FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 11) [2020] FCA 1656
File number(s): NSD 850 of 2014 Judgment of: RARES J Date of judgment: 26 October 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application during trial for leave to discontinue cross-claim under r 26.12(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – where cross-claimant did not lead evidence regarding his motivation or reasons for seeking leave to discontinue – where parties had an extensive history of litigation in various courts around the world – principles for exercise of discretion in allowing party to discontinue proceeding where hearing has commenced – not appropriate to grant leave to discontinue – cross-claim dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth), s 37M
Federal Court Rules 2011, r 26.12
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), ss 28, 29
Cases cited: Feldman v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 260
In the matter of Mempoll Pty Ltd, Anankin Pty Ltd and Gold Kings Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 301
SCI Operations Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1984) 2 FCR 113
Stahlschmidt v Walford (1879) 4 QBD 217
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 8) [2018] FCA 1995
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Number of paragraphs: 25 Date of hearing: 19 – 26 October 2020 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr P. Gray SC with Mr M. Polden Solicitor for the Applicants: Russell Kennedy Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Ms G.L. Schoff QC with Ms H. Jager Solicitor for the Respondents: HWL Ebsworth ORDERS
NSD 850 of 2014 BETWEEN: THUNDER STUDIOS INC (CALIFORNIA)
First Applicant
AND RODRIC MARC DAVID
Second Applicant
AND: CHARIF KAZAL
First Respondent
ADAM KAZAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 OCTOBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The cross-claimant’s oral application to file a notice of discontinuance be refused.
2.There be a verdict and judgment for the cross-respondents on the cross-claim and the cross-claim be dismissed.
3.The cross-claimant pay the cross-respondents’ costs of the cross-claim.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J
Today is the sixth day of the trial of the claim and cross-claim in this proceeding. At 7.30 pm last night, Sunday, 25 October 2020, the first respondent / cross-claimant, Charif Kazal, notified the applicants / cross-respondents, Rodric David and Thunder Studios Inc (California), that he wishes to discontinue the cross-claim. The hearing of the cross-claim would have commenced today, following the conclusion of the evidence of Michael Hammond who was the last witness called by Mr David and Thunder.
Under r 26.12(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, a party may file its notice of discontinuance “with the leave of the Court – at any time”. Mr David and Thunder oppose the grant of leave to discontinue and contend that, if Charif does not want to…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1656
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether to exercise its discretion under rule 26.12(2)(c) to allow the cross-claimant to discontinue the proceeding once the hearing had commenced. The court considered the principles for exercising this discretion, which included the overarching purpose of achieving a just resolution of the dispute according to law, as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible. The court also took into account the potential for injustice to the opponent and the importance of not compelling parties to litigate against their will. The court found that, in this case, it was not appropriate to grant leave to discontinue the cross-claim.
Justice Bromberg refused the application to discontinue the proceedings and dismissed the cross-claim. The court ordered that there be a verdict and judgment for the cross-respondents on the cross-claim and that the cross-claim be dismissed. The court also ordered the cross-claimant to pay the cross-respondents’ costs of the cross-claim. The court reserved the question whether the costs order should be on an indemnity basis.
This case highlights the importance of considering the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions and the principles for exercising discretion in allowing a party to discontinue a proceeding. It also underscores the importance of ensuring that parties are not compelled to litigate against their will, while also protecting the opponent from potential injustice.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The cross-claimant’s oral application to file a notice of discontinuance be refused.
2. There be a verdict and judgment for the cross-respondents on the cross-claim and the cross-claim be dismissed.
3. The cross-claimant pay the cross-respondents’ costs of the cross-claim.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Senior counsel for Mr David and Thunder contended that Mr Price’s position (that he was the sole publisher) was the principal basis of their defence to the cross-claim. Indeed, at an earlier stage in the proceedings, they sought a separate trial, which Charif opposed, on the question of publication alone, in order to have established that neither of them was a publisher of the Kazal Family Truth website. I refused that application on the basis that all issues between these parties ought be resolved at this trial: Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 8) [2018] FCA 1995. The effect of the notice of discontinuance, were I to grant it, would be to leave those issues unresolved. Consideration Rule 26.12(2)(c) confers a broad discretion on the Court to grant a party leave to discontinue at any stage of a proceeding prior to judgment. Ordinarily, a court will allow the claiming party to discontinue if he, she or it wants to, provided that no injustice will be caused to the opponent. Courts are mindful that parties should not be compelled to litigate against their will, and this is a factor that is relevant to the exercise of the discretion under the rule. However, it has long been the law that the court will rarely grant leave to a party to discontinue his, her or its action once the final hearing of the proceeding has commenced. In Stahlschmidt v Walford (1879) 4 QBD 217 at 219, Cockburn CJ and Mellor J, sitting as the Divisional Court, held that Field J had wrongly exercised his discretion to grant a plaintiff leave to discontinue on terms that no other action should be brought in respect of the subject matter of the proceeding, and that he should pay the costs of the action. Cockburn CJ held that the defendant was entitled to be protected against the potential for future prejudice because of some possible use that the plaintiff, thereafter, might seek to make of the discontinued subject-matter of his claim. He said that the defendant was, in justice, entitled to the fruits of the proceeding. Mellor J, concurring, said that the discretion to grant leave to discontinue:…must be exercised with certain limitations, and so as not to take away from the defendant any advantage to which he is fairly and reasonably entitled. In In the matter of Mempoll Pty Ltd, Anankin Pty Ltd and Gold Kings Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 301 at [10], Brereton J applied that principle. He explained that, ordinarily, once the parties have defined their positions, prepared their cases and proceeded to a hearing, it will be unfair to deprive a party who has obtained a forensic advantage of that advantage by allowing the cause of action to remain unresolved: see too SCI Operations Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1984) 2 FCR 113 at 142–143 per Sweeney J, 161–163 per Lockhart J and 181–183 per Sheppard J. In SCI 2 FCR at 182, Sheppard J said: I have embarked upon this discussion to provide a background for what I next say. It is, in my opinion, highly undesirable for courts in this day and age to leave parties to litigation which is to be terminated before a hearing in an uncertain state as to what further litigation concerning the same subject matter may be brought by one or the other in the future.Whether the court is concerned with dismissal before a hearing on the merits or leave to discontinue, the rules direct its attention, and also that of the parties, to what is to be the future position in relation to further reliance on the same cause of action. Thus the court is empowered, in effect, to say whether there is to be cause of action estoppel or not. The fact that there is uncertainty concerning the creation of an issue estoppel where proceedings are dismissed seems to me to make it highly desirable for the court to provide, if it is able to do so, for whether any issue estoppel is to exist or not. It cannot do so directly and, in relation to dismissal, the provisions of O. 35, r. 6 are probably such as to prevent it doing so at all. But if a party, as has the Commission here, has made an application for leave to discontinue, then it seems to me that the court in deciding whether to grant leave and, if so, upon what terms that leave should be granted, has a wide discretion to do justice between the parties.(emphasis added)