Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 6)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 6)

[2017] FCA 1573

File number: NSD 850 of 2014
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 15 December 2017
Catchwords:

HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – whether application by contemnor for order pursuant to r 42.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 that he be discharged before end of prison term imposed by Full Court in resentencing is in original or appellate jurisdiction of Court – whether single judge has power in original jurisdiction to order contemnor’s discharge before end of term of sentence imposed by Full Court

CONTEMPT OF COURT – consideration of matters relevant to take into account in application under r 42.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 for discharge of contemnor before end of prison term – where contemnor guilty of breaching Court orders and interfering with administration of justice – where contempts criminal in nature – where evidence of contemnor’s rehabilitation – where contemnor belatedly expressed contrition – whether in interests of justice to order discharge  

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 22, 25, 51

Federal Court Rules 2011 Pt 42, r 42.22

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) r 83.31

Cases cited:

Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chaste Corporation Pty Ltd (No 7) (2015) 235 FCR 563

CJ v Flintshire Borough Council [2010] 2 FLR 1224

Consolidated Press Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 325

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375

Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186

Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15

In re Barrell Enterprises [1973] 1 WLR 19; [2010] EWCA Civ 393

Johnson v Grant 1923 SC 789

Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal;  Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45

Swindon Borough Council v Webb [2016] 1 WLR 3301

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 2) [2017] FCA 202

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal [2016] FCA 1598

Young v Registrar of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales [No 3] (1993) 32 NSWLR 262

Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt (5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2017)

Bingham, Sir T, “The Judge as Juror:  the Judicial Determination of Factual Issues” (1985) Current Legal Problems 1

Date of hearing: 15 December 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr P Gray SC with Mr M Polden
Solicitor for the Applicants: Aitken Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr A Moses SC with Ms R Gall
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Mitry Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 850 of 2014
BETWEEN:

THUNDER STUDIOS INC (CALIFORNIA)

First Applicant

RODRIC MARC DAVID

Second Applicant

AND:

CHARIF KAZAL

First Respondent

ADAM KAZAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1573
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 6) involved a dispute between Thunder Studios Inc and Kazal regarding a contempt of court matter. The Federal Court was tasked with deciding whether an application by the contemnor, Kazal, for an order to be discharged before the end of a prison term imposed by the Full Court in a resentencing was within the original or appellate jurisdiction of the Court. The Court also had to determine whether a single judge had the power in original jurisdiction to order Kazal's discharge before the end of the term of sentence imposed by the Full Court.

The Court found that the distinction between civil and criminal contempts, although sometimes illusory or elusive, was still relevant. The proceeding for the contempts for which Kazal was convicted arose in the civil jurisdiction of the Court, although the contempts were criminal in nature. The Full Court affirmed and sentenced Kazal for four criminal contempts. The Court held that the contempts in charges 8 and 9 were criminal in nature as they involved interference with the administration of justice, which is a criminal contempt. The Court also considered the evidence of Kazal's rehabilitation and his belated expression of contrition but found that it was not sufficiently persuasive to warrant a remission of the sentence imposed for the purposes and reasons given by the Full Court.

The Court concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to discharge Kazal before the end of his prison term. While the Court accepted that Kazal was likely to abide by the undertakings he had offered and that this reflected a reformation of his conduct and behaviour towards the applicants and the authority of the Court, it did not think that his conduct and other evidence was sufficiently persuasive to warrant a discharge. The Court dismissed the interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017 with costs.

The Court also noted that the undertaking dated 15 December 2017 given to the Court by counsel for Kazal that he will pay $100,000 into Court within three months of the determination of the interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017, to be held on account of any costs orders against Kazal as assessed or agreed in favour of the applicants.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017 be dismissed.

2. The second respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017 and those costs be taxable forthwith.

3. The time by which the second respondent can file an application for leave to appeal be extended to 14 days after the publication of these reasons.

4. These orders not be entered without further order of the Court.

THE COURT NOTES:

5. The undertaking dated 15 December 2017 given to the Court by counsel for the second respondent on behalf of Abraham Kazal that he will pay $100,000 into Court within three months of the determination of the interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017, to be held on account of any costs orders against the second respondent as assessed or agreed in favour of the applicants.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

However, I do not feel persuaded that it is in the interests of justice to discharge him before the end of the term of his imprisonment. While I accept that the contemnor is likely in the future to abide by the undertakings that he has offered, and that this reflects a reformation of his conduct and behaviour towards the applicants and the authority of the Court, I do not think that that conduct and his other evidence is sufficiently persuasive to warrant what is, in effect, a remission of a sentence imposed for the purposes and the reasons that the Full Court gave.Conclusion For these reasons the interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017 must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As his senior counsel pointed out, a Court should be cautious to apply to a witness whose first language is not English, and whose cultural background is different to that of a person who was born and grew up in Australia, cultural or linguistic presuppositions that might be apposite in determining demeanour based findings about the witness’ evidence, as, indeed, Ipp JA noted in Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186 at 190 [20]-[22], citing what Sir Thomas Bingham had written in “The Judge as Juror: the Judicial Determination of Factual Issues” (1985) Current Legal Problems 1 at 10-11. I accept that submission as apposite to assessing the written and oral evidence of the contemnor about the description of the assistance that he had received from his family and how he understood question 16 in his statement of affairs. He said he filled his statement of affairs out or signed it while he was in jail during an interview with his solicitor. As his senior counsel put, there was no advantage to him in giving a deliberately false answer to question 16 in that form, since the contemnor’s object had been to procure his discharge from bankruptcy, and, in order to do so, it would have been necessary to have, first, completed a statement of affairs and, secondly, paid out all his debts in full, including the trustee’s fees, which I infer must have happened through the assistance of his brothers.The relief issue – consideration The question that arises is what is the appropriate approach to the application of r 42.22. There is a distinction between civil and criminal contempts that, although sometimes illusory or elusive, is nonetheless still relevant. The High Court recognised the distinction recently in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375 at 388 [40]-[41]. The proceeding for the contempts for which the contemnor was convicted arose in the civil jurisdiction of the Court, although, in my opinion, the four contempts that the Full Court affirmed and on which it sentenced the contemnor were criminal in nature. That is because, first, the convictions on charges 3 and 5 related to the contemnor’s past, once for all, breaches of the 11 November orders and the punishment imposed could not be seen as intended (or at least primarily intended) to enforce compliance with those orders. All of the contemnor’s offending conduct had ceased by the time that the charges were laid. In other words, those two charges and convictions were for past breaches of the 11 November orders on particular occasions that could not be undone. The Full Court upheld my finding that the contemnor’s conduct underpinning his convictions on charges 3 and 5 was both deliberate and a public defiance of the Court’s authority and, accordingly, contumacious (Kazal [2017] FCAFC 111 at [130]-[133]). The contempts in charges 8 and 9 were even more serious. They recorded convictions based on the contemnor’s interference with the administration of justice (Kazal [2017] FCAFC 111 at [135]-[139]). Interference with the administration of justice is a criminal contempt. In Consolidated Press Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 325 at 333, Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ said: “Contempt of court is a criminal offence punishable summarily by the Supreme Court”. But as Mason CJ, Wilson, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ held in Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15 at 89, in applying McRae 93 CLR 325:Notwithstanding that a contempt may be described as a criminal offence, the proceedings do not attract the criminal jurisdiction of the court to which the application is made. On the contrary, they proceed in the civil jurisdiction and attract the rule that ordinarily applies in that jurisdiction, namely, that costs follow the event.