FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 3)
[2017] FCA 1170
File number: NSD 850 of 2014 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 18 August 2017 Catchwords: CONTEMPT OF COURT – where respondent in contempt of court in proceedings in which he sought to file a defence out of time – where respondent had not purged contempt or shown any contrition or acknowledgement of Court’s authority – principle that party in contempt of Court ordinarily will not be heard in proceedings in relation to which contempt exists – Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285 – consideration of appropriate test for hearing party who is in contempt in proceedings
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by respondent for leave to file a defence out of time – where time to file a defence had expired over two years earlier – where respondent provided no explanation for delay – where defence raised plea of justification without providing any particulars – whether exercise of Court’s discretion under r 1.39 of Federal Court Rules 2011 to grant respondent leave would relieve against injustice
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB, s 37M
Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 1.39, 5.22, 5.23, 16.07, 16.32
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Celestino v Celestino [1990] FCA 449
FAI General Insurance Company Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268
Foster v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2014) 219 FCR 563
Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516
Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111
Sydney Equine Coaches Pty Ltd v Gorst [2017] FCAFC 34
Tamaya Resources Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2016) 332 ALR 199
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 2) [2017] FCA 202
Date of hearing: 18 August 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 28 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr M Polden Solicitor for the Applicants: Aitken Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr W Calokerinos Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Saab Law Group ORDERS
NSD 850 of 2014 BETWEEN: THUNDER STUDIOS INC (CALIFORNIA)
First Applicant
RODRIC MARC DAVID
Second Applicant
AND: CHARIF KAZAL
First Respondent
ADAM KAZAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 AUGUST 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory applications filed by the second respondent on 16 June 2017 and 28 July 2017 be dismissed.
2.The second respondent pay the applicants’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1170
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory applications filed by the second respondent on 16 June 2017 and 28 July 2017 be dismissed.
2. The second respondent pay the applicants’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the meantime, on 1 August 2017 Adam obtained an annulment of his bankruptcy. His statement of affairs, that he belatedly made, revealed that he had, effectively, no assets. Yet as I, and the Full Court, observed, there was no evidence of how he supported himself or his means, assets or liabilities (Kazal [2017] FCAFC 111 at [147]). He has managed to engage several senior and junior counsel in the contempt proceedings and appeal and several firms of solicitors to instruct counsel through the course of them, and now has engaged a new firm of solicitors and junior counsel on his present interlocutory applications. Consideration The circumstances give rise to two independent discretionary considerations as to the exercise of the Court’s power whether to grant Adam’s interlocutory applications. First, there is a principle that a party in contempt of Court ordinarily will not be heard in the proceedings in relation to which the contempt exists. Secondly, the exercise of a discretionary power of the kind conferred by r 1.39 is to relieve against injustice: FAI General Insurance Company Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268 at 283-284 per Wilson J, see esp at 283, with whom Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ agreed, see too at 291 per Gaudron J, and Sydney Equine Coaches Pty Ltd v Gorst [2017] FCAFC 34 at [17]-[19] per Rares, Flick and Bromwich JJ. What is signal about each of the present applications is the absence of any evidence, first, about why it is being made and, secondly, of any expression of contrition or acknowledgment of the Court’s authority by Adam himself. The Full Court said in Kazal [2017] FCAFC 111 at [148]-[149]:148it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that there was no evidence to support the assertion that the appellant’s conduct was in some way benign. It was pointed out that the appellant has never made an apology or expressed any remorse for his conduct. In those circumstances, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the observations of the primary judge:(1)at [27] of the sentence judgment that the regret expressed was as to being found guilty, rather than an apology or any sort of contrition; and (2)at [50] of the sentence judgment that the appellant had shown no respect for the orders of the Court and no remorse for his conduct and further no respect for the right of the respondents to litigate their dispute with him and his brother on the merits, were fairly open to his Honour. 149The respondents’ submissions should be accepted. The appellant’s anger at perceived injustice and his consequent lack of self-control in the face of both the substantive proceedings and direct orders to desist not only deny the benign characterisation he asserted, but heighten the need for specific and general deterrence. Actions such as this may be driven by anger, self-justification and even vigilante sentiments. This cannot be tolerated if the rule of law, and the role of the courts, is to have a meaningful part to play in maintaining civil society. There was no error on the part of the primary judge on this topic. (emphasis added)