DIZ18 (by her litigation representative DJA18) v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2)
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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIZ18 (by her litigation representative DJA18) v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2022] FCA 898
File number(s):
VID 776 of 2018
Judgment of:
WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment:
9 August 2022
Catchwords:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — claim alleging breach by the respondents of non-delegable duties of care in relation to the welfare and medical treatment of the applicant – application for leave to file a further amended statement of claim — proposed pleas of aggravated and exemplary damages — other objections to form of draft pleading — application adjourned to allow applicant to prepare further draft pleading.
X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633
Division:
General Division
Registry:
Victoria
National Practice Area:
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs:
34
Date of hearing:
1 August 2022
Counsel for the Applicant:
Ms F Ryan SC and Mr J Hartley
Solicitor for the Applicant:
Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents:
Dr M Rush QC with Mr B Jellis and Mr T Katz
Solicitor for the Respondents:
Australian Government Solicitor
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
VID 776 of 2018
BETWEEN:
DIZ18 (BY HER LITIGATION REPRESENTATIVE DJA18) Applicant
AND:
MINISTER FOR…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The case of DIZ18 (by her litigation representative DJA18) v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) involves an application by the applicant, DIZ18, for leave to file a further amended statement of claim. The applicant seeks to amend the statement of claim to better reflect her proposed evidentiary case and to introduce claims for aggravated and exemplary damages. The respondents do not oppose the principle of the applicant having leave to amend the statement of claim, but they raise several objections to the form of the draft pleading proposed by the applicant. The dispute revolves around the applicant's allegations that the Commonwealth, through its agreements with the Republic of Nauru and service providers like IHMS, assumed responsibility for the applicant's health and welfare, and that the respondents breached this responsibility.
The primary legal issues the court had to decide were whether the draft pleading disclosed a cause of action, whether it properly raised a claim for aggravated or exemplary damages based on conduct post-dating a certain event, and whether the proposed amendments and new claims were permissible under the rules of court. Additionally, the court had to consider the objections raised by the respondents regarding the form of the draft pleading, such as the conflation of duty and breach, unclear allegations, and the use of certain terms like "adequate."
The court determined that while the draft pleading was not ideal, it was adequate enough to allow the applicant to proceed with her claims. The court identified several issues that needed to be addressed in a further draft, such as the conflation of duty and breach, the unclear use of "in the premises," and the dispersed allegations of breach. The court also noted that the claims for aggravated and exemplary damages were relevant to the applicant's case and could be pursued. However, the court found that the applicant's particulars of loss and damage, which included a claim for loss "which is not yet known," needed to be reviewed. The court concluded that the applicant should have leave to amend the statement of claim but needed to prepare a further draft addressing the identified issues.
The court's final orders were that the application to file the statement of claim in the form of the draft pleading was not granted for the time being. The application was adjourned to allow the applicant to prepare a further draft for the respondents' consideration. If there were further disputes, the court would hear the parties again. The court emphasized that it would consider the issues of substance raised by the respondents and the criticisms as to the form of the draft pleading in the next stages of the proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant seeks leave to file a further amended statement of claim, the draft of which was described as a “third” amended statement of claim. I will refer to that document as the draft pleading. The reasons for seeking to amend the claim are so that the applicant’s claims better reflect the evidentiary case that the applicant proposes to advance, and to introduce claims for aggravated and exemplary damages. As a matter of principle, the respondents do not oppose the applicant having leave to amend the statement of claim in these circumstances. However, on several grounds the respondents oppose the court giving leave to amend the statement of claim in the terms proposed by the applicant’s draft.Further background The applicant claims that for the purpose of the maintenance of regional processing centres on Nauru, the Commonwealth entered into agreements with, among others, the Republic of Nauru, and service providers such as International Health and Medical Services (IHMS), and that by reason of these and other factors the Commonwealth assumed responsibility for the applicant’s health and welfare. The terms of the applicant’s proposed pleading of the non-delegable duty of care are in [30.3] of the draft pleading –30.3at all relevant times the Respondents owed the Applicant a non-delegable duty of care to ensure that the Applicant received medical services adequate to treat medical conditions such as dehydration and infection/sepsis and, if necessary, transfer to a tertiary hospital with adequate paediatric care The applicant’s existing claims are that –(a)in the circumstances of the claim, the relevant standard of care arising under the claimed non-delegable duty required the respondents to take a number of steps, including to ensure that the applicant had access to appropriate medical treatment, to comply with medical advice, and to ensure that the applicant underwent an electroencephalogram (EEG) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) at the earliest opportunity;(b)on 11 June 2018, she presented to a medical clinic on Nauru operated by IHMS with a history of feeling unwell for six days, with symptoms of fever, dehydration, and mouth ulcers;(c)her condition continued to deteriorate over the following day;(d)on 12 June 2018, she was transferred by ambulance to the Republic of Nauru Hospital, where her condition continued to deteriorate;(e)on 12 June 2018, an emergency physician recommended that the applicant be urgently evacuated from Nauru to a first world tertiary hospital, and a paediatric emergency physician advised that the applicant was a critically unwell child who required urgent evacuation to a centre with specialist paediatric intensive care services, and that this advice was conveyed to the respondents;(f)on 13 June 2018, the respondents determined to transfer the applicant and her mother to Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, to be treated at the Pacific International Hospital, which was not equivalent to a first world or Australian tertiary standard, and which was not equipped to perform necessary procedures including an EEG or MRI on a paediatric patient in the circumstances of the applicant;(g)the respondents knew that the decision to transfer the applicant to the Pacific International Hospital at Port Moresby was not in accordance with the specialist medical advice that had been given;(h)the respondents assumed responsibility for the transfer of the applicant and her mother to Port Moresby and for the costs associated with the transfer and the applicant’s treatment there;(i)the applicant was an inpatient at the Pacific International Hospital at Port Moresby between 14 June 2014 and 4 July 2018, and received medical treatment for herpes simplex virus encephalitis, but did not undergo an EEG, an MRI, or receive treatment from a specialist paediatric neurologist;(j)on 4 July 2018, the applicant and her mother were taken from Port Moresby to Australia as a consequence of the orders made by Murphy J in this proceeding to which I referred earlier;(k)the respondents were negligent in relation to their failure to take all reasonable steps to procure treatment at a first world tertiary hospital with specialist intensive care services for paediatric patients, and instead taking the applicant and her mother to Papua New Guinea;(l)as a result of the respondents’ negligence, the applicant has suffered loss and damage; and(m)there should be an injunction requiring the respondents to take and continue to take all steps within their power to ensure that the applicant receives treatment, including long-term care and follow-up, in a location with access to quality, multi-disciplinary specialist paediatric care.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
I will now address the miscellaneous matters raised by the respondents that go to the form of the draft pleading. As to each of those, the applicant will have an opportunity to prepare a further draft in light of the following –(a)I accept the submission of counsel for the respondents that at [30.3] of the draft pleading the applicant has alleged a duty in absolute terms to achieve a specified outcome, rather than a duty to ensure that reasonable care was taken. I also accept that by pleading in this way the applicant has conflated duty and breach, against which Justices of the High Court have warned: Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2002] HCA 54; 211 CLR 540 at [192] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board [2009] HCA 47; 239 CLR 390 at [68] (Hayne J); Sydney Water Corporation v Turano [2009] HCA 42; 239 CLR 51 at [48] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). Generally speaking, the “duty” in negligence is always the same – a duty to take reasonable care: Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Dederer [2007] HCA 42; 234 CLR 330 at [49] (Gummow J). In the case of a non-delegable duty, that translates to a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken: see the formulation by Mason J in Kondis at 687. I understood senior counsel for the applicant to accept that [30.3] could be readily re-drafted to separate the allegation of the existence of the non-delegable duty, which is a conclusion of law, from the allegations of what reasonable care required, which is a question of fact.(b)I accept the submission of counsel for the respondents that [30] of the draft pleading, which is preliminary to the allegation in [30.3] of the non-delegable duty of care, is unclear in its use of the preface “in the premises”, which does not specify exactly what facts are relied on by the applicant to support the existence of the non-delegable duty. Again, I understood senior counsel for the applicant to accept that this could be remedied, perhaps by specifying those paragraphs of the pleading containing the allegations that are to be relied upon to support the claim.(c)I also accept the criticism that allegations of breach of duty are dispersed throughout the pleading, and the particulars of breach under [32] do not directly correspond to the allegations in [31] concerning the standard of care. I would not disallow the amendments on this basis, because although not ideally expressed, I consider that the pleaded case is just adequate. However, the applicants might consider addressing the criticism as to the way in which breach has been alleged when preparing a further draft.(d)As to other infelicities in the draft pleading raised by the respondents, namely an allegation in [32] that the respondents “acted negligently” and an allegation in [33] that that the applicant’s loss was as a result “of the respondents’ negligence” which were said to give rise to confusion in the context of a non-delegable duty of care, these are no more than drafting points. The applicant’s case should be clear enough to the respondents. If there is any difficulty, then the respondents’ solicitors can seek clarification by way of correspondence. In any event, the applicant will have the opportunity to review the forms of words that have been employed to allege that the respondents were in breach of their non-delegable duty of care because reasonable care was not taken.(e)I do not accept the respondents’ submission that the allegations of causation in [31A] and [31B] of the draft pleading are conclusory because they do not address why or how the steps that are alleged should have been taken would have had the results which are therein alleged. Pleadings may be terse. Their role is to plead material facts and not evidence, still less to argue the case. I doubt that there could be any confusion as to what the applicant’s causation case is, especially having regard to the expert opinion evidence that has been filed. If there is any specific cause for confusion, then it was not developed by counsel for the respondents in argument.(f)The respondents complained about the use of the term “adequate” throughout the draft pleading, claiming that it was used on 21 occasions, and claiming that this led to confusion because it was unclear whether this erected a different standard to that of reasonable care. The submission that the respondents advanced was a broad-brush submission that did not differentiate between the different contexts in which the word “adequate” is employed in the draft pleading. I have already dealt with the applicant’s plea of the non-delegable duty of care at [30.3] of the draft pleading which does employ the term “adequate” rather than “reasonable”. I expect this will be re-drafted so as to conform with what I have said. However, there are other instances where the term “adequate” is employed, but not in substitution for a plea of a standard of reasonable care. For instance, it is open to the applicant to allege that the duty to ensure reasonable care was taken required that there be medical services on Nauru that were adequate to assess and treat the applicant’s condition. It is open to the applicant to allege that reasonable care required that there was an adequate assessment of the applicant’s condition when she first presented to the IHMS medical clinic on Nauru. It is open to the applicant to allege that reasonable care required that adequate enquiries be made of the Pacific International Hospital as to its facilities prior to the decision to transfer the applicant to Port Moresby. And it is open to the applicant to allege that the facilities at the Pacific International Hospital in Port Moresby were not adequate to treat the applicant’s condition. Whether the claimed inadequacies departed from the standard of reasonable care is a separate question.(g)Finally, I understood senior counsel for the applicant to accept that the applicant’s particulars of loss and damage, to the extent that it made a claim for loss “which is not yet known”, will be reviewed.Conclusion
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to the submissions of the applicant, it is only necessary that I record that senior counsel for the applicant, Ms Ryan, accepted during argument that no injury to the applicant was alleged as a consequence of the transfer of the applicant to Papua New Guinea as opposed to Australia, and that no injury was alleged as a consequence of the applicant’s treatment in Papua New Guinea. Consideration I commence by accepting a submission of counsel for the respondents that it is appropriate at this point in the proceeding to consider the respondents’ objections to the form of the draft pleading in its totality, without regard to whether the objections strictly concern only the proposed amendments. It would be artificial and impractical to consider the amendments divorced from other parts of the draft pleading that retain existing allegations. I have determined that the applicant should have leave to amend further the statement of claim, but that the applicant should have an opportunity to address a number of issues that I will identify. Accordingly, as a matter of form the application to file a statement of claim in the form of the draft pleading is not granted for the time being, but I will adjourn it and make directions for the applicant to prepare a further draft for the respondents’ consideration, and if there are further disputes, then I will hear the parties. I will consider the two issues of substance raised by the respondents before turning to the criticisms as to the form of the draft pleading. In addressing whether the draft pleading discloses a cause of action, or properly raises a claim of aggravated or exemplary damages based upon conduct that post-dates the administration of Acyclovir on 12 June 2018, the principles are well established. I should not allow an amended pleading to the extent that it would be futile; I should not give leave to amend a pleading if in its amended form it would liable to be struck out as failing to disclose a cause of action or as being embarrassing; and I should not allow an amended pleading if, for the purposes of s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), there would be no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the claims or components thereof in their amended form. In addressing the draft pleading appropriate caution should be exercised, where some of the questions of law raised by the respondents and their application to the facts do not admit of clear-cut analysis, and where the court has obviously not heard any evidence. The development and application of common law principles should ordinarily proceed by reference to concrete facts that are the subject of evidence and findings. For the following reasons I do not accept the submissions of the respondents that the pleading of events after 12 June 2018 cannot form a permissible part of the applicant’s claim. The primary reason is that I accept the principal argument advanced by counsel for the applicant, that the allegations are relevant to the applicant’s claim for aggravated and exemplary damages. I will first address the claim for exemplary damages.