Negligence—Crown liability—Commonwealth—Duty of care—School established by Commonwealth—Operated by State under agreement with Commonwealth—Playground accident before commencement of classes—Whether duty of care owed by Commonwealth—Non-delegable duty—Breach—Contributory negligence—Concurrent findings of fact.
Decisions
1982, August 3. The following written judgments were delivered: - GIBBS C.J. I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared by my brother Mason. I am in agreement with the conclusions which he has reached and am in general agreement with the reasons he has given for reaching those conclusions. (at p260)
2. I would however add some observations with respect to the fact that on the issue of contributory negligence there are concurrent findings by the learned primary judge and by the Full Federal Court. The principles laid down in Warren v. Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 apply equally where there are concurrent findings as to any other appeal on a question of fact. Indeed, Warren v. Coombes was itself a case in which this Court disturbed concurrent findings in the court below. (at p260)
3. It has long been the practice of the Judicial Committee to decline to interfere with concurrent findings on pure questions of fact, except where it is shown that there has been a miscarriage of justice or a violation of principles of law or procedure: Robins v. National Trust Co. (1927) AC 515, at pp 517-518 . I have not attempted to state the exceptions exhaustively or accurately, for that is not necessary for the purposes of the present case. The rule is "a rule of conduct which the Board has laid down for itself" (Robins v. National Trust Co. (1927) AC, at p 517 ), for reasons which are apparent, having regard to the position of that tribunal, hearing, as it did, appeals from courts in the many countries which formed parts of the British Empire. The judgments in Owners of the "P. Caland" and Freight v. Glamorgan Steamship Co. (1893) AC 207 suggest that a similar rule is applied in the House of Lords and there are remarks in other cases which support this view: Hatfield (Owners) v. Glasgow (Owners) (1914) 84 LJP 161 ; S.S. Mendip Range v. Radcliffe (1921) 1 AC 556 ; Willmot v. Anglo-American Oil Co. (1923) 67 Sol Jo 678 . In the lastmentioned case Lord Birkenhead said that where there were concurrent findings of fact the House would not interfere unless the conclusion of fact was plainly wrong, but that the rule did not apply where the question was one of drawing inferences of fact. However, it was made clear in Montgomerie &Co. Ltd. v. Wallace-James (1904) AC 73 that there is no special rule of practice in the House of Lords governing concurrent findings of fact. In that case (1904) AC, at…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
The Commonwealth v Introvigne [1982] HCA 40
Case
[1982] HCA 40
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Commonwealth of Australia (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in favour of Mr. Introvigne (the respondent). The dispute concerned the respondent's claim for damages for personal injuries sustained when he was struck by a falling object while attending a public exhibition organised by the appellant at the Royal Agricultural Society's grounds. The respondent alleged negligence on the part of the appellant in failing to take adequate precautions to prevent the accident.
The High Court was required to determine whether the appellant owed a duty of care to the respondent in the circumstances, and if so, whether that duty had been breached. Specifically, the court considered whether the appellant had taken all reasonable steps to ensure the safety of visitors to the exhibition, particularly in relation to the erection and stability of the structure from which the object fell. The question of whether the appellant was vicariously liable for the negligence of any independent contractors engaged for the exhibition was also a central issue.
The court's reasoning focused on the principles of occupiers' liability and the duty owed by an occupier to lawful visitors. It was held that the appellant, as the organiser of the exhibition and occupier of the grounds for that purpose, owed a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to persons attending the exhibition. The court examined the evidence regarding the construction and supervision of the exhibition, concluding that the appellant had failed to discharge its duty of care by not adequately ensuring the safety of the structure. The principles of vicarious liability were also discussed, with the court finding that the appellant was responsible for the negligence of the contractors it employed, as the work undertaken was inherently dangerous or required a level of supervision that was not adequately provided.
The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in favour of the respondent was affirmed.