FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 6)
[2017] FCA 1573
File number: NSD 850 of 2014 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 15 December 2017 Catchwords: HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – whether application by contemnor for order pursuant to r 42.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 that he be discharged before end of prison term imposed by Full Court in resentencing is in original or appellate jurisdiction of Court – whether single judge has power in original jurisdiction to order contemnor’s discharge before end of term of sentence imposed by Full Court
CONTEMPT OF COURT – consideration of matters relevant to take into account in application under r 42.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 for discharge of contemnor before end of prison term – where contemnor guilty of breaching Court orders and interfering with administration of justice – where contempts criminal in nature – where evidence of contemnor’s rehabilitation – where contemnor belatedly expressed contrition – whether in interests of justice to order discharge
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 22, 25, 51
Federal Court Rules 2011 Pt 42, r 42.22
Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) r 83.31
Cases cited: Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98
CJ v Flintshire Borough Council [2010] 2 FLR 1224
Consolidated Press Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 325
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375
Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186
Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15
In re Barrell Enterprises [1973] 1 WLR 19; [2010] EWCA Civ 393
Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45
Swindon Borough Council v Webb [2016] 1 WLR 3301
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 2) [2017] FCA 202
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal [2016] FCA 1598
Young v Registrar of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales [No 3] (1993) 32 NSWLR 262
Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt (5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2017)
Bingham, Sir T, “The Judge as Juror: the Judicial Determination of Factual Issues” (1985) Current Legal Problems 1
Date of hearing: 15 December 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 65 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr P Gray SC with Mr M Polden Solicitor for the Applicants: Aitken Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr A Moses SC with Ms R Gall Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Mitry Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 850 of 2014 BETWEEN: THUNDER STUDIOS INC (CALIFORNIA)
First Applicant
RODRIC MARC DAVID
Second Applicant
AND: CHARIF KAZAL
First Respondent
ADAM KAZAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1573
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the distinction between civil and criminal contempts, although sometimes illusory or elusive, was still relevant. The proceeding for the contempts for which Kazal was convicted arose in the civil jurisdiction of the Court, although the contempts were criminal in nature. The Full Court affirmed and sentenced Kazal for four criminal contempts. The Court held that the contempts in charges 8 and 9 were criminal in nature as they involved interference with the administration of justice, which is a criminal contempt. The Court also considered the evidence of Kazal's rehabilitation and his belated expression of contrition but found that it was not sufficiently persuasive to warrant a remission of the sentence imposed for the purposes and reasons given by the Full Court.
The Court concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to discharge Kazal before the end of his prison term. While the Court accepted that Kazal was likely to abide by the undertakings he had offered and that this reflected a reformation of his conduct and behaviour towards the applicants and the authority of the Court, it did not think that his conduct and other evidence was sufficiently persuasive to warrant a discharge. The Court dismissed the interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017 with costs.
The Court also noted that the undertaking dated 15 December 2017 given to the Court by counsel for Kazal that he will pay $100,000 into Court within three months of the determination of the interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017, to be held on account of any costs orders against Kazal as assessed or agreed in favour of the applicants.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017 be dismissed.
2. The second respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017 and those costs be taxable forthwith.
3. The time by which the second respondent can file an application for leave to appeal be extended to 14 days after the publication of these reasons.
4. These orders not be entered without further order of the Court.
THE COURT NOTES:
5. The undertaking dated 15 December 2017 given to the Court by counsel for the second respondent on behalf of Abraham Kazal that he will pay $100,000 into Court within three months of the determination of the interlocutory application filed on 27 October 2017, to be held on account of any costs orders against the second respondent as assessed or agreed in favour of the applicants.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As his senior counsel pointed out, a Court should be cautious to apply to a witness whose first language is not English, and whose cultural background is different to that of a person who was born and grew up in Australia, cultural or linguistic presuppositions that might be apposite in determining demeanour based findings about the witness’ evidence, as, indeed, Ipp JA noted in Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186 at 190 [20]-[22], citing what Sir Thomas Bingham had written in “The Judge as Juror: the Judicial Determination of Factual Issues” (1985) Current Legal Problems 1 at 10-11. I accept that submission as apposite to assessing the written and oral evidence of the contemnor about the description of the assistance that he had received from his family and how he understood question 16 in his statement of affairs. He said he filled his statement of affairs out or signed it while he was in jail during an interview with his solicitor. As his senior counsel put, there was no advantage to him in giving a deliberately false answer to question 16 in that form, since the contemnor’s object had been to procure his discharge from bankruptcy, and, in order to do so, it would have been necessary to have, first, completed a statement of affairs and, secondly, paid out all his debts in full, including the trustee’s fees, which I infer must have happened through the assistance of his brothers.The relief issue – consideration The question that arises is what is the appropriate approach to the application of r 42.22. There is a distinction between civil and criminal contempts that, although sometimes illusory or elusive, is nonetheless still relevant. The High Court recognised the distinction recently in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375 at 388 [40]-[41]. The proceeding for the contempts for which the contemnor was convicted arose in the civil jurisdiction of the Court, although, in my opinion, the four contempts that the Full Court affirmed and on which it sentenced the contemnor were criminal in nature. That is because, first, the convictions on charges 3 and 5 related to the contemnor’s past, once for all, breaches of the 11 November orders and the punishment imposed could not be seen as intended (or at least primarily intended) to enforce compliance with those orders. All of the contemnor’s offending conduct had ceased by the time that the charges were laid. In other words, those two charges and convictions were for past breaches of the 11 November orders on particular occasions that could not be undone. The Full Court upheld my finding that the contemnor’s conduct underpinning his convictions on charges 3 and 5 was both deliberate and a public defiance of the Court’s authority and, accordingly, contumacious (Kazal [2017] FCAFC 111 at [130]-[133]). The contempts in charges 8 and 9 were even more serious. They recorded convictions based on the contemnor’s interference with the administration of justice (Kazal [2017] FCAFC 111 at [135]-[139]). Interference with the administration of justice is a criminal contempt. In Consolidated Press Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 325 at 333, Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ said: “Contempt of court is a criminal offence punishable summarily by the Supreme Court”. But as Mason CJ, Wilson, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ held in Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15 at 89, in applying McRae 93 CLR 325:Notwithstanding that a contempt may be described as a criminal offence, the proceedings do not attract the criminal jurisdiction of the court to which the application is made. On the contrary, they proceed in the civil jurisdiction and attract the rule that ordinarily applies in that jurisdiction, namely, that costs follow the event.