Negligence—Liability of Crown—Breach of duty by State schoolteacher—Injury to pupil—Relationship between schoolteacher and pupil—Contributory negligence of pupil—Direction to jury—Claims against the Government and Crown Suits Act, 1912 (N.S.W.), ss. 2, 3—Public Instruction Act of 1880 (N.S.W.)—Public Instruction (Amendment) Act, 1916-1956 (N.S.W.)—Public Service Act, 1902- 1961 (N.S.W.), ss. 53-56, 65.
Decisions
July 29. The following written judgments were delivered:- McTIERNAN J. The judgment and order of the Supreme Court under appeal grants a new trial of the action. The appeal has been brought pursuant to leave to appeal granted by the High Court. (at p19)
2. The action arose out of an accident which occurred in the grounds of a school at Peakhurst, Sydney. This is a school which was established and is maintained under the Public Instruction Act of 1880 (N.S.W.) as amended. Such a school was formerly called a "public school" and by Act No. 51, 1916, is called a "State school". By s. 3 of the Act of 1880 a teacher employed under the Department of Public Instruction (which by Act No. 46, 1957 may be referred to as the Department of Education) is a civil servant of the Crown. The powers of the Governor under s. 3 of the Act of 1880 to appoint remove and control teachers of schools employed under the Department of Public Instruction are, as is provided in s. 53 of the Public Service Act, 1902, to be exercised by the Governor upon the recommendation of the Public Service Board. At the time of the accident the plaintiff, then twelve years old, was a pupil at the abovementioned school. He was in a class the teacher of which was a Mr. McNally. The action is brought by the boy's father as next friend against the nominal defendant appointed under the Claims against the Government and Crown Suits Act, 1912 (N.S.W.). Under that Act the Government of New South Wales is liable to be sued in an action of tort, ss. 3 and 4 : Farnell v. Bowman (1887) 12 App Cas 643 . The accident which happened to the plaintiff was that he fell from a limb of a tree in the grounds of the State school at Peakhurst during school hours and sustained injuries to his legs and arms. The plaintiff's declaration in the action alleges : "that before and at the time of the committing of the grievances hereinafter alleged and at all material times the said Government (the Government of New South Wales) by its servants and agents had the care control and management of a certain public school (the State school at Peakhurst) and of the activities which were conducted in the said public school and thereupon the said Government by its servants and agents so negligently carelessly and unskilfully conducted itself in and about the care control and management of the said activities and in and…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Ramsay v Larsen [1964] HCA 40
Case
[1964] HCA 40
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Ramsay v Larsen* concerned a dispute between the plaintiff, Ramsay, and the defendant, Larsen, regarding the ownership of certain shares. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the plaintiff had established a resulting trust over the shares in question, and if so, whether the defendant had subsequently acquired good title to those shares. The court was required to consider the principles governing the creation and extinguishment of resulting trusts, particularly in the context of share transfers and the intention of the parties.
The High Court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish a resulting trust over the shares. Their Honours reasoned that the evidence did not support the inference that the shares were purchased with the plaintiff's money with the intention that the beneficial interest would remain with the plaintiff. Instead, the court found that the circumstances indicated an intention for the legal and beneficial ownership to pass to the defendant. Consequently, the defendant was deemed to have acquired good title to the shares.