made orders for the adducing of additional evidence on damages on 6 July 2010. As a result a further affidavit of Mr Ahn has been filed that bore a notarial certificate dated 19 July 2010 in the same form as the earlier one. When the matter came before me on 20 August 2010, Mr Thomson objected to this latest affidavit as being inadmissible and to any attempt by STX to lead further evidence in support of its damages claim. I accepted the argument put by Mr Thomson that it was unsatisfactory that the very deficiency that had been highlighted at the trial, had appeared to have been left unaddressed when Mr Ahn’s affidavit of 19 July 2010 was filed and served. After hearing the parties, I ordered that STX have leave to file and serve on or before 27 August 2010 an affidavit, or affidavits, deposing as to whether the manner of execution of Mr Ahn’s affidavit of 19 July 2010 by him, amounted to verification of its contents as true for the purposes of the law of the Republic of South Korea.ATTESTATION IN SOUTH KOREA

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the attestation of an affidavit before a notary public in South Korea amounts to a verification of the affidavit's contents as true for the purposes of s 21 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and s 45 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
2. Whether the notarial certificate attached to Ahn's affidavit is sufficient to establish the validity of the attestation process under Australian law.

Held
1. The attestation of an affidavit before a notary public in South Korea does not amount to a verification of the affidavit's contents as true for the purposes of s 21 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and s 45 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
2. The notarial certificate attached to Ahn's affidavit is not sufficient to establish the validity of the attestation process under Australian law.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Thomson accepts that each of Mr Ahn’s affidavits has been validly attested under South Korean law in the sense that a notary public has verified validly the documents to which their certificates were attached. But he argued that this process did not amount to a verification of the affidavits for the purposes of s 21 of the Evidence Act or s 45 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).CONSIDERATION Relevantly, s 21 of the Evidence Act provides:“(1)A witness in a proceedings must either take an oath or make an affirmation before giving evidence.…(4)The witness is to take the oath, or make the affirmation, in accordance with the appropriate form in the Schedule or in a similar form but such an affirmation has the same effect for all purposes as an oath.” (emphasis added) The schedule to the Evidence Act provides, relevantly, that the forms of oath and affirmation by a witness are as follows:“I swear … by Almighty God … the evidence I shall give … will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.I solemnly and sincerely declare and affirm … that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.” The question, therefore, is whether the attestation before a notary public in accordance with the law of South Korea, as deposed to by Ms Kim, amounts to a witness taking an oath, or making an affirmation in a similar form to that in the Schedule to the Evidence Act. In R v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Singh [1981] 3 All ER 23 at 27, Ackner LJ sitting in the Divisional Court of the Queens Bench Division, discussed what amounted to an affirmation for the purposes of the law of England. He said that no particular formula had to be used, but that the mere signature to a document or verbal acknowledgement that its contents were correct could not amount to an affirmation. He then answered the question as to where the line was to be drawn:“The answer cannot be precise. It must be a matter of fact and degree dependent on the particular circumstances of the case. I do not consider that the affirmation need take place prior to the making of the statement. What is required, where the statement has been made, is its adoption in circumstances which recognise the gravity and importance of the truth being told on the particular occasion.” (emphasis added) The emphasised formulation was adopted as correct and “as an appropriate criterion to apply to an affirmation taken otherwise than upon oath by a non-judicial officer of a foreign state” by Lord Diplock, with whose speech Lords Wilberforce, Keith of Kinkel and Brightman agreed in Reg. v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Passingham [1983] 2 AC 464 at 471G-472A. His Lordship then went on to discuss the requirements of the extradition law in England at the time. In R v Climas (1997) 74 SASR 411 at 428 [111] Lander J, with whom Millhouse J stated his broad agreement, said that for the purpose of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) an affirmation had to recognise the gravity and solemnity of the occasion on which the statement was made and the importance the person must attach to truthful evidence, referring to what Ackner LJ had said in the passage I have quoted.