Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 7)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 7)

[2018] FCA 996

File number: NSD 850 of 2014
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 8 June 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – apprehended bias – consideration of principles regarding disqualification
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N

Federal Court Rules 2011 r 42.22

Cases cited:

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2001) 205 CLR 337

GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare (UK) Ltd [2013] FCAFC 150

Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488

Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111

Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2018] FCA 593

Re Morling;  Ex parte Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union [1985] 66 ALR 608

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal [2016] FCA 1598

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 2) [2017] FCA 202

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 3) [2017] FCA 1170

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 5) [2017] FCA 1572

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 6) [2017] FCA 1573

Zhai v Luo [2015] FCAFC 144

Date of hearing: 8 June 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr M Polden
Solicitor for the Applicants: Aitken Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr C Dibb
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mitry Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 850 of 2014
BETWEEN:

THUNDER STUDIOS INC (CALIFORNIA)

First Applicant

RODRIC MARC DAVID

Second Applicant

AND:

CHARIF KAZAL

First Respondent

ADAM KAZAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JUNE 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondents’ application for recusal filed 6 June 2018 be dismissed.

2.The respondents/cross-claimants file and serve any written submissions (limited to five pages) upon which they propose to rely in support of their interlocutory application to amend the cross claim, on or before 22 June 2018.

3.The applicant/cross-respondents file and serve any written submissions (limited to five pages) and evidence upon which they propose to rely in opposition to the interlocutory application to amend the cross claim, on or before 6 July 2018.

4.The applicants/cross-respondents file and serve any expert reports upon which they propose to rely on their claim, on or before 6 July 2018.

5.The interlocutory applications of each of the parties be stood over to 10 August 2018 for hearing.

6.The respondents/cross-claimants pay the costs of today, including the costs thrown away by reason of the applicants not being able to proceed on their interlocutory application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. Charif and Adam Kazal, the respondents, have applied by interlocutory application dated 5 June 2018 that I recuse myself from further hearing the proceeding.  This proceeding has had a long history, and has been in my docket for over two and a half years.

  2. The basis on which the application is made…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 996
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 7) involved an application for the recusal of the trial judge based on an alleged apprehended bias. The applicants, Charif and Adam, contended that the judge's decisions in previous judgments in the same proceedings displayed a bias against them. They argued this bias was apparent in the judge's handling of various applications and procedural decisions, suggesting that the judge had already formed adverse conclusions about them. The court was required to determine whether the judge's decisions gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court examined the principle of apprehended bias, drawing on Australian jurisprudence. It noted that the test involves whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the issues. The court held that in determining this, one should consider whether the judge arrived at their decisions fairly and impartially, based on an objective assessment of the evidence and legal merits. The court concluded that the judge had made the decisions impartially and without prejudgment, thus finding no basis for an apprehension of bias.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application for recusal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias in the judge's conduct. The court emphasised that the apprehension of bias principle is about the appearance of impartiality rather than the actual thought processes of the judge. The court held that the judge's decisions were made in accordance with judicial practice and did not reflect any prejudgment of the issues. The court also issued directions for the proceeding of the interlocutory applications and costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondents’ application for recusal filed 6 June 2018 be dismissed.

2. The respondents/cross-claimants file and serve any written submissions (limited to five pages) upon which they propose to rely in support of their interlocutory application to amend the cross claim, on or before 22 June 2018.

3. The applicant/cross-respondents file and serve any written submissions (limited to five pages) and evidence upon which they propose to rely in opposition to the interlocutory application to amend the cross claim, on or before 6 July 2018.

4. The applicants/cross-respondents file and serve any expert reports upon which they propose to rely on their claim, on or before 6 July 2018.

5. The interlocutory applications of each of the parties be stood over to 10 August 2018 for hearing.

6. The respondents/cross-claimants pay the costs of today, including the costs thrown away by reason of the applicants not being able to proceed on their interlocutory application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my opinion, a fair-minded lay observer would approach the assessment of whether I might bring, or be perceived to bring, an impartial mind to the future resolution of the issues that will arise in this case, having regard to the facts that, in all the circumstances, I arrived at the adverse conclusions in each of the four judgments complained of fairly and impartially, in light of an objectively appropriate assessment of the evidence, arguments, and legal and factual merits of each application, and for no other reason.Conclusion For those reasons, I am not persuaded that my decisions or conduct in the proceedings on which Charif and Adam rely have given rise to an apprehension of bias. I refuse their application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicants took a neutral stance in relation to the application.Consideration In Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at 492 [11], Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said:the test to be applied in Australia in determining whether a judge is disqualified by reason of the appearance of bias (which, in the present case, was said to take the form of prejudgment) is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide (eg, Re Lusink; Ex parte Shaw (1980) 55 ALJR 12; 32 ALR 47; Livesey v NSW Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288; Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568; Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41). Their Honours said that the fictional observer is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law or of the character or ability of a particular judge. Rather, they said that (201 CLR at 493 [13]):the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice. The rules and conventions governing such practice are not frozen in time. They develop to take account of the exigencies of modern litigation. At the trial level, modern judges, responding to a need for more active case management, intervene in the conduct of cases to an extent that may surprise a person who came to court expecting a judge to remain, until the moment of pronouncement of judgment, as inscrutable as the Sphinx. (emphasis added) In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2001) 205 CLR 337 at 344–345 [6]-[8], Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ explained how the test worked. They said that its underlying rationale was to give effect to the principle that justice should both be done and be seen to be done. That reflects the fundamental importance that the tribunal, or judge, be independent and impartial. Hence, they pointed out, that even the appearance of a departure from the rule that the tribunal, or judge, be independent and impartial is prohibited:lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined. There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror.The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. (italic emphasis in original, bold emphasis added)