Simpson v Taylors Business Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Simpson v Taylors Business Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] FCA 1119   

File number(s): VID 891 of 2023
Judgment of: BENNETT J
Date of judgment: 15 September 2025
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for default judgment under r 5.23(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) in respect of part of an amended pleading – where respondent in default under r 5.22 – where respondent did not appear and failed to file a defence – where judgment reserved on separate questions – whether partial default judgment available – partial default judgment entered

REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS – consideration of scheme for the return of goods – notice to group members – treatment of intermingled goods – procedure for funds obtained through sale of goods – whether payment to group members whose goods have been lost is appropriate at this stage of proceeding

COSTS – application for lump sum costs order in respect of partial default judgment application  

Legislation:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 12BG, 12CB

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 22, 23, 33J, 33Y, 33Z, 33ZF

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 29(1), 32A(1) 35(1)

National Credit Code ss 39(3), 76

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 5.22, 5.23(2)

Consumer Credit (Victoria) Act 1995 (Vic) s 39(3)

Second-Hand Dealers and Pawnbrokers Act 1989 (Vic)

Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS)

Cases cited:

Fair Work Ombudsman v IE Enterprises Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 848

Gill v Ethicon Sarl (No 10) [2023] FCA 228

Hanwood Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Kelly [2020] FCA 1020

Henry v Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited (No 3) [2021] FCA 728

Henry v Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited (No 5) [2021] FCA 1648

Jarrett v Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs [2008] FCA 1043

Latitude Finance Australia v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2025] FCAFC 124

Palgo Holdings Pty Ltd v Gowans [2005] HCA 28; 221 CLR 249

Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) [1999] HCA 19; 198 CLR 435

Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd v Energizer Australia Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 47; 246 ALR 113

Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227

The Odessa; The Woolston [1916] 1 AC 145

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 9) [2020] FCA 846

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Number of paragraphs: 78
Date of last submission/s: 31 July 2025
Date of hearing: 21 July 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: M Guo with P Kelly
Solicitor for the Applicant: Consumer Action Law Centre
Solicitor for the Respondent: The Respondent did not appear.

ORDERS

VID 891 of 2023
BETWEEN:

LISA GAY SIMPSON

Applicant

AND:

TAYLORS BUSINESS PTY LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

BENNETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 SEPTEMBER 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Within seven days of the date of this order, the Applicant file a revised scheme consistent with the reasons of the Court.

Note:   Entry of…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 1119
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Simpson v Taylors Business Pty Ltd (No 2), the applicant, Simpson, sought a default judgment against the respondent, Taylors Business Pty Ltd, in respect of part of an amended pleading, after the respondent failed to appear and file a defence. The dispute involved claims related to the possession and ownership of pawned goods. The court considered whether a partial default judgment could be granted and whether a scheme for the return of goods was appropriate at that stage of the proceeding. Additionally, the court addressed the application for lump sum costs in respect of the partial default judgment application.

The legal issues before the court encompassed the availability of a partial default judgment under the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the appropriateness of a scheme for the return of goods when some items were lost, and the procedure for handling funds obtained from the sale of the goods. Furthermore, the court evaluated the application for lump sum costs related to the partial default judgment application.

The court found that it was possible to grant a default judgment over part of a claim, despite the general principle against fragmenting proceedings. The court noted the discretionary nature of such a judgment and the importance of avoiding waste and delay. The court held that it was satisfied, based on the amended pleadings, that the applicant was entitled to a declaration regarding the entitlement to possession of the pawned goods. However, the court also directed the applicant to revise the proposed scheme for the return of goods to ensure it was consistent with the court's reasons. In terms of costs, the court allowed the application for lump sum costs in relation to the partial default judgment application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Within seven days of the date of this order, the Applicant file a revised scheme consistent with the reasons of the Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is in the context that the application for default judgment comes before the Court for consideration. DEFAULT JUDGMENT General principles Rule 5.22 of the Rules sets out the circumstances in which a party is in default. It states: A party is in default if the party fails to:(a) do an act required to be done, or to do an act in the time required, by these Rules; or(b) comply with an order of the Court; or(c) attend a hearing in the proceeding; or(d) prosecute or defend the proceeding with due diligence. In the present application, default judgment is sought under r 5.23(2), which provides: (2) If a respondent is in default, an applicant may apply to the Court for:(a)an order that a step in the proceeding be taken within a specified time; or(b)if the claim against the respondent is for a debt or liquidated damages — an order giving judgment against the respondent for:(i) the debt or liquidated damages; and(ii)if appropriate, interest and costs in a sum fixed by the Court or to be taxed; or(c)if the proceeding was started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim or an alternative accompanying document referred to in rule 8.05, or if the Court has ordered that the proceeding continue on pleadings — an order giving judgment against the respondent for the relief claimed in the statement of claim or alternative accompanying document to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled; or(d)an order giving judgment against the respondent for damages to be assessed, or any other order; or(e)an order mentioned in paragraph (b), (c) or (d) to take effect if the respondent does not take a step ordered by the Court in the proceeding in the time specified in the order. The Respondent is in default because it has failed to file a defence to the Possession Claim as required by orders of the Court dated 23 May and 3 June 2025 (r 5.22(b)). Rule 5.23(2)(c) provides that judgment may be sought by an applicant if there has been a default and the “proceeding was started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim.” If those conditions are satisfied, then an applicant may seek an order giving judgment against the respondent for the relief claimed in the statement of claim to which the Court is satisfied the applicant is entitled. This proceeding was started by originating application and statement of claim. The principles relevant to making an order for default judgment were summarised in Fair Work Ombudsman v IE Enterprises Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 848 (IE Enterprises) at [19] by Anderson J, as follows: (a) the power afforded to the Court is discretionary. The discretion should generally be exercised with caution;(b) the discretionary power to enter a judgment by default is enlivened when an applicant makes application to the Court for an appropriate order. In the absence of such an application, the power cannot be invoked;(c) there is a difference in the terms by which the limits of the power conferred by former O 35A r 3(2)(c) are expressed and the wording of the current r 5.23(2)(c). Notwithstanding that difference in language, the requirement imposed is not that an applicant prove by way of evidence the claim which is sought to be advanced. The requirement is that the Court needs to be satisfied on the face of the Statement of Claim that the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed. The facts as alleged in the Statement of Claim are deemed to have been admitted by the respondent in default;(d) in order to be satisfied that an applicant is entitled to the relief claimed in the Statement of Claim, the Court needs to be satisfied that each element of the relevant civil wrong involved is properly and discretely pleaded in the Statement of Claim; and(e) in addition to the facts alleged in the Statement of Claim, the Court may permit recourse to limited further evidence. However, it may not admit evidence which would alter the case as pleaded.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I am satisfied, both based on an analysis of the terms of the Rules, and the apparent practice in this Court, that it is possible to grant default judgment over part of a claim in this Court. Of course, default judgment is discretionary. There are many judicial exhortations against the fragmentation of proceedings leading to waste and delay (Latitude Finance Australia v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2025] FCAFC 124 at [17]-[18] (O’Bryan, Cheeseman and Bennett JJ): while that was in the context of appellate fragmentation, the principle remains apposite). Considerations of that kind would ordinarily weigh heavily against seeking or obtaining judgment in default over part of a claim while the balance of the proceedings remain on foot. Issues of finality, and of parties being vexed only once with an issue, are significant, as is the proper use of judicial resources in the resolution of disputes. CONSIDERATIONHas the basis for the declaration been established? The second further amended statement of claim amended the claim to add allegations that: (1)Taylors was served with a notice by its landlord for breach of the lease of its store due to non-payment of rent; (2)the notice required Taylors to remedy the breach of the lease by 17 December 2024; (3)on or around 15 December 2024, Taylors: (a)removed its property from the store; (b)left behind the Pawned Goods; (c)otherwise vacated the store; and (d)abandoned its lease for the store. It is alleged that the above facts constitute abandonment of possession of the Pawned Goods by the Respondent. It is then pleaded that the title of the goods never passed from the owners, being the Applicant and the group members. Finally, it is alleged that because of the foregoing matters, the persons entitled to the possession of the Pawned Goods are their owners, being the Applicant and the group members. Based on these matters, and the Respondent’s default in providing a defence to these matters, the Applicant has sought: A declaration that the persons entitled to possession of the Pawned Goods are the Applicant and the Group Members. In the defence filed on 28 March 2024, the Respondent asserted that if a customer failed to pay a specified sum of money under the Pawn Contract by a specified time, then the Respondent became entitled to sell the goods the subject of that contract. At common law a pawnbroking arrangement does not involve any transfer of title to the goods. Rather, the authorities recognise that a pawn is a bailment of property, with the legal effect that the pawnbroker takes possession and gains a form of “special property” which has been described as “the right to detain the goods for the pledgee’s security and ‘is in truth no property at all’”, but does not acquire title to the goods (Palgo Holdings Pty Ltd v Gowans [2005] HCA 28; 221 CLR 249 at [17] (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), citing The Odessa; The Woolston [1916] 1 AC 145 at 158 (Lord Mersey)). Thus, it is clear that the entitlement to the Pawned Goods which the Respondent had was contractual and possessory. Title did not pass unless and until the Respondent sold the Pawned Goods. It is not in dispute that has not happened in this instance.