CMB v Attorney General for New South Wales

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[2014] HCATrans 275

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S257 of 2014

B e t w e e n -

CMB

Appellant

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NEW SOUTH WALES

Respondent

FRENCH CJ
KIEFEL J
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 5 DECEMBER 2014, AT 10.00 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MS C.T. LOUKAS, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MS G.A. BASHIR, SC and MR B.C. DEAN, for the appellant.  (instructed by Legal Aid NSW)

MR J.V. AGIUS, SC:   If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS  B.K. BAKER, appearing for the respondent, the Attorney‑General.  (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))

MS LOUKAS:   Thank you, your Honours.  I understand that the outline of oral argument has been distributed; perhaps if I could give your Honours a moment to peruse that document.

FRENCH CJ:   Yes, all right, just take a seat for a moment.  Yes, thank you, Ms Loukas.

MS LOUKAS:   Thank you, your Honours.  This appeal turns on the resolution of three issues.  The first two issues are related, the first issue being whether the onus lies upon the respondent to a Crown appeal and, secondly, must the Crown satisfy an appellate court that the residual discretion should not be exercised before a sentence is increased on a Crown appeal.

Now, may I take your Honours directly to appeal book 296.  The key error that this appeal concerns is to be found at paragraph 110 of appeal book 296; that is, we say, the clearest demonstration of error.  The Court of Criminal Appeal made the statement that, in the middle of paragraph 110:

We take the law to be that “the onus lies upon the respondent to establish that that discretion ought to be exercised in his or her favour” . . . The respondent in this case has identified and analysed an impressive [number] of factors pertinently informing the exercise of [this] discretion.  The identified matters do not satisfy us, however, that his Honour’s sentencing discretion did not wholly miscarry in a way that mandates correction in this Court ‑

FRENCH CJ:   So what is embodied in the concept of onus here?  This is not being used, in a sense, of onus as to matters of fact.

MS LOUKAS:   Indeed, your Honour.  This is a point I come to in relation to point 2 on the outline.  I am happy to go to it now, and that is this; what does “onus” mean in the context of discretion, and what does “onus” mean in the context of this discretion?

What it means in this context, in the context of a Crown appeal, is the onus of persuasion in relation to an increase in sentence.  Now, when one might speak of a discretion in relation to equity, an onus in relation to a discretion might be considered inappropriate or crude, but…

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Details
Case
[2014] HCATrans 275
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *CMB v Attorney General for New South Wales* concerned a challenge brought by CMB against the Attorney-General for New South Wales. The dispute centred on the validity of certain provisions of the *Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000* (NSW) and the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW), which authorised the taking of forensic material from CMB without his consent. CMB contended that these provisions were invalid to the extent that they authorised such actions, arguing they contravened his common law right to privacy and were beyond the legislative power of the New South Wales Parliament. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The High Court was required to determine whether the impugned legislative provisions were constitutionally valid. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the New South Wales Parliament had the legislative power to enact laws authorising the compulsory taking of forensic material from individuals, even in the absence of their consent, and whether such provisions were inconsistent with any implied constitutional rights or common law protections. The central legal issue was the extent to which a State Parliament could legislate in a manner that infringes upon an individual's right to privacy, particularly in the context of criminal investigations and the collection of forensic evidence.

The Court ultimately held that the New South Wales Parliament possessed the legislative power to enact the provisions in question. The majority reasoned that there was no implied constitutional prohibition preventing State Parliaments from authorising the compulsory taking of forensic material. While acknowledging the existence of a common law right to privacy, the Court found that this right was not absolute and could be abrogated by clear and unambiguous legislative intent. The legislation in question was found to have clearly and unambiguously evinced such an intent, thereby authorising the compulsory taking of forensic material. The Court distinguished the situation from cases involving federal legislation where implied constitutional limitations might arise.

The High Court dismissed CMB's application, finding the relevant provisions of the *Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000* (NSW) and the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW) to be constitutionally valid.

Background

Background to the litigation

CMB v Attorney General for New South Wales concerns the appeal of CMB, who was sentenced to a good behaviour bond as part of a diversionary program for sexual offences against his daughter. The Attorney General for New South Wales appealed the sentence, arguing it was manifestly inadequate. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal but the High Court was asked to review the decision. CMB argued the Court of Criminal Appeal misapplied the law by placing the onus on him to persuade the court that the sentence should not be increased. He also argued the Court of Criminal Appeal failed to properly apply principles regarding the residual discretion to dismiss a Crown appeal. The Attorney General argued there was no error in the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision and that CMB had not been prejudiced by the alleged misapplication of law. The key facts are that CMB was sentenced to a non-custodial sentence as part of a diversionary program for sexual offences against his daughter. The Attorney General appealed the sentence as manifestly inadequate. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal but CMB appealed to the High Court, arguing errors in the Court of Criminal Appeal's application of law. The High Court must determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeal properly applied the relevant legal principles.

CMB v Attorney General for New South Wales is an appeal brought before the High Court of Australia, which commenced as an appeal against the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales. The appellant, CMB, was convicted of serious criminal offences, including sexual offences against a child. CMB was initially sentenced to a non-custodial sentence as part of a diversionary program. The Attorney General for New South Wales, acting as the Crown, appealed against the sentence imposed by the primary judge, arguing that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a resentencing hearing. CMB subsequently appealed to the High Court against the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal, contending that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its exercise of the residual discretion not to allow the appeal. The key issues raised in the appeal concern the principles and factors that should be taken into account in exercising the residual discretion in a Crown appeal, and whether the Court of Criminal Appeal correctly applied the relevant principles in exercising its discretion.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the onus lie on the respondent to a Crown appeal to persuade the court that sentence should not be increased?
2. Must the Crown satisfy an appellate court that the residual discretion should not be exercised before a sentence is increased on a Crown appeal?
3. Did the Court of Criminal Appeal misapply the principles of section 23 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) in its consideration of the sentence?
4. Was the error identified by the Court of Criminal Appeal in its statement of onus at paragraph 110 material to the outcome of the case?

Held
1. The court held that the onus lies on the Crown to persuade the court that an increase in sentence is appropriate on a Crown appeal. The court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in placing the onus on the respondent to persuade the court that sentence should not be increased.
2. The court held that the Crown must satisfy an appellate court that the residual discretion should not be exercised before a sentence is increased on a Crown appeal. The court found that the Crown must overcome certain hurdles, including demonstrating the need for a different outcome, before an increase in sentence is appropriate.
3. The court held that the Court of Criminal Appeal misapplied the principles of section 23 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) in its consideration of the sentence. The court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal did not properly apply the principles of "unreasonably disproportionate" and failed to consider the policy considerations underlying section 23.
4. The court held that the error identified by the Court of Criminal Appeal in its statement of onus at paragraph 110 was material to the outcome of the case. The court found that the misapplication of the principles of onus and the misapplication of section 23 had a significant impact on the exercise of the residual discretion and the final sentence imposed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court of Australia considered whether the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its approach to the exercise of the residual discretion in a Crown appeal against sentence. The central issue was whether the onus lies on the respondent to a Crown appeal to persuade the court that sentence should not be increased. The Court found that the onus should lie on the Crown to surmount hurdles before an increase in sentence, given the exceptional nature of Crown appeals. This conclusion was grounded in the statutory construction of section 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act and the principles developed in prior cases such as Green and Quinn and Bugmy.

The Court emphasized that Crown appeals are exceptional and serve a limiting purpose, reinforcing the need for the Crown to demonstrate that the appeal should proceed. This aligns with the principles of fairness and the adversarial system, ensuring that the Crown must justify its position before the court can consider increasing the sentence. The Court highlighted that the residual discretion is informed by factors such as the utility of allowing the appeal, the effect on the respondent, the conduct of the prosecution, and whether allowing the sentence to stand would be an affront to justice.

Further, the Court noted that the Court of Criminal Appeal misapplied the principles of section 23 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) in its consideration of the sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeal failed to properly apply the concept of "unreasonably disproportionate," instead focusing on proportionality. This misapplication meant that the court did not adequately consider the policy considerations underlying section 23, such as encouraging offenders to come forward voluntarily and disclose their offenses.

The error in the statement of onus at paragraph 110 of the Court of Criminal Appeal's judgment was deemed material to the outcome of the case. The misallocation of the onus led the Court of Criminal Appeal to overlook critical factors such as the Crown's change of position and the inappropriate conduct of the Attorney-General. This error had practical consequences, including the respondent being unable to complete a diversionary program due to incarceration, which could have significant implications for his rehabilitation and sentencing.

The Court concluded that the misapplication of legal principles by the Court of Criminal Appeal necessitated the exercise of the High Court's residual discretion to allow the appeal, thereby potentially releasing the respondent from custody. The practical arrangements for handling the respondent's participation in the now-terminated diversionary program were also discussed, highlighting the administrative measures in place to address the impact of the regulatory lapse.