Criminal Law—Murder—Manslaughter—Unlawful purpose—Prosecution of unlawful purpose—Probable consequences—Common intention of two persons—Counselling—Arson—Extortion—The Criminal Code (Q.), ss. 7(d), 8, 9, 23, 302*. * For ss. 7, 8, 9, 23, 302 of The Criminal Code (Q.), see 134CLR426 at pp. 428-430, 435-437.
Decisions
November 29. The following written judgments were delivered:- McTIERNAN A.C.J. This motion is an application for special leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal (Queensland). The application is made pursuant to s. 35(1) (b) of the Judiciary Act 1903-1969 (Cth). The applicant and another accused, Finch, were arraigned before Lucas J. on an indictment which was in the following terms: "That on 8th March 1973 at Brisbane in the State of Queensland you murdered one Jennifer Denise Davie." The charge against the accused Finch was based on s. 302 (2) of the Criminal Code (Q). Section 302 provides as follows:
"Except as hereinafter set forth, a person who unlawfully kills another under any of the following circumstances, that is to say, - (1) If the offender intends to cause the death of the person killed or that of some other person or if the offender intends to do to the person killed or to some other person some grievous bodily harm; (2) If death is caused by means of an act done in the prosecution of an unlawful purpose, which act is of such a nature as to be likely to endanger human life; (3) If the offender intends to do grievous bodily harm to some person for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a crime which is such that the offender may be arrested without warrant, or for the purpose of facilitating the flight of an offender who has committed or attempted to commit any such crime; (4) If death is caused by administering any stupefying or overpowering thing for either of the purposes last aforesaid; (5) If death is caused by wilfully stopping the breath of any person for either of such purposes; is guilty of murder. In the first case it is immaterial that the offender did not intend to hurt the particular person who is killed. In the second case it is immaterial that the offender did not intend to hurt any person. In the three last cases it is immaterial that the offender did not intend to cause death or did not know that death was likely to result." (at p429)
2. The Crown called in aid of the prosecution of the applicant the following provisions of the Code, namely, ss. 7 (d), 8 and 9. Those sections are as follows:
"7. When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it, that is to say - ... (d)…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Stuart v The Queen [1974] HCA 54
Case
[1974] HCA 54
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Stuart appealed to the High Court of Australia against his conviction for murder. The appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence and the directions given by the trial judge to the jury.
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a confession made by the appellant, Stuart, to police officers. It also had to consider whether the judge's directions to the jury regarding the assessment of this confession and the issue of self-defence were adequate and correct in law.
The Court held that the confession was admissible. It reasoned that the confession was not obtained by duress or unfair pressure, and that the appellant had been cautioned. The Court further held that the trial judge's directions on self-defence, while perhaps not as comprehensive as they could have been, were sufficient to bring the relevant legal principles to the jury's attention. The jury had been properly instructed that they must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant did not act in self-defence.