Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 3)

[2017] FCA 1170

File number: NSD 850 of 2014
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 18 August 2017
Catchwords:

CONTEMPT OF COURT – where respondent in contempt of court in proceedings in which he sought to file a defence out of time – where respondent had not purged contempt or shown any contrition or acknowledgement of Court’s authority – principle that party in contempt of Court ordinarily will not be heard in proceedings in relation to which contempt exists – Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285 – consideration of appropriate test for hearing party who is in contempt in proceedings

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by respondent for leave to file a defence out of time – where time to file a defence had expired over two years earlier – where respondent provided no explanation for delay – where defence raised plea of justification without providing any particulars – whether exercise of Court’s discretion under r 1.39 of Federal Court Rules 2011 to grant respondent leave would relieve against injustice  

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB, s 37M

Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 1.39, 5.22, 5.23, 16.07, 16.32

Cases cited:

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Celestino v Celestino [1990] FCA 449

FAI General Insurance Company Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268

Foster v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2014) 219 FCR 563

Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285

Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516

Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111

Permewan Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Attorney-General of the State of New South Wales; on the relation of Franklins’ Stores Pty Ltd (1978) 35 NSWLR 365

Short v Short (1973) 7 SASR 1

Sydney Equine Coaches Pty Ltd v Gorst [2017] FCAFC 34

Tamaya Resources Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2016) 332 ALR 199

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 2) [2017] FCA 202

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal [2016] FCA 1598

X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian (Publishers) Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1

Date of hearing: 18 August 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr M Polden
Solicitor for the Applicants: Aitken Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr W Calokerinos
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Saab Law Group

ORDERS

NSD 850 of 2014
BETWEEN:

THUNDER STUDIOS INC (CALIFORNIA)

First Applicant

RODRIC MARC DAVID

Second Applicant

AND:

CHARIF KAZAL

First Respondent

ADAM KAZAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 AUGUST 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory applications filed by the second respondent on 16 June 2017 and 28 July 2017 be dismissed.

2.The second respondent pay the applicants’ costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1170
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Thunder Studios Inc (California) was the plaintiff and Kazal was the defendant in the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute involved allegations of copyright infringement and the defendant's contempt of court for failing to comply with court orders. The defendant sought to file a defence out of time and applied for leave to do so under rule 1.39 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. The legal issues before the court were whether the defendant's contempt of court and lack of contrition or acknowledgment of the court's authority precluded him from being heard in the proceedings and whether the court's discretion to grant leave to file a defence out of time should be exercised to relieve against injustice. The court found that the defendant's contempt of court and lack of respect for the court's authority precluded him from being heard in the proceedings. The court also found that the exercise of the court's discretion to grant leave to file a defence out of time would not relieve against injustice as the defendant had not provided any explanation for the delay in filing the defence and had not shown any contrition or acknowledgment of the court's authority. The court dismissed the defendant's interlocutory applications with costs. The court found that the defendant had demonstrated no respect for the orders of the court or its authority, and had carefully structured his affairs to avoid disclosing his assets or revealing where or how he would find the money to pay the already outstanding significant costs orders. The court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to have the benefit of a favourable exercise of the court's discretion to allow him to participate in the proceedings or to defend himself, and that it was not appropriate to permit him, as a contemnor, to engage further in the litigation and subject his adversaries to further expense. The court found that the defendant's conduct had denied any benign characterisation he asserted, and that there was a need for specific and general deterrence. The court found that the defendant's actions were driven by anger, self-justification, and even vigilante sentiments, which could not be tolerated if the rule of law and the role of the courts were to have a meaningful part to play in maintaining civil society. The court concluded that there was no error on the part of the primary judge on this topic. The court dismissed the interlocutory applications filed by the defendant and ordered him to pay the plaintiff's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory applications filed by the second respondent on 16 June 2017 and 28 July 2017 be dismissed.

2. The second respondent pay the applicants’ costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

He is not now entitled to have the benefit of a favourable exercise of the Court’s discretion to allow him now to participate in the proceedings or to defend himself. Far less is it appropriate to permit him, as a contemnor, to engage further in this litigation and subject his adversaries, the applicants, to further expense in circumstances where it is apparent that he has carefully structured his affairs so that, although very well resourced to afford legal representation and a comfortable lifestyle for himself and his family, he has no apparent assets that he has been willing to disclose to his trustee in bankruptcy in his statement of affairs or to reveal where or how he will find the money to pay the already outstanding significant costs orders. He has demonstrated no respect for the orders of the Court or its authority.Conclusion For these reasons, I am of opinion that the interlocutory applications must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the meantime, on 1 August 2017 Adam obtained an annulment of his bankruptcy. His statement of affairs, that he belatedly made, revealed that he had, effectively, no assets. Yet as I, and the Full Court, observed, there was no evidence of how he supported himself or his means, assets or liabilities (Kazal [2017] FCAFC 111 at [147]). He has managed to engage several senior and junior counsel in the contempt proceedings and appeal and several firms of solicitors to instruct counsel through the course of them, and now has engaged a new firm of solicitors and junior counsel on his present interlocutory applications. Consideration The circumstances give rise to two independent discretionary considerations as to the exercise of the Court’s power whether to grant Adam’s interlocutory applications. First, there is a principle that a party in contempt of Court ordinarily will not be heard in the proceedings in relation to which the contempt exists. Secondly, the exercise of a discretionary power of the kind conferred by r 1.39 is to relieve against injustice: FAI General Insurance Company Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268 at 283-284 per Wilson J, see esp at 283, with whom Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ agreed, see too at 291 per Gaudron J, and Sydney Equine Coaches Pty Ltd v Gorst [2017] FCAFC 34 at [17]-[19] per Rares, Flick and Bromwich JJ. What is signal about each of the present applications is the absence of any evidence, first, about why it is being made and, secondly, of any expression of contrition or acknowledgment of the Court’s authority by Adam himself. The Full Court said in Kazal [2017] FCAFC 111 at [148]-[149]:148it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that there was no evidence to support the assertion that the appellant’s conduct was in some way benign. It was pointed out that the appellant has never made an apology or expressed any remorse for his conduct. In those circumstances, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the observations of the primary judge:(1)at [27] of the sentence judgment that the regret expressed was as to being found guilty, rather than an apology or any sort of contrition; and (2)at [50] of the sentence judgment that the appellant had shown no respect for the orders of the Court and no remorse for his conduct and further no respect for the right of the respondents to litigate their dispute with him and his brother on the merits, were fairly open to his Honour. 149The respondents’ submissions should be accepted. The appellant’s anger at perceived injustice and his consequent lack of self-control in the face of both the substantive proceedings and direct orders to desist not only deny the benign characterisation he asserted, but heighten the need for specific and general deterrence. Actions such as this may be driven by anger, self-justification and even vigilante sentiments. This cannot be tolerated if the rule of law, and the role of the courts, is to have a meaningful part to play in maintaining civil society. There was no error on the part of the primary judge on this topic. (emphasis added)