Stefanski v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   STEFANSKI -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2022] WASCA 5

CORAM:   BUSS P

MAZZA JA

BEECH JA

HEARD:   6 AUGUST 2021

DELIVERED          :   31 JANUARY 2022

FILE NO/S:   CACR 80 of 2020

BETWEEN:   JASON RAINER STEFANSKI

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   HALL J

File Number            :   INS 72 of 2015


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Appellant convicted on his pleas of guilty of two counts of murder - Whether a miscarriage of justice occurred because, upon the admitted facts, the appellant could not in law have been guilty of murder - Whether the appellant was not guilty of murder on account of unsoundness of mind - When the appellant killed the deceased he had a mental illness (namely, paranoid schizophrenia or psychotic disorder) - Appellant's mental illness most likely triggered by his use of illicit substances, particularly cannabis - Appellant's ingestion of cannabis in the days and weeks before the killings could have uncovered the underlying mental illness - Appellant's mental illness precipitated and exacerbated by his drug use - Appellant's psychotic symptoms at the time of the killings would not have been as severe or intense as they were if the appellant had not been using cannabis - Proper construction of s 27, s 28(1) and s 28(2) of the Criminal Code (WA) - Whether a miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the primary judge acting on the appellant's pleas of guilty

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 39(1)
Criminal Code (WA), s 1(1), s 23A, s 26, s 27, s 28
Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA), s 21, s 24

Result:

Application for an extension of time to appeal dismissed
Appellant's application for leave to adduce additional evidence in the appeal granted
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : Mr S B Watters & Ms A M Taylor
Respondent : Ms A L Forrester SC

Solicitors:

Appellant : Kate King Legal Pty Ltd
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 26; (2005) 221 CLR 568

Armanasco v The King (1951) 52 WALR 78

Battle v The Queen (1993) 8 WAR 449

Bowden v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 118; (2013) 45 WAR 168

Brennan v The King [1936] HCA 24; (1936) 55 CLR 253

Cameron v The Queen (1990) 2 WAR 1

Chowdhury v Kenny [No 2] [2012] WASCA 35

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; (1997) 187 CLR 384

Dearnley v The King [1947] St R Qd 51

Herlihy v R [1956] St R Qd 18

Kaporonovski v The Queen [1973] HCA 35; (1973) 133 CLR 209

Kelly v The Queen [2004] HCA 12

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Details
Case
[2022] WASCA 5
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stefanski v The State of Western Australia is a case heard by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The dispute concerns the interpretation and application of certain sections of the Criminal Code in relation to intoxication and mental impairment as defences in criminal proceedings. The court was tasked with interpreting the meaning of "intoxication" and "stupefaction" as these terms are used in specific sections of the Code, including sections 26, 27, 28(1), and 28(2). The primary legal issue was how to ascertain the meaning of statutory provisions, particularly in the context of intoxication and mental impairment defences. The court needed to determine whether the statutory definitions and the context of the relevant sections of the Code provided sufficient guidance on the meaning of these terms and how they should be applied in practice.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the principle that the starting point for interpreting statutory provisions is the text of the statute itself, while also considering its context and purpose. The court emphasised that context should be considered at the initial stage of interpretation and in its widest sense. The court also noted that while the natural and ordinary meaning of words is important, it must be consistent with the statutory purpose. The court highlighted that definitions in statutes generally serve to aid in construing the substantive enactments that contain the defined terms, and their meaning depends on the context and purpose of the substantive enactment. In applying these principles, the court found that the statutory definitions and context provided sufficient guidance to interpret the terms "intoxication" and "stupefaction" in the relevant sections of the Code.

The outcome of the case was that the court provided clarity on the interpretation of the terms "intoxication" and "stupefaction" in the context of the specified sections of the Criminal Code. The court concluded that it was unnecessary to consider the application of these terms in other sections of the Code or in cases where the accused's mind was affected by delusions. Additionally, the court noted that a miscarriage of justice would not occur, and an appeal court would not set aside a conviction based on a plea of guilty merely because the appellant had an erroneous understanding of whether they had an arguable defence to the charge. This decision provides important guidance for future cases involving similar issues of statutory interpretation in the context of criminal law.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[20] Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ said:The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose (Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69] ‑ [71]; 72 ALJR 841; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47]; 83 ALJR 1152). Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense (CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408; 71 ALJR 312). This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.[20] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 [14]. The function of a definition in a statute is not, except in rare cases, to enact substantive law. Rather, its function is to provide aid in construing the substantive enactment that contains the defined term. The meaning of the definition depends on the context, and the purpose or object, of the substantive enactment. See Kelly v The Queen[21] and Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd.[22] [21] Kelly v The Queen [2004] HCA 12; (2004) 218 CLR 216 [103] (McHugh J).[22] Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 26; (2005) 221 CLR 568 [12] (McHugh J). In the present case, I will address the issue of intoxication or stupefaction, caused by drugs or intoxicating liquor or by any other means, for the purposes of s 26, s 27, s 28(1) and s 28(2) of the Code. It is unnecessary to consider the issue of intoxication or stupefaction, caused by drugs or intoxicating liquor or by any other means, for the purposes of s 28(3) or any other provisions of the Code. Also, it is unnecessary to consider the application of s 27 where the accused was not intoxicated or stupefied when he or she did the relevant act or made a relevant omission, but the accused had a 'mental impairment', as defined in s 1(1) of the Code, or the accused's mind was affected by delusions on some specific matter or matters, when he or she did the relevant act or made the relevant omission, caused by the appellant's historical and chronic use of drugs or intoxicating liquor. Section 26 of the Code creates a presumption, until the contrary is proved, that an accused is of sound mind and, at any time which comes in question, was of sound mind. Further and in any event, a miscarriage of justice will not occur, and an appeal court will not set aside a conviction based on a plea of guilty, merely because the appellant had an erroneous understanding about whether he had 'an arguable defence' to the charge.