Aboud v Attorney-General for New South Wales

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No Sl08 of 1987

Bet w-e en -

IAN SAfIUEL ABOUD

Applicant

and

ATTORNEY-GENERAL IN AND FOR TEE

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES

First Respondent

and

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

Second Respondent

and

DISTRICT COURT OF ~EW SOUTH WALES

Third Respondent

Aboud

Application for special leave to

appeal

:tv'iASON CJ
DEANE J

TOOHEY J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 19 FEBRUARY 1988, AT 12.26 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

S1Tl2/l/PLC 1 19/2/88

MR F.J. GORMLY, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my

learned friend, MR D. CUTLER, for the applicant.

(instructed by Watts & McKinnon.

MR K. MASON, QC, Solicitor-General for New South Wales: If the

Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend,

MISS R. DONNELLY, for the first and third respondents.

The second, I am sure, is a submitting respondent.

(instructed by the Crown Solicitor for New South Wales)

MASON CJ: Yes. I do not think we have a notice of that fact

but I am sure that can be taken for granted. Yes,

Mr Gormly?

MR GORMLY: If Your Honours please. This case raises some

important fundamental questions involving the
administration of the criminal law, in particular,
criminal procedure which are applicable not only to

New South Wales but to the country generally.

Firstly, in New South Wales, these kind of

applications, which are known locally as O'CONNELL

applications, are becoming increasingly important and

increasingly frequent.

MASON CJ: Yes. Perhaps we can take it that there are

important questions lurking around in the case but the

real difficulty for you is to establish that you have

prospects of success in an appeal, is it not?

MR GORMLY:  Yes. Your Honour, the core question is,"Is there

a right to a speedy trial?" The answer to that we say

is, "There is not." Now, what has happened is this,

Your Honours, we say: that the courts, following the

concept of the speedy trial which they have imported

into the law of New South Wales from overseas'

jurisdiction where there are bills of rights of various

kinds and charters which establish this right, have gone

astray in examining the precise situation that exists

in New South Wales under our jurisprudence.

Now, it is not proper, we say, to argue that the

Magna Carta, which seems to be the well-spring

of this concept in the particular words in Chapter XXIX

gave a right to a speedy trial. What those words did
was to impose upon the King or the executive or the

government, a duty and that was not a duty to bring

people to speedy trial but a duty, first, to ensure

that people were brought to trial - "we shall not deny

justice" - and at the same time, implicit in that, was

to set up a system of justice whereby persons could be

brought to trial. So what Magna Carta did was impose

a constitutional duty upon the executive. That

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Details
Case
[1988] HCATrans 28
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Aboud, sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the District Court of New South Wales. The Attorney-General for New South Wales and the Director of Public Prosecutions were the respondents. The case concerned the administration of criminal procedure in New South Wales, specifically the concept of a "speedy trial" and whether an accused person possessed such a right.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether an accused person in New South Wales has a right to a speedy trial, and if so, whether that right can be waived by the individual. The applicant argued that courts had imported the concept of a speedy trial from overseas jurisdictions with bills of rights, and that this was an incorrect application of the law to the New South Wales context. The applicant contended that the historical origins of this concept, such as Magna Carta, imposed a constitutional duty on the executive to ensure justice was administered and people were brought to trial, rather than conferring an individual right.

The applicant's reasoning was that if there is no individual right to a speedy trial, then an accused person cannot waive such a right. Instead, the applicant submitted that the fundamental rights of an accused person are the right to remain silent and the right to a fair trial, both of which can be waived by the individual. The applicant argued that the duty to bring an accused to trial is a constitutional duty of the executive, which cannot be waived by a citizen. The High Court considered whether the applicant had established sufficient prospects of success to warrant granting special leave to appeal.

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