Dymock v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   DYMOCK -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2019] WASCA 213

CORAM:   BUSS P

MAZZA JA

MITCHELL JA

HEARD:   14 AUGUST 2019

DELIVERED          :   21 AUGUST 2019

PUBLISHED           :   15 JANUARY 2020

FILE NO/S:   CACR 155 of 2018

BETWEEN:   COREY JOSHUA DYMOCK

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   JENKINS J

Citation:   [2018] WASCSR 92

File Number            :   INS 189 of 2017


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Appellant convicted after trial of being an accessory after the fact to murder - Trial judge sentenced the appellant having regard to assistance the appellant gave to the principal offenders while there was a reasonable possibility that the victim was still alive - Whether an accused can be an accessory after the fact to murder prior to the death of the victim - The nature of the knowledge which an accessory after the fact must have that the principal offenders have committed the offence - Proper construction of s 10(1) of the Criminal Code (WA)

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 2, s 10, s 279, s 562

Result:

Application for an extension of time within which to appeal granted
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Sentencing decision of the trial judge set aside
Appellant resentenced

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : Mr P D Yovich SC
Respondent : Mr R G Wilson

Solicitors:

Appellant : In person
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Birdsall v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 79; (2019) 54 WAR 418

Boughey v The Queen [1986] HCA 29; (1986) 161 CLR 10

Brennan v The King [1936] HCA 24; (1936) 55 CLR 253

Brown v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 173

Darkan v The Queen [2006] HCA 34; (2006) 227 CLR 373

Kaporonovski v The Queen [1973] HCA 35; (1973) 133 CLR 209

Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; (2014) 252 CLR 601

L v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 101; (2016) 49 WAR 545

McCartan v The Queen (Unreported, CCA, SCt of WA, Library No 950008, 13 January 1995)

Mikulic v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 150; (2009) 197 A Crim R 94

Patel v The Queen [2012] HCA 29; (2012) 247 CLR 531

R v Byrnes [2019] NSWSC 615

R v Carter and Savage, ex parte Attorney-General [1990] 2 Qd R 371

R v English (1993) 10 WAR 355

R v Humphreys and Turner [1965] 3 All ER 689

R v LK [2010] HCA 17; (2010) 241 CLR 177

R v Taylor, Reed & Minogue (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Criminal Appeal, No 173, 175, 178 and 187 of 1989, 22 June 1989)

R v Tevendale [1955] VLR 95

R v Williams (Unreported, NSWSC, Library No 70360 of 1993,…

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Details
Case
[2019] WASCA 213
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dymock v The State of Western Australia involved an appeal against the sentence imposed on the appellant following his conviction as an accessory after the fact to murder. The appellant was found to have provided assistance to the principal offenders in the context of a murder where there was a reasonable possibility that the victim was still alive at the time of the assistance. The central legal issues before the court were whether an accused could be an accessory after the fact to murder before the victim's death and what level of knowledge was required of the accused regarding the commission of the offence by the principal offenders. These issues necessitated a construction of section 10(1) of the Criminal Code (WA).

In addressing these issues, the court referenced the common law principles and statutory history to interpret the relevant provision. The court highlighted the common law position that a person would not be an accessory after the fact to homicide unless the victim had died at the time of the assistance. The court also noted that an accessory must know that a felony has been committed. The court was required to determine how these principles applied to the statutory provision, specifically focusing on the phrase "to his knowledge, guilty of an offence." The court concluded that for a person to be an accessory after the fact, they must have knowledge of the principal offender's guilt at the time of providing assistance. This knowledge requirement was deemed essential to the statutory definition, aligning with the common law precedents.

The court found that the appellant could not be an accessory after the fact to the murder before the victim's death, as the assistance provided was given while the victim was still alive. The appellant's knowledge of the commission of the offence by the principal offenders was also insufficient under the statutory provision. Consequently, the court quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial, with directions to consider the proper legal standards for the charge of being an accessory after the fact to murder.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In SZTAL v The Minister for Immigration & Border Protection,[24] Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ said:The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose (Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381 ‑ 382 [69] - [71]; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46 ‑ 47 [47]). Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense (CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408). This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.[24] SZTAL v The Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 [14]. Section 10 of the Code, as originally enacted, provided, relevantly:A person who receives or assists another who is, to his knowledge, guilty of an offence, in order to enable him to escape punishment, is said to become an accessory after the fact to the offence. Section 10, as originally enacted, was relevantly identical to the corresponding provision (namely cl 12) in the original draft Griffith Code. Sir Samuel Griffith expressed the opinion in the original draft Griffith Code that cl 12 reproduced the common law and s 74 of the draft Bill introduced into the House of Commons in 1880 (which was based on a Draft Code of Criminal Law of 1879 prepared by Lord Blackburn, Justice Barry (of Ireland), Justice Lush and Sir James Fitzjames Stephen). Archbold's Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases (21st ed, 1893) stated the common law in relation to an accessory after the fact to homicide as follows:To constitute this offence, it is necessary that the accessory have notice, direct or implied, at the time he assists or comforts the felon, that he had committed a felony. 2 Hawk. c. 29, s. 32. It is also necessary, that the felony be complete at the time the assistance is given; for, if one wound another mortally, and after the wound given, but before death ensues, a person assist or receive the delinquent, this does not make him accessory to the homicide; for until death ensues no murder or manslaughter is committed. 2 Hawk. c. 29, s. 35; 4 Bl. Com. 38 (18). Archbold cited Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1838), in support of the proposition that a person will not be an accessory after the fact to homicide unless, relevantly, at the time the person gives the assistance the victim has died [38]. According to Williams GL, Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed, 1961):(a)An accessory after the fact is one who assists a felon after his crime, with a view to shielding him from justice (409).(b)The accessory must know that a felony has been committed (413).