HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Aickin J. Barwick C.J., Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ. Barwick C.J., Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ.
AIR EXPRESS LTD. v. ANSETT TRANSPORT INDUSTRIES (OPERATIONS) PTY. LTD.
10 February 1981
Injunction—High Court
Injunction—Interlocutory injunction—Undertaking as to damages—Loss or damage—Whether sustained by reason of grant of injunction—Distinction between loss or damage caused by grant of interlocutory injunction and loss or damage arising from litigation—Defendant added after commencement of action—Original undertaking as to damages extended to added defendant. High Court—Practice—Appeal—Objection to competence—Claim for damages for loss sustained by reason of grant of injunction—Usual undertaking as to damages—Order refusing damages—Whether judgment—Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s. 34.
Decisions
1979, August 17.
AICKIN J. delivered the following written judgment: -
In these proceedings Air Express Ltd. ("Air Express") claims against Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty. Ltd. ("Ansett") damages pursuant to an undertaking given by Ansett to the Court to "abide by any order which the Court or a Justice may make as to damage in case the Court or a Justice shall hereafter be of the opinion that the defendants shall have sustained any, by reason of this Order, which the plaintiff ought to pay". (at p251)
2. That claim arises out of the decision of the Full Court in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54 . In that case Ansett commenced proceedings against the Commonwealth of Australia and Mr. C. C. Halton, the Secretary to the Department of Transport, by a writ issued on 18th February 1977. The writ was generally indorsed and so far as now material it claimed as follows:
"The plaintiff's claim against the defendants is for an injunction to restrain them and each of them their servants and agents
. . .
(b) from granting or causing or permitting to be granted Air Express Ltd. or any company related to Air Express Limited a permission in writing under the said Regulations to import two Carvair aircraft on the grounds - (i) that the grant of the said permission in writing is in breach of provisions of an Agreement made 24 October 1952 between the Plaintiff and the firstnamed Defendant and Agreements made 26 September 1961, 21 October 1972 and 26 October 1973 between the Plaintiff, the firstnamed Defendant Ansett Transport Industries Limited and Australian National Airlines Commission, and(ii) that neither of the defendants has power to grant the said permission in writing." (at p252)
3. On the same day an ex parte application was made to me in chambers for an injunction in terms of the relief claimed as quoted above, supported by an affidavit which set out a statement made by the Minister for Transport of the Commonwealth on 17th February 1977 in the House of Representatives. That statement included the following:
"I have looked at the air services to Tasmania and particularly the freight services and have concluded that some innovation is desired. That is why this week I have approved…
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- Case
- [1981] HCA 75
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the respondent had engaged in conduct that constituted exclusive dealing, thereby substantially lessening competition in a market. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the respondent had taken advantage of its dominant position in the market for air freight services to the detriment of competitors, such as the applicant, in contravention of the Act. The interpretation and application of sections 45E, 46, and 47 of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* were central to the determination of these issues.
The court's reasoning focused on the nature of the agreements entered into by the respondent with its customers, which allegedly restricted those customers from using other air freight carriers. The judges examined the economic impact of these arrangements, assessing whether they had the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in the relevant market. The principles of statutory interpretation were applied to ascertain the scope and intent of the prohibitions against exclusive dealing and the misuse of market power. The court considered the definition of "market" for the purposes of the Act and the evidence presented regarding the respondent's market share and competitive conduct.
The High Court ultimately found that the respondent had engaged in conduct that contravened the *Trade Practices Act 1974*. Orders were made restraining the respondent from continuing the offending practices and requiring it to take certain steps to remedy the situation.
Background
Background to the litigation
Air Express Ltd initiated proceedings against Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd, seeking damages for loss or damage allegedly sustained due to the grant of an interlocutory injunction. The injunction was initially granted on 18th February 1977 by Aickin J. and extended on 22nd and 25th February 1977 by the Chief Justice, restraining the defendants from granting permission to import two Carvair aircraft. Ansett had provided an undertaking to the Court to "abide by any order which the Court or a Justice may make as to damage in case the Court or a Justice shall hereafter be of the opinion that the defendants shall have sustained any, by reason of this Order, which the plaintiff ought to pay". Air Express claimed damages of $2,427,000, arguing that the injunction had prevented the importation of the aircraft, leading to significant financial losses. Aickin J. dismissed the claim for damages, holding that any loss Air Express suffered was due to the litigation itself, not the injunction. The case was appealed to the High Court, where the appeal was ultimately dismissed with costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court should order an inquiry into whether Air Express Ltd. sustained any damage by reason of the interlocutory injunction granted by Aickin J.
2. If an inquiry should be ordered, what principles should guide the assessment of any damages claimed by Air Express Ltd.
3. Whether Air Express Ltd. has sustained any damage by reason of the interlocutory injunction, and if so, what the amount of such damages should be.
Held
1. The court should order an inquiry into whether Air Express Ltd. sustained any damage by reason of the interlocutory injunction granted by Aickin J.
2. The principles guiding the assessment of any damages claimed by Air Express Ltd. should include that damages should be those which flow directly from the injunction and which could have been foreseen when the injunction was granted.
3. Air Express Ltd. has sustained damage by reason of the interlocutory injunction, and the amount of such damages should be determined by the inquiry ordered by the court.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court of Australia considered whether Air Express Ltd. was entitled to damages for loss sustained by reason of the interlocutory injunction granted by Aickin J. The Court addressed three main issues: whether an inquiry should be ordered, what principles should guide the assessment of any damages, and whether Air Express Ltd. had sustained any damage by reason of the interlocutory injunction, and if so, what the amount of such damages should be.
Regarding the first issue, the Court acknowledged that an inquiry into damages should generally be ordered if the claim for damages is not trivial or trifling. The Court noted that the undertaking given by Air Express Ltd. to the Court to "abide by any order which the Court or a Justice may make as to damage in case the Court or a Justice shall hereafter be of the opinion that the defendants shall have sustained any, by reason of this Order, which the plaintiff ought to pay" provided a basis for such an inquiry. The Court accepted that it had discretion to decide whether to order an inquiry and found that, in the circumstances of this case, an inquiry was warranted.
On the second issue, the Court outlined the principles that should guide the assessment of damages. It held that damages should be awarded to a defendant for breach of an undertaking given to the court if, in the light of the final judgment, it transpires that an interlocutory judgment should not have been granted. The Court emphasized that the damages should be the loss which is the natural consequence of the injunction under the circumstances of which the party obtaining the injunction had notice. The Court also noted the importance of distinguishing between damages flowing from the injunction and those flowing from the litigation itself.
Regarding the third issue, the Court found that Air Express Ltd. had sustained damage by reason of the interlocutory injunction. The Court rejected Aickin J.'s conclusion that the damage was caused by the litigation and not the injunction. The Court held that the non-issue of the import permit for the Carvair aircraft was due to the injunction, and thus, the damage was caused by the injunction. The Court also found that Air Express Ltd. had suffered loss of deposit on the Carvair aircraft, loss of net earnings in 1977 and 1978, and additional damages, totaling $1,745,754.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that when an interlocutory injunction is granted, and the defendant who ultimately fails in the action claims damages under an undertaking, an inquiry into damages should be ordered if the claim is not trivial or trifling. The assessment of damages should be guided by the principle that the damages should be the loss which is the natural consequence of the injunction under the circumstances of which the party obtaining the injunction had notice. Furthermore, the Court should distinguish between damages flowing from the injunction and those flowing from the litigation itself. If the injunction caused the damage, the defendant is entitled to compensation.