Huynh v Dang [No 2] - [2025] WADC 75

JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH
CITATION:   HUYNH -v- DANG [No 2] [2025] WADC 75
CORAM:   CURWOOD DCJ
HEARD:   21 OCTOBER 2025
DELIVERED          :   Ex tempore
PUBLISHED           :   30 OCTOBER 2025
FILE NO/S:   CIV 1624 of 2022
BETWEEN:   RICHARD LE MINH HUYNH
Plaintiff
AND
THI TUYET DANG
Defendant

Catchwords:

Judgment and orders - Setting aside judgment entered after trial in absence of defendant - Order 34 r 3 Rules of Supreme Court 1971 (WA) - Delay - Whether bona fide defence on merits

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Application to set aside judgment dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff	:	Ms J Moore
Defendant	:	Ms H Hofmann

Solicitors:

Plaintiff	:	Legal Care Australia
Defendant	:	Tan and Tan Lawyers

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Bevan v Bevan [2016] WASC 7
D'Orta‑Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1
Huynh v Dang [2025] WADC 4
Northey v Bega Valley Shire Council [2012] NSWCA 28
Pham v Gall [2020] NSWCA 116
Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Stockdale (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 239
Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co Ltd v Shu (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 405

CURWOOD DCJ:

[This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 21 October 2025 and has been edited from the transcript.]

On 10 and 11 February 2025 I heard a trial of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. On 18 February 2025 I ordered that judgment be entered for the plaintiff against the defendant for the sum of $111,134 plus interest and costs and delivered my reasons for decision.[1]
[1] Huynh v Dang [2025] WADC 4 (earlier Reasons).
The defendant did not attend the trial. In my earlier Reasons, I detailed why I decided that the trial should proceed notwithstanding the defendant's failure to appear at the trial.[2] These reasons should be read with my earlier Reasons delivered on 18 February 2025.
[2] See earlier Reasons [10] - [43] inclusive.
On 9 June 2025 the defendant filed a chamber summons seeking orders that:
(a)the time within which the application for an order under O 34 r 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC) could have been brought should be extended to 9 June 2025 pursuant to O 3 r 5 of the RSC; and
(b)the judgment entered on 18 February 2025 be set aside pursuant to O 34 r 3 of the RSC.
The chamber summons was programmed to a hearing before me. It is not clear to me why it has taken approximately four months from when the application was filed to be ready for a hearing.
In support of the application the defendant relies upon:
(a)an affidavit which she swore on 30 May 2025; and
(b)an affidavit of her solicitor, Mr Tyzton Jun Lai Tan, such affidavit having been sworn on 1 October 2025.
The jurat to the defendant's affidavit states that the affidavit was sworn through the interpretation of Trang Vo, who was first sworn and then truly and faithfully interpreted the contents of the affidavit to the deponent in Vietnamese and that the deponent appeared to understand the affidavit.
In her affidavit the defendant deposes:
1.During 2022 and 2023 she contracted COVID‑19 several times.[3]
[3] Defendant's affidavit sworn 30 May 2025, par 4.
2.'Since that time' she had been diagnosed by a doctor in Vietnam with hypertension, dyslipidaemia and myocardium.
3.She was unable to attend the trial in Perth because she was in hospital in Vietnam from 2 February 2025 to 22 February 2025.[4]
[4] Defendant's affidavit sworn 30 May 2025, par 6.
4.The hospitalisation in February 2025 was the only time she had to stay in hospital for a prolonged period since having been diagnosed with her medical conditions.
5.Between August 2024 and February 2025, she resided 'primarily' in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam but whenever her condition was 'manageable' she would return to Perth to visit her children, one of whom is her daughter, Ms Tu Ha.[5]
6.With respect to the first adjournment of the trial in November 2024 she felt unwell and saw a doctor in Vietnam who advised her not to travel. She asked her daughter, Ms Ha, to email the plaintiff's solicitors requesting an adjournment of the trial and, when that adjournment was not agreed to, on 18 November, she asked her daughter to file a letter in the District Court. As an aside, this letter is dealt with in my earlier Reasons at [28].
7.On 18 November 2024 she received a letter from the District Court Registry enclosing a copy of orders made by the court vacating the trial dates and re‑listing the matter for trial commencing on 10 February 2025.
8.She was going to represent herself at the trial and, in doing so, 'was going to explain to the court my side of the story'. She had planned to come back to Perth and would have stayed with her daughter, Ms Ha, but she did not buy plane tickets, intending to do so a few days before the trial.[6]
9.In late January she said that she was bedridden in her home in Ho Chi Minh City, on 2 February 2025 was hospitalised and on or around 5 February 2025 she said she was advised by a doctor to not travel to Perth.[7]
10.On 5 February 2025 she asked Ms Ha to send an email to the plaintiff's solicitors requesting an adjournment which occurred on 6 February 2025. As an aside, I note that the affidavit does not deal with the correspondence between the court and Ms Ha exchanged on 4 February 2025.[8]
11.A further letter was submitted to the court on her behalf on 8 February 2025 (which is set out in full in my earlier Reasons at [37]).
12.The next correspondence she received was an email which attached the final orders for judgment and the earelir Reasons delivered on 18 February 2025.
13.On 22 February 2025 she was discharged from hospital.
[5] Defendant's affidavit sworn 30 May 2025, pars 9 - 10.
[6] Defendant's affidavit sworn 30 May 2025, pars 19 - 21.
[7] Defendant's affidavit sworn 30 May 2025, pars 22 - 25.
[8] See earlier Reasons [34] ‑ [36].
Attached to the affidavit is a translation of a hospital discharge certificate, translated from Vietnamese, such translation having been procured on 15 March 2025. The discharge certificate refers to the defendant having been admitted to hospital at 10.48 am on 2 February 2025, discharged at 4.00 pm on 22 February 2025. The certificate reads in part and the preliminary diagnosis being:[9]
Preliminary diagnosis: Severe autonomic nervous disorder (Dysautonomia), unstable blood pressure, profuse sweating, irregular heartbeat, respiratory failure and repeated fainting.
Treatment: Hospitalisation for monitoring and treatment.
Note: Re-examination at the hospital on 22/03/2025 or when the patient has abnormal symptoms such as unstable blood pressure, excessive sweating, dizziness, shortness of breath, must be re‑examined immediately.
[9] Defendant's affidavit sworn 30 May 2025, page 9.
The certificate is sealed and signed by two doctors.
The defendant has not sought to obtain a report from any doctor in Vietnam who treated her at the hospital nor to confirm that it was not possible for her to travel from Vietnam to Perth for medical reasons.
At the commencement of the hearing before me, the plaintiff, by counsel, sought leave to cross‑examine the defendant on the terms of her affidavit sworn 30 May 2025.
The defendant was not present in court, and assuming I granted leave to the plaintiff to cross‑examine the defendant that would have resulted in an adjournment and a further delay of this matter. I refused the application for leave to cross‑examine the defendant, primarily on the basis that there would be further delay and expense, an interpreter would be required, and that the information before the court is that the costs of this matter for the plaintiff are already approaching the amount in issue.
The plaintiff, as I will turn to, also submitted that no significant weight should be placed upon the discharge summary attached to the affidavit. The plaintiff made some observations relating to these documents and raised doubts as to their authenticity, such that little or no weight should be attached to them.
As an aside, the plaintiff also sought to rely upon an affidavit of the plaintiff which had not previously been filed or served. That affidavit seemed to suggest, based upon Facebook posts, that the defendant was in Perth during January 2025 and until shortly before the trial, if not during the trial.
Because that affidavit had not been filed or served and counsel for the defendant had already completed her submissions in support of the application before the affidavit was referred to, I refused the plaintiff leave to rely upon the affidavit.
The reasons I gave for refusing leave to rely upon the affidavit were similar to the reasons for which I refused the plaintiff leave to cross‑examine the defendant on her affidavit. Namely, allowing the plaintiff to rely on a new affidavit would further delay the matter and an adjournment would necessarily be required to allow the defendant's legal representatives to take instructions and potentially put on further affidavit evidence. Further, on the face of the matter there did not seem to be any adequate explanation for the late delivery of the material given that this application has been on foot since 9 June 2025.
Returning to the defendant's affidavit, no reference was made in any of the letters from the defendant's daughter sent in February 2025 to the court or the plaintiff's lawyers that the defendant was in hospital.
As I have outlined in my earlier Reasons the defendant's daughter sent letters to the court. There was nothing within those letters which would lead to an inference that the defendant was in hospital or unable to travel to Perth. Rather, the email sent on 4 February by Ms Ha referred to her mother's flight back to Perth would be on 27 February 2025 and seeking a rescheduling of the trial date after 27 February.[10] When the court received that communication from Ms Ha, the listings coordinator informed the defendant's daughter that if the defendant sought to change the trial date, she would have to bring an application to adjourn the trial and to seek legal advice.[11]
[10] See earlier Reasons [35].
[11] See earlier Reasons [36].
The defendant refers to a letter which she prepared on 8 February 2025 and which was accompanied by a typed translation by Ms Ha which I have set out in full in my earlier Reasons at [37]. The letter concluded that the defendant sought the court to transfer the case to Vietnam and to allow her time to 'negotiate and resolve this case in Vietnam'. The letter did say that she was in poor health and unable to appear in court but did not make it initially clear that she was in hospital.
After the trial was heard and after judgment, the defendant was emailed the orders and earlier Reasons on 18 February 2025 and on the same day Ms Ha responded to the communication by an email to my associate which said in part:
We want to appeal the court's decision on this case. How should we fill out the form and which department we need to seek advice from?
As I have noted in [14] the defendant was represented by Tan and Tan Lawyers, who entered an appearance on her behalf on 6 May 2022 and remained on the record as her solicitors until 24 June 2024 when the defendant filed a notice of intention to act in person. Tan and Tan filed a notice of appointment for the defendant on 19 March 2025 whereby that firm got on the record again and has been on the record since that time. In my view, there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay in making and why it took until June 2025 for the present application to be filed.
On 11 March 2025 the defendant's solicitors, Tan and Tan filed a notice of appeal with respect to this court's judgment and sent a copy of that to the court and also to the plaintiff's solicitor.[12]
[12] Affidavit of Hoang Huy Tran sworn 1 October 2025, page 6.
On 21 May 2025 the plaintiff filed in the District Court a request in the form of a Form 6 document under the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) seeking the issue of a property (seizure and sale) order. Subsequently, on 13 June 2025 the District Court issued a Form 25 property (seizure and sale) order directed to the Sheriff of Western Australia that he was authorised and commanded by the order to seize and sell the saleable interest of the defendant in a property in Morley, Western Australia.
I note that the notice of appeal that was filed on 10 March 2025 was within the time limit prescribed by the rules of procedure that apply in the Court of Appeal. It is not clear (and no explanation is given as to) why, the current application was not filed more promptly, as it should have been made within 14 days of trial, and waited until 9 June 2025.
The defendant has not in her affidavit set out her position on the merits of the case by reference to my earlier Reasons. The submissions filed by counsel simply referred to an application for summary judgment being dismissed on 27 October 2023. This fact is relied upon to support the submission that the defendant accordingly has an arguable case on the merits which was established by the dismissal of the summary judgment application by Deputy Registrar Harman in October 2023,[13] which as an aside, upon my search of the court record I could not find any reasons for decision.
[13] Defendant's submissions filed 8 October 2025, par 23.

Legal principles

The application relies upon O 34 r 3 RSC which provides:
Any judgment, order, or verdict obtained where one party does not appear at the trial may be set aside by the Court upon such terms as the Court thinks just upon application made within 14 days after the trial.
In this respect the application is now significantly out of time. Any application should have been made by no later than 4 March 2025.
As may be noted, the rule confers an unfettered, though judicial, discretion.
In Bevan v Bevan[14] Acting Master Gething (as his Honour then was) identified five specific factors which the court should consider in the exercise of its discretion, being:[15]
•The reason why the party did not attend.
•Any delays in bringing the application.
•Whether some useful purpose would be served by setting aside the judgment, requiring an analysis of the merits of the case.
•The injustice to the applicant if the judgment is not set aside.
•The injustice to the respondent if the judgment is set aside, including whether orders can be made to minimise the possibility of any such injustice.
[14] Bevan v Bevan [2016] WASC 7.
[15] Bevan v Bevan [24].
A similar rule exists in New South Wales. It has been noted that the questions posed by Jordan CJ in Vacuum Oil v Stockdale[16] about the exercise of discretion in the context of an earlier rule remain appropriate and that for an application to set aside a judgment entered for a failure to attend a trial, it is necessary to consider:
(a)whether any useful purpose would be served by setting aside the judgment; and
(b)how it came about that the applicant became bound by a judgment regularly obtained.[17]
[16] Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Stockdale (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 239.
[17] Northey v Bega Valley Shire Council [2012] NSWCA 28 [16]; Pham v Gall [2020] NSWCA 116 [55], [108], [110].
It has been said by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in the case of Pham v Gall[18] that the discretion to set aside the judgment is encapsulated by the question whether there was 'a real likelihood that it would be unjust to the defendant to allow the judgment to stand'.[19] Further, the party in default needs to explain the reason for the default and the nature of the proposed defence and that those matters inform the exercise of the discretion.[20] Further, the discretion is also guided by consideration of the importance of finality of litigation, such that 'controversies, once resolved, are not reopened except in a few, narrowly defined, circumstances'[21] citing the High Court case in D'Orta‑Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid.[22]
[18] Pham v Gall.
[19] Pham v Gall [43], [55] - [56], [102].
[20] Pham v Gall [56].
[21] Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co Ltd v Shu(No 2) [2025] NSWSC 405 [34].
[22] D'Orta‑Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1 [43].

How it came about that the defendant became bound by a judgment regularly obtained

In this case the defendant became bound by a judgment because she failed to attend trial. She had notice of the trial. She was in Vietnam. Although she seems to have been in hospital when the trial took place, no steps were taken to notify the court, or the plaintiff's solicitors of that fact. Nor did the defendant take any steps to put on proper evidence that could have allowed the fact that she was in hospital to have been considered at the time that the trial was called on.
If the only criteria was whether there was a proper explanation as to how the applicant became bound by a regularly entered judgment, the facts put forward by the defendant may, on their own, be sufficient. However, as I will turn to, there is no proper description of a reasonably arguable defence.

Lack of evidence of a reasonably arguable defence

In this respect the plaintiff's case at trial was as follows and I have derived this description from my earlier Reasons at [6]:
1.On 19 April 2019 the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an oral agreement for the exchange of currency (April agreement).
2.There were express terms of the April agreement to the effect that:
1.The plaintiff would deposit to the defendant's nominated bank account in Vietnam the amount of 3.5 billion VND.
2.The defendant, within two days of receiving the payment would repay to the plaintiff in Australia the equivalent value of 3.5 billion VND in AUD.
3.The exchange rate applicable for the deposit was 1 AUD = 16,500 VND, accordingly a sum of $212,121.
4.Pursuant to the agreement the plaintiff caused 3.5 billion VND to be transferred to the defendant's nominated bank account in Vietnam.
3.On or about 20 May 2019 the parties entered into a further oral agreement for the exchange of currency (May agreement). Express terms of the May agreement were that:
1.The plaintiff would deposit to the defendant's nominated bank account in Vietnam 3 billion VND.
2.The defendant would, within two days of receiving the payment of 3 billion VND, pay the plaintiff the equivalent value of that sum in AUD.
3.The exchange rate applicable for the deposit was 1 AUD = 16,180 VND, accordingly a sum of $185,414.
4.Pursuant to the agreement on 20 May 2019 the plaintiff caused 3 billion VND to be transferred to the defendant's nominated account in Vietnam.
5.In reduction of the amounts she was obliged to pay the defendant, she has paid the plaintiff $286,401.
6.In breach of the May agreement the defendant has failed to pay the plaintiff $111,134 being the balance owing under that agreement.
The plaintiff's evidence was given on oath as was the evidence from a second witness being Thi My Diem Ho (Ms Ho).[23]
[23] See earlier Reasons [46] - [61].
I accepted the evidence given by the plaintiff of the payments made by the plaintiff to the defendant and repayments made by the defendant to the plaintiff.
Returning to the defendant's position, she swore an affidavit in opposition to an application for summary judgment on 8 September 2023. In that affidavit, she deposed as follows:
1.She denied making any agreement with the plaintiff to exchange currency with him.[24] She seemingly accepted that the plaintiff transferred 3.5 billion VND on 19 April 2019 and 3 billion VND on 20 May 2019 but she said these 'transactions … did not belong to the plaintiff and was not for the purposes of the purported currency exchange'.
2.Those payments were for business purposes in Vietnam unrelated to these proceedings and she could not recall what those transactions were for as she runs a busy garment import and export business and those transactions 'could relate to any payments at the time'.[25] She does not know Ms Ho and is unsure of any relationship between Ms Ho and the plaintiff.[26]
3.The defendant then deposed 'The Plaintiff has no privity of contract and has brought a claim under the incorrect jurisdiction in relation to Vietnamese transactions'.[27] She said that the payments she made were not repayments of the loan, but were moneys that she had loaned the plaintiff for unrelated matters between April 2019 and February 2021.
[24] Defendant's summary judgment affidavit, par 18.
[25] Defendant's summary judgment affidavit, pars 21 - 22.
[26] Defendant's summary judgment affidavit, par 23.
[27] Defendant's summary judgment affidavit, par 24.

The matters that were deposed to by the defendant in her summary judgment application were later distilled into an amended defence filed on her behalf by Tan and Tan Lawyers. In my earlier Reasons at [8] I summarised the amended defence. I summarised the amended defence because it informed the issues which arose on the pleadings which I also described in [9] of my earlier Reasons. I noted in my earlier Reasons that in substance, by the amended defence the defendant:
(a)pleads there was never an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant to exchange currency at any time;[28]
(b)admits that 6.5 billion VND was transferred to her bank account in Vietnam by two instalments in April and May 2019 but denies that 'that sum of money originated from or belonged to the plaintiff';
(c)pleads the amount 6.5 billion VND was transferred to her by a third party, Ms Ho for a separate business transaction;
(d)admits paying the plaintiff $286,401, but claims it was for a separate loan given in March 2019, for which the plaintiff was repaid in full;[29] and
(e)pleads that Vietnam has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.
[28] Amended defence, par 1.
[29] Amended defence, par 4.
In my earlier Reasons I identified the issues which arose on the pleadings as being:
1.Was there any agreement between the parties for the April and May remittances?
2.If so, what were the terms of that agreement (or agreements)?
3.Who deposited the sum of 6.5 billion VND into the defendant's bank account? If it was Ms Ho, did she act as the plaintiff's agent in making the deposit?
4.Were the payments totalling $286,401 made by the defendant to the plaintiff made to reduce the amount owing under a loan agreement as claimed by the plaintiff, or were they intended for another purpose or in accordance with a different arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant?
In my earlier Reasons, I noted the documentary evidence tendered[30] which included payment orders from a bank in Vietnam, BIDV, which evidenced the payments made to the bank account of the defendant, SMS messages between the plaintiff and the defendant and between the plaintiff and Ms Ha. I also outlined the oral evidence given by the plaintiff and Ms Ho.
[30] See earlier Reasons [47].
In this respect, the plaintiff gave evidence of the discussions he had with the defendant relating to the currency swap and the payment terms as to the currency swap which was that the agreement was for an immediate exchange of money. I also referred to Ms Ho's evidence which I summarised that in my earlier Reasons at [60], specifically that for each payment to the defendant, the plaintiff had asked her to transfer the sums 3.5 billion VND and 3 billion VND to the defendant, that she went to a branch of BIDV, and arranged the transfer of the money to the bank account of the defendant that the plaintiff had provided to her. The bank issued a payment order confirming and evidencing each transaction. Further the plaintiff was required to pay to Ms Ho the money she paid to the defendant's Vietnamese bank account.[31]
[31] See earlier Reasons [48] - [53].
The plaintiff's claim at trial was that he had advanced a total amount of VND which was valued at approximately $397,500 and that the defendant had repaid to him $286,401 leaving a balance of $111,134. It was not in issue, by virtue of the amended defence, that the defendant had paid the plaintiff $286,401. The issue was whether the payment made by the defendant to the plaintiff of that amount related to another transaction, such that the payments should not be construed as repayments of a sum of $397,500 she owed the plaintiff for the currency swap (which was the plaintiff's case). The other transaction was, according to the defendant, a loan she made to the plaintiff which the plaintiff repaid in full.
In my earlier Reasons, I made express findings that there was no other relevant business or commercial arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant other than the currency swap which was in issue on the plaintiff's claim. In this respect, the plaintiff gave oral evidence of those matters and, as I have said in my earlier Reasons at [74.8], a fair reading of the SMS messages exchanged between the parties did not indicate any other business arrangement for transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant from which it could be inferred that the plaintiff related to another purpose.
In this respect, the voluminous SMS messages between the plaintiff, the defendant and the plaintiff and the defendant's daughter corroborated the sum of money paid by the defendant to the plaintiff and what the purpose of those payments were, namely it was a repayment of a loan. Further, as I set out at [73] of my earlier Reasons there were various acknowledgments by the defendant in SMS messages of her indebtedness to the plaintiff. I set out three examples of that in my earlier Reasons at [73] before making the factual findings at [74] which led me to the conclusion that the plaintiff's claim had been made out.
I also dealt with in the final part of my earlier Reasons, the defendant's pleaded position that Vietnam had exclusive jurisdiction.
In this application, the defendant has not engaged with the factual findings I made in my earlier Reasons. She has not sought to provide any elaboration (or documentary evidence) of the loan she says she made to the plaintiff which the plaintiff repaid in full. One would have expected evidence in the form of the defendant's own bank statements, which, on her version of events of there being a loan, would have proved the money flowing from her bank account to the plaintiff and being repaid by the plaintiff to her. Nor has she sought to explain the SMS messages referred to in my earlier Reasons and put on evidence which would cast doubt on the inferences I have drawn from the messages to reach the findings I made in my earlier Reasons.
In my opinion, the defendant cannot for the purposes of this application rely upon a summary judgment application and affidavit that took place some years ago and an affidavit which contained assertions of what the payments she made was for and to deny the advances of money as being for other unstated business purposes.
In light of the earlier Reasons I delivered for the judgment being entered against the defendant, it was, in my view, incumbent upon the defendant to deal with the evidence that was led at trial including the contemporaneous SMS messages and then put before the court her own evidence of why those SMS messages should not be interpreted the way in which I interpreted them in the earlier Reasons.
Similar observations relate to putting on documentary evidence of the other business transaction which the plaintiff had denied, whereby she had made a loan to the plaintiff for the amounts which matched the payments which the plaintiff has said were in reduction of the amount owing for the currency swap.
Put simply, without swearing an affidavit condescending to particulars of what her defence would be if the judgment were set aside, leads me to a conclusion that the defendant has no reasonable or arguable defence to the plaintiff's claim.
By reason of:
1.The significant court time already engaged in this case being two days of hearing which has resulted in the entry of a judgment with written reasons outlining the nature of the plaintiff's case, the evidence to support his claims and why his claims should be accepted.
2.The lack of evidence from the defendant of her defence to the plaintiff's claim which is the subject of the judgment entered on 18 February 2025, including why the facts and evidence put forward by the plaintiff should not be accepted (or should even be doubted).
3.The fact that eight months has now passed since the judgment was entered and during which time the defendant has not presented a defence to the claim, or an alternative version of the events propounded by the plaintiff.
4.The delays in bringing this application from the time when Tan and Tan was briefed in March 2025, notwithstanding that an appeal was filed.
5.The paramount objective of litigation is the just resolution of disputes in a timely and efficient manner and the importance of finality of litigation, such that 'controversies, once resolved, are not reopened except in a few, narrowly defined, circumstances'.
6.The expense incurred by the plaintiff to obtain the judgment and commence execution combined with the obvious costs to reconduct a trial in circumstances where the defendant has not sought to engage with the factual findings that I set out based on the plaintiff's evidence at trial.
I conclude that no useful purpose would be served by setting aside the judgment. The end result of the hearing on 10 and 11 February 2025 cannot be doubted on the materials before me. In all of the circumstances, it is not unjust to the defendant to allow the judgment to stand. For these reasons, I dismiss the defendant's chamber summons.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.
LP
Associate to His Honour Judge Curwood
28 OCTOBER 2025