Woods (a pseudonym) v The Queen

Case [2014] VSCA 233


SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2013 0171

BRUCE WOODS (A PSEUDONYM)[1]
Appellant
v
THE QUEEN
Respondent

[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of identification of the victims of the sexual offending, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the appellant.

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JUDGES: WEINBERG, HANSEN and PRIEST JJA
WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING: 5 August 2014
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26 September 2014
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2014] VSCA 233
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: DDP v [Woods] (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Taft, 24 April 2013)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Conviction – Sexual offending – Father and daughter – Incest – Whether evidence of two separate incidents – Sufficiency of directions – Defence case that complainant had a motive to lie – Whether prosecutor’s response in addressing jury suggested they should accept complainant unless it likely she was lying – Statement by prosecutor in address as to what is ‘usual’ in these cases – No miscarriage.

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant Ms F H Todd Robert Stary Lawyers
For the Crown Mr B F Kissane Mr C Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

WEINBERG JA:

  1. I agree for the reasons given by Hansen JA that the appeal should be dismissed, and that leave to appeal should be refused in respect of ground 2(b). 

  1. I, too, have had the opportunity of seeing the complainant give her account of events in the three VARE interviews to which his Honour refers.  I agree with his assessment of the complainant.  She presented as a truthful and generally reliable witness. 

  1. Grounds 1, 2(a) and 3 turn largely upon a single answer that she gave during the course of the second VARE, on 20 October 2011.  That was some 10 weeks or so after the first VARE on 5 August 2011.  On that occasion, when asked whether the episode which subsequently became the subject of Charge 1 was the same or a separate incident altogether from that which she had described in the first VARE, and which became the subject of Charge 9, she replied that it was the ‘same’. 

  1. Notwithstanding that answer, there were significant differences between the descriptions given as to the circumstances surrounding these two acts of incest.  The jury were entitled to conclude that the complainant had either misunderstood the question put to her, during the second VARE, or had forgotten the precise details that she had previously given regarding this matter during the first VARE. 

  1. As regards ground 2(b), I agree with Hansen JA that the prosecutor did not, in his closing address, exceed the bounds of legitimate advocacy.[2]  He was entitled to anticipate that defence counsel would mount a strong attack upon the complainant’s credit, and to invite the jury to consider whether, on the whole of the evidence, she appeared to be the malevolent liar that, in substance, the defence claimed she was.  Nothing said by the prosecutor could reasonably have been understood to have…

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Woods (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2014] VSCA 233
Case
[2014] VSCA 233
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Woods was convicted of incest with his daughter and appealed against the conviction, arguing that the trial judge did not properly direct the jury on the sufficiency of the evidence. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia. The legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge provided adequate directions to the jury about the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly in light of the complainant’s motive to lie and the prosecutor’s comments during the trial.

The High Court found that the trial judge did not err in the directions given to the jury. The court held that the trial judge's directions were sufficient to ensure the jury considered the evidence critically, including the complainant's motive to lie. The court also determined that the prosecutor's comments, including those regarding what is "usual" in such cases, did not suggest that the jury should accept the complainant’s evidence unless it was likely she was lying. The court concluded that there was no miscarriage of justice and dismissed the appeal.

The High Court found that the trial judge’s directions adequately guided the jury on the evaluation of the evidence and the credibility of the complainant. The court held that the comments made by the prosecutor did not improperly influence the jury. As a result, the conviction was upheld. The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and the conviction affirmed.

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