Bennett v The King - [2025] SASCA 77

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
BENNETT v THE KING
[2025] SASCA 77
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable Justice S Doyle, the Honourable Justice David and the Honourable Justice B Doyle)
17 July 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MANSLAUGHTER - SENTENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE
Application for permission to appeal against sentence.

The applicant was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 10 years and five months, after pleading guilty to manslaughter contrary to s 13 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).
The applicant appeals on the sole ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held, per the Court, granting permission to appeal, but dismissing the appeal:
1.The sentence was not manifestly excessive.

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13, referred to.
Hackett v The Queen [2021] SASCA 32; R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; R v Franklin (2012) 114 SASR 206; R v Goude (2020) 267 CLR 141; R v Hansen (2011) 206 A Crim R 54; R v Monks [2019] SASCFC 47; Western Australia v Auckram (2013) 229 A Crim R 397; Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313, considered.

BENNETT v THE KING
[2025] SASCA 77
Court of Appeal – Criminal: S Doyle JA, David JA and B Doyle AJA

THE COURT: Part of the way through his trial for the offence of murder, the appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter.[1] His plea was accepted in satisfaction of the Information.
[1] Contrary to s 13 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).
The plea of guilty was entered on the basis that the appellant caused the death of Mr Hillier by engaging in unlawful and dangerous acts. This involved the appellant, during an alcohol fuelled disagreement, delivering a series of blows to the face and head of the older and weaker Mr Hillier.
The judge convicted the appellant, and sentenced him to imprisonment for a period of 13 years. She fixed a non-parole period of 10 years and five months.
The appellant seeks permission to appeal against his sentence on the sole ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. The sentence was said to be manifestly excessive having regard to the combined significance of several matters, including the appellant’s disadvantaged background, his low cognitive ability, and his earlier offer to plead guilty to manslaughter.
For the reasons which follow, we grant permission to appeal but dismiss the appeal.
Circumstances of the offending
The appellant and deceased met in 2019. The deceased had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder and chronic pain. A fall in late 2019 escalated the severity of his ailments. Consequently, he was incapable of looking after himself. He became dependent upon the appellant for his care, and the appellant commenced living with him.
In about October 2021, the deceased sold his property and purchased a motorhome van, which he and the appellant used for travel. The appellant drove the van because the deceased was physically unable to.
In early May 2022, the appellant and the deceased arrived in Venus Bay, on the Eyre Peninsula. Whilst staying in Venus Bay, they planned to purchase an art gallery and block of land in Poochera, from a Mr Miller.
On the afternoon of 29 May 2022, the appellant and the deceased went to the gallery to meet with Mr Miller. All three of them consumed alcohol, with the appellant in particular having consumed a significant quantity. The appellant and the deceased began to argue. The appellant resorted to violence ‘quickly and explosively’, slapping the deceased across the face, causing the deceased’s glasses to fly off his face and his nose to bleed.
The appellant left the art gallery to get some food from a local hotel, where he presented as ‘very agitated’ and ‘quite belligerent’. After about half an hour, the appellant returned to the gallery. The appellant suggested they leave, but the deceased resisted, and an argument followed. The appellant proceeded to physically manoeuvre the deceased into their van, over the deceased’s protest. On several occasions, the deceased slid from the van. At one point, he ended up on the ground by the van.
The appellant got on top of the deceased, and straddled him. He picked up a rock and started ‘screwing it’ into the deceased’s face. The appellant did so several times, and only stopped upon Mr Miller intervening. The deceased was moaning and had a bloodied face.
Mr Miller left, and from this point there were no eyewitnesses to what followed. The appellant, through his lawyer, provided an account of what occurred. It involved the appellant remaining on top of the deceased, and slapping and punching him numerous times. It was accepted that these blows were the substantial cause of the deceased’s death, and that this was the factual basis upon which the appellant fell to be sentenced.
After the beating, the appellant dragged the deceased into their van, and drove it back to Venus Bay. Upon arrival, the appellant lost his grip of the deceased while attempting to assist him out of the van, causing him to fall to the ground. By this time, the deceased was in a reduced state of consciousness.
The appellant left the deceased on the sofa for the night. When he woke the next morning, the deceased was cold and not moving. The appellant called triple-zero from a telephone box. He told the operator a convoluted lie designed to avoid responsibility for the deceased’s condition. The appellant later repeated the same false version to a civilian witness and to police.
When paramedics arrived at around 11.00 am, their attempts to resuscitate Mr Hillier were unsuccessful. The full extent of the deceased’s injuries were revealed during his post-mortem. His cause of death was determined to be a blunt force head injury. He had extensive bruising to his face and scalp, including bilateral, periorbital haematomas and a fracture to his left eye socket. He also had extensive bruising and abrasions to his body, including some abrasions which were consistent with his skin being dragged along the ground. There were multiple bruises and abrasions to both of his hands, and his left forearm, consistent with the appearance of defensive injuries. The deceased had multiple posterior and anterior left side rib fractures. Whilst the anterior fractures may have occurred during attempts to resuscitate the deceased, the pathologist concluded that the posterior fractures were likely to have been a result of a blunt force impact on the deceased’s chest.
Personal circumstances
The appellant was 45 years of age at the date of sentencing.
He had a difficult upbringing. He has three siblings, with whom he has maintained a good relationship. However, his relationship with his parents has been more difficult. His father was absent for long periods during his childhood. His mother also struggled with her responsibilities as a parent. Not only did she have her own intellectual and health challenges, but she too was absent for significant periods while caring for the appellant’s brother who suffered from epilepsy and spent significant periods of time in hospital.
In addition to the absence of any parental guidance, the appellant was the victim of multiple instances of sexual abuse while a child. He had an interrupted education, developing only very limited literacy skills. He commenced to experience issues with substance abuse in his adolescence which have continued through to the present. He has a significant history of mental health issues.
The appellant relied upon two reports from a psychologist, Ms Heinrich. She explained that the appellant suffers from a significant cognitive impairment, borderline personality disorder and satisfies the criteria for a polysubstance abuse disorder.
The appellant has achieved only a minimal history of employment. He has had only one significant relationship in his life, which lasted about nine years and resulted in two children (aged 23 and 17 at time of sentencing). That relationship ended as a result of the appellant’s poor mental health, although they remain on good terms.
The appellant has a significant history of offending. His offending commenced in 1997 and involved regular offending, including public disorder, violence, dishonesty and drug offending. He has served previous periods of imprisonment for his offending.
The sentencing remarks
The judge gave a detailed account of the circumstances of the appellant’s offending, the pertinent aspects of which have been set out above.
When describing the false versions that the appellant had initially provided to police and others, she noted his claim that he had offered to take the deceased to hospital in the early hours of the morning, but that the deceased had refused his offer. The judge observed that the ‘tragic fact of the matter is that, had you done what you claimed and taken Mr Hillier to hospital at this stage or any earlier point in time, his death may well have been prevented’.
The judge also summarised the victim impact statements which were provided by several members of the deceased’s family. They described a man who was very much loved and missed, and the devasting and profound effect his death had had on many people.
Her Honour addressed the appellant’s personal background and circumstances at length. This included reference to some of the detail included in Ms Heinrich’s reports. In the course of this, the judge noted that the appellant initially gave a false version of events to Ms Heinrich, suggesting that his offending occurred in response to Mr Hillier becoming violent and abusive.
The judge noted Ms Heinrich’s observations about the appellant’s significant cognitive impairment, and its adverse impact upon his problem-solving skills, memory and ability to function in the community. In Ms Heinrich’s view, the appellant’s cognitive impairment left him vulnerable to exploitation in the prison system, including being bullied and targeted by other prisoners. The judge accepted that the appellant’s impairment would make his time in custody more difficult than it would for someone without such an impairment, and said that she took this into account in arriving at an appropriate sentence.
The judge also accepted Ms Heinrich’s opinion that the appellant’s cognitive impairment gave rise to a possibility of confabulation. Indeed, her Honour accepted that a combination of intoxication at the time of the relevant events, and confabulation, had probably contributed to his false explanations of his offending to Ms Heinrich. Her Honour accepted that the appellant had not been deliberately untruthful to Ms Heinrich; rather, his account was a product of him attempting to make sense of what occurred. The judge said that she did not place the appellant’s false statements to Ms Heinrich in the same category as the ‘deliberate lies’ he told police and others immediately following the offending.
In fixing the appellant’s sentence, the judge described the objective seriousness of the offending as follows:
The offence of manslaughter is a serious offence, regardless of the circumstances in which it occurs. It involves the ending of a life of another human being. In my view this offending falls at the higher end of the scale of seriousness for the offence of manslaughter. It involved a senseless, savage beating of an older, weaker and infirm man who was dependent upon you for his care.
You resorted to violence quickly and explosively when you slapped Mr Hillier across the face, causing his nose to bleed. It involved you physically manhandling Mr Hillier into his own vehicle when he did not do what you wished; then once he was helpless on the ground you used a weapon, a rock, to ram into his face when he was no threat to you. You then beat him to death.
The judge said that the appellant’s conduct after the beating added to his culpability:
Your conduct is made all the worse by your failure to provide Mr Hillier with any medical care. Your behaviour after the assault deprived Mr Hillier of any opportunity to survive that assault. It is unknown what effect medical treatment would have had at any stage of these events. What is clear is had there been any hope, by your conduct, you vanquished it.
The judge accepted the submission on the appellant’s behalf that he was now remorseful for his actions, and that he regretted his conduct, adding that it was unfortunate that his remorse had not come sooner.
Turning to the appellant’s earlier offer to plead guilty, the judge was prepared to give it ‘some weight’:
Given the time and circumstances of your plea, you are not entitled to any statutory discount. [Defence counsel] submitted that although that is correct, I can still place some weight on your preparedness to enter a guilty plea to the offence of manslaughter at a much earlier point in time as an indicator of ‘your preparedness to facilitate the finalisation of the matter at an early stage.’
I accept this is a relevant factor in considering the issue of your remorse and your prospects of rehabilitation. However, that must be considered in the context of a very strong prosecution case for the offence of manslaughter.
The judge concluded that, taking into account all of the relevant considerations, including the appellant’s ‘complex personal circumstances’, a sentence of imprisonment for 13 years was appropriate. Noting her statutory obligation to fix a non-parole period not less than four-fifths the length of the head sentence, the judge fixed a non-parole period of 10 years and five months.
Manifest excess
As mentioned at the outset of these reasons, the appellant seeks permission to appeal against his sentence on the sole ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
The principles governing an appeal on the ground of manifest excess are well established and need not be re-stated.[2] Success requires that the appellant persuade this Court that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, in the sense that it was outside the range of sentences that might reasonably have been imposed.
[2] Hackett v The Queen [2021] SASCA 32 at [8] (Kelly P, Lovell and Livesey JJA).
The maximum penalty for manslaughter is imprisonment for life. Manslaughter is always a serious offence, particularly where it involves a death as a result of the defendant’s unlawful and dangerous act.[3] At the same time, it is often observed that the circumstances of the offence vary so widely that it is unhelpful to attempt to generalise about the range of sentences which might be appropriate.
[3] See, for example, the observations of the High Court in Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313 at 333 (Mason CJ, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), and R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464 at 469-470 (the Court).
The present case involved the appellant causing death by engaging in multiple unlawful and dangerous acts. It involved the appellant, during an alcohol fuelled disagreement, delivering a series of blows to the face and head of his friend and companion, Mr Hillier. These blows continued over a relatively extended period of time, and included the use of a rock. Even if it may be said that the violence commenced relatively suddenly or spontaneously, there were plenty of opportunities for the appellant to reflect and desist. However, rather than reflect and desist, he continued inflicting blows despite not meeting any resistance.
In addition to the number and duration of the blows, it is significant that Mr Hillier was older and physically weaker than the appellant. Indeed, Mr Hillier was not only vulnerable in a general sense, but had become dependent upon the appellant to care for him.
The appellant challenges the judge’s description of this offending as falling ‘at the higher end of the scale of seriousness for the offence of manslaughter’. Although mindful of the dangers of generalisations about manslaughter, we see no difficulty with this observation. Certainly the circumstances we have described made this an objectively serious instance of the offence of manslaughter. But perhaps more importantly, there is limited utility in challenging this general observation made by the judge. The challenge is more usefully focussed upon the outcome of the sentencing exercise.
The appellant also challenges the judge’s reference to the appellant’s conduct in not seeking medical assistance making his offending ‘all the worse’. Again, we have no difficulty with this observation. Even accepting that it was not possible on the material available to the judge to be clear as to the causal significance of his failure to seek medical assistance during the night, his failure to do so nevertheless informed an assessment of his culpability. At the very least, it underscored the lack of remorse and insight demonstrated by the appellant in the immediate aftermath of his offending, as demonstrated by his subsequent lies and attempts to avoid responsibility for Mr Hillier’s death.
As mentioned at the outset of these reasons, in developing his submission of manifest excess, the appellant relied upon the cumulative significance of several factors which he argued warranted some leniency or moderation in the sentence to be imposed.
The appellant relied in this respect upon the appellant’s difficult upbringing, including not only the lack of any settled family environment or support, but also the fact that he experienced multiple instances of sexual abuse. These features of his upbringing likely contributed to the appellant’s difficulties with substance abuse and with his mental health. The appellant’s difficulties were no doubt exacerbated by his significantly impaired cognitive ability, and limited education.
All of these circumstances of disadvantage were relevant to the sentencing exercise. However, the judge addressed these matters at length, and was plainly mindful of their role in the sentencing exercise. Whilst it is fair to say that these circumstances of disadvantage warranted a degree of leniency, or at least moderation, in the sentence to be imposed, this is something of an oversimplification. In reality they formed part of a complex and nuanced balancing of a number of sometimes competing considerations. The circumstances of disadvantage pulled in different directions, and with differing force, in respect of various of the objectives guiding the sentencing discretion.[4] The appellant’s circumstances of disadvantage may be seen, for example, to have lessened, at least in a general sense, the appellant’s moral culpability. Those circumstances, particularly his very low cognitive ability, may also be seen to have made him an unsuitable vehicle for seeking to achieve general deterrence. On the other hand, some of these circumstances (in combination with the appellant’s poor criminal history) may be seen to have increased the focus upon personal deterrence and ensuring adequate protection for the safety of the community, and to have warranted caution in terms of the appellant’s prospects of successful rehabilitation. As the judge mentioned, it was also relevant that these circumstances of disadvantage left the appellant vulnerable in a prison setting, meaning that he was likely to find prison more difficult than most.
[4] R vGoude (2020) 267 CLR 141 at [8] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Nettle JJ); R v Monks [2019] SASCFC 47 at [32]-[59] (Doyle J, Peek and Parker JJ agreeing).

The appellant also relied upon the appellant’s offer, shortly before trial, to plead guilty to manslaughter on a factual basis not dissimilar to the factual basis upon which the plea was ultimately made and accepted. This offer had been preceded by an earlier indication through his counsel that the appellant was willing to plead guilty to manslaughter. The appellant accepts that the late timing of his plea of guilty, as opposed to his earlier offer to plead, meant that he was not entitled to any statutory reduction in sentence. However, he argued the earlier offer to plead was mitigatory insofar as it indicated a degree of remorse and a preparedness to facilitate the course of justice. Whilst this submission is consistent with authority,[5] the judge plainly had regard to the appellant’s offer to plead guilty. It was a relevant matter. However, in circumstances where, upon the plea being rejected, the appellant commenced to present a defence case which was at odds with the factual basis for that plea, it was not a matter that weighed strongly in the exercise of the sentencing discretion.[6]
[5] See, for example, Western Australia v Auckram (2013) 229 A Crim R 397 at [95]-[102] (Buss JA, Mazza JA and Hall J agreeing).
[6] R v Hansen (2011) 206 A Crim R 54 at [8]-[10] (Vanstone J, Sulan J agreeing), [23]-[38] (White J); R v Franklin (2012) 114 SASR 206 at [49] (White J, Nicholson J agreeing).
The judge was entitled to accept that, by the time he ultimately pleaded guilty, the appellant had demonstrated some remorse and contrition. But it was appropriate that this be considered in a context where, as demonstrated in his post-offence lies about his responsibility for Mr Hillier’s death, he was slow to accept any responsibility for his actions, let alone demonstrate any remorse or contrition.
The appellant criticised the judge’s limited attention to the issue of rehabilitation. Although the judge did not labour the issue, it is plain her Honour had regard to it. Further, and in any event, given the matters described above, including the appellant’s poor criminal history and circumstances of disadvantage, which in combination meant he was at risk of reoffending, his prospects for rehabilitation were not particularly strong.
In the end, a conclusion as to manifest excess is largely impressionistic. Whilst it is necessary to have regard to the full range of sentencing considerations, and whatever guidance can be gleaned from a consideration of other cases, it is not a matter susceptible of detailed analysis.
Having carefully reflected upon all of the considerations relevant to the sentencing exercise in the present case, we are not satisfied that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. Given the objective seriousness of the offending and the appellant’s poor history of offending, a significant sentence of imprisonment was appropriate, despite the moderating effect of his circumstances of disadvantage and his earlier offer to plead guilty. A consideration of the other manslaughter sentences to which we were referred does not establish error.
We grant an extension of the time within which to appeal, and permission to appeal, but dismiss the appeal.