Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 10)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 10) [2020] FCA 1636  

File number(s): NSD 850 of 2014
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 22 October 2020
Catchwords:

DEFAMATION – damages – particulars of mitigation – whether directly relevant background context – whether applicant’s conduct provoked publication complained of

EVIDENCE – whether questioning of applicant in cross-examination permissible where respondent had no defence – whether material relied on in mitigation sufficiently connected to assessment of damages or applicant’s credibility

Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 s 18
Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Chau Chak Wing (2019) 271 FCR 632

Broome v Cassell Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027

Burstein v Time Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 579

Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2018] FCA 593

Re Emergent Capital Limited [2011] 2 CILR 329

Scott v Sampson 8 QBD 491

Speidel v Plato Films Ltd [1961] AC 1090

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal(No 3) [2017] FCA 1170

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal(No 5) [2017] FCA 1572

Turner v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 3469

Warren v Random House Group [2009] QB 600

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 17
Date of hearing: 19 – 22 October 2020
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr P. Gray SC with Mr M. Polden
Solicitor for the Applicants: Russell Kennedy Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms G.L. Schoff QC with Ms H. Jager
Solicitor for the Respondents: HWL Ebsworth

ORDERS

NSD 850 of 2014
BETWEEN:

THUNDER STUDIOS INC (CALIFORNIA)

First Applicant

RODRIC MARC DAVID

Second Applicant

AND:

CHARIF KAZAL

First Respondent

ADAM KAZAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 OCTOBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Paragraph 1(a)(i), (b) and (c) of the respondents’ particulars relied on in mitigation dated 22 October 2020 be struck out.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

Introduction

  1. Today is the fourth day of the trial.  Yesterday, during the course of the cross-examination of Rodric David (the second applicant) senior counsel for Charif and Adam Kazal (the respondents) put matters to him that provoked objection by senior counsel for the applicants that these questions went outside any scope afforded to a defendant or respondent in a defamation action in cross-examining a plaintiff or applicant where there was no defence to which such cross-examination could relate. 

  2. Here, the matters complained of were first published in June 2013.  Thunder Studios Inc (California) and Mr David claim damages for defamation and injurious falsehood by reason of the publication of defamatory imputations conveyed in the two matters complained of, being webpages, and also for contraventions of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law in Sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) by the publication of tweets directing people to the website on which the…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1636
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 10) involved a dispute over defamation damages and the relevance of certain evidence. The parties to the case were Thunder Studios Inc, a Californian film production company, and Kazal, an individual who was the subject of defamatory publications. The nature of the dispute was primarily focused on the admissibility of particulars of mitigation and the relevance of certain background context evidence in the assessment of damages for defamation.

The legal issues that the court had to decide included whether the particulars of mitigation presented by Kazal were directly relevant to the background context of the defamatory publication and whether the questioning of Kazal during cross-examination was permissible when the respondent had no defence. Additionally, the court had to determine if the material relied on in mitigation was sufficiently connected to the assessment of damages or Kazal's credibility.

In its decision, the court held that the particulars of mitigation presented by Kazal were not directly relevant to the background context of the defamatory publication and, therefore, could not be relied on in mitigation of damages. The court reasoned that the material in question had not been presented as part of a substantive defence to liability and that it was illogical and undesirable for the defendant to rely on such facts in relation to the assessment of damages. Furthermore, the court held that the questioning of Kazal during cross-examination was not permissible as the respondent had no defence.

The final orders of the court were that paragraph 1(a)(i), (b) and (c) of the respondents’ particulars relied on in mitigation dated 22 October 2020 be struck out. The court further noted that the issue of the admissibility of questions relating to the findings of the Grand Court would be left to when it arises. The entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Paragraph 1(a)(i), (b) and (c) of the respondents’ particulars relied on in mitigation dated 22 October 2020 be struck out.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Subsequently, in Warren v Random House Group [2009] QB 600 (at 646–647 [78]–[79]), Sir Anthony Clarke MR, May and Wilson LJJ said:The decision of this court in Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 579, cited above, established two important interlocking propositions. (a) In relation to the court’s assessment of damages for libel it is open to a defendant to seek to rely upon such facts as fall within the “directly relevant background context” to the defamatory publication. See in particular the judgment of May LJ, at para 42. (b) It is illogical and undesirable that a defendant can seek to rely upon such facts in relation to such assessment only if he has presented them as part of a substantive defence to liability, in particular within a plea of justification of the publication. He can rely upon them as freestanding matters pleaded as relevant only to the assessment of damages: see in particular the judgment of May LJ, at para 47.… But, although we are clear that the “directly relevant background context” is the best encapsulation within a single phrase of the criterion for admissibility, we agree with the observations of Moses LJ in Turner’s case [[2006] 1 WLR 3469], at paras 87–89, to the effect that, taken on its own, it would give insufficient guidance to judges called upon to apply it. There is no substitute for examination in each case of whether the material qualifies as background context directly relevant to the assessment of the damage sustained by the claimant as a result of the publication, in particular the damage to his reputation in the sector of his life to which it relates and the injury to his feelings. Indeed, as Keene LJ pointed out in Turner’s case, at para 60, the claimant’s reputation should largely have been repaired by publication of the correction and apology which attends acceptance of an offer of amends, with the result that injury to feelings tends to play an especially prominent part in determination of compensation under the Act. Keene LJ also called for caution in the application of the principle. Then he stated, at para 56:“If evidence is to qualify under the principle spelt out in Burstein’s case, it has to be evidence which is so clearly relevant to the subject matter of the libel or to the claimant’s reputation or sensitivity in that part of his life that there would be a real risk of the [court’s] assessing damages on a false basis if [it was] kept in ignorance of the facts to which the evidence relates.”(citation and emphasis added) Consideration During the course of giving evidence-in-chief, Mr David said that when he first saw the matters complained of in June 2013 he felt “a mixture of anger and despondency. There had been a period of time where I thought possibly they [the respondents and their brothers] were getting on with their own lives, just as I was, and clearly their vendetta marched on.” The respondents wish to challenge that evidence in relation to, first, its credibility and, secondly, its connection to the damages which the applicants seek.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

One of the particular difficulties with what has happened is that at no prior point did the respondents, and in particular Charif Kazal when he had a defence on the record, seek to rely on the material in the particulars now advanced as part of their case in mitigation of damages. Charif Kazal’s struck out defence relied on his having published, under qualified privilege, a defence to an attack on him and his family by Mr Besser and The Sydney Morning Herald by reason of which, he then claimed, the matters complained of were a response to that provocation. Notably, his defence of qualified privilege did not allege that the occasion of qualified privilege arose due to any direct or indirect connection with Mr David and the publication of, or his being the source for, the articles. Rather, that defence alleged that those two articles, and a swathe of others, constituted attacks on both the respondents and their broader family which created an occasion of qualified privilege because the matters complained of were replying to those attacks by the newspaper and the journalist.Conclusion For those reasons, I will not allow particulars 1(a)(i), (b) and (c) to be relied on in mitigation of damages and I strike out the whole of paragraph 1 of those particulars. I will leave to when it arises the issue of admissibility of questions relating to the findings of the Grand Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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