CMB v Attorney General for New South Wales

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[2014] HCATrans 275

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S257 of 2014

B e t w e e n -

CMB

Appellant

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NEW SOUTH WALES

Respondent

FRENCH CJ
KIEFEL J
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 5 DECEMBER 2014, AT 10.00 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MS C.T. LOUKAS, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MS G.A. BASHIR, SC and MR B.C. DEAN, for the appellant.  (instructed by Legal Aid NSW)

MR J.V. AGIUS, SC:   If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS  B.K. BAKER, appearing for the respondent, the Attorney‑General.  (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))

MS LOUKAS:   Thank you, your Honours.  I understand that the outline of oral argument has been distributed; perhaps if I could give your Honours a moment to peruse that document.

FRENCH CJ:   Yes, all right, just take a seat for a moment.  Yes, thank you, Ms Loukas.

MS LOUKAS:   Thank you, your Honours.  This appeal turns on the resolution of three issues.  The first two issues are related, the first issue being whether the onus lies upon the respondent to a Crown appeal and, secondly, must the Crown satisfy an appellate court that the residual discretion should not be exercised before a sentence is increased on a Crown appeal.

Now, may I take your Honours directly to appeal book 296.  The key error that this appeal concerns is to be found at paragraph 110 of appeal book 296; that is, we say, the clearest demonstration of error.  The Court of Criminal Appeal made the statement that, in the middle of paragraph 110:

We take the law to be that “the onus lies upon the respondent to establish that that discretion ought to be exercised in his or her favour” . . . The respondent in this case has identified and analysed an impressive [number] of factors pertinently informing the exercise of [this] discretion.  The identified matters do not satisfy us, however, that his Honour’s sentencing discretion did not wholly miscarry in a way that mandates correction in this Court ‑

FRENCH CJ:   So what is embodied in the concept of onus here?  This is not being used, in a sense, of onus as to matters of fact.

MS LOUKAS:   Indeed, your Honour.  This is a point I come to in relation to point 2 on the outline.  I am happy to go to it now, and that is this; what does “onus” mean in the context of discretion, and what does “onus” mean in the context of this discretion?

What it means in this context, in the context of a Crown appeal, is the onus of persuasion in relation to an increase in sentence.  Now, when one might speak of a discretion in relation to equity, an onus in relation to a discretion might be considered inappropriate or crude, but…

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Details
Case
[2014] HCATrans 275
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *CMB v Attorney General for New South Wales* concerned a challenge brought by CMB against the Attorney-General for New South Wales. The dispute centred on the validity of certain provisions of the *Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000* (NSW) and the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW), which authorised the taking of forensic material from CMB without his consent. CMB contended that these provisions were invalid to the extent that they authorised such actions, arguing they contravened his common law right to privacy and were beyond the legislative power of the New South Wales Parliament. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The High Court was required to determine whether the impugned legislative provisions were constitutionally valid. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the New South Wales Parliament had the legislative power to enact laws authorising the compulsory taking of forensic material from individuals, even in the absence of their consent, and whether such provisions were inconsistent with any implied constitutional rights or common law protections. The central legal issue was the extent to which a State Parliament could legislate in a manner that infringes upon an individual's right to privacy, particularly in the context of criminal investigations and the collection of forensic evidence.

The Court ultimately held that the New South Wales Parliament possessed the legislative power to enact the provisions in question. The majority reasoned that there was no implied constitutional prohibition preventing State Parliaments from authorising the compulsory taking of forensic material. While acknowledging the existence of a common law right to privacy, the Court found that this right was not absolute and could be abrogated by clear and unambiguous legislative intent. The legislation in question was found to have clearly and unambiguously evinced such an intent, thereby authorising the compulsory taking of forensic material. The Court distinguished the situation from cases involving federal legislation where implied constitutional limitations might arise.

The High Court dismissed CMB's application, finding the relevant provisions of the *Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000* (NSW) and the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW) to be constitutionally valid.

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