Subramaniam v The Queen

Case [2004] HCA 51


HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

KALA SUBRAMANIAM  APPELLANT

AND

THE QUEEN  RESPONDENT

Subramaniam v The Queen [2004] HCA 51

10 November 2004
S588/2003

ORDER

1.        Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the order of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal made on 25 November 2002 dismissing the appellant's appeal and, in its place, order that:

(a)the appellant's appeal to that Court be allowed;

(b)the conviction of the appellant be quashed; and

(c)there be a new trial of the appellant on the first count of the indictment.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation:

M R Einfeld QC with D R J Toomey for the appellant (instructed by McClellands)

R D Cogswell SC with G E Smith and J A Quilter for the respondent (instructed by the Solicitor for Public Prosecutions for New South Wales)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Subramaniam v The Queen

Criminal law – Unfitness to be tried – Attorney-General directed that a "special hearing" under the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW) ("the Act") be conducted in respect of charges against the appellant – Whether and in what circumstances a "special hearing" should be stayed – Whether "special hearing" conducted in compliance with conditions and procedures required by the Act – Adequacy of trial judge's directions to the jury.

Practice and procedure – Trials conducted as "special hearings" under the Act – Jury directions.

Words and phrases – "unfit to be tried", "special hearing", "substantial miscarriage of justice".

Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW), ss 19, 21(4).

  1. GLEESON CJ, McHUGH, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ.  The principal questions in this appeal are whether a stay of the appellant's trial under the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW) ("the Act") should have been granted, and whether, when the trial did proceed, it was conducted in compliance with the Act.

    Facts

  2. The initiating events:  On a morning in August 1995 the driver of a vehicle registered in the name of Ms Leigh Johnson, who was then a practising solicitor, failed to stop at a red light in a Sydney suburb.  The failure was captured on camera.  The features, and therefore the identity of the driver could not be distinguished in the photograph.  Ms Johnson was issued with an infringement notice.  She elected, as she was entitled to do, to contest the charge contained in the notice before the Local Court of New South Wales.  In November 1995 Ms Johnson requested that Court to grant her an adjournment on the grounds of her physical inability to attend.  On 10 January 1996 the case was set down for hearing on 29 May 1996.  On 30 January 1996, Ms Johnson requested copies of the images captured on camera.  They were supplied.  On 29 February 1996 the appellant, who at the time was an employee of Ms Johnson, made a…

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Subramaniam v The Queen [2004] HCA 51
Case
[2004] HCA 51
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal concerning charges of perverting the course of justice against the appellant. The dispute arose from the appellant making a statutory declaration falsely identifying herself as the driver of a vehicle that had run a red light, with the intention of perverting the course of justice. The appellant was subsequently charged with making a false statutory declaration and giving false evidence. The core of the appeal concerned whether a "special hearing" conducted under the *Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990* (NSW) should have been stayed, and whether the hearing was conducted in compliance with the Act.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a stay of proceedings, considering the appellant's mental unfitness to stand trial. The court also had to determine if the special hearing was conducted in accordance with the procedural requirements of the *Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990* (NSW), particularly regarding the adequacy of the trial judge's directions to the jury concerning the appellant's absence from giving evidence and the handling of certain recorded and oral evidence. A further issue was whether the prosecution had a duty to present more detailed evidence regarding the appellant's mental health to the jury.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashing the appellant's conviction and ordering a new trial. The Court found that the trial judge had failed to comply with section 21(4) of the *Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990* (NSW), which mandates that a judge must be satisfied that the accused is capable of understanding the proceedings and is capable of communicating with their legal representative. The Court held that the evidence before the trial judge was insufficient to establish these matters, particularly given the appellant's diagnosed mental health issues. The Court also noted that the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the appellant's unfitness to be tried and the handling of evidence were inadequate.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the order of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal made on 25 November 2002 dismissing the appellant's appeal and, in its place, order that:

(a) the appellant's appeal to that Court be allowed;

(b) the conviction of the appellant be quashed; and

(c) there be a new trial of the appellant on the first count of the indictment.

Background

Background to the litigation

GLEESON CJ, Mc The principal questions in this appeal are whether a stay of the appellant's trial under the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW) ("the Act") should have been granted, and whether, when the trial did proceed, it was conducted in compliance with the Act. Facts The initiating events: On a morning in August 1995 the driver of a vehicle registered in the name of Ms Leigh Johnson, who was then a practising solicitor, failed to stop at a red light in a Sydney suburb. The failure was captured on camera. The features, and therefore the identity of the driver could not be distinguished in the photograph. Ms Johnson was issued with an infringement notice. She elected, as she was entitled to do, to contest the charge contained in the notice before the Local Court of New South Wales. In November 1995 Ms Johnson requested that Court to grant her an adjournment on the grounds of her physical inability to attend. On 10 January 1996 the case was set down for hearing on 29 May 1996. On 30 January 1996, Ms Johnson requested copies of the images captured on camera. They were supplied. On 29 February 1996 the appellant, who at the time was an employee of Ms Johnson, made a statutory declaration that she was the infringing driver of the vehicle. The declaration was witnessed by another solicitor employed by Ms Johnson. On 5 March 1996 Ms Johnson sent the appellant's statutory declaration to the prosecutor with a request that the case be discontinued. She also asked that the infringement notice be forwarded to the appellant. The prosecutor rejected the requests. On 2 July 1996 Ms Johnson was convicted in absentia. On 5 August 1996 she appealed to the District Court of New South Wales. There the appellant gave evidence that was, with one non-material exception, generally consistent with her declaration. The appeal was upheld and Ms Johnson's conviction was quashed. On 5 December 1996 the appellant and Ms Johnson were charged with two counts of perverting the course of justice under s 312 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The first charge against the appellant was as follows: "on 29 February 1996 at Sydney in the State of New South Wales did make a statutory declaration knowing it to be false with intent to pervert the course of justice."This was the second charge:"on 5 August 1996 at Sydney in the State of New South Wales did give false evidence to the District Court with intent to pervert the course of justice." A recorded conversation: On 6 December 1996 members of the Homicide Unit of the New South Wales Police Force – why that Unit was involved was not explored – arranged for a former employee of Ms Johnson and therefore an acquaintance of the appellant, Ms Coughlan, to meet the appellant. Ms Coughlan was fitted with a recording device to record surreptitiously any conversation that she might have with the appellant. Ms Coughlan then contrived a meeting with the appellant and discussed the infringement and Ms Johnson's and the appellant's involvement in it. These exchanges formed part of that discussion:"[Coughlan]: Yeah. Well do you remember I was in the, I was in the, do you remember, you know when we were in the room and she asked which one of us, you know, was going to take it. And I couldn't because of all my ... [Appellant]: Oh, I'd take it.[Coughlan]: And you said you could, because of your perfect driving record.[Appellant]: Not that I could, but that ... [Coughlan]: You didn't want to ...[Appellant]: Yeah, I could ...[Coughlan]: … because of your ...[Appellant]: … not that I wanted to.[Coughlan]: Yeah, yeah.[Appellant]: But the thing is that they were out of time: they can't strip, they couldn't take any points of my licence anyway. So I've still got a clean record.[Coughlan]: Really?...[Appellant]: Yeah, so she didn't lose any points, neither did I.[Coughlan]: Yeah.[Appellant]: And no one got fined either.[Coughlan]: Yeah.[Appellant]: Yeah....[Appellant]: ... well we didn't stall it. What happened was, they didn't inform us the first day. Right? By the time they had to re-list it, we had not documentation saying it was listed on that day. So no one turned up....[Coughlan]: So what did they ask you in court?[Appellant]: Well, I just, I just sat in the witness box and had a nice conversation with the judge.[Coughlan]: So you weren't cross examined?[Appellant]: No, because, Leigh, Leigh thought she'd have to. Because she was, like, all ready to go.[Coughlan]: Yeah.[Appellant]: And he was just sitting there asking me questions, and I was just, like, sitting back enjoying myself....[Appellant]: (Laughs) But the photos, the photos, the photos ... [Coughlan]: … and showed her driving instead of you.[Appellant]: The photos showed nothing. We ordered the photos.[Coughlan]: Right.[Appellant]: Mm. And they showed nothing. You couldn't tell who was driving.[Coughlan]: So, you weren't worried about …...[Coughlan]: ... apart from her being blonde and with you being like dark haired.[Appellant]: I know, I know, I know.[Coughlan]: Yeah, because when it came out in the paper I thought, 'Oh my God, she could have at least ...'[Appellant]: Yeah.[Coughlan]: … got someone blonde to say they were driving. You know what I mean?"

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In this Court the appellant's ground was not directed to the admissibility of the taped evidence because special leave to argue such a ground was refused. Instead, the appellant sought to rely on a ground that the trial judge misdirected the jury as to the way in which they should deal with that evidence and the in-court oral evidence of Ms Coughlan. The argument in essence turned out to be little more than a complaint that the taped material contained irrelevant and scandalous matter. Although the appellant also contended that the trial judge "[failed] to explain the tape" she did not develop the submission beyond that. Nonetheless we have examined what the trial judge said of the taped evidence and the in-court evidence of Ms Coughlan, which was not, we would point out, the subject of any request for redirections at the trial. The trial judge's comments regarding these bodies of evidence were entirely appropriate. His Honour drew attention to the greater worldliness of Ms Coughlan and to the possibility that, because of the leading nature of some of the questions she asked the appellant, the answers might not be reliable. He also referred to some inconsistencies between Ms Coughlan's evidence and some of the objective facts. Finally, he summarized uncritically the submissions made on each side with respect to Ms Coughlan. There is nothing in this ground and it must accordingly be rejected. The failure to call evidence The prosecutor's suggested duty: The appellant argued that the prosecution should have adduced detailed evidence of the appellant's mental unfitness so that the jury could understand, or understand better, the respects in which she was disabled, and might therefore be denied full participation in her trial. To some extent the trial judge in referring to Dr Menzies' evidence in relation to the second application, did do this. It is true, however, that at no stage did the jury have the benefit of expert testimony concerning the appellant's mental health. All that they had was the trial judge's economical opening remarks about the appellant's mental health. The appellant's submission, in substance, was that it was unfair to her for the respondent to fail to tender in the special hearing itself detailed evidence of the kind to which we have referred. There is no doubt that the prosecution is under a duty to present the case fairly and completely[24]. Long ago, in R v Puddick[25] Crompton J made the following observation of prosecutors:"[they] are to regard themselves as ministers of justice, and not to struggle for a conviction" In R v Lucas Smith ACJ said this of a prosecutor's duty to act fairly[26]:"For the purpose of establishing such an allegation of unfairness it is not necessary for the applicant to be able to point to the conduct of an identified person or persons concerned in the prosecution as having been blameworthy. It is sufficient for him to show that the totality of the acts of those concerned on behalf of the Crown in the preparation and conduct of the prosecution has operated unfairly against him.... the duty of a prosecutor is to prosecute and not to defend, nevertheless it has long been established that a prosecution must be conducted with fairness towards the accused and with a single view to determining and establishing the truth."[24]Richardson v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 116 at 119; Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 663-664, 674; R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 573‑577; Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285 at 292-293 [11], 298-299 [27], 326-327 [117], [119]. See also R v Thomas (No 2) [1974] 1 NZLR 658.[25](1865) 4 F & F 497 at 499 [176 ER 662 at 663]. [26][1973] VR 693 at 696.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HUGH, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ (dissent)
On 25 November 2002 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (Beazley JA and Sully J, Simpson J dissenting on the issue of the stay which was also the subject of the appeal) dismissed an appeal brought by the appellant against her conviction. It is from this judgment that the appellant appeals to this Court.Decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal Beazley JA, (Sully J agreeing) said this with respect to the stay[3]:"It is often the case that, because of a person's mental condition, the person is not able to give evidence or otherwise meaningfully participate in the trial. As I have said, his Honour considered that the interests of justice were best served by the trial proceeding as soon as possible ... It is often the case with a person being tried under [the Act] that he/she cannot, in any practical or meaningful way, participate in the trial. Accordingly, I do not see any appellable error in his Honour having refused the application." [3][2002] NSWCCA 372 at [42]. In her dissenting judgment Simpson J[4] expressed the view that the "medical evidence was so overwhelming as to dictate that the proceedings be stayed – if not permanently, at least temporarily." [4][2002] NSWCCA 372 at [84].The appeal to this Court The appellant appealed to this Court on a number of grounds: that the Court of Criminal Appeal should have set aside the finding of the trial judge, Luland DCJ, that there should not be a stay in the proceedings; that the trial judge failed to direct the jury adequately about why the appellant did not give evidence, or how they should approach the absence of that evidence; and about how they should deal with the taped evidence and the evidence of Ms Coughlan. The next ground of appeal was as follows: "The trial/special hearing miscarried by reason of the Crown's failure to place evidence before the jury of the nature and extent of the appellant's mental illness and unfitness to give evidence in the light of:(a)The Crown's refusal to consent to the trial/special hearing proceeding before a Judge alone as permitted by the relevant legislation, so requiring it to be a trial by Jury;(b)The Crown's requirement and the trial Judge's order that the appellant be present throughout the trial/special hearing;(c)The fact that the appellant had previously given sworn evidence on these issues of which the jury had not rejected." During the hearing of the appeal the appellant was granted leave to add another ground as follows:"The special hearing miscarried by reason of the trial judge's failure to comply with the requirements imposed by s 21(4) of [the Act]." It was upon this ground that the parties particularly focussed during the hearing of the appeal.The stay The principles governing stays: The principles relating to the grant of a stay are not disputed[5]. The appellant does not in this Court, nor has she previously, complained of unreasonable delay in the prosecution of her case. She relies solely on the fact of her deteriorating mental health, that it relevantly adversely affected her in two particular respects. First, it is submitted that her mental health prevented her from being able to give reliable testimony. Secondly, further prosecution of the proceedings could have resulted in a serious worsening of her current mental health. We observe at this point that no fresh evidence was sought to be tendered in the Court of Criminal Appeal to establish that the trial had in fact significantly worsened the appellant's condition.[5]Aboud v Attorney-General for New South Wales (1987) 10 NSWLR 671 at 684 per Kirby P, 692 per McHugh JA.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

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