Fair Work Ombudsman v IE Enterprises Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fair Work Ombudsman v IE Enterprises Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 848

File number: VID 75 of 2020
Judge: ANDERSON J
Date of judgment: 18 June 2020
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for partial default judgment under r 5.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) against respondents – failure of respondents to defend proceeding – failure of respondents to attend case management hearing – failure of respondents to comply with Court orders – whether Court has jurisdiction to grant relief – whether applicant is entitled to relief

INDUSTRIAL LAW – application for declaratory relief and compensation orders in relation to contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – failure to pay minimum hourly rates – failure to pay employees in full – failure to make and keep employee records – failure to provide pay slips – whether contraventions are serious contraventions as they were part of a systematic pattern of conduct – whether first respondent expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised contraventions – whether second respondent knew that first respondent’s contraventions were serious contraventions

Held: application for partial default judgment granted

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 45, 323(1), 535(1), 536(1), 536(3), 545(2)(b), 547(2), 550, 550(2), 557A, 557A(1), 557(5A), 557B(1)

Fair Work Amendment (Protecting Vulnerable Workers) Act 2017 (Cth)

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 39

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 21, 51A

Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) regs 3.32, 3.33

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 4.03, 4.05, 6.01

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 5.22, 5.22(d), 5.23(2)(b), 5.23(2)(c)

Cases cited:

Ahmed v Al-Hussain Pty Ltd t/as The Cheesecake Shop (No 3) [2019] FCA 848

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yellow Page Marketing BV (No 2) [2011] FCA 352; 195 FCR 1

Fair Work Ombudsman v IE Enterprises Pty Ltd & Anor [2019] FCCA 2952

Ferraro v DBN Holdings Aust Pty Ltd T/As Sports Auto Group [2015] FCA 1127; 246 FCR 138

Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 388

Maylord Equity Management Pty Ltd v Parazelsus Ltd [2014] FCA 979

Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227

Veeraragoo v Goldbreak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 1448

Winn v Yeo as former trustee of the estate of Goodwin (a bankrupt) [2020] FCA 552

Yeo v Damos Earthmoving Pty Ltd; Re Beechwood Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] FCA 1129

Yorke v Lucas [1985] HCA 65; 158 CLR 661

Date of hearing: 18 June 2020
Registry: Victoria
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 69
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms F Knowles
Solicitor for the Applicant: Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman
Counsel for the Respondents: The Respondents did not appear

ORDERS

VID 75 of 2020
BETWEEN:

FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN

Applicant

AND:

IE ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 151 469 877)

First Respondent

EYAL ISRAEL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ANDERSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 JUNE 2020

THE…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 848
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves the Fair Work Ombudsman taking legal action against IE Enterprises Pty Ltd and another respondent over alleged breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The primary issues the court needed to resolve were whether the respondents had defaulted under the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), and if so, whether the court should grant the relief sought by the Ombudsman. The court considered the legal principles relevant to default judgment, which include the discretionary nature of the power to enter such a judgment and the requirement that the court be satisfied the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed. The Ombudsman provided affidavits and evidence to support their claims of underpayment of wages, failure to keep employee records, and failure to provide pay slips, among other alleged breaches.

After hearing arguments from the Ombudsman’s counsel, the court found that the respondents had indeed defaulted by not participating in the proceedings, failing to comply with court orders, and not attending a case management hearing. The court exercised its discretion to grant a partial default judgment, entering declaratory relief and orders for compensation to the employees, but not yet for pecuniary penalties. The court held that the evidence provided by the Ombudsman was sufficient to deem the facts alleged in the statement of claim as admitted by the respondents. The court also found that the alleged contraventions constituted serious contraventions under the Fair Work Act, as they were part of a systematic pattern of conduct. Consequently, the court ordered the respondents to pay outstanding underpayment amounts, interest, and superannuation contributions to the affected employees.

Orders

Orders of the court

3. Pursuant to subsection 545(2) of the Act, the First Respondent is required to pay the following outstanding underpayment amounts to the Employees:

Employees

Underpayment amount

Debora van Hattem

$853.70

Elisabeth Brugman

$395.65

Jean-Brieuc Gicquel

$1,416.58

Jium (Bimo) Ku

$5,041.78

Julian Mizzi

$4,425.49

Mike Timmers

$3,156.82

Seoin (Jessica) Park

$2,304.94

Thomas Gatt

$4,153.03

Total

$21,747.99

4. The Second Respondent is jointly and severally liable with the First Respondent to pay the following outstanding underpayment amounts to the Employees in respect of the contraventions of the First Respondent with which he was involved, specifically:

Employees

Underpayment amount

Debora van Hattem

$828.60

Elisabeth Brugman

$287.72

Jean-Brieuc Gicquel

$1,351.32

Jium (Bimo) Ku

$3,381.41

Julian Mizzi

$3,198.10

Mike Timmers

$1,979.63

Seoin (Jessica) Park

$1,710.07

Thomas Gatt

$2,925.64

Total

$15,662.49

5. Pursuant to section 545(2) of the Act that the First Respondent is required to make superannuation contributions on behalf of the Employees, to their nominated superannuation funds:

(a) in respect of the ordinary time earnings component of any payment made pursuant to order 3 above at the superannuation guarantee charge rate prescribed by applicable superannuation legislation as at the date those orders are made; and/or

(b) in the amount of any relevant superannuation guarantee charge under the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).

6. Pursuant to section 545(2) of the Act the Second Respondent is jointly and severally liable with the First Respondent to make the superannuation contributions on behalf of the Employees, to their nominated superannuation funds:

(a) in respect of the ordinary time earnings component of any payment made pursuant to order 4 above at the superannuation guarantee charge rate prescribed by applicable superannuation legislation as at the date those orders are made; and/or

(b) in the amount of any relevant superannuation guarantee charge under the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).

7. Pursuant to subsection 547(2) of the Act that the First Respondent is required to pay interest to the Employees on the amounts referred to in order 3 above for the period between 20 May 2019 and 18 June 2020 at the rate of 4.75% being:

Employees

Interest amount

Debora van Hattem

$41.57

Elisabeth Brugman

$19.27

Jean-Brieuc Gicquel

$68.99

Jium (Bimo) Ku

$245.53

Julian Mizzi

$215.52

Mike Timmers

$153.73

Seoin (Jessica) Park

$112.25

Thomas Gatt

$202.25

8. Pursuant to subsection 547(2) of the Act that the Second Respondent is jointly and severally required with the Second Respondent to pay interest to the Employees on the amounts referred to in order 4 above for the period between 20 May 2019 and 18 June 2020 at the rate of 4.75% being:

Employees

Interest amount

Debora van Hattem

$40.35

Elisabeth Brugman

$14.01

Jean-Brieuc Gicquel

$65.81

Jium (Bimo) Ku

$164.67

Julian Mizzi

$155.74

Mike Timmers

$96.41

Seoin (Jessica) Park

$83.28

Thomas Gatt

$142.47

9. An order that the Applicant have liberty to apply on seven days' notice in the event that any of the preceding orders are not complied with.

10. The matter be listed for a case management hearing on a date to be fixed for a timetable to be set for the filing of evidence and submissions in respect of the determination of penalties.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondents have not filed an appearance or any response to the Ombudsman’s claims.Procedural background As noted above, the Ombudsman commenced this proceeding in the Circuit Court on 21 May 2019. The proceeding was transferred to this Court pursuant to the order of Judge O’Sullivan on 16 October 2019 made pursuant to s 39 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth): Fair Work Ombudsman v IE Enterprises Pty Ltd & Anor [2019] FCCA 2952. At a case management hearing on 31 March 2020, I made orders in the form proposed by the Ombudsman, which relevantly provided that, should the respondents not file a Notice of Address for Service, Response or a Defence in the proceeding by a prescribed date, the proceeding would be listed for a hearing as to default judgment on the relief claimed by the applicant other than penalties (that is, the relief set out above at [9], but not [10]). The Ombudsman filed the following affidavits in support of the order for default judgment:(a)sworn affidavit of Claire Toner (who is a Senior Lawyer in the Ombudsman’s office) (Ms Toner) dated 16 April 2020, with annexures CT-1 to CT-27 (First Toner Affidavit); and(b)sworn affidavit of Ms Toner dated on 15 June 2020, with annexures CT-28 to CT-32 (Second Toner Affidavit);(c)sworn affidavit of Ms Toner dated 15 June 2020, which provides the most recent confirmation of outstanding underpayment amounts (Third Toner Affidavit),(collectively, supporting affidavits). The supporting affidavits set out the history of the proceedings, the acts or omissions by the respondents that constitute the alleged default, and the Ombudsman’s solicitors’ attempts to engage with the respondents in respect of this proceeding. I heard the Ombudsman’s default judgment application today, on 18 June 2020. The respondents did not appear. After hearing counsel for the Ombudsman, Ms Knowles, I determined to enter partial default judgment against the respondents and make the declarations and orders (other than in respect of pecuniary penalties) in the form sought by the Ombudsman. Default judgment – Relevant principles Rule 5.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) provides that a party is in default if the party fails to:(a)do an act required to be done, or to do an act in the time required, by the Rules;(b)comply with an order of the Court;(c)attend a hearing in the proceeding; or(d)prosecute or defend the proceeding with due diligence. Rule 5.23(2)(c) of the Rules enables the Court, if a respondent is in default, to give judgment against the respondent, in a proceeding which was commenced by an originating application supported by a statement of claim, for the relief that:(a)is claimed in the statement of claim; and(b)to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled. The principles relevant to the making of an order for default judgment have previously been summarised in, amongst other decisions, Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 at [19]–[26] per Flick J, Maylord Equity Management Pty Ltd v Parazelsus Ltd [2014] FCA 979 at [10]–[14] per Gleeson J and Ferraro v DBN Holdings Aust Pty Ltd T/As Sports Auto Group [2015] FCA 1127; 246 FCR 138 at [20] per Besanko J. The key principles may be summarised as follows:(a)the power afforded to the Court is discretionary. The discretion should generally be exercised with caution; (b)the discretionary power to enter a judgment by default is enlivened when an applicant makes application to the Court for an appropriate order. In the absence of such an application, the power cannot be invoked; (c)there is a difference in the terms by which the limits of the power conferred by former O 35A r 3(2)(c) are expressed and the wording of the current r 5.23(2)(c). Notwithstanding that difference in language, the requirement imposed is not that an applicant prove by way of evidence the claim which is sought to be advanced. The requirement is that the Court needs to be satisfied on the face of the Statement of Claim that the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed. The facts as alleged in the Statement of Claim are deemed to have been admitted by the respondent in default; (d)in order to be satisfied that an applicant is entitled to the relief claimed in the Statement of Claim, the Court needs to be satisfied that each element of the relevant civil wrong involved is properly and discretely pleaded in the Statement of Claim; and (e)in addition to the facts alleged in the Statement of Claim, the Court may permit recourse to limited further evidence. However, it may not admit evidence which would alter the case as pleaded.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I heard the Ombudsman’s default judgment application today, on 18 June 2020. The respondents did not appear. After hearing counsel for the Ombudsman, Ms Knowles, I determined to enter partial default judgment against the respondents and make the declarations and orders (other than in respect of pecuniary penalties) in the form sought by the Ombudsman. Default judgment – Relevant principles Rule 5.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) provides that a party is in default if the party fails to:(a)do an act required to be done, or to do an act in the time required, by the Rules;(b)comply with an order of the Court;(c)attend a hearing in the proceeding; or(d)prosecute or defend the proceeding with due diligence. Rule 5.23(2)(c) of the Rules enables the Court, if a respondent is in default, to give judgment against the respondent, in a proceeding which was commenced by an originating application supported by a statement of claim, for the relief that:(a)is claimed in the statement of claim; and(b)to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled. The principles relevant to the making of an order for default judgment have previously been summarised in, amongst other decisions, Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 at [19]–[26] per Flick J, Maylord Equity Management Pty Ltd v Parazelsus Ltd [2014] FCA 979 at [10]–[14] per Gleeson J and Ferraro v DBN Holdings Aust Pty Ltd T/As Sports Auto Group [2015] FCA 1127; 246 FCR 138 at [20] per Besanko J. The key principles may be summarised as follows:(a)the power afforded to the Court is discretionary. The discretion should generally be exercised with caution; (b)the discretionary power to enter a judgment by default is enlivened when an applicant makes application to the Court for an appropriate order. In the absence of such an application, the power cannot be invoked; (c)there is a difference in the terms by which the limits of the power conferred by former O 35A r 3(2)(c) are expressed and the wording of the current r 5.23(2)(c). Notwithstanding that difference in language, the requirement imposed is not that an applicant prove by way of evidence the claim which is sought to be advanced. The requirement is that the Court needs to be satisfied on the face of the Statement of Claim that the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed. The facts as alleged in the Statement of Claim are deemed to have been admitted by the respondent in default; (d)in order to be satisfied that an applicant is entitled to the relief claimed in the Statement of Claim, the Court needs to be satisfied that each element of the relevant civil wrong involved is properly and discretely pleaded in the Statement of Claim; and (e)in addition to the facts alleged in the Statement of Claim, the Court may permit recourse to limited further evidence. However, it may not admit evidence which would alter the case as pleaded. Default judgment may be entered where a party’s participation in the proceedings is such as to indicate an inability or unwillingness to cooperate with the Court and the other party in having the matter ready for trial in an acceptable period, or where non-compliance is continuing and occasioning unnecessary delay, expense or other prejudice to the other party: Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 388 at 396 per Wilcox and Gummow JJ; see also, as a recent example, Winn v Yeo as former trustee of the estate of Goodwin (a bankrupt) [2020] FCA 552 at [44] per O’Callaghan J.Are the respondents in default?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On the basis that each of the facts alleged therein are taken to be admitted, the Court is satisfied that the Ombudsman is entitled to the declaratory relief sought in this regard.Declarations of serious contraventions by the Company As indicated above, the declarations sought by the Ombudsman include that five of the contraventions committed by the Company set out above were “serious contraventions” within the meaning of s 557A(1) of the Act. For reference, s 557A of the Act provides as follows:Serious contravention of civil remedy provisions(1) A contravention of a civil remedy provision by a person is a serious contravention if:(a) the person knowingly contravened the provision; and(b) the person’s conduct constituting the contravention was part of a systematic pattern of conduct relating to one or more other persons.Systematic pattern of conduct(2) In determining whether the person’s conduct constituting the contravention of the provision was part of a systematic pattern of conduct, a court may have regard to:(a) the number of contraventions (the relevant contraventions) of this Act committed by the person; and(b) the period over which the relevant contraventions occurred; and(c) the number of other persons affected by the relevant contraventions; and(ca) the person’s response, or failure to respond, to any complaints made about the relevant contraventions; and(d) except if the provision contravened is section 535—whether the person also contravened subsection 535(1), (2) or (4) by failing to make or keep, in accordance with that section, an employee record relating to the conduct constituting the relevant contraventions; and(e) except if the provision contravened is section 536—whether the person also contravened subsection 536(1), (2) or (3) by failing to give, in accordance with that section, a pay slip relating to the conduct constituting the relevant contraventions.(3) Subsection (2) does not limit the matters that a court may have regard to.(4) Subsection 557(1) does not apply for the purposes of determining whether the person’s conduct was part of a systematic pattern of conduct.(5) Subsection (4) does not otherwise affect the operation of subsection 557(1) in relation to serious contraventions of civil remedy provisions.Involvement in a serious contravention(5A) A person (the involved person) who is involved in a contravention of a civil remedy provision by another person (the principal) commits a serious contravention of the provision only if:(a) the principal’s contravention was a serious contravention; and(b) the involved person knew that the principal’s contravention was a serious contravention.Application for a serious contravention order and alternative orders(6) If a person is applying for an order in relation to a serious contravention of a civil remedy provision, the person’s application under subsection 539(2) must specify the relevant serious contravention.(7) If, in proceedings for an order in relation to a serious contravention of a civil remedy provision, the court:(a) is not satisfied that the person has committed a serious contravention against that provision; and(b) is satisfied that the person has contravened that provision;the court may make a pecuniary penalty order against the person not for the serious contravention but for the contravention of that provision.