Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 26 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] FCA 631  

File number(s): QUD 117 of 2024
Judgment of: DOWLING J
Date of judgment: 14 June 2024
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for security for costs – applicant found to be involved in an unlawful conspiracy in New Zealand – applicant has insufficient assets to meet an adverse costs order – applicant is a natural person – whether leave to appeal has reasonable prospects of success – security for costs ordered – quantum and timing of order
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 56

Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), ss 25 and 26

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 19.01

Cases cited:

Australian Equity Investors v Colliers International (NSW) Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 57

Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1

Botsman v Bolitho & Ors [2018] VSCA 111

Bryan E Fencott & Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497

Clack v Collins (No 1) [2010] FCA 513

Commissioner of Taxation v Vasiliades [2016] FCAFC 170; (2016) 344 ALR 558

Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 CH D 34

Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397

Etnyre v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 610

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Pty Ltd [No 35] [2001] NSWSC 60; (2001) 51 NSWLR 333

James v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No. 1) (1985) 9 FCR 442

Kea Investments Limited v Wikely Family Trustee Limited (in interim liquidation) [2023] NZHC 3532

Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215

Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Limited (in interim liquidation) [2023] NZHC 3260

Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 764

KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189

Logue v Hansen Technologies Ltd [2003] FCA 81; (2003) 125 FCR 590

Madgwick v Kelly [2013] FCAFC 61; (2013) 212 FCR 1

McCardle v Johnson [2023] FCA 1369

Pearson v Naydler [1977] 3 All ER 531; [1977] 1 WLR 899

Re Taylor: Ex parte Natwest Australia Bank Ltd [1992] FCA 296; 37 (1992) FCR 194

Singh v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCA 90

Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2005] FCA 1643

Stapleton v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1418

Tait v Bindal People [2002] FCA 322

Thomas v STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2011] FCA 254

Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2023] QCA 255

Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] FCA 155

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 77
Date of hearing: 1 May 2024
Counsel for the Applicant The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent Mr P K O’Higgins KC and Mr B Wacker
Solicitors for the Respondent Colin Biggers & Paisley

ORDERS

QUD 117…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] FCA 631
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd, the respondent, Kea Investments Pty Ltd, sought an order for security for costs from the applicant, Mr Kenneth Wikeley, in relation to his application for leave to appeal a decision of the Court in Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] FCA 155 (Primary Judgment). The Primary Judgment ordered Mr Wikeley to provide security for costs, in the sum of $120,000, of the proceeding. In that proceeding, Mr Wikeley sought to set aside three judgments of the High Court of New Zealand registered in Australia by Kea under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). The Court also ordered that if security for costs was not provided by Mr Wikeley, that proceeding would be dismissed. Mr Wikeley did not provide the security and that proceeding was dismissed on 5 March 2024.

The Court considered the relevant legislative framework and principles, including the broad discretionary power of the Court to make an order for security for costs. The Court then addressed the relevant factors, including the promptness of the application, the applicant's status as a natural person, and the risk of non-compliance with a costs order. The Court found that the application was brought promptly, that Mr Wikeley's status as a natural person was accompanied by other factors such as a lack of prospects of success, residence outside of Australia, and the amount ordered not being oppressive, and that there was a high risk that Mr Wikeley would not comply with an adverse costs order if he was unsuccessful in the proceedings. Based on these considerations, the Court ordered that Mr Wikeley provide security for the respondent’s costs of his application for leave to appeal in the amount of $30,000 within 21 days of the date of this order. If security is not provided in accordance with the order, the proceeding would be dismissed without further order, and the applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding and this application on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant provide security for the respondent’s costs of the applicant’s application for leave to appeal filed 4 March 2024 in the amount of $30,000 in a form satisfactory to the Registrar within 21 days of the date of this order.

2. If security is not provided in accordance with paragraph 1:

(a) the proceeding be dismissed without further order; and

(b) the applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding and this application on the standard basis.

3. Costs reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Sixth, whether an order of security for costs would stifle the litigation. This factor may be less important in the context of an appeal: Thomas v STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2011] FCA 254 at [7], Etnyre at [16]. EVIDENCE Kea relied upon two affidavits. Both affidavits contained evidence of the estimate of Kea’s costs of Mr Wikeley’s leave to appeal application. The first affidavit was sworn by Mr Adam Bloom, a costs consultant at Bloom Costs. The second affidavit was sworn by Mr Matthew Deighton, the solicitor for Kea in these proceedings. Both Mr Bloom and Mr Deighton estimated the costs as around $54,000. Mr Wikeley provided four affidavits to my chambers and the applicant. They were not filed consistently with the Court process, but I have considered them for the purpose of this application. Mr Wikeley, in the hearing on 1 May 2024, accepted that these affidavits were not relevant to this application but instead related to his proceeding the subject of the Primary Judgment.CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS The primary judge set out the relevant factual background at paragraphs [1] to [35] of the Primary Judgment. I adopt that background and extract the following key events. In Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Limited (in interim liquidation) [2023] NZHC 3260 (Gault J Decision), Gault J of the High Court of New Zealand found that:(a)Mr Wikeley was involved in an unlawful means conspiracy against Kea: see [122] of Gault J Decision;(b)That conspiracy involved multiple attempts to fraudulently use a Kentucky Default Judgment awarded against Kea worth US$120 million: see [122] of Gault J Decision;(c)The Kentucky Default Judgment was obtained on the basis of a fraudulent Coal Agreement: see [122] of Gault J Decision; and(d)the Coal Agreement was likely created by or for Mr Wikeley years after its purported date of execution: see [110] of Gault J Decision. The Coal Agreement purported to be between Kea and the Wikeley Family Trustee Limited, a New Zealand company controlled by Mr Wikeley. During the course of that New Zealand proceeding before Gault J, Mr Wikeley attempted to assign the benefit of the Kentucky Judgment and the Coal Agreement to other companies, or trustees, he controlled despite Court orders: see Gault J Decision at [58]. Mr Wikeley also attempted to appoint a new trustee and change the applicable law of the Wikeley Family Trust to Kentucky instead of New Zealand: see Gault J Decision at [60]– [62]. The final relief ordered by Gault J at [156] of the Gault J Decision included: (a)permanent injunctive relief against Mr Wikeley restraining him from taking steps with respect to the Kentucky Default Judgment and the Coal Agreement;(b)declaratory relief that the Kentucky Default Judgment was obtained by fraud;(c)damages against Mr Wikeley and his related companies of £779,031.88, US$412,225.94 and AU$115,625.21 totalling over AU $2m; and(d)Mr Wikeley to pay Kea’s costs and interest. Gault J then made a further order on 5 December 2023: see Kea Investments Limited v Wikely Family Trustee Limited (in interim liquidation) [2023] NZHC 3532. This order restrained Mr Wikeley and the other defendants from:(a)changing the trustee; and, or(b)changing the proper law of the Wikeley Family Trust until the Kentucky Judgment had been discharged.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondent, Kea Investments Pty Ltd, seeks an order for security for costs from the applicant, Mr Kenneth Wikeley, of his application for leave to appeal. Mr Wikeley seeks leave to appeal from a decision of a single judge of this Court in Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] FCA 155 (Primary Judgment). In the Primary Judgment the Court ordered, amongst other matters, that Mr Wikeley provide security for costs, in the sum of $120,000, of that proceeding. In that proceeding Mr Wikeley sought to set aside 3 judgments of the High Court of New Zealand registered in Australia by Kea under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). In the Primary Judgment the Court also ordered that if security for costs was not provided by Mr Wikeley, that proceeding would be dismissed. Mr Wikeley did not provide the security and that proceeding was dismissed on 5 March 2024. For the reasons that follow I am satisfied that it is appropriate that Mr Wikeley be ordered to provide security for the respondent’s costs of Mr Wikeley’s application for leave to appeal the Primary Judgment.LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND PRINCIPLES Section 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) relevantly provides:(1) The Court or a Judge may order an applicant in a proceeding in the Court, or an appellant in an appeal under Division 2 of Part III, to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against him or her.(2) The security shall be of such amount and given at such time and in such manner and form, as the Court or Judge directs. Rule 19.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides:(1)A respondent may apply to the Court for an order:(a) that an applicant give security for costs and for the manner, time and terms for the giving of the security; and(b) that the applicant’s proceeding be stayed until security is given; and(c) that if the applicant fails to comply with the order to provide security within the time specified in the order, the proceeding be stayed or dismissed. The court has a broad discretionary power to make an order for security for costs: James v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No. 1) (1985) 9 FCR 442 at [444]; Madgwick v Kelly [2013] FCAFC 61; (2013) 212 FCR 1 at [6]; Stapleton v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1418 at [6]-[7]; Etnyre v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 610 at [8]. The Court must exercise its discretion in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case: Botsman v Bolitho & Ors [2018] VSCA 111 at [36]; Stapleton at [6]. In Etnyre, Abraham J summarised the relevant factors regulating the exercise of the Court’s discretion. I adopt that summary as it applies in the present circumstances. The relevant factors are as follows. First, whether the security for costs application has been brought promptly: KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189 at 197, Etnyre at [10]. Second, whether the applicant is a natural person or a corporation: Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 CH D 34 at [38] per Bowen LJ, Etnyre at [11].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 28 March 2024, Kea filed an interlocutory application for security for costs of Mr Wikeley’s application for leave. That application was heard before me on 1 May 2024. CONSIDERATION Against that background, I now address the relevant principles and factors (set out above at [7] to [15]) as applied to the circumstances of this case.Was the application for security for costs brought promptly? There is no issue of delay in this case. Mr Wikeley’s application for leave to appeal was filed on 4 March 2024. Kea’s application for security for costs was brought on 28 March 2024. Should security be ordered against a natural person? Whilst the courts are generally disinclined to order security for costs against a natural person, such an application may be granted where impecuniosity is accompanied by some other factor. That other factor might be: a lack of prospects of success; or residence outside of Australia; or a sum ordered that was not oppressive: see Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 764 at [32]-[33]; Etnyre at [11]. For the reasons set out below each of those other factors are present in the circumstances of this application. Mr Wikeley’s status as a natural person is considered further under the factor assessing whether an order for security will stultify the proceeding. Is there a risk of non-compliance with a costs order? The primary judge found that there was a high risk that Mr Wikeley would not comply with an adverse costs order if he was unsuccessful in the proceedings before her: Primary Judgment at [66]. In an affidavit filed on 5 February 2024 in the proceedings before the primary judge, Mr Wikeley deposed that he owned 50% of an apartment in Ukraine (which he purchased in 2007 for about USD$330,000), a car, golf clubs, two mobile phones and a laptop and around $50,000 of cash. He also deposed that about $70,000 is held in his solicitors’ trust account for legal fees. In an affidavit provided on 19 April 2024 in this proceeding Mr Wikeley deposed that as at 17 April 2024 he had $3,533.94 in the bank (and no longer $50,000 in cash) but otherwise the assets above remain. Mr Wikeley no longer retains his lawyers and submitted in the interlocutory hearing before me on 1 May 2024 that he owed his lawyers $265,000. I am satisfied, on the material before me, that it is very likely that Mr Wikeley would not be able to comply with an adverse costs order awarded against him if his application for leave to appeal was dismissed. In the Primary Judgment her Honour found that, irrespective of Mr Wikeley’s asset position, the findings of Gault J (in New Zealand) and Cooper J (in Queensland) were relevant to and support a conclusion that there is a real risk that Mr Wikeley is likely to fail to meet any adverse costs order. The Gault J findings relied upon by the primary judge included:(a)The incorporation of Wikeley Inc and USA Asset Holdings Inc in Kentucky;(b)The purported assignment of the Coal Agreement and the Kentucky Default Judgment to Wikeley Inc;(c)The purported change of trustee of the Wikeley Family Trust to a Kentucky company; and(d)The purported change of applicable law of the trust from New Zealand to Kentucky.