| IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA |
| Office of the Registry |
Sydney No Sl08 of 1987 Bet w-e en -
IAN SAfIUEL ABOUD
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY-GENERAL IN AND FOR TEE
STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
First Respondent
and
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Second Respondent
and
DISTRICT COURT OF ~EW SOUTH WALES
Third Respondent
| Aboud |
Application for special leave to
appeal
:tv'iASON CJ
DEANE J
TOOHEY J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 19 FEBRUARY 1988, AT 12.26 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| S1Tl2/l/PLC | 1 | 19/2/88 |
MR F.J. GORMLY, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my
learned friend, MR D. CUTLER, for the applicant.
(instructed by Watts & McKinnon.
MR K. MASON, QC, Solicitor-General for New South Wales: If the
Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend,
MISS R. DONNELLY, for the first and third respondents.
The second, I am sure, is a submitting respondent. (instructed by the Crown Solicitor for New South Wales)
| MASON CJ: Yes. | I do not think we have a notice of that fact |
but I am sure that can be taken for granted. Yes,
Mr Gormly?
MR GORMLY: If Your Honours please. This case raises some
important fundamental questions involving the
administration of the criminal law, in particular,
criminal procedure which are applicable not only toNew South Wales but to the country generally.
Firstly, in New South Wales, these kind of
applications, which are known locally as O'CONNELL
applications, are becoming increasingly important and
increasingly frequent.
MASON CJ: Yes. Perhaps we can take it that there are
important questions lurking around in the case but the
real difficulty for you is to establish that you have
prospects of success in an appeal, is it not?
| MR GORMLY: | Yes. | Your Honour, the core question is,"Is there |
a right to a speedy trial?" The answer to that we say
is, "There is not." Now, what has happened is this, Your Honours, we say: that the courts, following the
concept of the speedy trial which they have imported
into the law of New South Wales from overseas'
jurisdiction where there are bills of rights of various
kinds and charters which establish this right, have gone
astray in examining the precise situation that exists
in New South Wales under our jurisprudence.
Now, it is not proper, we say, to argue that the
Magna Carta, which seems to be the well-spring
of this concept in the particular words in Chapter XXIX
gave a right to a speedy trial. What those words did
was to impose upon the King or the executive or thegovernment, a duty and that was not a duty to bring
people to speedy trial but a duty, first, to ensure
that people were brought to trial - "we shall not deny
justice" - and at the same time, implicit in that, was
to set up a system of justice whereby persons could be
brought to trial. So what Magna Carta did was impose a constitutional duty upon the executive. That
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- Case
- [1988] HCATrans 28
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether an accused person in New South Wales has a right to a speedy trial, and if so, whether that right can be waived by the individual. The applicant argued that courts had imported the concept of a speedy trial from overseas jurisdictions with bills of rights, and that this was an incorrect application of the law to the New South Wales context. The applicant contended that the historical origins of this concept, such as Magna Carta, imposed a constitutional duty on the executive to ensure justice was administered and people were brought to trial, rather than conferring an individual right.
The applicant's reasoning was that if there is no individual right to a speedy trial, then an accused person cannot waive such a right. Instead, the applicant submitted that the fundamental rights of an accused person are the right to remain silent and the right to a fair trial, both of which can be waived by the individual. The applicant argued that the duty to bring an accused to trial is a constitutional duty of the executive, which cannot be waived by a citizen. The High Court considered whether the applicant had established sufficient prospects of success to warrant granting special leave to appeal.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence Before The Court
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