Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215

PARTIES:

KEA INVESTMENTS LTD

(applicant)

v
KENNETH DAVID WIKELEY

(respondent)

FILE NO:

BS No 4338 of 2023

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

4 October 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

3 August 2023 and 4 August 2023

JUDGE:

Cooper J

ORDERS:

Upon the undertaking of Kea Investments Ltd’s solicitors to hold the sum of $100,000 in their trust account as security for Kea Investments Ltd’s undertaking as to damages:

1.   Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the orders made on 26 April 2023 are set aside.

2.   The security in the amount of $10,000 paid into court in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of the orders made on 26 April 2023 is to be paid out to Kenneth David Wikeley.

3.   The amended application filed on 15 June 2023 is otherwise dismissed.

4.   I will hear the parties as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – RESTRAINT OF PROCEEDINGS – OF LOCAL PROCEEDINGS: CLEARLY INAPPROPRIATE FORUM – GENERALLY – where the applicant is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands – where a court in the United States issued a default judgment in respect of an agreement the applicant contends is a forgery – where the applicant has commenced proceedings in a court in New Zealand against the respondent seeking relief with respect to the default judgment in the United States and damages for tortious conspiracy – where the applicant obtained interim and interlocutory injunctive relief in New Zealand restraining the respondent from enforcing the default judgment – where the respondent has taken steps to contravene and avoid the effect of the orders made in New Zealand – where the applicant applied to the Supreme Court of Queensland for interim injunctive relief against the respondent and orders were made – whether the orders involved a breach of comity – whether the proceeding is oppressive or vexatious – whether the Supreme Court of Queensland is a clearly inappropriate forum

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – RESTRAINT OF PROCEEDINGS – OF FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS: ANTI SUIT INJUNCTIONS – TO PROTECT JURISDICTION OF COURT AND ITS PROCESSES – whether there is a serious question to be tried – whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of an interlocutory injunction or the continuation of the anti-enforcement injunctive relief

PROCEDURE – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – EX PARTE ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS – where orders were made pursuant to ss 25 and 26 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) following an ex parte hearing – whether the applicant failed to make full disclosure to the court of the correct legal principles, material facts and defences which the respondent submits were available to him –  whether the applicant failed to comply with its obligation of disclosure at the ex parte hearing – whether the orders should be set aside

PROCEDURE – STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION,…

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Details
Case
[2023] QSC 215
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kea Investments Ltd, a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, filed an application in the Supreme Court of Queensland seeking interim injunctive relief against Kenneth David Wikeley, an Australian resident, and orders restraining him from enforcing a default judgment obtained in the United States against Kea. The application followed a default judgment issued by a Kentucky court against Kea in respect of an agreement Kea contends is a forgery. Kea had commenced proceedings in a New Zealand court against Wikeley seeking relief with respect to the default judgment and damages for tortious conspiracy. The New Zealand court had issued interlocutory injunctive relief restraining Wikeley from enforcing the default judgment. Wikeley had taken steps to contravene and avoid the effect of the New Zealand orders. The Queensland court was asked to grant Kea the relief sought in the New Zealand proceedings. The court had to decide whether the Queensland court was a clearly inappropriate forum for the proceeding, whether the proceeding was oppressive or vexatious, and whether the orders were obtained by non-disclosure of relevant facts. The court also had to decide whether there was a serious question to be tried and whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of an interlocutory injunction or the continuation of the anti-enforcement injunctive relief. The Queensland Supreme Court found that the proceeding was not oppressive or vexatious, and the orders were not obtained by non-disclosure of relevant facts. The court found that there was a serious question to be tried and that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of an interlocutory injunction or the continuation of the anti-enforcement injunctive relief. The court set aside paragraphs 2 to 4 of the orders made on 26 April 2023 and ordered that the security of $10,000 paid into court in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of the orders made on 26 April 2023 be paid out to Wikeley. The court dismissed the amended application and reserved costs for later determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

Upon the undertaking of Kea Investments Ltd’s solicitors to hold the sum of $100,000 in their trust account as security for Kea Investments Ltd’s undertaking as to damages:

1. Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the orders made on 26 April 2023 are set aside.

2. The security in the amount of $10,000 paid into court in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of the orders made on 26 April 2023 is to be paid out to Kenneth David Wikeley.

3. The amended application filed on 15 June 2023 is otherwise dismissed.

4. I will hear the parties as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The conspiracy is said to have arisen from a dispute between Sir Owen Glenn and Mr Watson concerning Kea’s participation in an investment called Project Spartan. On 31 July 2018, the High Court of England and Wales found that Kea and Sir Owen Glenn had been fraudulently induced to participate in that investment at a cost of £129 million.[4] Mr Watson was found to be the architect of the fraud. Kea’s director at the relevant time, Mr Peter Dickson, was found to have breached his fiduciary duties to the company.[4]Glenn v Watson [2018] EWHC 2016 (Ch) (English judgment). Kea asserts that the Coal Funding and JV Investment Agreement (Coal Agreement), which WFTL relied on to obtain the default judgment in the Kentucky Court, is a forgery, or at least is unenforceable. It maintains that the purpose of the Kentucky proceeding brought by WFTL is to frustrate Kea’s enforcement of the English judgment against Mr Watson, to force disclosure of Kea’s confidential financial information and to extract value from Kea.The Coal Agreement The Coal Agreement purports to be an agreement between Mr Wikeley, as trustee for the Wikeley Family Trust, and Kea. On its face, it was executed by Mr Wikeley and by Mr Dickson, Kea’s then director, on 23 October 2012 with both signatures having been witnessed by Mr Watson. The recitals record that Kea and Mr Wikeley had agreed to enter into a joint venture for the purpose of investing in coal and other energy projects identified by Mr Wikeley. They refer to various prospective investments, including a coal project in Kentucky. Under the terms of the Coal Agreement, Kea was obliged to provide a minimum capital amount of US$75 million over 8 years to the joint venture to fund the proposed investments. Those capital payments were to be made by way of 20-year loans at an interest rate of 3%. The loans were to be repaid once investments were sold or placed in listed corporate vehicles. Kea would receive 60% of the joint venture profits. No security was to be provided for the loans. Although the wording of the Coal Agreement is far from clear, it appears that Kea also agreed to pay a royalty of US$1.5 million per year for a period of 20 years to Mr Wikeley “irrespective as to whether production has commenced or not, or if for any reason investment has been delayed”. Under the terms of the Coal Agreement, Kea also:(a)indemnified Mr Wikeley for any losses and lost profits if it failed to provide a minimum capital amount of $US75 million;(b)guaranteed its performance of all its obligations under the agreement, including the capital funding commitment and the royalty payment, in all circumstances including negligence by Mr Wikeley;(c)in the event it failed to provide the minimum capital amount, indemnified Mr Wikeley for the greater of 25% of the estimated profits from the proposed investments—in one place said to be US$375 million and in another place said to be £375 million—or 25% of the actual profits earned by third parties from the projects identified by Mr Wikeley for investment (if capable of determination).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Having regard to the earlier discussion of the fraud exception in the context of considerations of comity, I do not accept Mr Wikeley’s submission that orders of the kind made against him by this court could only be justified by a need to protect the integrity of the processes of this court and to ensure compliance with its own orders.Consideration of the balance of convenience (paragraph 3 of the 21 April orders) The factors that weigh in favour of the continuation of the injunctions made in paragraph 3 of the 21 April orders are:(a)the evidence which establishes an arguable case that the default judgment was obtained using a fabricated document, and that the procuring of that judgment and steps taken subsequently to enforce it have been taken pursuant to a tortious conspiracy between Mr Wikeley and others to injure Kea;(b)the potential for harm to be caused to Kea by the continued perpetration of the alleged tortious conspiracy. The assessment of the potential for harm to be caused to Kea must have regard to evidence of Mr Wikeley’s present ability (through Wikeley Inc) to take further steps directed towards enforcement of the default judgment. In this regard, Mr Wikeley referred to:(a)the order made in the New Zealand proceeding which appointed interim liquidators to WFTL and expressly stated that Mr Wikeley had ceased to have any powers, functions or duties as director of WFTL other than those required or permitted by New Zealand statutory provisions governing company liquidations; (b)evidence that the interim liquidators of WFTL sought and, on 25 May 2023, obtained, recognition by the US Bankruptcy Court of the interim liquidation of WFTL as a foreign main proceeding under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, and the effect of this recognition and the provisional relief granted by the US Bankruptcy Court in staying the hearing of the substitution motion in the Kentucky courts and any further attempts at enforcement against the assets of WFTL (see [58] to [61] above);[170](c)Mr Wikeley’s evidence that he was told by his former attorney in Kentucky that he is no longer in control of Wikeley Inc because the shareholders of that company (Mr Wikeley’s sons) had removed him as president of the company and replaced him with Mr Branham.[171][170]CFI 51, [5]–[9]; CFI 84, [5]–[13].[171]CFI 52, [12]–[13]. The first two of these matters support the submission that Mr Wikeley’s ability to pursue the substitution motion, and thereby continue to pursue enforcement of the default judgment by Wikeley Inc, is now constrained by orders of the US Bankruptcy Court. However, the injunctions in paragraph 3 of the 21 April orders extend beyond a restraint on Mr Wikeley causing WFTL or Wikeley Inc from taking steps in existing proceedings. They act to restrain him from taking any steps himself, or causing any other person (not only WFTL or Wikeley Inc) from taking any steps, based on: the Coal Agreement; the default judgment; the statutory demand; the purported assignment of the Coal Agreement; the purported assignment of the default judgment; any notices of the purported assignments; and any subpoenas issued based upon the Coal Agreement or the default judgment. Given the evidence that Mr Wikeley breached the orders made in the New Zealand proceeding by causing the purported assignment of the Coal Agreement and the default judgment from WFTL to Wikeley Inc, I am satisfied that there is continued utility in maintaining the injunctions in paragraph 3 of the 21 April orders notwithstanding the constraints now imposed by the orders of the US Bankruptcy Court.